JUDGMENT M.N. Roy, J. The appellant No.1, is a Mini Bus Operators Co. ordination Committee and is a registered Association (hereinafter referred to as the said Association), In respect of mini buses plying in Calcutta, Howrah and 24-Parganas regions having their office at 63/B, Sarat Bose Road, Calcutta-25 Appellant nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 are their President, General Secretary, Joint Secretary and Treasurer respectively. 2. It has been stated that the object of the said Association is to (a) encourage and develop the mini bus and other automobile service in West Bengal and (b) to make provisions for their members, of a place of meeting and a centre of Information and advice on matters pertaining to motor and minibus services it bas been stated that In terms of such objects, the laid Association was at all matters times required and still the same is required to devote their attention as far as may be possible and practicable inter alia to the following :- i) Watch carefully the local administration of all laws and regulations affecting use of motor vehicles and to take any necessary action In these matters; ii) afford members information and advice ; iii) prepare time and fare tables for different routes; iv) avoid all competition amongst members and services having the same object as this ; v) Negotiate with the local authorities on all road and traffic matter vi) protect and encourage motor services; vii) provide advice and assistance in all matters pertaining to motor services 3. The said Association 'has staled' that on or about 4th August 1986, the Regional Transport Authority, Calcutta Region respondent no.3 (here-in-after referred to as the said R.T.A), issued a notification in the daily issues of Ananda Bazar Partika, wherefrom it appeared that the Secretary of the Same, invited applications for contract carriage permits for different routes in Howrah. Calcutta and 24-Parganas and it was indicated that in all 123 permits would be issued in respect of different routes for which vacancles have been declared in Calcutta, Howrah and 24-Parganas. Calcutta and 24-Parganas and it was indicated that in all 123 permits would be issued in respect of different routes for which vacancles have been declared in Calcutta, Howrah and 24-Parganas. It has been indicated that while issuing such notification or inviting applications for different routes, the Secretary of the said RTA did not Invite any application for the following routes:- 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, l18, 119, 120, 123, 124, 131,133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 152, 158, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 171, 172, 175, 174, 177, 179 and 181 nor did or anybody connected with the said RTA announced any vacancies for the routes as mentioned above or for Introduction of any bye-route/bye-routes. 4. The appellants have stated that such action was thought by them to be wholly arbitrary, illegal, uncalled for and mala fide, the more so when the said R.T.A purported to issue offer letters/temporary permits against the non-existing vacancies and that too without duly inviting or calling for objection from the existing operators or following the norms and practice and the procedure as laid down in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) or the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) and if has also been claimed by them that such action on the part of the said RTA was also in violation of an order dated 17th February, 1987, as passed by Susanta Kumar Chaterjee, J. in CO No (W) of 1987, the particulers whereof, would be indicated hereafter in fact, It has been stated that against the issue of the offer letter in respect of these routes as mentioned hereinbefore and for which routes there was no declared vacancies at all or any vacancy existed and since the action as taken by the said RTA, was completely contrary to the notification dated 4th August 1986, an application under Article 226 of the constitution of India was moved on behalf of the said Association which proceeding was disposed of by the learned Judge as mentioned above on 17th February, 1987 directing that there will be no grant of any permit beyond the sanctioned strength as published in the notification dated 4th August, 1986. In the event the Regional Transport Authority feels to increase the strength beyond the notification, the Regional Transport Authority will publish fresh notification in accordance with law and the petitioners will raise objection in accordance with law. It has been claimed by the appellants that the above order dated 17th February 1987, was duly communicated to the respondent authorities by a letter of the same day from their learned Advocate and in reply thereto, he received a communication bearing No. RTA/2993/G dated 2nd March, 1987, whereby the Secretary of the RTA informed that on a meticulous perusal of a letter referred to above, quoted portion in particular the under signed further ensures that the said order of the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta would be strictly complied with. The authorities will not graft any permit beyond the sanctioned strength as published in the newspapers dated 4th August, 1986 and in the event of increasing the fleet strength it will only be done after observing the legal formalities. This may be conveyed to your clients. The appellants have indicated that after going through the letter under reference they were assured that there would be strict compliance with the order as made by this Court and in the event of increasing the fleet strength, the same would be done only after observing the legal formalities and the said letter has further ensured that there would not be any grant of permit beyond the sanctioned strength or contrary to the notice as published on 4th August, 1986. 5. The appellants have alleged that even after such assurance or within a very short time thereafter they had come to learn that the said RTA has issued offer letters in respect of the routes as indicated hereunder :- For route No. 178- Rajabazar to alipore Court. 3 offer letters. For route No. 138-Jadavpur to Airport 2 offer letters For route No 108 -Kasba Rathrala to B.B.D Bag 2 offer letters For route No 113 -Ranikuthi to BBD Bag 3 offer letters For route No 129 -Parnashree to Howrah 3 offer letters For route No 130 -Bijoygarh to Howrah. 2 offer letters and for which there was no declared vacancies at all in the concerned notification dated 4th August 1906. 2 offer letters and for which there was no declared vacancies at all in the concerned notification dated 4th August 1906. It has further been alleged that the appellants have come to learn from the office of the said RTA that in all 55 offer letters will be issued within a short span of time including the 15 offer letter as mentioned hereinbefore against which temporary permits will be issued in no time. It has been alleged that the appellants have been able to gather from the office of the said RTA that they were also going to introduce bye route styled as Barasat to Alipore Zoo via Shyambazar, which is practically a bye-route of Route No.175 i.e. New Barrackpore to Alipore Zoo via VIP Road The appellants have also stated that all the moves as mentioned above, have been taken by the concerned authorities of the said RTA without at all following any norms or practice or procedure under the said Act or the said Rules 6. The purported attempt or move to issue the offer letters as mentioned above, against which temporary permits will be issued for allowing the plying of mini buses on different routes and also the move or the steps as taken to allow Introduction of new bye route without there being tiny public notification in terms of the assurances as given by the Secretary of the said RTA by his letter dated 2nd March 1987, was claimed by the appellants to be a case of extreme administrative highhandedness, apart from being steps taken in colourable use and exercise of power for some collateral and oblique purposes and such being the position, they have claimed that the said RTA or the authorities under then have acted in gross abuse of executive powers as vested in them. The taking of steps contrary to the undertaking as given after the order dated 17th February, 1987, was also claimed to be not bona fide and motivated. 7. The appellants have further claimed that the procedures of consideration of application for contract carriage permits have been provided for under ss. 47, 49, 50 and 57 of the said Act and in respect of the grant of stage carriage permits for routes and areas, Rule 55A of the said Rules is to the following effect: 55A. Route or area for the stage carriage permits: Publication thereof. 47, 49, 50 and 57 of the said Act and in respect of the grant of stage carriage permits for routes and areas, Rule 55A of the said Rules is to the following effect: 55A. Route or area for the stage carriage permits: Publication thereof. The Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority, if it decides to grant permits or stage carriage on any route or area, shall publish in a newspaper or newspapers of standing in the region, particulars of such route or area, the number of permits to be granted and the dale appointed for receipt of applications for such permits". 7A. It has been stated that in view of the provisions of the said Act or the said Rules, it was thus mandatory on the part of the said RTA to publish Insertions duly in newspapers stating the particulars of the routes or area the number of permits to be granted and the date appointed for receipt of application for such permits and in the instant case the authorities concerned have sought to act In gross abuse or misuse of their power and have also sought to act in complete breach of defiance of the provisions of the said Act and the said Rules as mentioned hereinbefore or in grossest abuse of the directions as given on 17th February 1987, by S.K. Chatterjee J. in Civil Order No (W) of 1987. In fact, it has also been alleged that taking of the present steps and after the said order dated 17th February 1987 or the undertaking as given by the Secretary of the said RTA is nothing but as fraud committed by the authorities concerned over the said order as made by this Court, the more so when, they categorically assured in the manner as indicated hereinbefore that the terms of the said order dated 17th February 1987, will be complied with and followed. As mentioned earlier, it has also been restated by the appellant, that the said RTA or their authorities have purportedly sought to issue the concerned offer letters or permits against them, without making any publication of any notification in the newspapers or without any effective surveyor without determining the needs of the traveling public of the area, which according to them is and should be the paramount consideration under the said Act in fact, it has also been stated that there was or has been no need or any necessity for having the fleet strength of the minibuses in the concerned routes increased or augmented. 8. The appellants have stated that in the context of the said Act or the said Rules, public interests, take within the fold several factors viz. maximum number of permits that may be issued on the routes or on any routes having regard to that needs and convenience of the traveling public, the problems of law and order, availability of fuel, problems arising out of atmospheric pollution caused by a large number of motor vehicles operating in any route or area, the condition of loads and/or bridges on routes, uneconomic running of stage carriage/contract carriage leading to elimination of small operators Prevention of uneconomic competition amongst the operators of motor vehicles, construction of stands with necessary amenities, maintenance of standards of comforts and development of traffic area and in the instant case, there was no consideration at all of the factors as mentioned above, by the authorities concerned, who have only sought to issue offer letters and permits there again and also to introduce by route or routes and there has been no consideration for the formalities in these regards at all. Thus, the actions as challenged have been clamed to have been resorted to by the authorities concerned, as wholly contumacious of the said order dated 17th February 1987, apart from being wholly illegal, arbitrary and in violation of Articles 14 and 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It has been claimed, that admittedly has been no notification at all in any newspapers in respect of the move to issue further offer letters or the permits and introducing bye-routes. It has been claimed, that admittedly has been no notification at all in any newspapers in respect of the move to issue further offer letters or the permits and introducing bye-routes. In that the said RTA and their authorities have as mentioned here-in-before, sought to act in grossest abuse of the executive powers as vested in them and because of the arbitrariness, extreme form of administrative high-handedness and ulterior and collateral motive behind the basis of the purported issue of further offer letters as complained of, and that too, for the purpose of issuing temporary permits and for issuing bye routes without observing the legal formalities in that respect, all action as taken were claimed to be bad, void and improper. 9. It should be noted that the appellants, through the Treasurer of the said Association, filed a supplementary affidavit dated 9th March 1987, in the Initial proceeding and have further stated that 55 temporary permits have already been issued by the respondent authorities In a hot haste manner, taking advantage of the intervening Friday, Saturday and Sunday and out of those 55 temporary permits, the appellants have learnt the details of 48 permits as Issued and the particulars of those permits have also been disclosed along with the supplementary affidavit in question and they have also given, the particulars of some mini buses, which have already started plying on the basis of the extra permits as issued. 10. There was no affidavit in opposition to the main petition but such an opposition which was dated 16th March 1987, was filed against the supplementary affidavit as mentioned above, by one Shri Sabyasachi Rakshit the Secretary of the said RTA before incorporating the relative statements of the said affidavit-in-opposition, an order dated 9th March 1987, which is to the following effect :- “Having heard the learned Advocates of both the sides and upon perusal of the materials on record and the pleading as averred in the application as well as on the supplementary affidavit, the Secretary RTA is directed to produce the relevant records as to the date of issuance of permit to the vehicles as stated in para 5 of the supplementary affidavit sworn by S.K. Pal on 9.3.87. The Secretary RTA is also directed to file an affidavit stating as to the details of issuing necessary permits in routes as mentioned in para 5 of the Supplementary affidavit after the order made by this Court on 87217 as referred in para 8 of the main writ application within seven days. Let this matter appear as specially fixed 16387 Respondents are restrained from granting any further permit in the routes as referred in the writ application in any manner, without the leave of this Court." should be incorporated, as the said affidavit in-opposition made a specific reference to that order. 11. The deponent of the affidavit as mentioned above, has thus dealt only with paragraphs 4 and 5 of the supplementary affidavit in question and not the other paragraphs of the Same or the statements as contained in the petition or motion. It was his Case that the petition of motion contained statements which were untrue and they were made with ulterior motive to mislead this Court in so far as it has been alleged that 55 temporary permits hive been issued during the intervening days from 6th March, 1987 to 9th March 1987 i.e. from Friday to Monday. The department has further stated that the earlier writ petition was not served on the answering respondents but the same was served on the registered clerk of their retained lawyer on 5th March, 1987. It has been stated that on 6th March, 1987, the lawyer concerned was ill and as such could not attend the Court on that date or a day prior to that and the learned Judge had directed the matter to appear on 9th March, 1987 marked as "for orders". It has also been alleged that on that date, the supplementary affidavit in question, which was also dated 9th March, 1987, was handed over to the learned Advocate for the answering respondents and in any event, the office of the said RTA was closed on Sunday. It has also been alleged that on that date, the supplementary affidavit in question, which was also dated 9th March, 1987, was handed over to the learned Advocate for the answering respondents and in any event, the office of the said RTA was closed on Sunday. The allegations that the permits were issued on Sunday were absolutely wrong Those statements according to the deponent will prove that the writ petitioner sought to Create prejudice and bias against the answering respondents He has further stated that the permits were issued on 6tb March, 1987 and thereafter, against the routes notified in the concerned notification dated 4th August, 1986 and on the basis of the terms and conditions of the offer letters, and the rule "firs' come serve" was followed by the answering respondents and the permits in question were issued within the sanctioned strength of the routes in question and that too, in terms of the stipulation as contention in the notification dated 4th August, 1986 12. The deponent has further stated that some offer latter holders, came within the fixed period of 150 days for issuance of permits, but as the vacancies in question, were filled up on the basis of the above rule, they were offered to place their vehicle- on other available routes of their choice and upon their application, where vacancies were in existence, by virtue of extension and/or bifurcation or the sanctioned strength of those routes were increased and augmented, after duly communicating to the Syndicate of the routes in question. It has been stated that to terms of the application made by such offer letter holders as mentioned above, the answering respondents had issued 63 offer letters for permits upto 6th march, 1987 to the applicants in question and they have not issued any permit beyond the sanctioned strength in the routes