B. L. YADAV, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a criminal revision under sections 397/402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code) against the order dated 27-1-1987 allowing partly the appeal filed by the applicant in a case under section 323, I. P. C. and converting the substantive sentence of imprisonment into a fine of Rs. 400/- and in default directing the applicant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, arising out of the order dated 20-6-86 passed by the Munsif - Magistrate, Azamgarh convicting the applicant under section 323 I. P. C. and awarding the sentence of six months R. I. ( 2 ) THE prosecution story was that on 20-7-1982 at about 5 P. M. the applicant along-with others was laying foundation in the chak of the complainant. The complainants mother reprimanded the applicant, who along with others inflicted injuries on her with lathies. The Magistrate convicted the applicant under section 323, I. P. C. and sentenced him to six months R. I. In appeal by the applicant sentence was reduced and was converted into a fine of Rs. 400/- and in default of payment to undergo six months R. I. ( 3 ) SRI D. N. Pandey, the learned counsel for the applicant strenuously urged that the doctor was to be examined to prove the injuries but on so many dates he could not come. Hence the case was adjourned on 15-6-1985 when the doctor came but Sri Ashfaq Ahmad, learned counsel for the applicant was not present as he had gone for some work in the High Court. An application was moved on behalf of the applicant for adjournment but the same was not allowed. The examination and cross-examination of the doctor continued and on behalf of the applicant some other counsel other than Sri Ashfaq Ahmad. examined the doctor. According to Sri Pandey the other learned counsel was a junior counsel and was not a counsel of the choice of the applicant hence the case of the applicant has been prejudiced as the efficiency of the senior counsel was not permitted to be valid of. He relied on Shambhunath Bhattacharjee v. State of Sikkim1. ( 4 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the applicant I am of the opinion that the revision is devoid of merits. He relied on Shambhunath Bhattacharjee v. State of Sikkim1. ( 4 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the applicant I am of the opinion that the revision is devoid of merits. As regards the case of Shambhunath Bhattacharjee (supra) no doubt in that case it was held that the accused has got a right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses through a counsel of his choice. But it was not a blanket proposition that adjournment should be granted to the accused on account of the absence of a lawyer of his choice. The relevant observations in that case are set out below; It cannot be laid down as a blanket proposition that adjournment should be granted to the accused whenever it is prayed for on the ground of the absence of a lawyer of his choice. If in a given case, the Court feels that the absence of the defence lawyer is wholly unjustified and/or the accused has not taken proper and diligent steps to secure or ensure his presence, an adjournment prayed on the ground of the absence of the lawyer may be refused. ( 5 ) IN the instant case the other counsel was also engaged along with the counsel of the choice of the applicant and he was present on the date when the doctor was examined. As the two counsels, however, were engaged, it could not be said with certainty as to who was the counsels of the choice of the accused and who was not. Ordinarily, I am of the view that the engagement of the two counsels is with a view that in case the senior counsel is not available, the case may be argued with the help, of the other counsel who might not be so senior as the first counsel. But if the junior counsel cross-examined the witness particularly in a case like the present one whether the injury was caused to the lady and doctor who examined the same came in the witness box, I do not think that the cross-examination done by the other counsel who was also engaged by the applicant could be said to be improper, nor the same could be assumed to have caused any injustice to the applicant. ( 6 ) NO doubt, there is no denial of the fact that in view of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India re-inforced by Article 39-A of the Constitution and considering the concept of just, fair and reasonable trial and that sufficient opportunity must be given to the accused to defend himself, it is imminently clear that the accused had got a right to be defended by a counsel of his choice. But under the circumstances of the particular case, in case cross-examination was done by a counsel who was also engaged by the applicant it cannot be said that the applicants case had been prejudiced on that account. The concept of fair trial is that the accused must be permitted to avail the services of a counsel engaged by him, who is said to be a counsel of his choice. ( 7 ) IT is better to quote an observation in Escobedo v. Illinoia2 as follows; We have learned. . . that no system of criminal justice can or should survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens abdication through Unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system. ( 8 ) I have great regards for the aforesaid observation of the American Supreme Court. But in the instant case considering the facts and the circumstances I am convinced that there was no denial of opportunity to the applicant for being defended by a counsel of his choice. In the instant case in fact the learned counsel engaged by the applicant has cross-examined the doctor. The engagement of the second counsel presupposes that the applicant has faith in him also. The degree of the faith, if the applicant reposes in the first counselor the second counsel may, however, vary. But in a case under section 323. I. P. C. if the cross-examination was done by the second counsel it could not be said that the case of the applicant has been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. The degree of the faith, if the applicant reposes in the first counselor the second counsel may, however, vary. But in a case under section 323. I. P. C. if the cross-examination was done by the second counsel it could not be said that the case of the applicant has been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. I am accordingly of the view that there was no lack of opportunity to the applicant to defend his case with the assistance of a lawyer. ( 9 ) THE revision is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. .