JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. – This appeal arises out of a judgment and decree passed by. Sri Sheo Kumar Prasad Verma passed in Money Suit No. 75 of 1977 whereby and wherein the said learned court dismissed the plaintiffs appellant's suit. 2. The plaintiff-appellant filed the aforementioned suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 12, 475/- as described in the account of claim stated in the plaint i.e. a sum of Rs. 8153.78 paise being the amount illegally retained by the defendant and a sum of Rs. 4,421.22 paise being interest calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the aforementioned sum. 3. As the fact of the case have been stated in details by the learned court below; it is not necessary to state the facts in details over again herein for the purpose of disposal of this appeal. 4. Suffice is to say that the plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit on the pleadings that as per rule and policy of the Government of India of sales and exports of Mica to the foreign buyers as per prevalent mode through the defendant. The plaintiff secured through the defendant a business of exporting Mica of various grades to Rotterdam in pursuance whereof the plaintiff made over ten cases of Mica to a shipping agent as directed by the defendant at Giridih for being exported. The plaintiff further alleged that for the aforementioned purpose it paid to the custom authorities sum of Rs. 8153.78 paise by a cheque dated 28.12.1972 for shipment of the aforementioned cases of Mica on behalf of the defendant. It is further alleged that the said Mica could not be shipped as arranged and a refund order for a sum of Rs. 8153.78 paise was issued by the custom authorities to the defendant. The plaintiff came to learn about the non-shipment of the aforementioned 10 cases of Mica sometime in August/September, 1975 and thereafter it lodged its claim with the defendant for repayment of the said sum of Rs.8153.78 paise having come to learn the receipt of the aforementioned sum by the defendant, whereupon the defendant intimated that the refund order received by it from the custom authorities appear to be misplaced and requested the plaintiff to submit an indemnity bond duly signed by it for obtaining the duplicate order from the custom authorities which the plaintiff did in the year, 1976. 4. 4. The plaintiff, however, came to learn subsequently that the defendant has issued a cheque for a sum of Rs. 8153.78 paise to the Manager of M/s G. Rangnath, the shipping agent aforementioned, without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff. It is further alleged that in fact the defendant got the cheque dated 26.4.1973 back from the said M/s G. Rangnath and thereafter issued a fresh cheque on or about 7.5.1973. It is further alleged that the plaintiff having made an enquiry in that regard came to know that the defendant on receipt of the refund order from the custom authorities endorsed the same to M/s G. Rangnath and these facts became known to the plaintiff by the defendant by its letter dated 2nd July, 1976. 5. In the aforementioned suit the defendant-respondent appeared and took various legal objections which may be summarised as follows :- (a) The suit is barred by limitation. (b) The court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. (c) M/s G. Rangnath is a necessary party to the suit and in its absence the suit cannot proceed. (d) There is no cause of action for the suit. 6. The defendant in its written statement did not deny the basic facts stated by the plaintiff, and in fact admitted its liability to pay the aforementioned amount of Rs. 8153.78 paise to the plaintiff, but advanced a plea that as the payment of the aforementioned sum has been made to M/s G. Rangnath who was authorised on behalf of the plaintiff to receive the said amount on his behalf, the defendant stands discharged from its liability. 7. The learned court below has framed various issues but for the purpose of this case the follow in: issues are relevant : - (a) Has the plaintiff got any cause of action for suit ? (b) Is the suit barred by limitation ? (c) Is the suit bad on account of Non-joinder of M/s G. Rangnath. (d) Has this court jurisdiction to try this suit. 8. Learned court below decided all the issues in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 9. Mr. Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, submitted that the finding of the learned court below on all counts aforementioned are wrong. (d) Has this court jurisdiction to try this suit. 8. Learned court below decided all the issues in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 9. Mr. Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant, submitted that the finding of the learned court below on all counts aforementioned are wrong. He firstly, submitted that the suit is not barred by limitation as the cases of action for the suit arose after the plaintiff came to learn that the aforementioned amount has been paid to Mr. G. Rangnath by the defendant. He further submitted that in any event from the various letters exchanged between the parties it would be evident that the defendant has admitted and acknowledged its liability to pay the laid sum from time to time but the same was not paid to the plaintiff by the defendant only on the ground that the money paid to Mr. G. Rangnath was recoverable from him. With regard to the finding of the learned court below on issue no. 4, he submitted that M/s G. Rangnath was not a necessary party inasmuch as the plaintiff cannot chase a person who was not authorised to receive the payment of its behalf. Developing his argument the learned counsel submitted that admittedly M/s G. Rangnath was a shipping agent and not an agent of the plaintiff authorised to receive the payment on its behalf. 10. He further submitted that the plaintiff could not be called upon to implead the said M/s G. Rangnath as a party to the suit only because the defendant has wrongfully made certain payments to him. With regard to issue no. 5, he submitted that the court below had jurisdiction to try the suit, as a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the said court and in any event as it was specifically stated in the plaint that the defendant-company carries business for gain within the jurisdiction of the court below, and as such the suit was maintainable in terms of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. Mr. Madan Gopal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand, submitted that the suit was barred by limitation as the cheque was issued in favour of M/s G. Rangnath as far back as on 7.5.1973, whereas the suit was filed on 13.10.1977. 11. Mr. Madan Gopal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the other hand, submitted that the suit was barred by limitation as the cheque was issued in favour of M/s G. Rangnath as far back as on 7.5.1973, whereas the suit was filed on 13.10.1977. He further submitted that M/s. G. Rangnath had the authority to receive the money on behalf of the plaintiff; if not by an express authority then by an implied authority. The learned court below by his judgment impugned in this appeal has held as follows : – (a) The suit is barred by limitation. (b) The suit is bad for non-joinder of M/s G. Rangnath as a party to the suit. (c) No cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court below and as such the court had no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. (d) The amount paid by the defendant to M/s G. Rangnath amounts to the payment of the plaintiff. 12. In view of the facts involved in the suit and having regard to the materials on record the following questions arise for consideration in this appeal : – (i) Whether the learned court below had the territorial Jurisdiction to try the suit ? (ii) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of M/s G. Rangnath as a party to the suit ? (iii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? (iv) Whether the amount paid by the defendant no. 1 to Mr. Rangnath amounts to the payment of the plaintiff ? 13. So far as the question of jurisdiction of the court below to try the suit is concerned, before deciding the said issue it is necessary to mention that the learned court below committed a serious error of law in deciding the suit on merit even after holding that it had no territoral jurisdiction to try the suit. It is now well settled principle of law that if a court had no jurisdiction to try the suit then any decision renderd by it becomes a nullity. However, in view of the fact that points with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the court below has been raised along with the other points which fall for consideration in this appeal, the said point and other points are also being decided. 14. However, in view of the fact that points with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the court below has been raised along with the other points which fall for consideration in this appeal, the said point and other points are also being decided. 14. The question of jurisdiction can be decided briefly on the ground that in paragraph 2 of the plaint the plaintiff has categorically stated that the Mica in question, which was to be exported in terms of the contract with the defendant, was to be despatched from Giridih. It has further been mentioned therein that the defendant also carries on business having its office at Giridih, for gain. The aforementioned statements made in paragraph 2 of the plaint have not been denied or dispute by the defendant. The defendant in fact in paragraph 2 of the written statement does not traverse the aforementioned statements made in paragraph 2 of the plaint at all. In view of the fact that the defendant has not specifically denied in the written statements so far as the allegations made in the plaint are concerned that it carries on business at Giridih for gain stands unrebutted in terms of the provisions of Order 8 Rule 3 and Order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Keeping in view the provisions of section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act along with the aforementioned provision, the statements made in the plaint that the defendant carries on business for gain at Giridih stands admitted. 