JUDGMENT 1. A short but interesting question arises for determination in this revision, but the question, far from being res Integra, is squarely covered by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court and also of this Court. The question is whether a tenant-defendant governed by the provisions of the West Bengal premises Tenancy act, 1956, having been a party to a compromise resulting in a decree for ejectment, can still turn round and resist execution thereof on the ground that the compromise was recorded and a decree was passed by the court without any advertence to and without being satisfied as to the existence of any of the grounds of ejectment as mentioned in Section 13 (1) of the Action which alone ejectment can be decreed, and was therefore a nullity. The learned Munsif has found the impugned compromise decree to bs such a nullity and has struck out execution thereof. Hence this revision by the landlords. 2. THERE should be no doubt that Section 13 (1) of the West Bengal premises Tenancy act by providing that notwithstanding anything contrary in any other law, no decree far the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant exception one or more of the grounds specified therein. las put a clear embargo on the jurisdiction of the court to decree eviction unless any of those grounds, which alone can vest the court with the requisite jurisdiction, is found to exist in fact. A decree for eviction, therefore, whether on contest or on consent, would be a nullity if the records of the case go to demonstrate the absence of any material to found such a ground. However solemnly a tenant may agree to suffer a decree of ejectment on compromise, the executing court would still relieve him of the decree if the materials on record do not indicate or disclose any ground of ejectment, under the Act. However solemnly a tenant may agree to suffer a decree of ejectment on compromise, the executing court would still relieve him of the decree if the materials on record do not indicate or disclose any ground of ejectment, under the Act. For quite sometime, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kaushalya Devi (AIR 1970 SC 83s) and in Ferozi Lal Jain ( AIR 1970 sc 794 ) were assumed to be authorities for the proposition that in order to sustain a decree of ejectment on compromise, the records must show that the court was satisfied as to the existence of a permissible ground of ejectment and did not decree ejectment merely on the ground that the parties, and the tenant in particular, agreed thereto. But in the later decisions in K. K. Chari ( AIR 1973 SC 1311 ), in Nagindas Ramdas ( AIR 1974 SC 471 ) and then in Roshan Lal ( AIR 1975 SC 2130 ), the question was considered by the Supreme Court in more depth and it was held that, if it could be shown that at the time of recording the compromise and passing the decree thereon, there was some material before the Court on the basis of which the Court could be prima facie satisfied as to the existence of a statutory ground of eviction, it would be presume that the Court was duly satisfied as to its existence and decreed eviction on such; satisfaction, even though the decree or the order, far from recording such satisfaction, might give an apparent impression that it was granted solely on the basis of the compromise. This, in effect, would be applying the presumption under Illustration (e)to Section 114 of the Evidence Act to the effect that judicial acts have been regularly performed. The; two yet later decisions of the Supreme court in Nai Bahu ( AIR 1978 SC 22 ) and in Suleman Noormohamed ( AIR 1978 SC 952 ) have again reinforced the position. This, in effect, would be applying the presumption under Illustration (e)to Section 114 of the Evidence Act to the effect that judicial acts have been regularly performed. The; two yet later decisions of the Supreme court in Nai Bahu ( AIR 1978 SC 22 ) and in Suleman Noormohamed ( AIR 1978 SC 952 ) have again reinforced the position. And the position emerging from a conspectus of all these decisions may be stated, thus:- (1) A court cannot decree eviction even on compromise between the landlord and the tenant unless it is satisfied that a ground and the tenant unless of is, satisfied that a grounds therefore as specified in Section 13 (1) of the West bengal Premises Tenancy act exists and a decree without such satisfaction would be a nullity for the purpose of execution, not with standing that the compromise was entered into with all solemnity and satisfied all the essential elements of an otherwise lawful agreement. (2) But satisfaction of the court as the existence of a permissible ground need not take the shape of any express declaration to that effect in the decree or the order and if the records of the case contain materials on which the Court could reasonably be satisfied as to the existence of any of the relevant grounds, it shall be presumed that the court was so satisfied. (3) If there is express record of satisfaction, the executing court cannot go behind the decree to enquire, and ascertain as to whether there were sufficient grounds for such satisfaction. But where there is no such express record, the executing court can and should go beyond and behind the decree to look into the records and if it finds materials justifying such satisfaction it must hold the decree to be executable even sans such express record. The decisions of this court have also taken similar view relying on the above noted decisions of the Supreme Court and reference, for example, may be made to the Division Bench decisions of this Court in Kironmoy Mitra v. Birendra Kurmar Mitra (1978-1 Calcutta Law Journal 115) and Sushil Chandra v. Sadhana fakobi (AIR 1982 Calcutta 417. 3. The decisions of this court have also taken similar view relying on the above noted decisions of the Supreme Court and reference, for example, may be made to the Division Bench decisions of this Court in Kironmoy Mitra v. Birendra Kurmar Mitra (1978-1 Calcutta Law Journal 115) and Sushil Chandra v. Sadhana fakobi (AIR 1982 Calcutta 417. 3. IT has, however, been urged on behalf of the petitioners-landlords that since under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act a decree for ejectment even on compromise cannot be lawfully passed unless the court is satisfied as to the existence of any statutory ground as specified in Section 13 (1) and' since under Order 2 3, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court can record the compromise only when it is satisfied that the terms thereof are lawful, and since the trial court in its order has held that the "terms of compromise appear to be lawful", it must be held that the court was satisfied as to the existence of a statutory ground of ejectment, and there need not be any further enquiry as to whether such a ground really existed. It has been pointed out by Bhagwati, 3. (as his Lordship then was) in Motilal padampat Sugar Mills ( AIR 1979 SC 621 at 629), relying on the observations of Lord Atkin, that the presumption, wrongly nourished in many quarters, to the effect that every person knows the law is groundless. We are afraid that a similar presumption as to the Courts of Law knowing the correct law must also be taken to be equally un founded. While we would have been glad to know that our Courts know the correct law, there can be no presumption that they always do and seeing, as we do, that the views of the courts below are very often overturned by the higher courts, who again in their turn are no infrequently overruled or reversed by yet higher courts or the highest Court and the highest Court also goes on overruling itself, we can not act on any such presumption. And knowing, as we do, how much rushed- through our arrear - ridden courts are we can very well understand that even if or even though they know the correct law, it is not always possible for them to the with precise correctness, We can not, therefore, presume that since a court has, while passing a decree for ejectment under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, found the terms of compromise to be lawful, it must have also found a statutory ground for ejectment to exist. The presumption under Illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act can not take us that far. 4. IN the case at hand, however, it appears that in the joint petition of compromise, the tenant-respondent has clearly admitted to have defaulted in payment of rent far about five years. That being so, there being such a clear admission as to the existence of a statutory ground of ejectment in the petition for compromise itself, it must, according to the well-settled principles of law, noted hereinabove, be presumed that the court was duly satisfied that such a ground existed. It appears that the tenant-respondent agreed to suffer a decree on consent and gained about two years time under it and has now gained another period of about four years by putting in objection to the execution of the decree to which he clearly consented. The revision is accordingly allowed and the rule is made absolute with costs assessed at 10 G. Ms. The impugned order of the learned munsif holding the decree to be not executable so far as it directs delivery of possession is hereby set aside. The learned Munsif is directed to proceed with the execution case as expeditiously as possible. The records, along with a copy of this order, to go down at once. Rule made absolute.