ORDER This writ petition is directed against an order of termination of the petitioner's service as the Financial Director of M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. dated 22nd August 1986. 2. The issues raised are important as well as interesting as questions of law Whilst the petitioner contended that the case is fully covered by the decision of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brajanath Ganguly reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 and as such the termination order is bad simplicitor and the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement. The respondents contended, however, that no relief can be granted to the petitioner inter alia for (at Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. cannot be termed to be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitutions; (b) assuming Andrew Yule & Co. be termed to be an authority, the writ petition cannot succeed by reason of restrictions in regard to the assumption of jurisdiction by the writ Court in a private law field as compared to that of a public law field which has not been noticed in Central Inland's decision (supra), though sufficient reliance on that score can be found from the decisions of the Supreme Court in LIC v. Escorts Ltd. reported in (1986) 1 SCC and (c) Central Inland’s decision (supra) in any event does not have any manner of application on the factual aspect of the matter. 3. Before, however, proceeding on to the rival contentions raised as noted above, a brief reference to facts ought to be made at this juncture. 4. The petitioner being a Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and a member of the British Institute of Management joined M/s Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. as the Chief Infernal Auditor in August 1972. In August 1976 the petitioner was made the Chief Accountant of Banarhat Tea Co. Ltd. along with five other Tea Companies, all being subsidiary to M/s. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. In August 1978 the petitioner was appointed as a Financial Controller of the Andrew Yule & Co Ltd. The post of Financial Controller, however, was elevated to that of Chief Executive with effect from October 1980 and the petitioner's gross salary was fixed at Rs. 5275/- per month. 5. Incidentally it is to be noted that Andrew Yule & Co. 5275/- per month. 5. Incidentally it is to be noted that Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd being a Company incorporated under the Companies Act of 1913, in common parlance an existing Company within the meaning of Companies’ Act, 1956 and a private sector Company became a Government Company within the meaning of s 617 of the Companies’ Act in May 1979. At present the President of India holds about 85% share capital of the Company. The shares are even now quoted in the Stock Exchange and the Company is mainly concerned with the manufacturing of the various trading articles. At present the Board of Directors of Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. consists of 3 whole-time Directors and 7 part-time Directors. Amongst the 7 part-time Directors, 2 Directors are representing the Government of India-one from Ministry of Industry and the other from the Ministry of Finance. 6. On 31st December 1984, the President of India in terms of Article 115 (1)(a) of the Articles of Association of the Company appointed the petitioner as the Director (Finance) of the Company for a period of two years in the first instance with effect from 4th of January 1985. In the letter of appointment of the petitioner as Director (Finance) of Andrew Yule & Co Ltd., it gas been specifically stated that the appointment may, however, be terminated by either side on three months’ notice or on payment of three months’ salary in lieu thereof. The letter of appointment further provided that the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules framed and followed by Andrew Yule & Co Ltd. in respect of their non-workmen category of staff would also mutatis, mutandis apply to the petitioner with the modification that the disciplinary authority in the case of the petitioner would be the President. The other terms and conditions would be the same as appears from the rules of the Company Subsequently by an order dated 22nd August 1986 the petitioner was served with a letter of termination from the post of Director (Finance) in Andrew Yule & Co Ltd with Immediate effect and a Cheque towards three months salary in lieu of notice was enclosed with the letter of termination. It is this order of termination which is under challenge as mala fide and an utter abuse of the powers vested onto the authority concerned and also on the ground of lack of fairness. 7. Mr. It is this order of termination which is under challenge as mala fide and an utter abuse of the powers vested onto the authority concerned and also on the ground of lack of fairness. 7. Mr. Basu appearing for the petitioner strenuously contended that the decision in Central Inland's case applies in all force in the facts and circumstances of the case under consideration. But before considering the same, the issue as advanced by Mr. Solicitor-General in regard to the maintainability of the writ application on the ground of Andrew Yule & Co Ltd. not being an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution has to be dealt with in slightly greater detail as a preliminary issue. 