in question, which again were issued by them in term, of the undertaking given before this Court on 17th February, 1987 or after the making of the said order. It was the further case of the deponent that where any Syndicate opposed the decision of the said RTA for extension, bifurcation or augmentation of the routes in question, they have nut given any effect to the decision of the said RTA and the said deponent has also given some instance, where, on the objection by Budge Mini Bus owners Association (Mini Bus Route No 132) and the Syndicate of Mini Bus Route No. 183 Sodepur H.B Town to Band Stand) were accepted The deponent has further stated that the said. Association is not the actual representive body of the mini bus operators within the region of the answering respondents and as such, neither they nor any of their member through them have any locus standi to maintain the petitioner of motion 13. It was the further case of the deponent that the answering respondent have not flouted or disobeyed the order dated 17th February, 1987, as passed by this court and stated that the permits as involved in respect of the routes in question were, not issued in hot haste taking advantage of the intervening holidays as alleged. On the contrary, it has been advantage of the intervening holidays as alleged. On the Contrary, it has been stated that the permits in question were issued on the basis of the assurance as given by the answering respondents on 17th February, 1987 or thereafter, before this Court He has further indicated that the temporary permits in respect of the following :- i) Route No. 101 in respect of WBR 4528 ii) Route No. 137 in respect of WBY 2938 iii) Route No. 131 in respect of WBR 2771 iv) Route No. 135 in respect of WBY 2928 v) Route No. 109 in respect of WHY 2300 vi) Route No. 154 In respect of WBY 2690 vii) Route No. 178 in respect of WBY 2039 viii) Route No. 158 in respect of WBY not WBY 1168 were issued against the permanent vacancies which were detected by the answering respondent after the notification dated 4th August, 1986 and necessary steps were taken to meet the permanent needs of the traveling public. In fact it has been averred that considering such need to be permanent one, the answering respondent issued the temporary permits in favor of the applicant who possessed ready vehicles and were selected by the said RTA pursuant to the notification dated 4th August 1986 and their assigned routes became fitted up before they could approach the answering respondents, for the issue of the necessary permits against the offer letters, which were Issued earlier pursuant to the notification as mentioned above and following the terms and conditions of "first come first serve” as stipulated in those offer letters. It was the further case of the deponent that considering the permanent needs or the traveling public, as well as the financial liabilities Involved by the offer letter holders, the temporary permits in question, were issued on the routes as Involved and that too, without exceeding the sanction strength of the routes in question. He has further stated that the temporary permits were issued to : (i) Route No 108 and 108/1 In respect of WBY 2910, WBY 2834, WBY 2942, WBY 2964 after extension and bifurcation consequently increasing and augmenting the fleet strength of these two composite routes by a valid resolution of the respondent no. 8 and the same was duly communicated to the Secretary of the Syndicate of the Route in question through its letter dated 19.2.1987 (ii) Route No. 196 in respect of WBY 2903, WBY 2981, WBY 2023, WBY 2031, WBY 2702 (after extension and bifurcation Consequently increasing and augmenting the fleet strength of these composite routes by a resolution of the respondent no.3 and the same was duly communicated to the concerned authorities Including the officials of the Syndicate of the Route in question through its letter dated 17.2.87 fare chart In respect of the composite Route No 106 and 106/1 was prepared and delivered to the quarters of the Route in question and thereby the operators have accepted the decision of the Board in respect of bifurcation and augmentation of the fleet strength inasmuch as the petitioner no.1 has no authority and/or jurisdiction to raise any abjection suo moto without the consent and/or concurrence of the affected parties i.e. operators of the route in question (iii) Route No. 129 and not in Route No. 127 or Route No. 130 as alleged or at all in respect of vehicles No. 2956 and 2938. Those temporary permits were issued within the sanctioned strength were as notified in the notification dated 4.8.1986 and as such the allegation of violation of the order of this Hon’ble Court does not arise at all and (iv) Route no. 166 in respect of WBY 2459, WBY 2913. WBY 2930, WBY 2933 after increasing and augmenting the sanction fleet strength (two in number) by a valid resolution of the respondent no.3 after extending the said sick route in order to make the route viable and stable for the ulterior motive to serve the commuters as well as the lone operators may be impetus to continue to operate her vehicle on the said route and this resolution was adopted by the respondent no. 8 well within its jurisdiction and/or power or contemplated in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1936 14. In the facts and circumstances of the Case as Indicated above, it was the specific submission of the deponent that the answering respondents had no intention to flout or disobey the order of this Court as mentioned above or to shift from the assurance given by them to this court on 17th February 1987 or thereafter he has slated that the temporary permits as mentioned hereinbefore were issued with jurisdiction and authority of the answering respondents under the said Act or in terms of their understanding of the order dated 17th February 1987, as passed by this Court He has restated that the permits have been issued for the interest of the traveling public and the solve to same extent, the transport crises as in existence in the city of Calcutta or its suburbs While on the question of the Interest of the traveling public or their convenience in the matter of granting additional number of mini buses we must have it on record that the issuing authorities should also consider the hazards and difficulties of the traveling public, in case excessive number of mini busses are allowed to ply in the roads of Calcutta and its suburbs, considering the condition of the roads. the way, manner and character, In which the mini buses are plied in some cases, it cannot be doubted that mini buses instead of serving the cause of the people, have become a meance and we also fail to understand why the said RTA or the authorities of the same or the answering respondents have not taken or are not taking any steps to restrict the character of their plying either by fixing time schedules or by ceiling their governors so that the mini buses are not allowed to be plied in the reckless manner in which they are being plied now a days in the Strests of Calcutta and the suburbs. 15. The reply to the above affidavit in opposition was dated 27th March 1987. On a reference to the same it would appear that the case of the appellants as indicated hereinbefore, have been restated. 16. In the original proceeding there was one application for addition of parties dated 10th March 1987, by Bangshi Bhuiya and 19 others. There was another application for addition of parties dates 16th March 1987, by Mukul Majumdar and 22 others apart from another application for addition of parties dated 25th March 1987, by Gautam Saha and another. Those application were contested before the learned Trial judge and after heaving them subject to such objections may be taken at the time of final hearing of the matter. 17. It should also be noted that the added respondents above, filed their affidavit in opposition dated 25th March 1987, against the writ petition and claimed the same to be defective and not sustainable in law their case that the respective transport authorities and the state government are entrusted to discharge their respective statutory duties in respect of preparation of fare table and discouraging uneconomic plying of vehicles. They have further stated that the said Association is not entitled to discharge statutory functions under the said Act. 18. It was also the case of the added respondents as mentioned above, that the said RTA, after assessing the traffic potentiality of the respective routes, would be empowered to issue and grant contract carriage permit (Mini Bus) in favour of the respective applicants and under s.57(1) of the said Act, application for such carriages may be made at any time and as such, no notification was necessary. It was their case, that the power in granting mini bus permits and/or offer letters is vested upon the said RTA and pursuant to the advertisement dated 4th August 1986, application were received by them in the month of November 1986, and they have granted offer letter for placing vehicles on different routes, against available vacancies thereon the basis of “first come first serve” basis, at the risk of the grantees and according to them those offer letters were given validity for a period of 150 days within which the grantees were required to place their vehicles on routes after observing all formalities and otherwise such offer letters would stand cancelled. 19. The deponent of the affidavit under consideration has also stated that the said RTA granted offer letters in excess of the vacancy, as declared on 4th August 1986, subject to the terms as mentioned above and writ petitioners being aware of such fact, never raised any objection. It has also been stated that most of the added respondents made their vehicle ready for placing on routes in question within the stipulated period of 150 days as mentioned above and the rest have got their chassis and the body building of those vehicles is going on. It was the categorical case of this deponent that the writ petitioners waived their objections with regard to their claim and there is no doubt that the added respondents have got their vehicles made ready by Investing a substantial amount, apart from the above, it bas also been stated that some of the added respondents have got their vehicles financed by Bank and some of them procures finance from private commercial institutions and some has procured the money in cash. He has given the particulars of the offer letter holders who have placed their ready vehicles for plying on the routes and has contended that as the vacancies notified on 4th August 1986, were exhausted, the said R T.A. granted temporary offer letters in favour of the persons as mentioned above, in respect of the routes where the needs of the traveling public exist, on condition that substantive regular permits would be issued after observing legal formalities under the provisions of the said Act. He has also given the particulars of the offer letter holders who have got their chassis ready or body building works of whose vehicles are going on and has claimed that if those offer letters holders are not allowed to ply their vehicles or to place them on the concerned routes, they will suffer loss and will be rained. The deponent has also indicated that against the order dated 17th February 1987, the added respondents along with others have preferred an appeal being FMAT No 847 of 1987 and the same is pending. 20. It was also the case of the deponent that mini bus permits are issued by the said RTA treating them as contract carriages and under s. 57(1) of the said Act, application for contract carriage permits may be made at any time. It was also the case of the deponent that he Regional transport Authority concerned is empowered to issue and grant such contract carriage permits considering the needs of the traveling public in respect of the routes in or around the area in question. Whether the mini buses should he treated, considering their nature, character and manner of plying, as contract carriage, we have our reservations and we shall indicate our view, hereafter. 21. It has further been alleged by the deponent of the affidavit under consideration that the writ petitioners not having challenged the resolution of the said RTA whereby they had issued excess offer letters in November 1986 and in effect, they having waived their objections in spite of their specific knowledge they would not be entitled to challenge those proceeding or to maintain the present objection it has further been indicated that Route Nos. 108, 129 and 130 were notified in the notification dated 4th August 1986 and the said RTA is empowered to issue contract carriage (Mini Bus) permits, considering the traffic potentialities of the area in question and too, when public convenience is and should be the paramount consideration under the said act. 108, 129 and 130 were notified in the notification dated 4th August 1986 and the said RTA is empowered to issue contract carriage (Mini Bus) permits, considering the traffic potentialities of the area in question and too, when public convenience is and should be the paramount consideration under the said act. It has further been stated that s. 47 of the said Act is not applicable in the case of contract carriages (mini buses) and according to him Rule 55A has also no manner of application in the case of contract carriage (Mini Bus) permits it has been stated that application for mini bus permits may be made at any time of s.57(1) of the said which specifically says that an application for a contract carriage permit or a private carrier’s permit may be made at any time. It has also been stated that transport Authorities issued permit and/or offer letters considering this case. It was also been reiterated that pursuant to the offer letters issued in November 1986, the added respondents as mentioned above, made their vehicles ready for placing on routes in question, and vacancies were not available on the routes as published in the notification dated 4th August 1986. In fact, it has been sated that the added respondent submitted their application for obtaining routes permit against their respective ready vehicles and thereafter, some fresh temporary offer letters were issued by the authorities in respect of the routes considering the needs of the traveling public. 22. The affidavit-in opposition as mentioned above, by the added respondents was replied by the writ petitioners by their affidavit-in reply dated 30th march, 1987 and from a reference to the statement as made therein, it would appear that the material allegation, both on facts and on law have been denied and disputed and that apart, the facts as contained in the writ petition, have been reiterated. 23. From a reference to the order dated 27th April, 1987, as made in this appeal, it would appear, that considering the fact and circumstances of the case and conditions of the offer letter holders on that date we had directed that when the notification was for the grant of 123 contract carriages, the issue of 850 offer letters, was not perhaps proper. We have been informed by that today many of the holders of the letter have perhaps taken steps duly Such being the position, we direct that offer letters as issued or action as taken up till today, will not be interfered with, but there must not be any grant of any route or sub route permits on the basis of the offer letters as issued from tomorrow and the offer letters as issued will not be effective from tomorrow. This order of course, we keep it in record, will not affect Shri Debendra Goyal, who we are informed by Mr. Moitra, on basis of the offer letters as received, has taken steps as far as back as on 10th April, 1987 and inspite of repeated demand, the transport Authorities concerned have not taken steps to issue the permit. We further have it on record that until further orders or till the disposal of the appeal, the interim order that we have made today will continue and parties will of course have liberty to come lip earlier for any other appropriate order, if necessary. We have kept it on record further that in case of any further permit on the basis of the offer letters as issued, is requited to be granted, that must be done with the leave of this Court and not otherwise and the permits which have been granted already will continue upto the terms for which they have been granted and not thereafter. It would also appears from a reference to the order sheet of this appeal, that after the above order, many applications for addition of parties were made and by our orders dated 5th May, 1987, 12th May, 1987 and 1st June. 1987, those applications for addition of parties were allowed subject to such objections that may be taken at the time of hearing. We shall refer to the particulars of those applications at the appropriate time and place of this judgment. 