15. In terms of the provisions of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure the suit shall lie at such place where the defendant carries on business. In that view of the matter, it must be held that the court below had jurisdiction to try the suit. 16. So far as the question as to whether the suit was bad for non-joinder of M/s. G. Rangnath as a party thereto is concerned, the learned court below held that in view of the fact that the defendant had (sic) payment to M/s. G. Rangnath he was a necessary party. The answer to this question would depend upon the answer to the issue with regard to the authority in M/s. G. Rangnath to receive payment on behalf of the plaintiff. If it is held that Mr. The answer to this question would depend upon the answer to the issue with regard to the authority in M/s. G. Rangnath to receive payment on behalf of the plaintiff. If it is held that Mr. G. Rangnath had the necessary authority whether express or implied to receive the amount is question from the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff in that event the plaintiff could even in this suit pray for realisation of the amount from M/s. G. Rangnath. However, in terms of the pleadings of the parties particularly those made in the plaint, the suit in my opinion would does not fail for not impleading M/s. G. Rangnath as a party thereto. The learned court below has not held that M/s G. Rangnath was a necessary party. I can at best be said that in the facts and circumstances of this case M/s. G. Rangnath was a proper party; but in view of Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code or Civil Procedure the suit can-not fail only because M/s. G. Rangnath has not been impleaded as a party. For deciding the aforementioned issue it is to be borne in my mind that the plaintiffs proceed on the basis that the defendant and defendant alone was liable to make payment to the plaintiff and no body else. 17. The learned court below not only fails to answer the issue from this angle but proceeded on the basis that as M/s. G. Rangnath was the shipping agent of the plaintiff therefore, be was a necessary party. He further wrongly held that although Mr. G. Rangnath is dead still the firm of M/s. G. Rangnath could be proceeded with in this suit. 18. It is no body's case that M/s G. Rangnath was a partnership firm. From the Judgment of the learned court below itself it appears that M/s. G. Rangnath was merely a proprietary concern and therefore, the cause of action as against him, if any, did not survive after his death. If the wife of late G. Rangnath has been carrying on business she is doing so in her own right and not as successor of Mr. G. Rangnath. Therefore, if there was any liability of Mr. G. Rangnath not only his wife but also his other heirs were liable to discharge the debt of Mr. G. Rangnath. However, in view of my finding aforementioned, Mr. G. Rangnath. Therefore, if there was any liability of Mr. G. Rangnath not only his wife but also his other heirs were liable to discharge the debt of Mr. G. Rangnath. However, in view of my finding aforementioned, Mr. G. Rangnath was at best a proper party and not a necessary party. In my opinion, the suit cannot fail on the ground of non-joinder of Mr. G. Rangnath as a party thereto. 19. So far as the question that the suit is barred by limitation is concerned, the same involves a contentuous point. The learned court below discussed the question of limitation in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgement. For the purpose of determination of this issue it is necessary to take note of certain facts. Admittedly, the custom department gave a refund voucher to the defendant in January, 1973 which was endorsed by the defendant to M/s G. Rangnath on or about 26.4.1973. 20. The plaintiff in paragraph 5 of the plaint categorically stated that it paid to the custom authority a sum of Rs. 8,153.78 paise as export duty for shipment on behalf of the defendant under Shipping Bill No. E-7 dated 1.1.1973. The plaintiff further admitted that the voucher dated 31.12.1972/1.1.1972 was issued by the custom authorities to the defendant as ten cases of Mica belonging to the plaintiff could not be shipped in terms of the contract. In paragraph 7 of the plaint the plaintiff vaguely stated that he came to learn about the non-shipment of ten cases of Mica in August/September, 1975 and thereafter lodged their claims with the defendant. According to the plaintiff the cause of action for the suit arose on 5.8.1977 when it received a letter by the defendant dated 3.8.1977 denying its liability to pay the amount. 21. In this case it is contended that Article 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable which reads as follows :– Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period beings to run For money payable by Three years When the money is the defendant to the received. plaintiff for money received by the defendant, for the plaintiff’s use. 22. From the aforementioned provisions of the Limitation Act, it is evident that time runs from the date when money is received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use. plaintiff for money received by the defendant, for the plaintiff’s use. 22. From the aforementioned provisions of the Limitation Act, it is evident that time runs from the date when money is received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use. It has not been alleged by the plaintiff that he could not acquire any knowledge about the payment of the amount in question by the custom authorities to the defendant by reason of an act of fraud on the part of the defendant. 