8. The concept of "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution has gained much significance in the recent past-more so by reason of participation of the State in even ordinary trade and commerce Public interest, public concerns and public welfare, though the cry of the day in regard to the State actions, but Law Courts have been kept busy on the issue as to whether a Government Company within the meaning of s 617 of the Companies’ Act is a "State" or not? 9. In Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 212 Supreme Court while dealing with the issue referred to long catena of cases and as regards the Airport Authority's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) Krishna Iyer, J, observed: “There is no doubt that Bhagwati, J broadened the scope of State under Art 12 and according to Shri G.B. Pal the observations spill over beyond the requirements of the case and must be dismissed as obiter. His submission is that having regard to the fact that the International Airport Authority is a corporation created by statute there was no occasion to go beyond the narrow needs of the situation and expand upon the theme of State in Act, 12 vis-a-vis Government companies, registered societies and what not. He assails the decision also on another ground, namely, the contradiction between Sukhdev, (1975) 3 SCR 619 ( : AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) and Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCR 489 ( : AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). We will examine both these contentions and, incidentally, consider what the law laid down in the other ruling is. He assails the decision also on another ground, namely, the contradiction between Sukhdev, (1975) 3 SCR 619 ( : AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) and Airport Authority (1979) 3 SCR 489 ( : AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). We will examine both these contentions and, incidentally, consider what the law laid down in the other ruling is. We are free to confess that the propositions have not been neatly chiseled and presented in any of the rulings and further, some measure of incongruity may be noticed if we search for the same, but our approach is not to detect contradictions but to discover a broad consensus if there be any and distill the law in accordance therewith. We may first deal with Towary's case, (1975) 3 SCR : ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) where the question mooted was as to whether the CSIR (Council of Scientific and Industrial Research) was 'State' under Art 12. The CSIR is a registered society with official and non-official members appointed by Government and subject to some measure of control by government in the Ministry of Sciences and Technology. The court held it was not 'State' as defined in Art. 12. It is significant that the court implicitly assented to the proposition that if the society were really an agency of the government it would be 'State'. But on the facts and feature present there the character of agency of government was negatived. The rulings relied on are, unfortunately, in the province of Art. 311 and it is clear that a body may by 'State' under Part III but not under Part XIV Ray, C J, rejected the argument that merely because the Prime Minister was the President or that the other members were appointed and removed by Government did not make the society a 'State' With great respect, we agree that in the absence of the other features elaborated in Airport Authority case (1979) 3 SCC 489 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) the composition of the governing body alone may not be decisive. The laconic discussion and the limited ratio in Tewary (1975)3 SCR 616 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) hardly help either side here" 10. The laconic discussion and the limited ratio in Tewary (1975)3 SCR 616 : ( AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) hardly help either side here" 10. The Supreme Court, however, in Sam Prakash Rekhi's case (supra) decocted 5 tests as follows : "One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government. Existence of 'deep and pervasive State control' may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. It may also be a relevant factor........whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. If the function of the corporation are of public importance and, closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of government. Specifically, if a department or Governments transferred to a corporation it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of government.” 11. There can not be any hesitation, however, in laying down that the cumulative effect of all the relevant factors ought to be assessed and upon such consideration of the cumulative effect once the body is found to be an instrumentality or an agent of the government, the inevitable conclusion would be that it is ‘State’ and is subject to the same constitutional limitation as the government. 12. Article 12 in Pt. III of the Constitution defines the 'State' and provides that the 'State' includes the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. It is this local or other authorities within the country or under the control of the Government of India, that has led the Court to consider the issue of existence of deep and pervasive State control. 13. Against this backdrop the decision of the Supreme Court in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanuel reported in AIR 1969 SC 1306 is of some consideration. 