24. On a reference to Annexure "A" to the writ petition i.e. the notification dated 4th August, 1986, Mr. Chatterjee, appealing support of the appeal, pointed out that for 23 Mini Bus routes 123 vacancies were declared and according to him, much more than such number of vacancies and more particularly 1132 offer letters, which number was of course denied by the said RTA were issued. Chatterjee, appealing support of the appeal, pointed out that for 23 Mini Bus routes 123 vacancies were declared and according to him, much more than such number of vacancies and more particularly 1132 offer letters, which number was of course denied by the said RTA were issued. In fact, it was admitted by the said RTA that for the vacancies in a question 850 offer letters were issued. They have pleaded that such extra number of offer letter was issued, as they and their experience, have found that such issued of extra offer letter or more than the actual number are required to be issued, as all the candidates to not ultimately accept the offers for various reasons. Thus, on the basis of the this pleading as available it is an admitted fact that offer letter much in excess of the vacancies as notified, were issued. The proceeding of the meeting of the said RTA’s meeting as held on 17th September 1986, was produced by Mr. Manik Chandra Das, for establishing the background or the reason as above, for which, offer letters in excess in excess of the vacancies as notified were issued. The extract from the said resolution, which we direct to be kept in the record, is to the following effect:- The Chairman, RTA Calcutta took to the chair to continue the deferred agenda of the meeting dated 9.9.86. The Secretary RTA, Calcutta, placed before the board all applications received in connection with Contract Carriage (minibus) routes as against this RTA’s notification dt.4.8.86 for examination consideration and selection by the board to fill up vacancies in 30 minibus routes. The board contemplated on a very important issue raised by some members in a many previous occasions including today’s meeting that is, the sad experience of this RTA due to failure of the offer letter holders to secure bank finance or private finance to procure buses. The rate of success is nearly 10% of the total offer letter issued in the last two years for filling up the vacancies in different routes. The offer letter holders goes on revalidating the periods month after months and thereby keep vacancies unfulfilled for couple of years and thereby cause suffering to the traveling public. The rate of success is nearly 10% of the total offer letter issued in the last two years for filling up the vacancies in different routes. The offer letter holders goes on revalidating the periods month after months and thereby keep vacancies unfulfilled for couple of years and thereby cause suffering to the traveling public. The board, therefore, resolved that, if valid applications are available, fulfilling ail the given preconditions for selections, this board will issue offer letter against all such valid applications irrespective of the no. of vacancies in each concerned route it will not be Improper if under this principle the total no of offer letter issued by this RTA touches the target figure of 1250 as 10% of such no may mature ensuring the fulfilling all existing vacancies of 125. A question was raised, what will happen if more than 125 vehicles are procured by offer letter holders or if in any particular routes the no of vehicles placed by offer letter holders exceed the prescribed quota ? The board considered the issued and resolved as follows :- (a) Since certain routes, though experiencing unmanageable pressure of traveling public but no enhancement of fleet strength could be arranged in such routes till the inception of the routes If additional no of vehicle could be procured by the offer letter holders the same may be absorbed to meet up the additional pressure certain routes; (b) if there are more vehicles placed before certain routes exceeding the quota advertised, augmentation of the quota of the said route may be made by this RTA if need of the traveling public is felt otherwise the RO of excess vehicle will be given free choice of routes where vehicle could be located, (c) the offer letters is issued by the RTA will have a fixed period of validity of 150 day only and there will be no further expansion of period by revalidation of on; (d) each offer letter issued to any candidate should clearly mention these conditions and all candidates will lake the offer letter for procuring and placing all the vehicle on the basis of "first come first serve" at their own risk. The offer letters will thus be conditional and it will be delivered to the candidates who accept the same knowing pre conditions of such offer letters. 25. Mr. The offer letters will thus be conditional and it will be delivered to the candidates who accept the same knowing pre conditions of such offer letters. 25. Mr. Chatterjee claimed that the action in this case was in complete breach and contrary to the provisions of the said Act and the said Rules and so also the notification dated 4th August 1986 and the undertaking, to comply with the High Court's Older dated 17th February 1987. In fact, he sought to sustain the above on the basil of the facts as indicated hereinbefore. His main attack against the impugned action and that too on the basis of the pleadings of the said RTA were that firstly compassionate ground cannot and should not be allowed to be the basis of the ground of issuing offer letters or permits much in excess of' he notification in the facts of the Case, secondly, asking for the grant of temporary mini bus permits on such ground was void and thirdly, any directions to have such grant made were also unauthorized. To supplement his submission that compassion has no application in a case of the present nature, Mr. Chatterjee referred to the Case of Cumbum roadways (p) Ltd. V. balagura Bus Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. Etc, AIR 1977 SC 1563 where the Supreme Court has observed that in granting a permit the RTA cannot prefer a candidate with lesser mark on the ground that the rival with the lesser marks had already got a permit on an overlapping route, apart from observing that it must be remembered that public interest is at stake when public transport services are operated. The scheme or the Motor Vehicles Act is that he who can serve the traveling public best, is to be chosen as permit holder Consideration of grace, charity and compassion at the expense of public interest and an act of unfairness to the Act Mr. Chatterjee submitted that thus public interest and convenience and in convenience in the matter of grant of extra mini bus permits will have to be considered, but such consideration most not only be on compassionate grounds alone and while making such grants, the observations as made by us earlier will have to be complied with and the provisions of the said Act and the said Rules must not be overlooked or given a go bye 26. On the basis of the terms of ss. 50 and 51 of the said Act, which the to the following effect :- ,. Section 50: A Regional Transport Authority shall, (in considering an application for) a contract carriage permit, have regard to the extent to which additions contract carriage may be necessary or desirable in the public interest and shall also take into consideration any representation which any then be made or which may previously have been made by persons already holding contract carriage permits in the region or by any local authority or police authority in the region to the effect that the number of contract carriage for which permits have already been granted is sufficient for or to excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region. Section 51: (1) Subject to the provisions of s.50. a Regional Transport Authority may on an application made to it under s.49, grant a contract carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such a permit: Provided that no such permit shall be granted in respect of any area not specified in the application" Mr. Chatterjee contended that when the notification dated 4th August 1986. has advertised and indicated the number of grants will be 123 only, before granting more permits or offer letters for them, the laid RTA and their authorities should have duly formed the necessary opinion for the extra grant and such opinion, not having been formed, the entire actions were vitiated or they become void bad and irregular. In support of his submissions Mr. Chatterjee placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court to the effect that the statutory criteria for grant of permits is set out in section 50 and renewals of permits must be governed by the some considerations, the procedure being regulated by s. 58 Section 50 specifies the guidelines. The transport tribunals function quasi-judicially and this imports some imperatives. The Authority must remember that a permit holder has an ordinary right of renewal unless it is shown that outweighing reasons of public interest lead to a country result. Permits are not bounty but right restricted reasonably by the motor vehicles Act and the key criterion when a contract carriage permit is sought, is to ask ones. The Authority must remember that a permit holder has an ordinary right of renewal unless it is shown that outweighing reasons of public interest lead to a country result. Permits are not bounty but right restricted reasonably by the motor vehicles Act and the key criterion when a contract carriage permit is sought, is to ask ones. If whether an extra vehicles unnecessary or undesirable in the public Interest, and whether. Further, the permits already grauted are sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region. The bare ipse dixit that the state transport Authority considers the facilities provided by public sector undertaking are adequate, is not intelligible without some basis, as made in the case of D. Nataraja Mudaliar v. The State Transport Authority, Madras, AIR 1979 SC 114 . 27. Mr. Chatterjee contended on the basis of the determination in the case of B.S. Minhas v. The Indian Statistical Institute & Anr. (1983) 4 SCC 582 , where it has been observed that bye laws framed by authority for procedural fairness, even if not have its statutory force are binding and in the instant case, thus the authorities concerned were required to act fairly and not arbitrarily. They have in fact, acted contrary to such rules in the matter of hawing the offer letters much in excess of the number as notified, issued in the routes in question. There is no doubt that the procedure as laid down for granting permits be it permanent and temporary or for stage carriage or contract carriage in the said Act or in the said Rules must be followed and they, in terms of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia v. The State of Punjab & Ors (1975) 3 SCC 503 , cannot be ignored While on the points, Mr. Chatterjee made a further reference of the case of Bijoy Krishna Bhattacharjee v. The Regional Transport Authority Calcutta, 61 CWN 590 where it has been observed that in the case of representation in respect of the grant of a contract carriage permit no express provision his been laid down for giving notice. The giving of some kind of notice is however, implied. The giving of some kind of notice is however, implied. The method by which such notice should be given is a matter which ought to be the subject matter of rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 Since there are no such rules at present any rational method of giving notice would be sufficient, apart from holding that Rule 75 of the Motor Vehicles Rules 1940 is not inconsistent with any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act nor is it outside the scope of the rule making power conferred by s.60 of the Act nor is it ultra vires and where the question is whether the Regional Transport Authority has the power to allow replacement of contract carriage by a vehicle of different nature and or capacity the appropriate rule to be applied is rules 75 and not rule 76. The observations in that case were made while dealing with s.50 of the said Act. On his submissions on "public interest" as mentioned in s. 43A of the said Act or the Implications of those words Mr. Chatterjee relied on and referred to the case of Rameshwar Prasad & ors. V. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (1983) 2 SCC 195 and more particularly to the observations of the Supreme Court to the effect that after the amendment at any rate it has to be held that Sub s.(1) of s.43A of the Act did not comprehend within its scope the power to issue directions for issuing permit to all eligible applicants without tiny sort of restriction relevant to the scheme of the Act What does s.43A(1) after all say? It says that the State Government may issue such directions of a general character as it may consider necessary in the public interest what is the meaning of the form 'public interest'? It says that the State Government may issue such directions of a general character as it may consider necessary in the public interest what is the meaning of the form 'public interest'? In the context of the Act, it takes within its fold several factors such as, the maximum number of permits that may be issued on a routes or in any area having regard to the needs arid convenience of the traveling public, the non-availability of sufficient number of stage carriage services in other routes or areas which may be in need of running of additional services, the problems of law and order, availability of fuel, problems arising out of atmospheric pollution caused by a large number of motor vehicles operating in any route or are, the condition of roads and bridges on the routes, uneconomic running of stage carriage service leading to elimination of small operators and employment of more capital than necessary in any sector leading to starvation of capital on of capital investment in other sectors etc public interest under the Act does not mean the interest of the operators or of the passengers only we have to bear in mind that like every other economic activity the running of stage carriage service is an activity which Involves use of scarce or limited productive resources. Motor transport involves a huge capital investment on motor vehicles, training or competent drivers and mechanics, establishment of workshops, construction of safe roads and bridges deployment of sufficient number of policemen to preserve law and order and several other matters. To say that larger the number of stage carriages in any route or area more convenient it would be to the members of the public is an over simplification of a problem with myriad facets affecting the general public it we run through the various provisions of the Act it becomes clear how much attention is given by it to various matters affecting public interest. There are provisions relating to licensing of driven on the basis of their competence, licensing or conductors, specifications to which the motor vehicles should conform, coordination of road and rail transport, prevention of deterioration of the road system, prevent on of uneconomic competition among motor vehicles, fixation of reasonable fare, compliance by motor vehicles with the prescribed time table, construction of bus stands with necessary amenities, maintenance of standards of comfort and cleanliness in the vehicle, development of Inter-State tourist traffic and several other matters with the object of making available adequate and efficient transport facilities to all parts of the country Any direction given by the State Government under s.43A of the Act should therefore, be in conformity with all matters regarding which the statute has made provision In this situation to say that any number of permits can be issued to any eligible operator without any upper limit is to overstep the limits of delegation of statutory power and to make a mockery of an important economic activity like the motor transport. On the balls of such determination Mr. Chatterjee’s further specific and categorical submissions that the said RTA or the authorities of the same have not thus acted duly, fairly and property in the instant case. 28. Mr. Chatterjee referred to the order dated 17th February 1987, as made by the learned Trial Judge and the particulars whereof we have Indicated hereinbefore, apart from undertaking given by the said RTA through their Secretary's letter as dated 2nd March 1987 as mentioned earlier and submitted that such the action as impeached in the writ petition in this case was certainly not bona fide and proper and claimed further that in all fairness such undertaking as mentioned above, should have been honoured by the said RTA and its officers and in not doing so they have exposed their actions, to be severely dealt with and set aside by this Court and for such wilful act or neglect they deserve no sympathy. It was indicated further by Mr. Chatterjee that the order for maintenance of status quo ante as made on 17th February 1987, would mean that the offer letters in this case were issued contrary to the same and as such also they cannot he sustained. For establishing his submissions as above or on the effect of not following the order for maintenance of status quo ante, Mr. For establishing his submissions as above or on the effect of not following the order for maintenance of status quo ante, Mr. Chatterjee referred to and relied on the Full Bench determinations of the Kerala High Court to the case of Manukku Kumara Pillai Thanu Pillai v. Mathevan of Aravamkudu Karakattu Madathen veedu AIR 1963 Ker 179 (FB) which bas indicated that it is the duty of a person bound by an order of Injunction to obey its command Disobedience will provide the foundation for a punishment; not the basis for a claim, apart from observing that where during the pendency of a suit for rememption an Injunction is issued by the trial Court prohibiting the defendant from making improvements on the property, but in spite of the order and in deliberate violation thereof he constructs a building on the property, the defendant is not entitled to the value of the building as part of the price of redemption though the building concerned is an improvement and under normal circumstances its value will be a part of the price of redemption. The defendant should remove the building if he likes while on the point, Mr. Chatterjee also made a reference to the case of Sitaram v. Ganesh Das AIR 1973 All 440, where while dealing with the effect of Order 39 Rule 2-A as added in U.P the Allahabad High Court has observed that the purpose of Order 39 Rule 2A is not to punish a person, who disobeys injunction order, the purpose is to enforce the order of injunction. Where the wrong done by disobedience of the order is remedied and the status quo ante is brought, the delinquent cannot be sent in prison nor is the attachment of property needed. 29. Mr. Where the wrong done by disobedience of the order is remedied and the status quo ante is brought, the delinquent cannot be sent in prison nor is the attachment of property needed. 