23. There is absolutely no reason as to why the plaintiff could not learn about the payment made by the custom authorities to the defenelant. Neither any fraud has been alleged nor any other plea available to it for saving the period of limitation has been taken in the plaint as would appear from the statements made in paragraph 5 of the plaint. The plaintiff has categorically stated that it paid the aforementioned sum of Rs. 8,153.78 paise by a cheque dated 28.12.1972 on behalf of the defendant. 24. From the aforementioned statements it appears that the money was paid by the plaintiff to the custom authorites not on its own behalf which is evident from the fact that the custom authorities returned the said amount to the defendant. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that there had been a contract by and between the plaintiff and the defendant that it will have to pay unto the custom authorities the aforementioned sum on behalf of the defendant in terms of any contract and the same was to be refunded to the plaintiff by the defend ant on the contingencies of the Mica being not shipped. In my opinion, therefore, the plaintiff could, within a period of three years from the aforementioned date when the cheque was issued by it to the custom authorities, file the suit to recover the amount in suit from the defendant. There is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was entitled to the said amount from the defendant only when the custom authorities paid the said sum to the defendant but it appears from the statement made in the plaint that the plaintiff was entitled to get back the said amount from the defendant irrespective of the fact as to whether the same is refundable by the custom authorities or not. Therefore, this case has to be judged also on the basis that Article 24 of the Limitation Act, has no application. However, in the event, for the sake of argument if it is contended that Article 24 of the Limitation Act applies to the facts and circumstances of this case, still then, in my view the limitation for filing the suit would begin to run from the date when the custom authorities made payment to the defendant and not from the date when the plaintiff came to know about the said payment or from the date when the defendant finally rejected the claim of the plaintiff. 25. Mr. Prasad has referred to a decision of Full Bench of Calcutta High Court reported in A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 157 (Biman Chandra Datta v. Promotho Nath Ghose and another). The said decision instead of helping Mr. Prasad goes against his contention. 26. It is not the case of the plaintiff, as noticed hereinbefore, that the defendant had committed any fraud so as to keep the plaintiff unaware of the transaction. In fact, as would appear from the facts and as stated hereinbefore, that it was the goods of the plaintiff which was to be transshipped and as such the plaintiff was vitally interested in the subject matter of the contract and in that view of the matter, there was absolutely no reason as to why the plaintiff did not keep itself abreast with the events which took place subsequent to the goods having been handed over to the defendant for shipment. 27. Mr. Prasad has drawn my attention to the various Exhts. where-from it appears that the defendant having to learn about the non-payment of the amount in question to the plaintiff by M/s G. Rangnath approached M/s G. Rangnath and requested it to make payment of the said sum either to the plaintiff or to the defendant. The said letters, in my opinion, do not enlarge the period of limitation. There is nothing to show that the defendant inspite of having paid the amount to M/s G. Rangnath had admitted or acknowledged its liability to pay the said amount unconditionally to the plaintiff; but it was merely trying to get back the said amount from M/s G. Rangnath which it was bound to do as a public sector organisation. There is nothing to show that the defendant inspite of having paid the amount to M/s G. Rangnath had admitted or acknowledged its liability to pay the said amount unconditionally to the plaintiff; but it was merely trying to get back the said amount from M/s G. Rangnath which it was bound to do as a public sector organisation. The said Exbts., therefore, have to be read in the context in which they were written and cannot be interpreted as admission or acknowledgment by the defendant of the plaintiffs dues. As the suit was filed on 13.10.1977, the same must be held to be barred by limitation. 28. In view of my finding aforementioned that the suit is barred by limitation, it is not necessary for me to decide the question as to whether M/s G. Rangnath had the authority express or implied to receive the payments from the defendant for and all behalf of the plaintiff. 29. In the result, this appeal is hereby dismissed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.