13. Against this backdrop the decision of the Supreme Court in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanuel reported in AIR 1969 SC 1306 is of some consideration. The Supreme Court while dealing with the matter as regards the maintainability of the writ petition against Praga Tools Corporation observed : “The company being a non-statutory body and one incorporated under the Companies Act, there was neither a statutory nor a public duty imposed on it by a statute in respect of which enforcement could be sought by means of a mandamus nor was there in its workmen any corresponding legal right for enforcement of any such statutory or public duty. The High Court, therefore, was right in holding that no writ petition for a mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus could lie against the company.” 14. Incidentally, it is to by noted that Praga Tools Corporations is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and at the material time, however, the Union Government and the Government of Andhra Pradesh between them held 88% of its shares respectively and the balance 12% shares were held by private individuals. Being the largest shareholder, the Union Government had the power to nominate the Company’s Directors. Even so, being registered under the Companies Act and governed by the provisions of that Act, the Supreme Court observed that the company was a separate legal entity and could not be said to be either a Government, Corporation or an Industry run by or under the authority of the Union Government. The Supreme Court while dealing with the matter, however, observed that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty. 15. In Ajay Hasia's case (Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib ; reported in AIR 1981 SC 487 ), the Supreme Court stated : “The tests for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government may now be culled out from the judgment in the International Airport Authority's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). These tests are not conclusive or clinching, but they are merely indicative indicia which have to be used with care and caution, because while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the expression "other authorities", it must be realised that it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the government with the sweep of the expression. A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. We may summarise the relevant tests gathered from the decision in the International Airport Authority's case as follows: (1) “One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government.” (2) ‘Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character" (3) "It may also be a relevant factor...............whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected" (4) "Existence of 'deep and pervasive State control' may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality." (5) "If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of government". (6) "Specifically, if a department of government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of government". If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of government, it would, as pointed out in the International Airport Authority's case be within the meaning of the expression in Article 12.” 16. After setting out the tests as above, the Supreme Court observed : "We may point out that it is immaterial for this purpose whether the corporation is created by a statute or under a statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the government and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the government and not as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The corporation may be a statutory Company or a Company formed under the Companies Act, 1956 or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or any other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an "authority' within the meaning of article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company of the relevant factors whether the company or society is an instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression "authority" in Article 12" 17. In this context the decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of B Rajkumar Patra v. Union of India reported in AIR 1981 Orissa 143 ought also to be noted. In that decision the High Court observed : “We are inclined to think that no particular test has a predominant role to play. The cumulative effect has to be looked into. Where the functions are closely related to governmental functions and where a department of government is transferred to a corporation or where rule making or regulation making power has been given which when made would regulate the conduct of the people at large are clear features in support of treating the institution as a instrumentality or agency of government. Where, however, government while embarking upon a commercial activity putting entire money and exercise direct or indirect control and receive the profits these by themselves may not be adequate to hold the institution to be an agency or instrumentality of government. In our view, the present one is that of a limited type and on the facts disclosed, the company cannot be held to be an instrumentality of the government. That being the position, the petitioner cannot succeed on the allegation of contravention of equality clause”. 18. In our view, the present one is that of a limited type and on the facts disclosed, the company cannot be held to be an instrumentality of the government. That being the position, the petitioner cannot succeed on the allegation of contravention of equality clause”. 18. The Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Jagadish Chandra Gupta v. Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd. reported in AIR 1986 J & K Pg 1 while dealing with the issue vis-a-vis the Jammu & Kashmir Bank observed that its functions are not of public importance. It is a business concern and cannot be said to be discharging any function which is closely related to the Government functions. There is no obligation on the government to run a Banking business. It may patronise a Bank or it may transact its business with a Bank but that would not mean that the respondent-Bank is discharging the functions which are closely related to the Government functions. The High Court further observed that it is not a government department transferred to the corporation. It was established as a business concern for purpose of transacting Banking business by 8 individuals under the Company Law then applicable to the State. Only two of them were in the service of His Highness. It had its origin and separate existence. 19. On the basis of the law laid down as above, it will have to be, therefore, seen as to whether Andrew Yule & Co. falls squarely and evenly within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The respondent company carries on purely commercial functions of manufacture of Industrial Air-control machineries including sub-purpose fans, heavy duty sinter and metric fans, dust control and ventilation systems, electrical equipment, such as, switch fuse, flame proof equipment, process timers, drill control panels, distribution Board, transformer and switch-gear, designing and implementing micro-wave communication system M/s Andrew Yule Company also manufactures conveyor belts, automatic fans and V. Belts, moulded case circuit progress, bimetal overload release. The shares of the company which weave privately owned were acquired from time to time until the majority holding is now of the government and are quoted regularly in the Stock Exchange. The purely commercial nature of the company will appear from its activities, viz. Engineering Division, Electrical Division Belting Division etc. The shares of the company which weave privately owned were acquired from time to time until the majority holding is now of the government and are quoted regularly in the Stock Exchange. The purely commercial nature of the company will appear from its activities, viz. Engineering Division, Electrical Division Belting Division etc. Apart from the nature of the business it is to be noted that the company did not receive any grant-in-aid or subsidy at least in the 7th plan period from the Central Government. The company also functions as a holding company of large number of tea growing and manufacturing companies and variety of associated companies. The shares of there subsidiary companies are also quoted in the Calcutta Stock Exchange. There are a number of competitors in the market in respect of manufacture and sale of the various engineering products. For Engineering Division, the competitors are Flakt India Ltd, General Electric Co Ltd., Thermax Pvt. Ltd, Batlibol & Co Ltd, etc. For Electrostatic Precepetators, Voltage India Ltd, General Electric Co, Flakt India, Thermax Pvt. Ltd etc. For Tea manufacturing machinery, Steelworth Pvt. Ltd, Teama Consortium, Bicram Forgoing Pvt. Ltd, Bedi & Bedi Pvt. Ltd, Egloo Pvt. Ltd. etc. In the Electrical Division, Siemens India Ltd. Larsen & Tubro Ltd English Electrical Co India Ltd, Jyoti Electrical Ltd, Crompton Greaves Ltd, Bharatiya Cuttler Hammer Ltd., A.K.G. Industries, Viswa Engineering Works, Uptron India Ltd, etc In the Belting Division, some of the competitors in the market are : Dunlop India Ltd, Universal Belting, Mercury Rubber Mills, Northland Rubber. For Fan & V. Belts ;-Dunlop India Ltd, Fenner Nerolus Synthetic Fibres & Chemicals Ltd, Hilton Rubbers Pvt. Ltd, Good Year India Ltd, etc. 20. It appears from records that Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd, does not get any preferential treatment in the matter of contracts or orders or for any other tax or revenue. As regard the generation of Funds, the company generates its own fund by Bank loans and finance from Financial Corporations and the like. Whatever money has come from the Central Government has been credited to the company's accounts as loan repayable with interest as in the case of any other loan. In the matter of policy and management, the company is wholly independent. Whatever money has come from the Central Government has been credited to the company's accounts as loan repayable with interest as in the case of any other loan. In the matter of policy and management, the company is wholly independent. The whole-time directors are appointed by the President of India who holds 86.31% ordinary shares and part-time directors are taken from other government departments and/or organizations. Its accounts are subject to audit and scrutiny of the Comptroller & Auditor-General as provided in the Companies Act 1956. There is no other control by the Central Government. 21. In regard to the functioning of the company, it is neither of public importance, nor closely related to governmental functions. It is a trading concern and the company does not enjoy State protected monopoly. The nature and character or function of the company has not been in any way changed by becoming a Government Company within the meaning of s 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. 