29. Mr. Chatterjee further claimed that the said Association, in view of their character of formation and capacity, has locus standi to move this Court in its writ jurisdiction and such being the position, the proceedings as initiated by them will be maintainable and in support of such submissions he referred to the determinations in the case of D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 , when the Supreme Court has indicated that while the expanding horizons of social economic justice, the Socialist Republic and Welfare State which the country endeavours to set up and the are exposed to fact that the old man who retired when emoluments were comparatively low vagaries of continuously rising prices, the falling value of the rupee consequent upon inflationary inputs, by introducing of arbitrary eligibility criteria, “belong in service and retiring subsequent to the specified date” for being eligible for the liberalized pension scheme and thereby dividing a homogeneous class, the classification being not based on any discernible rational principle and being wholly unrelated to the object sought to be achieved by grant of liberalized pension and eligibility criteria devised roughly arbitrary the eligibility for liberalized pension scheme of “being in service on the specified date and retiring subsequent to that date” in the memoranda violates article 14 and is unconstitutional and liable to the struck down. But as the arbitrary and discriminatory portion in the memoranda can be easily severed both the memoranda shall be enforced and implemented after severance of the unconstitutional part. However, arrears of pension prior to the specified date are not required to be paid to those have retired before the specified date because to that extant the scheme is prospective. Accordingly, all pensioners governed by the 1972 rules and Army Pension Regulations shall be entitiled to pension as computed under the liberalized pension scheme from the specified date, irrespective of their date of retirement Mr. Accordingly, all pensioners governed by the 1972 rules and Army Pension Regulations shall be entitiled to pension as computed under the liberalized pension scheme from the specified date, irrespective of their date of retirement Mr. Chatterjee also contended that apart from the above determination, there are other classical judgment of the Supreme Court on the point, on the basis whereof, it is too late in the day to contend that the said Association will have no jurisdiction and authority to move this court, for the relief’s as claimed, more particularly when they were and are aimed at to protect this interest of the their members. 30. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that on the admitted basis of the pleadings of the answering respondents or their defence, the need, which is subsisting is really a permanent one and that being the position, the steps as taken to issue temporary permits, were absolutely unauthorized, irregular and not bona fide and in support of such submissions, he reffered to the case of a vishwanathan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal pondicherry AIR 1981 SC 731 where it his been observed that a temporary permit can be granted only if the permit is required for the Purposes or reasons mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of s.62(1) of the Act or in the circumstances referred to in sub-s.(2) thereof, apart from indicating that were the State Transport Authority does not take steps to issue regular permits on several routes (18 routes in instant case) even though the need for issuing those permits is established beyond doubt, but on the order hand it continues issuing temporary permits for years together (nearly six years in the instant case) in respect of those routes, the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the economically weaker sections of the community would obviously suffer disadvantages by such procedure adopted by the State Transport Authority. If stage carriage permits are to be issued to them in compliance with sub-s.(1A) of s.47 of the Act certain percentage of the said permits would have to be reserved for the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and if the Government so desires to the economically weaker sections of the community, If the issue of such permits is postponed for any reason and only temporary permits ale issued then persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the weaker sections would not be able to enjoy the benefit of the reservation issuing temporary permits in such situation repeatedly for a long number of years would clearly be in violation of the letter and spirit of s.62 under which such temporary permits are issued. The revalidation or a temporary permit or extension of the period for which a temporary permit is issued is not contemplated by law. 30A. Such being the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it was claimed by Mr. Chatterjee that the directions as given in this case or the steps as taken, were against the provisions of the statute it was also pointed out by Mr. Chatterjee on the basis or the determinations in the case of G. Veerapaa Pilai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 192 that the High Court will not be authorized to direct grant of permits. 31. Mr. Moitra, appearing for respondent nos. 6 to 48 pointed out that the case of the respondent offer letter holders may be grouped in four categories viz (1) these who have placed their vehicles co the basis of offer letter, (2) those who have purchased the vehicles within 150 days, but could not get either any interim order or the permit, (3) those who have purchased the vehicles, But could not get them registered and (4) those who have received offer letters but could not place the vehicles. 32. He submitted specifically that the said Association has no locus standi, since they no right or any interest in the proceeding and according to him right if any, infringed, must be held and found to be that of individual owners dual affectation of rights not having been indicated or pleaded, the concerned proceedings at the instance of or by the said Association will not be maintainable 33. In the case of Calcutta Gas Company Ltd. V. State of W.B. AIR 1962 SC 1044 , the Supreme Court has Indicated that the nature and scope of proceeding under Article 226 has conferred very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writ of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III or for any other purpose it is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental rights can also approach the High Court seeking a relief thereunder, apart from observing that the said Article 226 in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. The existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 The right that Can be enforced under Article 226, like Article 32, must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief The right that can be enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or Individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified and on a reference to such determinations, which again Mr. Moitra submitted, have been considered in the famous case on Judge's transfer, we should hold and observe that the present proceeding as initiated at the instance of the said Association, was not maintainable and that should also be the position to law, since no decision has been taken against the said Association, in view of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. M.M. Seervai, Advocate General of Maharastra, Bombay, AIR 1971 SC 395 where the effect of the word "person aggrieved" has been construed. It was further contended by Mr. Moitra, that since the said Association or their members have no subsisting permit or right to any permit in question, which are to be granted. It was further contended by Mr. Moitra, that since the said Association or their members have no subsisting permit or right to any permit in question, which are to be granted. In terms of the observations of the Supreme Court to the effect that if a scheme was validly promulgated and became filial within the meaning of s.68D, Motor Vehicles Act it had the effect of extinguishing all rights of a person to ply his vehicles under his permit After cancellation of his permit, be could not maintain a petition for a writ under Article 226 because a right to main lain such a petition postulates a subsisting personal right in the claim which the petitioner makes and in the protection of which he is personally interested. Even if the petitioner, at the date of the petition filed in the High Court, Held a permit which was a ensure till a certain date, if the permit was validity terminated from the date specified, he will not be entitled to any relief, as made in the case of Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1183 such proceedings as initiated by them and from which the present appeal has been taken will not also be maintainable. 34. It was also stated by Mr. Moitra that the said Association or their members are rivals of the answering respondent offer letter holders in the Mini Bus operational trade and as such also they will have no right in this case or to maintain the petition on the basis of their claims in support of such submissions, Mr. Mohra referred to the case of The Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N. Takappa Co. & Bros, AIR 1971 SC 246 , where, while dealing with the case of change of location of a rice mill or the sanction for change obtained after shifting under the provisions of Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, It has been indicated that even assuming previous sanction is required before moving of machinery, a competitor has no locus standi to challenge the grant of permission. While his submissions on lows standi. Mr. Moitra made further references of the Supreme Court that In order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person " The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. While his submissions on lows standi. Mr. Moitra made further references of the Supreme Court that In order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an "aggrieved person " The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variables factors such as the content and Intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner’s interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or Injury suffered by him, and contended that the said Association was not admittedly an aggrieved person, so also the proceeding was not maintainable, as made in the Case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Busher Ahmed , AIR 1976 SC 578 . 35. Apart from the above, Mr. Moitra claimed that the writ proceeding was not maintainable since, firstly the advertisement notification dated 4th August 1986 has not been challenged, secondly the offers as made have not been challenged and thirdly the decision of the said RTA or their power to select the offers bas not been challenged He further claimed that the writ proceeding was not entertainable because of the inordinate and unexplained delay. In support of such submissions, Mr. Moiltrs Indicated that the notification in question was issued on 4th August 1986, thereafter the offer letters were issued In November 1986 and this Court was moved in March 1987. 36. On merits, Mr. Moitra submitted that be it stage or contract carriage, for temporary permits, no notice is necessary and is such also the said Association or their members and constituents cannot have any grievance and it was specifically pointed out that s.57(2) of the said Act, which is to the effect that an application for a stage carriage permit. On merits, Mr. Moitra submitted that be it stage or contract carriage, for temporary permits, no notice is necessary and is such also the said Association or their members and constituents cannot have any grievance and it was specifically pointed out that s.57(2) of the said Act, which is to the effect that an application for a stage carriage permit. Or a public carrier's permit shall be mad not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the permit shall take effect, or, if the Regional Transport Authority appoints dates for the receipt of such application on such dates, deals with stage carriage and as such will have no application in the case relating to Mini Buses, which according to him are contract carriage and for the grant of them only s.62 of the said Act, which is to the following effect :- Section 62 (1) A Regional Transport Authority may *** without following the procedure laid down in section 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily- (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occassions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business. or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, (or) (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of permit, and may attach to any such permit any Condition it thinks fit : Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in application for the grant of a new permit under s.46 or s.54 during the pendency of the application: Provided further that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such application for renewal) (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s (1), a temporary permit may be granted thereunder in respect of any route or area where- (i) no permit could be Issued under s.48 or s.51 or s.54 in respect of that route or area by reason of an order of a Court or, other competent authority restraining the issue of the same, for a period not exceeding the period for which the issue of the permit has been so restrained; or (ii) as a result of the suspension by a Court or other competent authority of the permit of any vehicle in respect of that route or area, there is no transport vehicle of the same class with a valid permit, In respect of that route or area, or there is no adequate number of such vehicles in respect of that route or area, for a period not exceeding the period of such suspension; Provided that the number of transport vehicle in respect of which the temporary permit is so granted shall not exceed the number of vehicles In respect of which the issue of a permit has been restrained or as the case may be, the permit has been suspended, will apply and will be of relevant consideration. 37. It was further contended by him that non issuance of a fresh notification, even on the basis of the determinations io the Case of R. Srihari Naidu v. Govt. of A.P., 1985 SC 864 which though has made the observations that applications under s.57(2) for the grant of stage carriage permits can be filed voluntarily and without any notification being issued in that behalf. of A.P., 1985 SC 864 which though has made the observations that applications under s.57(2) for the grant of stage carriage permits can be filed voluntarily and without any notification being issued in that behalf. When that is so, in the Case where stage carriage permits have been granted by a properly constituted RTA by considering application received in pursuance of a notification issued by an improperly constituted RTA and without itself issuing a flesh notification the question whether a fresh notification inviting fresh applications by the properly constituted Regional Transport Authority ought to have been issued or not or whether the property constituted Regional Transport Authority Could proceed to act to the earlier notification issued by the Secretary would be immaterial and of no consequence and the ultimate decision of the Appellate Authority (in this case the stage-carriage permit granted to the appellant had been set aside by the Appellate Authority) not to grant stage carriage permit to the appellant cannot be disturbed on this ground and secondly, the non issuance of a fresh notification by the property constituted Regional Transport Authority could, if at all be made a ground of attack by those persons who were unable to make applications because of such non issuance and not by the appellant who had made an application, the appellants Cannot ask for any Interference in this case. He further submitted that such would also be the position, even on the basis of the observations in the case of Bijoy Krishna Bhattacharjee v. The Regional Transport Authority Calcutta & ors (supra), which was cited by Mr. Chatterjee also Indicates that, that is why and since the permits in question in this question was temporary in nature, the case or D. Nataraja Mudaliar v. The Transport Authority, Madras (supra), will have no application and so also the case of Cumbum Roadways (P) Ltd v. Balaguru Bus Syndicate Pvt. Ltd etc. (supra) 38. It was the further and specific submissions of Mr. Moitra that under s.57 of the said Act, which lays down the procedure in applying for and granting permits, no application is either required to be filed or invited, and in view of the amendment incorporated in s.6l(1) of the said Act by the.... West Bengal amendment s.47 has also been Included So the said s.62 will now have application in cases coming under ss. West Bengal amendment s.47 has also been Included So the said s.62 will now have application in cases coming under ss. 47 and 57 of the said Act. 39. Mr. Moitra, in his usual fairness submitted that under the scheme of the said Act or the said Rulas, there is no provision for creation of by routes and the right to ply a Mini Bus is a fundamental right of a holder of permit of the same under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, subject or course to the reasonable restrictions as imposed by the said Act Thus Mr. Moitra, in effect admitted that such right as mentioned earlier will not be an absolute or unfettered, right. To substantiate his submissions, reliance was placed by Mr. Moitra to the case of Saghir Ahmed & Anr. V. State of UP &Ors., AIR 1954 SC 728 , which has laid down inter alia amongst others that the right of the public to use motor vehicles on the public road cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a right created by the Motor Vehicles Act. The right exists anterior to any legislation on this subject as an incident of public rights over a highway. This State only controls and regulates it for the purpose of ensuring safety, peace, health and good morals of the public. Once the position is accepted that it member of the public is entitled to ply motor vehicles on the public road as an Incident of his right of passage over highway, the question is really immaterial whether be plies a vehicle fur pleasure or pastime or for the purpose of trade and business. The nature of the right in respect to the highway is not in any way affected thereby and it cannot be said that the user of a public road for purposes of trade is an extraordinary or special use of the highway which can be acquired only under special sanction from the State and has also indicated that the American doctrine of franchise has no place in our Constitution. Under the Indian Constitution the contract carriers as well as the common carriers would occupy the same position so far as the guaranteed right under Articles 19 (1)(g) is concerned and both are liable to be controlled by appropriate regulations under clause (6) of that Article, apart from indicating that within the limits imposed by State regulations any member of the public can ply motor vehicles on a public road. To that extent he can also carry on the business of trans porting passengers with the aid of the vehicles. It is to this carrying on of the trade or business that the guarantee in Article 19(1)(g) is attracted and a citizen can leg timately complain if any legislation takes away or curtails that right any more than is permissible under clause (6) of that Article. 