JUDGMENT : C. P. SEN, J. This judgment will also dispose of M. C. C. Nos. 303 to 305 of 1983 between the same parties. These references have been made under section 44 of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, by the Tribunal (Board of Revenue, M. P.) at the instance of Commissioner of Sales Tax to answer the following question : " Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that reassessment of the dealer under section 19 (1) was not legal as second appeal decided did not take into account the issue on which reassessment under section 19 (1) is made ?" 2. The non-applicant dealer deals in cotton bales and was assessed to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, for the Diwali years 1965-66, 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69 out of which these four references arise. In the original assessment, packing material consisting of hessian and iron hoops were assessed to tax on the theory of implied sales. Sales of iron hoops was assessed at 2 per cent for the period prior to 1st April, 1966 and 3 per cent thereafter as declared goods under entry "iron and Steel", entry No. 5 of Part I of Schedule II. In the first appeal, the order of the assessing authority was since different articles are sold under composite contract, different items will have to be charged at different rates provided for them. Thus, the packing material was to be charged at the rate applicable to the said packing material and not at the rate applicable to baled cotton as was pleaded by the dealer. The assessing authority thereafter reopened the assessment under section 19 (1) of the State Act on the ground that the iron hoops were not covered by the entry iron and steel and in the absence of "c" form, this should have been taxed at 10 per cent. First appeal by the dealer was rejected by the Appellate Additional Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. The dealer then preferred second appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that in the earlier appeal before, it was concerning tax on packing material. That order became final as per provision of section 38 (6) of the Act. First appeal by the dealer was rejected by the Appellate Additional Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. The dealer then preferred second appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that in the earlier appeal before, it was concerning tax on packing material. That order became final as per provision of section 38 (6) of the Act. It is the same question of tax on packing material which was later sought to be reopened by the assessing authority under section 19 (1) of the Act. In view of the clear provision under section 38 (6), reassessment of the dealer under section 19 (1) was not legal. Therefore, the appeals were allowed and the order of assessment under section 19 (1) of the State Act was set aside. 3. After having heard the learned Additional Advocate General, since none appeared for the dealer, whereof the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding legal as the order passed in earlier second appeal had become final regarding assessment of tax on packing material and the matter cannot be reopened under section 19 (1 ). The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income tax v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. [1958] 34 ITR 130 has held as under : " There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a Tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the Tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law, the position would be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the Tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirmance of the decision of the Tribunal by the appellate authority, the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement. " In a later decision the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd. [1967] 19 STC 144 held that the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and the application of doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Ltd. [1967] 19 STC 144 held that the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and the application of doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. In the earlier order, the Tribunal upheld the assessment of tax on packing material at the rate of 2 per cent and 3 per cent treating iron hoops as being covered under the entry "iron and steel". In view of the order of the Tribunal in second appeal, the original assessment by the assessing authority merged in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement. Section 38 (6) provides that the orders passed in second appeal shall be final. Therefore, the question of assessment of packing material, i. e. iron hoops at 2 percent and 3 per cent under entry "iron and steel" became final and it was not open to the assessing authority to reopen the same under section 19 (1) on the ground that iron hoops were not covered by entry "iron and steel" and hence in the absence of "c" form, this should have been taxed at 10 per cent. However, the position has not changed in view of the M. P. General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 35 of 1983) which has come into force on November 15, 1983 by which section 19a has been added giving power of reassessment in certain cases to Commissioner despite the order of any court of Tribunal which has become final provided the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. However, this amendment has no application to the present case as the order of reassessment was passed by the assessing authority on August 27, 1974 and that of the Tribunal on February 13, 1979, much before the amendment came into force. 4. Therefore, the question is answered in favour of the dealer by affirming the order of the Tribunal holding that the reassessment of the dealer under section 19 (1) was not legal as the order in the earlier second appeal had become final regarding assessment of tax on packing material. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative. .