22. It is at this juncture s 617 of the Act ought to be noted Section 617 read: ‘617 - Definition of "Government company"-For the purposes of this Act, 'Government Company' means, any company in which not less than 51% of the paid up share capital is held by the Central Government or any State Government or Governments or partly by the Central Government and partly by one or more State Governmental and it includes a company which is a subsidiary of the Government company as thus defined” 23. From the records it appears that the President of India acquired by purchase the total foreign holdings of 9,5,026 shares, i.e. of 49.15% of the ordinary shares of the Company in 1974-75. In 1978-79 however the President of India further purchased 34180 shares, i.e. 171% by reason wherefor Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. became a Government company by virtue of holding of 50.86% of the total equity share holdings. In 1979-80 President of India further purchased 6000 ordinary shares and the holdings have gone upto 51.16%. Subsequently, however the President of India further acquired its shares which undoubtedly have brought M/s Andrew Yule & Co Ltd, a company within the meaning of s 617 of the Companies Act. But the issue arises as to whether by reason of the factum of M/s Andrew Yule & Co. Subsequently, however the President of India further acquired its shares which undoubtedly have brought M/s Andrew Yule & Co Ltd, a company within the meaning of s 617 of the Companies Act. But the issue arises as to whether by reason of the factum of M/s Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd becoming a Government Company within the meaning of the Companies Act, the writ petition can be said to be maintainable. The law is now well settled and I need not dilate much on that scare. In this context, however, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Heavy Engineering Majdoor Union v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1970 SC 82 . In that decision the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms observed that the mere fact that the entire share capital of the company being contributed by the Central Government and that all its shares are held by the President and certain officers of the Central Government, that does not make any difference. The company and the share holders are distinct entitles and that the fact that President of India and certain officers held all its shares does not make the company an agent-either of the President or of the Central Government, an incorporated company as is well-known has its separate evidence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. This new personality, the Supreme Court observed, emerges from the moment of its incorporation and from that date the person subscribing to its Memorandum of Association and others joining as members are recorded as a Body incorporated or a Corporation aggregate and the new person begins to function as an entity. 24. The recent trend of decisions as noted above, however, sounded a slightly different note and dealt with the issue from a different point of view. The six tests laid down by the Supreme Court ought to be considered in true perspective and it is to be seen whether the cumulative effect of these tests have been satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the case. The six tests laid down by the Supreme Court ought to be considered in true perspective and it is to be seen whether the cumulative effect of these tests have been satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the case. The first test is in regard to the entire share capital of the Corporation which would go long way indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or an agency of the Government-admittedly the entire share capital is not being held by the Government in so far as M/s Andrew Yule & Co Ltd. is concerned Secondly the financial assistance of the State so as to meet almost entire expenditure of the Corporation also has no factual support. The Government loan and equity as a percentage of total expenditure comes to 5.57% and the Government loan as a percentage of total expenditure comes to 2.311% aud that is also restricted to upto the 6th plan period. There is no assistance, neither any ought for nor received in the 7th plan period and till date no Government aid or grant has also been received. The third test laid down by the Supreme Court is in regard to the monopoly status. That also does not find corroboration with the facts disclosed in the matter in issue. It is a trading concern and as noted above, on the factual aspect, it cannot be said that there exists any monopoly status so far as Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd is concerned. The functional approach does not also confer the status of a Governmental agency by reason of the nature of business carried on by M/s Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. It cannot be termed to be the function of public importance being closely related to Governmental functions. No department of the Government has been transferred to the company and as such, question of the same being a strong factor supportive and an inference being an instrumentality or agency of the Government does not and cannot arise. The only other test, viz, deep and pervasive State control and on which strenuous submissions have been made, in my view, also cannot strictly be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case under consideration. The provisions of the Companies’ Act has been made applicable. The only other test, viz, deep and pervasive State control and on which strenuous submissions have been made, in my view, also cannot strictly be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case under consideration. The provisions of the Companies’ Act has been made applicable. Annual accounts being audited by the Auditor and Controller General or appointment of Directors being made by the Bureau of Public Enterprises cannot by itself be termed to be deep and pervasive State Control. The Management of the Company rests with the Board and the decisions are also of the Board and not of the Government Deep and pervasive State control has a definite connotation. It