40. In the case of The Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Bairagarh, Bhopal (MP) v. B.P. Upadhyaya etc. AIR 1966 SC 156 , while dealing with the expression "particular temporary need" or the meaning thereof if such need can co-exist with permanent need for a particular route, It has been observed that the view that whenever there was a permanent Deed there could be no temporary need and so temporary permit could not be granted under s.62(c) is erroneous There, is no reason why the clause in s.62(c) that the Regional Transport Authority may grant a temporary permit "to meet a particular temporary need", should be given any special or restricted meaning. There is no antithesis between a particular temporary need and a permanent need. These two kinds of need may co-exist on a particular route. The sub section (c) of s.62 thus contemplates that there may exist a temporary need for transport facilities on a particular route even in case of permanent need for such facilities. Where, therefore, the Regional. Transport Authority considered that, in a case of a permanent need for transport facility, there was also a particular temporary need and granted it temporary permit to the appellant his action cannot be challenged as legally Invalid and construction of s.62 of the said Act it has further been indicated that the contention that the words "in any case " in s.62 mean that under no circumstances a temporary permit can be granted on any route for more than a total period of 4 months is not correct. These words do not mean in any circumstances" The section means that at anyone lime the Regional Transport Authority is not permitted to issue to any person a temporary permit for a period exceeding 4 months, but where the temporary need persists, where, for example, the formalities under s.57 are not completed within a period of 4 months, the Regional Transport Authority can grant a second temporary permit in order to meet the temporary need and the Regional Transport. Authority, however, cannot abuse its power by going on granting temporary permits in quick succession and not take speedy action for completing the procedure under s.57. Where upon the facts of any particular case it is apparent that he is so abusing his powers his action is liable to be corrected by granting a writ, but were no such abuse of power is alleged or shown, the mere fact that he has granted a temporary permit for a second time and the total duration of the two periods is more than 4 month, would not invalidate the second permit and on the basis or such observations, Mr. Moitra submitted that the said RTA has not thus acted in abuse of their powers in this case. He of course in his usual fairness stated in case of abuse of such power or abusive use or the same, this Court will certainly ban jurisdiction and power to interfere. But since such is not the case here and power has duly been exercised in terms of s.62 of the said Act by the laid RTA this Court should not make any Interference it was claimed by Mr. Moitra that the determinations in the Case of A. Viswanathan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal pondicherry & any (supra) as the same was not a Case grant of successive temporary permit or permits of the present nature. Mr. Moitra also pointed out that since the resolution in question has not been challenged, the determinations In the case of B.S. Minhas v. The Indian Statistical Institute & Anr. (supra), will also have the same fate like the earlier case as mentioned above. 41. Mr. Mr. Moitra also pointed out that since the resolution in question has not been challenged, the determinations In the case of B.S. Minhas v. The Indian Statistical Institute & Anr. (supra), will also have the same fate like the earlier case as mentioned above. 41. Mr. Moitra also submitted that for no fault on their part the respondent offer letter holders are suffering or are bound to suffer much and immensely as on receipt of the offer letters, they have arranged for finance in many oases for securing the vehicles and many of them have aha got their vehicles ready He submitted that even for any irregular or invalid decision of the said RTA if the same is found, those offer letter holders must not he made to suffer. Apart from the above, it was submitted by Mr. Moitra that the balance of convenience in this case. which should be In favour of providing more Mini Buses, for the convenience of traveling public, must also be considered and such consideration should be the prime and fort most consideration and as such also, this Court should not make such order, whereby the number of Mini Buses, the permits whereof are sought to be granted, are decreased in support of such submissions, Mr. Moitra firstly referred to the case of E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd. & ors. V. State of Tamil Nadu & ors, AIR 1985 SC 753 , where dealing with the question of closure of an old Sugar factory, the Supreme Court has issued various directions for having the factory run as it was felt that without such order, not only large number of workmen but also procurers of sugarcane, will be adversely affected. Secondly, Mr. Moitra referred to the case of Sri Harminder Singh Wrora v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1527 . In that case tenders were invited for supply of fresh buffalo and cow milk. The appellant who was eligible and had been supplying milk and was also on approved list submitted tenders. The General Manager Government Milk Scheme filed tenders but it was in respect of pasteurized milk and not fresh milk. The milk supplied by the Milk Scheme also required re-pasteurization which entailed an additional cost. The appellant who was eligible and had been supplying milk and was also on approved list submitted tenders. The General Manager Government Milk Scheme filed tenders but it was in respect of pasteurized milk and not fresh milk. The milk supplied by the Milk Scheme also required re-pasteurization which entailed an additional cost. The appellants tender was the lowest but lender of Government Milk Scheme was accepted and it has been held that acceptance of tender by authorities was illegal and has to be quashed. It has also been indicated in that case, that the Instrumentalities of the state invited tenders for the supply of fresh buffaloes and cows milk and, therefore, this Case has to be decided on the basis of bid by the tenders. There was no question of any policy in this case it is open to the Stale to adopt a policy different from the one in question. But if the authority or the State Government chooses to invite tenders then it must abide by the result of the tender and cannot arbitrarily and capriciously accept the bid of the Milk Scheme although it was much higher and to the detriment of the Slate. The High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine by saying that the question relates to the contractual obligation and the policy relates to the contractual obligation and the policy decision cannot be termed as unfair or arbitrary There was no question of any policy decision in the instant case. The contract of supply of milk was to be given to the lowest bidder under the terms of the tender notice and the appellant being the lowest bidder he should have been granted the contract to supply, especially, when he has been doing so for the last so many years and it is true that the Government may enter into a contract with any person but in so doing the State or its instrumentalities cannot act arbitrarily. In the Instant case, tenders were invited and the appellant and Milk Scheme submitted their tenders. The tenders were to be adjudged on their own intrinsic merits in accordance with the terms and conditions of the tender notice. The Case third referred to, was that of Randhir Randhir Singh v. Union of India & ors. In the Instant case, tenders were invited and the appellant and Milk Scheme submitted their tenders. The tenders were to be adjudged on their own intrinsic merits in accordance with the terms and conditions of the tender notice. The Case third referred to, was that of Randhir Randhir Singh v. Union of India & ors. (1982) SCC 618, where the Supreme Court has indicated that word 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women' in Article 39(d) means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. The word 'Socialist' in the Premable to the Constitution, if does not mean 'to each according to his need', must mean 'equal pay for equal work' The Directive Principles have to be read into the Fundamental Rights as a matter of interpretation, apart from indicating that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government If anything, by reason of their investitures with the 'powers,. functions and privileges of police office’, their duties and responsibilities are more arduous There is, therefore, no reason for giving them a lower scale of pay them other. The argument that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different department is and that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not a principle which the courts may recognise and act upon is unsound. The Court, therefore, directed the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force al lea it on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force and fourthly reference was made to the case of Hira Lal v. The District Judge, Ghaziabad & ors., AIR 1984 SC 1212 , where appellant to a candidate of Scheduled caste was denied, without following the roster register contemplated by Government Order, on the ground, that more than 21% of the posts in Grade III, In which the said post fell, were already being manned by people belonging to Scheduled Caste at the relevant time, was not proper. 42. We have Indicated curlier and that too, on the basis of the submissions as made by Mr. 42. We have Indicated curlier and that too, on the basis of the submissions as made by Mr. Mootra the Categories and class of offer letter holders, who have filed applications for addition of parties After being added those added respondents also made applications for vacating, carrying or modifying the subsisting interim order. The applicants in the application of Asit Baran Roy Chowdhury and others would come within the first category which was mentioned by Mr. Moitra i.e. they had produced their vehicles. Those applicants have adopted the arguments of Mr. Moitra, the particulars whereof have been indicated hereinbefore. The applicants in the application of Ranjit Kumar Saha and others, Ashck Kumar Chakraborty and Avijit Bagchi and so also the applicant in the application of Smt. Reba Karmakar have produced their vehicles within 150 days i.e. in terms of the offer letter. The applicants in the application of Indro Deb Saha and others would come within the second category as mentioned by Mr. Moitra it would appear that another applicant Debashis Chakraborty in spite of taking all due steps by him in terms of the offer letter has said not to have received the necessary permit above. There were three other sets of applications filed through Dipak Kumar Middy and others, Subhas Mondal and others and Nomita Dey. Those applicants claimed, that they got their respective vehicles registered and deposited the permit fees, but could not get the necessary permits, because of the subsisting interim orders. We should. Indicate that they got them serves added on the plea that they were and are vitally interested in this proceeding like the other applicants, whose Particulars have been mentioned here therefore. The learned Advocates appearing for Asit Baran Roy Chowdhury and others and Indro Deb Saba and others, adopted the submissions as made by Mr. Moitra, in addition to their further plea that not only the writ application but also the appeal was not maintainable and such was also the claim of the applicants in the application of Ranjit Kumar Saha, Ashok Kumar Chakraburty and Avijit Bagchi and they further claimed that the writ application was not maintainable as the same was not presented with the leave to move the same in a representative capacity. They also submitted on the question of promissory estoppel and contended that since they have really acted to their detriment on the premise of the RTA no order could be made by this Court by which their in erest will be jeopardised, apart from such submissions, it was also claimed by them that they having belonging to Scheduled Casters or Scheduled tribes their applications should have been preferred under s.4 (1A) of the said Act, which postulates that the Government of a State shall reserve in that State certain percentage of stage carriage permits for the Scheduled Cases and Scheduled Tribes and the explanations ale under that sub-s (1A) was pointed out to mean "Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes’ as assigned in Article 366 of the Constitution of India. For the scope of the grant of permits under the said Act, reference was made to the Case of G. Veerapaa Pilai etc. v. Raman & Raman Ltd., Kumabakonam etc & ors. (supra), which has laid down such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or ill violation of the principles of nataral justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the Jurisdiction may be it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken of the order to be made. The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation No one is entitled to permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. There is a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters ale to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievancess or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had, apart from indicating that the issue of a permit for a bus which falls within the definition of a "stage carriage" is not dependent on the ownership of the vehicle. All that is required for obtaining a permit is possession of the bus. On the basis of the above determinations and since it was claimed that Injustice Was not duly proved which was also claimed to be the objective tests, it was claimed specifically that the writ petition, so also the appeal as taken therefrom should be dismissed. 43. Before we take up the submissions as advanced by the learned Advocate General, we think that for proper appreciation of the defence as mentioned hereinbefore, the terms of the offer letters which is inter alia to the following effect :- "this offer letter is issued for placing vehicle on route against available vacancies thereon, on "first come first serve" basis at their own risk and this shall remain valid for 150 days within which you must place vehicle on route after observing all formalities, otherwise, the offer letter shall stand cancelled automatically without making any further reference to you", should be Indicated. 44. Mr. Guptoo, the learned Advocate General, submitted and that too in terms of the submissions or Mr. Moitra, that neither the said Association nor the members or constituents of the same, had any legal right in this Case which has been infringed and as such, they had no locus standi to move this Court. 44. Mr. Guptoo, the learned Advocate General, submitted and that too in terms of the submissions or Mr. Moitra, that neither the said Association nor the members or constituents of the same, had any legal right in this Case which has been infringed and as such, they had no locus standi to move this Court. The relevant facts on the basis whereof such submissions were advanced by the learned Advocate General have been indicated here-in-before it was further submitted by him that it was not true to contend or suggest even that the permits or the offer letters in the instant case, were issued in derogation of the provisions of the said Act or the said Rules and in fact, he claimed that such offer letters were issued for augmentation of the routes and that too, with the consent of the concerned authorities He claimed that since the permits as involved, were of temporary nature, so s.50 of the said Act was duly followed and as such there was total compliance with the provisions of the statute and that being the position, in terms of the division Bench determinations of the Assam High Court in the Case of Krishna Mohon Sarkar v. The State Transport Authorities & Ors, AIR 1971 A&N 166. there should not be any interference by this Court and more particularly when, the concerned augmentation was sought to be made for increasing the fleet strength for the purpose. of meeting public convenience which should and must be the foremost consideration under the said Act. In that cue, it has been observed by the Division Bench, while construing s.64A of the said Act, that an order of the RTA granting contract carriage permit to 13 applicants out of 250 as against lesser number of five or more permits advertised does not violate 250 or other provisions and the order of the STA under s.64A setting aside RTA’s order constitute an error of law apparent on the face of the record and can be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 45. 45. Apart from the above, the learned Advocate General also contended that this Court should not make any interference, since firstly, there is no challenge to the amendment as incorporated in s.62 of the said Act, secondly the notification/advertisement dated 4th August 1986, has not been challenged, thirdly there is no challenge to the resolution in question, and fourthly, he pointed out that the offer letters not having been challenged this court will not be justified in making any in reference. Those submissions were made by the learned Advocate General, in addition to his earlier submissions on locus standi and he further claimed that as the said Association was not a concerned Syndicate of the routes as involved where augmentation has been made and furthermore the concerned Association of the Routes, where augmentation bas been made, having agreed, this Court will not also have any jurisdiction to interfere as admittedly, in terms or his earlier submission neither the said association nor their members or constituents will have the necessary locus standi to move this court. 46. He further pointed our that the said Association is not an Association or a Syndicate of a particular route, so they cannot be said to be an aggrieved party, more particularly when there has been no breach of law in the instant case. The learned Advocate General specifically stated that by the action is sought to be impeached, the said RTA has not taken any decision to issue new permits but such decisions on augmentation as mentioned "hove, was actually taken for serving the interest of the traveling public. 47. Replying to the submissions as referred to hereinbefore and which were made by Mr. Moitra and the learned Advocate General and so also the other learned Advocates supporting them, Mr. 47. Replying to the submissions as referred to hereinbefore and which were made by Mr. Moitra and the learned Advocate General and so also the other learned Advocates supporting them, Mr. Chatterjee referred to paragraph 5 of the writ petition which gives the particulars of the routes and route numbers, the operators wherein are the members of the said Association and where it has been claimed that the said Association represents the mini bus operators if the concerned Mini bus routes, apart from referring to a letter No 3043 STA/7A/13/86 dated 17th March, 1986, which was addressed to the Regional Transport Authority, Howrah by the Deputy Secretary, STA, West Bengal and the contents whereof Indicated that a letter from shri Laxmi Das, General Secretary, Mini Bus Co-ordination Committee the said Association was entertained for taking necessary decision. Let the copy of the said letter as produced be kept to the record and let it also be indicated that a copy of this letter was also banded over to the learned Advocates appearing against Mr. Chatterjee. On the basis of the above facts amongst others, Mr. Chatterjee claimed and contended, which we also feei with justification that there is no basis on the submission of the answering respondents that the said Association has no locus standi in the instant case and such findings of ours will also be supporred from the decisions as cited by Mr. Chatterjee and the particulars whereof are given hereafter in support of his submissions, Mr. Chatterjee firstly, referred to the case of, Jatindra Nath Set v. Jadavpur University, ILR 1960(2) Cal 311 where while dealing with a case under the Jadavpur University Act, 1965. It has been observed amongst other after careful consideration of the provisions of the several deeds of trust, it is clear that the Jadavpur University Act has given due recognition to the National Council of Education and has sought to carefully preserve the sanctity of the provisions of the several Deeds of Trust Further the applicant not being a Trustee nor a beneficiary under such Trust Deeda, has no locus standi to correct private breaches of trust, if any, unless such breaches of trust are unconstitutional or ultra vires. On the analogy of the findings as above, Mr. On the analogy of the findings as above, Mr. Chatterjee contended that there to the facts of the case, it would not be proper to say, on consideration of the character and manner of their formation, that the said Association will have no locus standi to maintain this proceedings. It was also Mr. Chatterjee's submissions, on the basis of the observations in the Case of Bhabataran Paul v. Bhamini Ranjan Chatterjee. ILR (1962) 2 Cal 493, that the actions in this case was patently without jurisdiction or in absence of the same, even a stranger, least to speak of the said Association, could move this Court. He secondly referred to the case of Gadda Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of A.P. & ors, AIR 1960 SC 828, where it has been observed that is petitioner who seeks to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution should "ordinarily" be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary Interest: it can also relate to an Interest of a trustee. That apart in exceptional Cases, as the expression "ordinarily" indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter thereof. Thirdly, he referred to the Administrative law (5th Edition) by HWR Wade. In fact, Mr. Chatterjee made specific reference to the following :- "A recurrent theme of the speeches in the Inland Revenue Commissioners case is the 'change in legal policy' which has greatly relaxed the rules about standing in recent years. This was put at its highest by Lord Diplock, who related it to 'that progress towards a comprehensive system of administrative law that I regard as having been the greatest achievement of the English courts in my judicial lifetime He spoke of 'a virtual abandonment of the former restrictive rules as to the locus standi of applicants for prerogative orders and he approved the widest implications of the award of prohibition to a citizen seeking to prevent a local authority from licsesing indecent films. He also approved the eloquent words of Lord Denning M.R. in the same case : I regard it as a matter of high constitutional principle that if there is good ground for supposing that a government department or a public authority is transgressing the law, or is about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures thousands of Her Majesty's subjects, then any one of those offended or Injured can draw it to the attention of the court of law and seek' to have the law enforced, and the courts in their discretion can grant whatever remedy is appropriate. Lord Diplock expressed the same point in his own words: It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public spirited taxpayer, were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped. Although Lord Diplock's speech was the most far-reaching in its terms, it is fully consistent with the majority view that the real question is whether the applicant can show some substantial default or abuse and not whether his personal rights or interests are involved. 48. In effect, therefore a citizen's action or actio popularis, is in principle allowable in suitable cases Whether the case is suitable will depend upon the whole factual and statutory context, including any Implications that can fairly be drawn from the statute as to who are the right persons to apply for remedies. In fact the possibility of a citizen's action has long existed in the case of the prerogative remedies, but now the court may, In its discretion, grant a declaration or an injunction also Although the House of Lords had laid it down in 1977 that only the Attorney-General could sue on behalf of the public for the purpose of preventing public wrongs, and that declaration could be granted only to litigants whose own legal position was in issue, the House held that these sweeping statements were Inapplicable to judicial review of governmental power, to the prerogative remedies and to declaration and injunction available in the same procedure under Order 53. Lord Diplock pointed out that neither the Attorney. Lord Diplock pointed out that neither the Attorney. General's practices, nor the doctrine of ministerial responsibility to Parliament, were adequate to fill the 'grave lacuna' which would exist otherwise it would seem, a fortiori, that under Order 53 a ratepayer will now have standing to challenge the legality of his local authority's actions without needing to enlist the aid of the Attorney-General, provided only that he can show a good case and fourthly, he made a reference to the Case of D.S. Nakara & Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 (supra), where, while dealing with the question of locus standi of a Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act and constituting of public spirited citizens, It has been indicated that seeking to espouse case of retirees who are unable to seek redress individually relief can be obtained through a party who is not affected personally. We further feel that the question of locus standi and the manner and form in which the same has been sought to be raised in this case, have lost signification and importance in view of the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1981) SCC 87, which is Popularly known as Judge. Transfer case where the Supreme Court entertained writ application of petitioners, who moved the same for the benefit of some others, who were not before the Court and also in view of the determinations to the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 , where the Supreme Court, on consideration of the language of the Article 32 has indicated that the same do not mention who alone has to move the Court to invoke its jurisdiction and concluded that any citizen can do it. In fact, that application was filed by an organization dedicated to the Cause of releasing bonded labourers from their surfdom 49. The orthodox idea or locus stundi bas taken a radical change on the basis of the Supreme Court determinations as above amongst other and even in spite of the representative character of the said Association if we uphold the submission of the answering respondents on the point, that would not be fair but the same would be too narrow and not in keeping with the recent trend of the judgments. So, we hold that the writ petition so also the appeal as taken by the said Association and their members and associates would be maintainable and thus the submissions on locus standi as advanced by the answering respondents, cannot be accepted. 50. While repiying to the submissions on the question of delay, Mr. Chatterjee indicated that by the order dated 17th February 1987, this Court bad earlier and in fact directed the said RTA, not to issue permits in excess of the numbers as advertised and the Secretary of the said RTA, by his letter dated 2nd March 1987, agreed and undertook to comply with that order, but on 4th March 1987, the appellants learnt that the said RTA was going to give permits in excess of the notification dated 4th August 1987 and in Violation of their undertaking as mentioned above and as such, the appellants moved the concerned writ petition in this Court on 6th March 1987. Such being the position, we also agree with the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee that there was in fact no laches or any negligence on the part of the appellants in coming to this court and so the submissions of the answering respondents on the ground of delay, cannot be accepted. It should be indicated here that Mr. Samanta stated that from the order dated 17th February 1987, an appeal has been taken and the said appeal is pending. 51. Mr. Chatterjee also pointed out that in the notification dated 4th August 1986, there has been no declared vacancy in respect of Route Nos.8, 13, 28, 29, 31, 37 and 66 yet offer letters have been issued in those routes and be also pointed out that the said RTA., if at all, invited application by the laid notification in respect of the Route Nos. 1, 2, 5, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 43, 46, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67 and 69 Mr. Chatterjee also placed reliance on the determination in the case of Rameshwar Prasad v. The State of U.P. (1983) 2 SCC 195 , for the purpose of indicating, what is meant by "public Interest" as used in s.43A of the laid Act. Chatterjee also placed reliance on the determination in the case of Rameshwar Prasad v. The State of U.P. (1983) 2 SCC 195 , for the purpose of indicating, what is meant by "public Interest" as used in s.43A of the laid Act. The Supreme Court has observed while dealing with the U.P. amendment in respect of s.43A of the said Act to mean that as its stand after its amendment, it should be read subject to the amendment brought about by the Parliament by Act 47 of 1978 in s.47. The amendments made by the Parliament will have overriding effect on s. 43A as it stood prior to 1976 amendment by the State Legislature and a Court when called upon to interpret an amended provisions it has to bear in mind the history of the provisions, the mischief which the Legislature admitted to remedy, the remedy provided by the amendment and the reason providing for such amendment it has also been observed that the various provisions of the Act show how much attention is given by it is various matter a affecting public interest and any direction given by the State Government under s.43A should therefore, be in conformity with all matters regarding which the statute has made provisions, apart from indicating that in such situation, to say that any number of permits ran be issued to any eligible operator without any upper limit, is to overstep the limit of delegation of statute power and to make a mockery of an important economic activity like the motor transport. It was further pointed out by Mr. Chatterjee that temporary permit, if at all, can be issued in a Case like this under s.62(c) of the said Act and there his been no evidence of such exigencies as mentioned in the ssaid s.62(c) in this case. It was also contended by him that against the permanent vacancies no temporary permit can he issued and thus the rule as mentioned In the case of A. Viswanathan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal pondicherry & Anr, (supra), will apply in this case and will not authorities the said RTA in the matter of making the grants as indicated and is impeached in this proceeding. Mr. Chatterjee also referred to and indicated that the observations as made in the case of Bijoy Krishna Bhattacharjee & Ors. v. The Regional Transport Authority Calcutta & Ors. Mr. Chatterjee also referred to and indicated that the observations as made in the case of Bijoy Krishna Bhattacharjee & Ors. v. The Regional Transport Authority Calcutta & Ors. (supra), or the effect thereof, would mean that the said Association or their members and constitutions were entitled to make representations against the grants as sought to be made and for that they were entitled to some rational notice and such notice, not having admittedly been given to or received by them, the step as sought to be taken by the said RTA and more particularly when such notice as required were sought to be given by the said RTA, after the grants were made, was thoroughly unjustified. To establish that the concerned notices were given after the grants were made, Mr. Chatterjee referred to Memo Nos. RTA/2377/G dated 19th February 1987 and RTA/2229/G dated 17th February 1987 By the first letter the Secretary, Mini Bus Operators Association was informed that in order to meet the need of traveling public extension of the concerned route has been made by the Regional Transport Authority Board's meeting, held on 30th January 1987 on augmentation of fleet strength by five more public service vehicles in addition and by the second letter Sarbashree Sudhirsankar and Uday Sankar Saha were similarly informed in respect of Route No 108 and the addressees of both the letters were directed to ply their vehicles accordingly, after obtaining necessary entries on permit and fare-table in question Construing the two notice as mentioned above, Mr. Chatterjee pointed out that they were issued not prior to the decision to have the extension done but thereafter He further restated that public notification in terms of or in accordance with the determinations In the case of Bijoy Krishna Bhattacharjee & Ors. (supra), was not given in the instant case and it was also submitted by him that before taking the decision to grant extra vehicles on the routes in question, the appellants should have been notified. It was also claimed by him that there should have been resolution in the instant case to establish that there has been the existence of the concerned need and to establish whether such need should be permanent or temporary, Mr. Chatterjee firstly, referred to the case of Ram Dayal & Anr. It was also claimed by him that there should have been resolution in the instant case to establish that there has been the existence of the concerned need and to establish whether such need should be permanent or temporary, Mr. Chatterjee firstly, referred to the case of Ram Dayal & Anr. v State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors., AIR 1983 Rajasthan 172, where it has been observed that in a case where the scope of non temporary permits is increased, the question of temporary need arises only for the period during which non-temporary permits under the increased scope are to be finalized. This period cannot be a very long period and if the RTA thinks that the existing buses plied on the route cannot cater to the need of the traveling public and taking into consideration the traffic potentialities and public convenience it is necessary to grant temporary permits, it may certainly grant temporary permits. But while taking all these factors into consideration the RTA while granting temporary permits should also take into consideration whether the existing vehicles plied on the route by existing operation were insufficient to meet the current needs of the traveling public for a short duration till non temporary permits are granted on the Increased scope in a given case if the RTA arrives at the conclusion that the existing vehicles by increasing their trips can meet such temporary need, it should not grant temporary permits to new applicants but can fulfill the need of traveling public by adjusting or increasing the trips of the existing permit holders. If it is not possible to do so, then certainly the RTA should grant temporary permits to flesh applicants to meet the current needs of the traveling public Thirdly, reference was made by him to the observations that merely because vacancies are caused on account of revision of limit of permits on a route and the filling of such vacancies is likely to take some time, it could not be held to be a particular temporary need, unless the RTA also comes to the conclusion that the existing vehicles are insufficient to meet the Current needs of the traveling public. A temporary need may co-exist with a permanent need, but the mere repetition of this phrase by the RTA cannot be held to be sufficient for the purpose of justifying the grant of temporary permits unless a further finding is also recorded by the concerned Authority that such a temporary need does actually exist on the route in question as made in the case of Gafoor v. Regional Transport Authority, Jaipur Region & Ors. AIR 1976 Raj 166 Thirdly, reference was made by Mr. Chatterjee to the case of Shri Krishna Gopal Dutta v. Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan, AIR 1970 Cal 164 where it has been observed that the Regional Transport Authority must set out In the order authorizing the issue of a permit the purpose or the ground on which temporary permit is issued. This is necessary all the more because s.62 itself impose restrictions on the power to issue temporary permits The Regional Transport Authority is a statutory authority. It derives its power authority and jurisdiction, to issue or refuse permits, from the statute itself. Equally in exercising its power to grant a permit it must observe the limitations on its powers created by the statute. A statement of the purpose of the grant is necessary so that the order authorizing issue of a temporary permit may be open to scratiny, having regard to the restrictions created by the statute and the requirement in s.62 that a temporary permit can be granted only for one or other of the reasons set out under s.62 of the Act are conditions precedent to the exercise of the power to grant a temporary permit if one or other of these conditions precedent do 'not exit, or if the prohibition in the first or the second proviso to s. 62 is attracted, a temporary permit cannot be granted by the Regional Transport Authority it is well settled that where the exercise of jurisdiction is dependent upon the existence of conditions precedent, the authority exercising the jurisdiction of making an order in exercise thereof, must satisfy the Court that the condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction has been fulfilled Mr. Chatterjee, fourthly, referred to the case of The Punjab Transport Co-operative Societies Ltd. Amritsar, v. The State Transport commissioner, Chandigarh & Anr. Chatterjee, fourthly, referred to the case of The Punjab Transport Co-operative Societies Ltd. Amritsar, v. The State Transport commissioner, Chandigarh & Anr. AIR 1972 P&H 167 which, while dealing with the question of pressing need has observed that such need must be proved and grant, if any made, without hearing the interested person, are liable to be set aside in this case admittedly and as would appear from the recording made hereafter, that there has not only been no resolution with regard to such pressing need but Mr. Manik Chandra Das appearing for the said RTA, on being asked also indicated that resolution, if there be any, were not signed by all the attending members. 52. Mr. Chatterjee also referred to ss.43 and 44 of the said Act and indicated the background for which the State Government has kept with themselves the power to control road transport arid to constitute in the State, a State Transport Authority it was submitted by him that the said RTA in this case, was thus constitution by the State Government in terms of such powers as mentioned above and also for regulating the concerned powers of the said RTA but the said RTA have acted beyond their competence, power and jurisdiction and have misused the power, as vested in them. 53. It should be noted that the learned Advocate General appearing for the said RTA and to establish their case, during the Course of hearing and more particularly on 23rd June, 1986, had filed a Broad sheet, apart from a chart in three sheets, showing the position of Mini bus routes of RTA, Cal. Region as on 17th May, 1987. We direct those sheets to be kept In the record on a reference to those sheets the learned Advocate General wanted to contend that the said RTA has not really issued new permits, but permits on the basis of the offer letters as involved, have really been granted for augmenting the fleet strength of Mini buses on the route in question and that too, as mentioned earlier, for the convenience of the traveling public Mr. Chatterjee dealt with the several routes as mentioned to the broad sheet. Route No. 106 has been shown to ply from Santoshpur to B.B.D. Bag and Route No 106/1 from Ramlal Bazar to BBD Bag. It was pointed out that the said route is required to pass via Haltu. Chatterjee dealt with the several routes as mentioned to the broad sheet. Route No. 106 has been shown to ply from Santoshpur to B.B.D. Bag and Route No 106/1 from Ramlal Bazar to BBD Bag. It was pointed out that the said route is required to pass via Haltu. Kasba Rathtala, BB Chatterjee Road, Bijon Sethu, R.B Avenue, Sarat Bose Road, Lower Circular Road, Chowringhee, Birla Planetorlam, and Park Street for the purpose of reaching B.B.D. Bag, On the basis of the plying of the vehicles in those two routes, Mr. Chatterjee claimed that Route Nos. 106 and 106/1 were and are thus two routes although they are ending their journey at B.B.D. Bag. Such being the position, Mr. Chatterjee claimed that Route No 106/1 could not have been a complementary route of Route No.106 either on augmentation or on any ground, but the same was a new route. Then he took up Route No 108 and 108/1. Route No.108 as appeared from the broad sheet is from Kasba Rathtala to BBD, Bag and Route No 108/1 has also been shown to be from Kasba Rathtala to BBD Bag but the same runs from (Bosepukur) Kasba to Howrah Fire Service Station following Bosepukur, Eastern Bye-pass and reaching BBD Bag via Bijon Sethu, Gariahat and SN Banerjee Road Such being the condition and character of the plying of the two routes Mr. Chatterjee claimed them to be two different new routes So far Route No.112. which runs from Naktala to Howrah Fire Service Station and was claimed that the numbers in the said route were Sought to be increased on augmentation, Mr., Chatterjee pointed out, that even if the same was the case of augmentation, no objection certificate was obtained by the said RTA He then took up Route No. 113 from the broad sheet, which runs from Ranikuthi to Sait Lake (Tank No 8) via BBD Bag and pointed out that the Mini buses of that route are not really and admittedly plying upto Salt Lake and therefore there cannot be any question of any new vacancy. Thereafter, Mr. Thereafter, Mr. Chatterjee took up Route No.116, which runs from Lake Gardens to Howrah Fire Service station and pointed out that the Mini buses of this route were originally plying upto BBD Bag and still they are plying upto that place and if the numbers have been sought to be increased on augmentation, no objection certificate has been obtained Then, Mr. Chatterjee took up Route Nos. 131 and 131/1 Route No.131 runs from Joka to BBD Bag and Route no.131/1 has been shown to be plying from Amtala to Band Stand. It was indicated by Mr. Chatterjee Amtala is beyond Joka, if anyone travels from Calcutta and in fact, there was objection taken by Jokd Mini Bus Owners' Association on 26th June, 1987. In fact, before the said 26th June, 1987 objection there were other objection taken by the said Association on 15th January, 1987. 1st April, 1987 and 28th April 1987. The copies of the objection as mentioned above, were filed during the course of the hearing of the appeal by Mr. Chatterjee after supplying copies of them to his adversaries. We direct those copies to be kept in the record. It was stated by Mr. Chaterjee that even in, spite of such objections, steps have been taken by the said RTA in the matter of increasing the fleet strength of the concerned routes and as such, the submissions as put forward by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the said RTA that increase of number of permits be it on augmentation or otherwise, was done after considering the objections, was, not correct There after, Mr. Chatterjee cited Route No.133 which has been shown by the said RTA to be plying from Haridebpur to Dum Dum Park and they have claimed that the increase in number have been suggested on the basis of the principle of augmentation, after receiving no objection Mr. Chatterjee pointed out that the buses in these routes are not plying up to Dum Dum Park but in fact, they are plying upto band Stand and such being the position, there could not have been any else for increasing the fleet strength on the basis of augmentation as claimed. So far the mini bus Routes in Serial No. 40 of Broad sheet which has been claimed to be running from Birati to BBD Bag and for which no route number has been mentioned Mr. So far the mini bus Routes in Serial No. 40 of Broad sheet which has been claimed to be running from Birati to BBD Bag and for which no route number has been mentioned Mr. Chatterjee produced the objections of the Birati Mini Bus Owners' Association. Copies of these objections were a so handed over to the learned Advocates al appearing against him and we direct that the said objection, be kept in the record Thus Mr. Chatterjee Claimed that so far us this route is concerned, objection has been given, but the same has not been considered While on the Broad sheet, Mr. Chatterjee lastly, pointed out Route No.166 which is from Tangra Housing Estate to Kamar hati and in which case it has been claimed that the Increase in the fleet strength has been made on augmentation after receiving no objection, that the original route was only upto BBD Bag. 54. After referring to the above routes and his submissions as recorded hereinbefore, Mr. Chatterjee also claimed that under s.62(c) of the said Act a specific resolution was necessary but unfortunately there has been no such resolution and as such, the increase In the number of fleet strength, be it on augmentation or otherwise cannot he allowed. We have indicated earlier, that on being asked to produce resolution, if any, on the point. Mr. Das made his submissions as Indicated above. Although there was admittedly no such resolution, hilt it appeared from the pleading of the said RTA that in or about April, 1986, there has been a resolution empowering the Secretary of the said RTA to consider the case of grant of temporary permit or to fill up the vacancies against permanent routes or to have the fleet strength augmented. Such empowering of the Secretary 'of the said RTA was claimed by both Mr. Chatterjee and his junior Mr. Banerjee to be illegal, irregular and contrary to the provisions of the said Act. 55. Apart from the above, both Mr. Chatterjee and Mr. Such empowering of the Secretary 'of the said RTA was claimed by both Mr. Chatterjee and his junior Mr. Banerjee to be illegal, irregular and contrary to the provisions of the said Act. 55. Apart from the above, both Mr. Chatterjee and Mr. Banerjee pointed out, the terms as contained in the offer letters and submitted that since by such terms in case vacancies are not available in the available routes the offer letter holders have been asked to elect routes of their choise in the matter of placing their vehicles the entire action should be deemed to be not bona fide and the same was contrary to s.50 of the said Act. In fact, it was contended and claimed, that the terms of the offer letters was nothing but terms containing secret manner or dealing of the permits by the offer letter holders at the instance or the said RTA or its Secretary and as such entire action was nothing but an instance and example of maladministration. In the case of Vivekanand Travels v. Secy. Transport Authority, Calcutta, 91 CWN 491, a Division Bench of this Court has indicated how records are to be maintained and such maintenance of record as Indicated In the said Act are mandatory, so also the recording of reasonings and it would not be proper if reasons ale recorded subsequently apart from indicating that the purpose of good administration, should mean and necessitates openness fairness and impartiality for promoting and securing welfare of the citizens and to assert such openness, fairness and impartiality the administration should be free from influence of calculated secrecy, unfairness and partiality. In the field of tribunals and/or quasi judicial authorities openness requires the publicity of proceedings and knowledge of the essential reasoning underlying the decision Reference to the above Case was really made by Mr. Banerjee. For supporting and augmenting the submissions of the appellants as recorded hereinbefore. It was specifically Indicated that such openness of mind, which was required, was absent after 2nd March 1987, since after filling up the necessary vacancies, there has been no notification made or published. The appellants made it clear also, that their challenge was really not against the decision to grant 123 permits, but they are challenging in this proceedings, the action sought to be taken subsequent thereto viz. The appellants made it clear also, that their challenge was really not against the decision to grant 123 permits, but they are challenging in this proceedings, the action sought to be taken subsequent thereto viz. the grant of offer letters, much in excess than that what was notified on 4th August 1986 and as such, It was claimed that the absence of challenge to the said notification, would not be fatal Such submissions of the appellants were with reasons and justification and as such, we uphold the same and consequently, the arguments of the answering respondents on the point, cannot be accepted. 56. Before we take up the last and a very important point for consideration, we think that it would be better, if we keep our findings on the points as indicated hereinbefore, to addition to the other findings, which we have already recorded. 57. The permits through the offer letters in question, in this Case could only be granted to the offer letter holders or to anyone, on satisfaction of s.62(c) of the said Act only or on establishment of the fact that there was been a proper resolution to that effect under the said s 62(c), and since there has admittedly been no such resolution, the action as impeached cannot be allowed to be continued. Apart from the above, it should also be noted that the action as impeached, was really sought to be taken wit bout due opportunities to the appellants, their members and associates, who were and are pliers to the respective routes, and as such also the same was bad, void and irregular. We also hold that before taking the decision to giant extra vehicles on the routes in question, the appellants should have been duly notified. 58. On the basis of the submissions as made by the learned Advocates and testing them with the determinations in the cases as cited at the Bur we find that the need of placing extra vehicles as a temporary measure, has not been duly established. In fact, we were not shown any resolution with any due and cogent reasons, that such placement of extra Mini Buses, was required and necessary. The said RTA was required to indicate and satisfy the existence of such necessary reasons before taking the decision to grant extra Mini Bus permits. In fact, we were not shown any resolution with any due and cogent reasons, that such placement of extra Mini Buses, was required and necessary. The said RTA was required to indicate and satisfy the existence of such necessary reasons before taking the decision to grant extra Mini Bus permits. But they have failed to do so to the absence of such and necessary reasons in support of the extra grants as sought to be made, It becomes difficult for this Court, to uphold their decision in any event, temporary permits as in this case, be it for augmentation of the fleet strength for serving the cause of the public or their need, would not be enough and such grants or action on that basis, cannot be allowed, unless the case can be brought within the four corners of s.62 of the said Act The case on augmentation, as was sought to be made now by the said RTA in our view bas not been established but the same has also no concern under s.62. of the said Act. We further hold that compliance with the provisions of s.62 of the said Act in a Case of the present nature, was mandatory and such conditions precedent in this case, have not been followed. 59. On consideration of the Broad Sheet and the other sheets as filed and the submissions as made on their basis, we find it difficult also to agree with the submissions of the respondent that the extra permit to the offer letter holders, were sought to be issued for augmenting the number of the Mini Buses and that too for the Purposes as Mentioned above. We restate that while taking steps for augmentation, the provisions of s.62 of the said Act cannot be overlooked or given a go by. We are further of the view, that in purporting to augment the fleet strength and that too for the purposes as mentioned, at least for many routes as mentioned earlier, new routes have been sought to be opened and introduced. Such action was certainly unauthorized as they were taken without duly following the necessary formalities under the said Act. 60. We are further of the view, that in purporting to augment the fleet strength and that too for the purposes as mentioned, at least for many routes as mentioned earlier, new routes have been sought to be opened and introduced. Such action was certainly unauthorized as they were taken without duly following the necessary formalities under the said Act. 60. Apart from the above, there admittedly being no specific resolution under s.62 of the said Act, the action of the said RTA as impeached, must be set aside and cannot be upheld it is needless to point out that the choice as given to the offer letter holders, to elect routes or their choice, in the matter of placing their vehicles. In case they cannot be provided with such placement of their vehicles, was not only void and arbitrary but the same has really opened floodgate for manipulation, which is not desirable and such action would be contrary to the provisions of s.50 of the said Act or would give rise to the power being not exercised bona fide or dealing the matter in a secret manner. 