means and imply, actual working is under the control of the State, but from the documents disclosed, it does not appear to be so Giving however full credence to Mr. Basu's submission that Andrew Yule & Co Ltd. acts as an agency of the State since there exist a deep and pervasive State control, I am, however, disinclined to take view that the test by itself would bring home the contention of Mr. Basu that Andrew Yule & Co Ltd. ought to be termed as an instrumentality or an agency to the Government. This is more so by reason of the caution exercised by the Supreme Court that the cumulative effect of these tests ought to be the guiding factor and not any one particular test. What weighed with the Supreme Court in the case of Control Inland Water Transport Corporation is the monopoly status and monopolistic trading in water transport together with the financial assistance and deep pervasive State control Central Inland discharges the function of public importance in regard to the river transport as compared to Surface Transport, viz. railways. On that perspective, Central Inland was stated to be an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 25. Law Courts in my view ought not to readily clothe a Company incorporated under the Companies Act the status of a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution because of the fact that it has since become a Government Company. It is a legal entity and is subject to the rigours of the provisions of the Companies Act like any other Incorporated Company. The approach ought to be extremely cautious in this regard. It is a legal entity and is subject to the rigours of the provisions of the Companies Act like any other Incorporated Company. The approach ought to be extremely cautious in this regard. The recent trend of the judicial decisions as regards the issue under discussion is by reason of the changed circumstances-social and economical as also the Government’s active participation in the ordinary trade and commerce but that by itself would not be sufficient to ascribe status of 'State' to a Company incorporated under the Companies Act. Can it be said that M/s. Andrew Yule Co is in fact discharging function for the benefit of the Society? Can it be sold that M/s Andrew Yule & Co is a Public Utility Organisation? The answer is invariably in the negative. It is merely a trading Company like any other Trading organisation and it is for this reason only that the long catena of cases, noted above, sounded a caution that the cumulative effect of all the six tests ought to be considered rather than relying upon anyone of the tests. 26. In that view of the matter the preliminary objection of Mr. Solicitor General as regards M/s Andrew Yule & Co. not being an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution succeeds. 27. The view expressed above is sufficient to dispose of the writ petition but judicial decorum prompts me to discuss the other aspect of the matter as raised in the matter, viz., the intervention of the writ court as regards the private and public law field. 28. The speech of Sir John Donaldson (MR) in the decision R v. East Borkshire Health Authority, Exparte Walsh reported in (1934) 3 All E.R. 425 though undoubtedly opened a new vista after the decision in O’ Reilly v. Machman reported in (1982)3 All ER 680 in regard to the private and public law field in administrative actions but the same had in fact been recognised in our country for more than three decades. The earliest decision in the matter in issue is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chandra Agarwal reported in AIR 1953 SC 250 . In that decision the Supreme Court observed: "There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. The earliest decision in the matter in issue is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satish Chandra Agarwal reported in AIR 1953 SC 250 . In that decision the Supreme Court observed: "There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the offer which was made to him. Having accepted, he still has open to him all rights and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which have been denied to him assuming there are any and to pursue in the ordinary Courts of the land such remedies for a breach as are open to him to exactly the same extent as other persons similarly situated. He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim. The remedy of a writ is misconceived." 29. The subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, viz., the case of Purusattamlal Dhingra v. Union of India reported in AIR 1958 SC 38 and the case of Roshanlal Tandon v. Union of India reported in AIR 1967SC 1889 support the distinction between contract and work and status or office. 30. In Lekhraj Satramdas v. MM Shah reported in AIR 1966 SC 334 the Supreme Court observed: "In our opinion any duty or obligation falling upon a public servant out of a contract entered into by him as such public servant cannot be enforced by the machinery of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution". 