61. On our request Mr. Manik Chandra Das produced the Minutes of Public Vehicles Department of RTA Calcutta Region, starting from the proceedings of the meeting of the RTA Calcutta Region held on 16.4.1986 and 18.4.1986 to the proceedings of the Board meeting of the said RTA held on 30.1.1987. It would appear that under the miscellaneous item of the agenda of the meeting of 14.11.1986, the following resolution. Miscellaneous items The following miscellaneous hems wire taken up under permission of the Chairmen for discussion and decision. A. the Board considered the submission of Sri Bhabesh Moitra the renowned educationist and public leader in respect of plight of the residents of Salt Lake area for adequate transport service. The Board appreciated the difficulties confronting the people of Salt Lake area particularly of Sector. III in view of which the Board decided that stage carriage route No.230 be bifurcated info two sub routes namely Rt. No. 239 and 239 A the former plying along the schedule alignment and the later plying from GD Block (Homeopathic Colleges) of Sector III to Band Stand via Board Way-HA and IA Blooks 8th Ave Purbachal. EM By Pass Chingrihata then following the alignment of stage carriage Rt.No. 239. B. Secy, RTA, Cal. No. 239 and 239 A the former plying along the schedule alignment and the later plying from GD Block (Homeopathic Colleges) of Sector III to Band Stand via Board Way-HA and IA Blooks 8th Ave Purbachal. EM By Pass Chingrihata then following the alignment of stage carriage Rt.No. 239. B. Secy, RTA, Cal. brought to the notice all the members of the Board about large number of vacancies existing on some stage carriage rts. The Board decided that wide publicity be made involving applications from the eligible candidates through news dailies of importance for filling up the vacancy and in this respect Secy, RTA, was requested to take all necessary steps. C. The question of considering the model of Minibus for plying in the rts under the jurisdiction of this RTA came up for discussion. The Board brought to the notice of all the member of the RTA Board that quite a few number of applicants have been receiving by this authority in response to its advertisement dt. 4.9.86 wherein the applicants have showed Mini Bus model below 1979 whereas year 1976 has been stipulated as one of the O/Ls The members of the Board decided that as flow of application was exhautice out of which the authority expected to have good member of current models and that the people of Cal should not be provided with below model old vehicles. The Board decided that models of mini bus should not be lowered down below 1976 and the condition as already stipulated in the OL should stand was adopted. It will also appear that on the question of augmentation of fleet strength of certain Mini bus route, the Board delegated the power in to the Secy, RTA, Calcutta Region for augmenting the fleet strength of certain Mini bus as per expediency with the view to accommodating the applicants who have already come up with ready carriages but unable to get permit owing to the vacancy on the route applied for being filled up meantime. 62. It is strange that the question of increasing the number of Mini Buses was not in the agenda, but the concerned resolution was passed and so also the power for augmentation was delegated to the Secretary of the said RTA Mr. 62. It is strange that the question of increasing the number of Mini Buses was not in the agenda, but the concerned resolution was passed and so also the power for augmentation was delegated to the Secretary of the said RTA Mr. Chatterjee submitted that such delegation to the Secretary of the said RTA was not proper, valid, legal and bona fide or the concerned delegation was made by the Board in excess of their power, competence and jurisdiction Rule 54 of the said Rules deal with the conduct of business of Trans Port Authorities and sub-rule (1) thereunder lays down that State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority may by resolution recorded in its proceeding and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the resolution, delegate, to the Secretary power with respect to all or any of the following matters, namely:- (1) The grant of contract carriage or private carrier’s permit or temporary permits under clauses (b) and (c) of s.62, so, however, that the power so delegated shall not extend to the refusal to grant any permit, or to the grant of a permit for contract carriage when representation may have been made by any person under the provisions of s.50 unless the Secretary has been specifically authorized to refuse a permit or to grant such a permit to a particular case: (2) the renewal of stage carriage or public carrier permits under sub-s (2) of s.58 when no representations under provisions of s.57 have been received : (3) the issue of duplicates in place of permits lost, destroyed mutilated under rule 80 of these rules : (4) the permission for replacement of an existing vehicle covered by permit under the provisions of sub s.(2) of s.59 : (5) the grant of authorities to drive a public service vehicle under the provisions of rule 4 of these rules : (6) the grant of relaxation on respect of the provisions of rule 128, rule 129 or rule 131 of these rules; (7) the declaration in respect of any person under sub-s.(1) of s.16 that such person is disqualified for a specified period for holding or obtaining a licence to drive transport vehicles in the State ; (8) the grant of countersignature of permits for a period not exceeding three months under s.63 of the Act read with rule 63 of these rules, and (9) the grant of extension of time for the registration of vehicles by the persons to whom transport permits have been sanctioned by the Regional Transport Authority under rule 61 of these rules; Provided that the power exercised by be Secretary in respect of any of the matter referred to in clause (1) to (9), shall be subject to the approval of the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the ease may be, at its next meeting, and that being the position, it cannot be doubted or it should be observed that power to the Secretary of the said RTA could be delegated in terms of Rule 54(1) and in case of such delegation, he should use such power as indicate in the Rule and not otherwise and the question of augmentation of fleet strength of Mini Buses, could not have either been delegated to him or he could use such power authoritatively under those provisions Thus the authorization as made, was improper and irregular it should also be noted that the resolution dates 16.4.1986 and 18.4.1986 were not under s.62(c) of the said Act and there has been no particular or specific need disclosed. When the need was actually and only to accommodate some persons, who could not succeed in the matter of placing their vehicles in the circumstances as mentioned earlier, the grant in their favour cannot certainly be brought under or within the purview of the provisions of s.62 of the said. It was also pointed out that immediately after the undertaking given by the Secretary of the said RTA through his letter of 2nd March 1987, permits without any due and proper resolution, were started to be granted on or from 4th March 1987. This was certainly not a fair, bona fide, and authorized act on the part of the said RTA or their Secretary. 63. The minute book as produced also appeared to us to be not properly maintained. As admitted by Mr. Manik Chandra Das. resolutions were not signed by all the attending members and it also appeared that the minutes of the earlier meeting or the resolutions as passed were not confirmed and ratified at the next meeting. That apart, some of the minutes are typed and some are cyclostyled. The minutes of the meeting held on 16.4.1986 and 18.4.1986 are in typed beets, which are countersigned on each page by some one and ultimately one Shrl B. Chatterjee, a member of the said RTA who was the Acting Chairman of the same has signed Similar is the position of the meeting held on 25.4.1986 The minutes of the meeting held on 27.5.1986 and 31.5.1986, are also typed and countersigned in each page by same one and ultimately the Same has been signed by Mr. Sukumar Das, Director, PVD and Chairman of the said RTA on 8.8.1986 The typed minute sheets of the meeting held on 23.6.1986 and 24.6.1986, have also been signed by the said Mr. Das on 8.9.1986 Mr. Das has also signed the typed minut sheets of the meeting of 8.8.1986 on 24.8.1986 and those of 83931986 on the same date. But the minutes of 9.9.1986 are in a cyclostyled form and there, the cyclostyled signature of Mr. Das is available and not the original. Das on 8.9.1986 Mr. Das has also signed the typed minut sheets of the meeting of 8.8.1986 on 24.8.1986 and those of 83931986 on the same date. But the minutes of 9.9.1986 are in a cyclostyled form and there, the cyclostyled signature of Mr. Das is available and not the original. The minutes book which was produced was Book No. 14 and after the minute of 9.9.1986 there is it note pasted that the Resolution of 8.9.1980 will be available In Book No. 15 and thereafter, there is the cyclostyled minute of the meeting of 31.10.1986 This is under the original signature of Mr. Dal Oil the same day we fail to understand the reason why the minute dated 18.9.1986 has been kept in another book When minutes are duly maintained it is expected that their sequence should also he maintained The minutes of the meeting of 14.11.1986 are in cyclostyled form and also under the cyclostyled signature of Mr. Das, without any date. on being asked the reasons for such irregularities, Mr. Manik Chandra Das, specifically informed the court that the said Shri Das had kept the original typed copy and sent the cyclostyled copy to the office of the said RTA, for keeping the same in the minute book. As we felt some difficulty in accepting the explanation as offered and were not satisfied about the manner of keeping the minute book we requested Mr. Manik Chandra Das, to have the original produced. But that was not done and instead thereof a letter dated 7th July, 1987, addressed to him by Mr. Sukumar Das was produced We direct the said letter, which runs as under :- Sir, I learn from Shri S Rakshit, Secretary, RTA Calcutta Region, that their Lordships Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.N. Roy and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.K Basu of Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta have been pleased to ask you today to produce the original copies of resolutions dated 9.9.86 and 14.11.86 of the RTA Board Meeting, Calcutta Region. Justice M.N. Roy and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.K Basu of Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta have been pleased to ask you today to produce the original copies of resolutions dated 9.9.86 and 14.11.86 of the RTA Board Meeting, Calcutta Region. I 1ike to state in this context that the cyclostyled copies duly signed by me and pasted in the Minutes Book are the duly compared exact reproduction of the original resolution and the same can be used for all practical purposes, as the original document of the resolutions The first typed copy of the resolutions being used by different typist for making out copies were recollected for preservation. But the same could not be traced today. We are trying to locate it as soon as possible I further certify that the cyclostyled copies which were compared and signed by me are as good as the original ones. This is for your information and action as you kindly deem fit when the original has not been produced then we feel that there is no other way but to draw adverse presumption for such non production under s.114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act The Minutes of 28.11.1986 and 1.2.1986 are in typed sheets and under the signature of Mr. B. Chatterjee, a member of the said RTA The minutes of 16.1.1987 and also in typed sheet under the signature of Mr. S. Das and such is also the position in respect of the minutes of 30.11987 Apart from the signatures in the minutes as Indicated above, they arc initialed by some one. One thing also strikes us viz why in many oases, the resolutions of two meetings are incorporated in one minute. On the basis of the evidence as disclosed, it is difficult to accept the validity bona fide and to some extent the genuineness of the minutes as produced the manner of keeping the resolution has also struck up. 64. One thing also strikes us viz why in many oases, the resolutions of two meetings are incorporated in one minute. On the basis of the evidence as disclosed, it is difficult to accept the validity bona fide and to some extent the genuineness of the minutes as produced the manner of keeping the resolution has also struck up. 64. From the submissions as made by Mr., Manick Chandra Das, it appeared that letter were issued under the signature of the Secretary of the said RTA and he has subscribed his signature in the presence of some members of the said RTA, In fact, Mr., Das made such statements on production of same offer letters, We had then directed him to produce a chart in respect of all the offer letter as issued giving the names of the offer letter holders, the number of their vehicles, the Routes for which they had made their application, the Routes allotted to them and the authorities, who have signed these offer letters, On such, Mr. Manik Chandra Das had produced the relevant chart in two sheets dated 13th July, 1987 under the signature of the Secretary of the said RTA containing the names of 127 offer letter holders Let the charts as produced be kept in the records. The signature of the offer letters by anyone other than the Secretary of the said RTA was oat authorised in view of or on the face of the resolution dated 4.11.86 the particulars whereof have been indicated hereinbefore 65. The appellant contended that the user of Mini Buses and the fare structure thereof would establish that the Mini Buses do not come with in the definition of "Contract Carriages" and as such permits cannot be granted, as and when liked and if any permit is granted, observance of the procedure as laid down in the said Act, is required to be followed strictly. In the case of Amar Kumar Naik & Ors. In the case of Amar Kumar Naik & Ors. v. State of W.B & Ors., 80 CWN 526, a point arose whether the Mini Buses, considering their character and manner of plying are "Stage Carriages" or contract carriage and it has been indicated that both the type of vehicles would come within the definition of "Public serve vehicle", but they ale distinct and separate classes with characteristics and requirement of their own which cannot be done away with, apart from holding that the permits for "Mini Buses" were really for stage carriages and not for contract carriages. We were informed that from such determination no appeal has been taken. The above Single Bench view has really been indicated also by the unreported Division Bench determination dated 14th September 1976 in the case of Shyam Sunder Ash & Ors. v. State of W.B. FMAT Nos. 2694 to 2696 of 1976, where it has been observed that the Regional Transport Authority while granting contract carriage permits to Mini Buses would ensure that these Mini Buses are not used as stage carriages at all. We were informed that no appeal has also been preferred from such determination. Thus, so far this Court is concerned the law is settled viz. Mini Buses, considering the nature and character of their plying cannot be regarded as "Contract carriages" but they are "stage carriages" The above view, we are further informed, has also been followed by another Single Bench in Civil Rule No. 219 (W) of 1983. where the nature and character of plying of Mini Buses as “Contract Carriages”. Wad in issue and it was claimed that they are not really "Contract Carriages" We are informed that the said Rule and a contempt Rule being Civil Rule. No.11477(W) of 1986, arising therefore, are still pending. where the nature and character of plying of Mini Buses as “Contract Carriages”. Wad in issue and it was claimed that they are not really "Contract Carriages" We are informed that the said Rule and a contempt Rule being Civil Rule. No.11477(W) of 1986, arising therefore, are still pending. If an ordinary litigant refuses to follow the law as laid down every one lakes exception and ordinarily such action on the part of such litigant is not expected, That being the position, it was and is all the more expected that the said RTA, a statutory body should have also followed the law as mentioned above, but it is strange that to spite of their knowledge of the law as laid down, they have nut upto date cared to follow and honour the Said law and in flagrant violation of the same, are going un with the issue of Mini Bus permits as “Contract Carriages”. This must not be allowed unless the provisions of the said Act are suitably amended Thus, we hope and expect that steps should at once be taken to regularize the matter by converting the existing Mini Bus "Contract Carriage" permits to Stage Carriages and thereafter, until and unless suitable amendment is incorporate in the statute, not to issue any Mini 'Bus permits treating them as "Contract Carriages". We arc really restraining the said RTA and its authorities from action in any manner or way contrary to the above We also feel that when public convenience is required to be considered at the time of grant of Mini Bus permits, public hazards and inconvenience arising out of the manner of plying of Mini Buses, should also be considered and in consideration thereof, some restrictions must be imposed on their reckless way of their plying, either by fixing time schedules or by contracting the governors of them chines Unless the above restriction are imposed, the Mini Buses will continue to ply in the menacing way in which they are plying now. 66. 66. We further feel and observe that if offer letters as in this case are allowed to be issued by the said RTA or their authorities, that would not only open the flood gates of corruption, favouritism and use of power arbitrarily but such grant of offer letters would also create great embarrassment, prejudice and sufferings to the offer letter holders, in Case they do not get any berth for the vehicles, Which they will serve with great difficulties. 67. Let our findings in the last two preceding paragraphs be communicated to the Legal Remembrance, Government of West Bengal. 68. For the reasons as Indicated, we hold that the learned Judge was also justified in making the observations in the first portion of his determination, but not the second portion and as such, this appeal, which bas really impeached the said second portion of the judgment is allowed and consequently the second portion of the judgment, as impeached, is set aside, There will he no order as to costs. The applications are also disposed on the basis of our determinations in the appeal. 69. Apart from the document, which we have already directed to be kept in the records of this proceedings, various other documents woe filed by the parties appearing before us. Even though we have not made any reference to them. We direct these documents, also be kept in the records or this case. We are of course directing the Minute Book No.14 to be returned. 70. We feel that because of this order the said RTA or their authorities cannot now grant Mini Bus Permits to the present offer letter holders and we cannot but feel for their unfold sufferings as all of them have procured the vehicles, maybe with their limited resources or by making arrangements with the financial institutions Keeping such sufferings in view, we direct that unless and until they are accommodated in different routes, as and when their Will be vacancies, no further permits would be granted. We make it clear that after absorption of those offer letter holders in different routes the said RTA will be at liberty to proceed in the matter of opening of other routes and/or for granting permits in accordance with the law. Stay of the order as prayed for, is refused Dilip Kumar Basu, J : I agree Appeal allowed.