31. The celebrated decision of Radhakrishna Agarwal v. The State of Bihar reported in AIR 1977 SC 1496 negatived the submission that whenever a State or its agent deal with the citizen either when making a transaction or after making it in exercise of powers under the terms of contract between the parties, there is a dealing between State and the citizen which involves performance of certain legal and public duties. The Supreme Court as a matter of fact categorically staled that the same cannot be a sound principle of law. The Supreme Court as a matter of fact categorically staled that the same cannot be a sound principle of law. In the last noted decision the Supreme Court observed : "When a contract is sought to be terminable by the officers of the State purporting to act under the terms of an agreement between the parties, such action is not taken in purported exercise of a statutory power at all" 32. At this juncture however the decision in Sukhdev Singh’s case (Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram) reported in AIR 1975 SC 1331 ought also to be noted. In that decision Mathew J. observed : "The difficulty of separating vital Government functions from non-government functions has created further difficulties. Is the distinction between governmental and non governmental functions which plagued the courts a rational one? The contract is between governmental activities which are private and private activities which are governmental. Without the adoption of a radical laissez fair philosophy and the definition of State functions as they were current in the days of Herbert Spencer it is impossible to sort out proper from improper functions. Besides the so-called traditional functions, the modern state operates a multitude of public enterprises. Mr. Justice Holmes said, the Constitution does not enact Herbert Spender's social static’s. This applied equally to the definition of State function for legal purposes". 33. After however the decision of Radhakrishna Agarwal and Sukhdev Singh (supra) the concept of State action has received a much broader interpretation. In the case of Ramanna v. International Airport Authorities of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 . The decision of the Supreme Court though based on the minority view expressed in Kathrine Jackson’s case has some significance. In that decision the Supreme Court observed: "There is also another factor which may be regarded as having a bearing on this issue and it is whether the operation of the corporation is an important public function. It has been held in the United States in a number of cases that the concept of private action must yield to a conception of State action where the public functions are being performed Vide Arthur S Millar : “The, Constitutional Law of the 'Security State' " (10 Stanford Law Review 620 at p 664). It has been held in the United States in a number of cases that the concept of private action must yield to a conception of State action where the public functions are being performed Vide Arthur S Millar : “The, Constitutional Law of the 'Security State' " (10 Stanford Law Review 620 at p 664). It was pointed out by Douglas, J. in E.S. Evans v. Charles E Newton (1966) 382 US 296 : 15 L ED 2d 373 that "when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State", Of course, with the growth of the welfare, it is very difficult to define what functions are governmental and what are not, because, as pointed out by Villmer, LJ, in Pflzer v Ministry of Health (1964) 1 Ch 614, there has been since mid-victorian times, "a revolution in political thought and a totally different conception prevails today as to what Is and what is not within the functions of Government" Douglas, J, also observed to the same effect in New York v. United States (1945) 326 US 572 : "A State's project is as much a legitimate governmental activity whether it is traditional or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit" Cf. Helvering v Gerhardi, (1937) 304 US 405, 426, 427. A State may deem it as essential to its economy that it owns and operates a railroad, a mill, or an irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges, street lights, or a sewage disposal plant. What might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities may today be deemed indispensable. It may be noted that besides the so-called traditional functions, if the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. This is precisely what was pointed out by Mathew, J, in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram ( AIR 1975 SC 1331 ) (supra) where the learned Judge said that institutions engaged in matters of high public interest or performing public functions performed government agencies. Activities which are too fundamental to the society are by definition too important not to be considered government functions". 34. Activities which are too fundamental to the society are by definition too important not to be considered government functions". 34. In L.I.C. v. Escorts Ltd reported in (1986) 1 SCC 264 , the Supreme Court however sounded a different note. The Supreme Court observed that if the action of the State is related to contractual obligation or obligations arising out of the tort, the Court may not ordinarily examine, it, unless the action has some public law character attached to it. The Supreme Court further observed that broadly speaking, the Court will interfere in actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them, if they pertain to the private law field. The Supreme Court however, itself experienced difficulty in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is on this score Mr. Solicitor General submitted that in order to determine as to the principles to be invoked in demarcating the frontiers between public and private law field the aid of English cases relating to master and servant and public employment ought to be sought for. 35. At this juncture, however, the Supreme Court's Statement of Law in Escort's case is to be noted : The Supreme Court observed : "When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate work and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robe of a shareholder with all the rights available to such a shareholder". 36. The Supreme Court in paragraph 101 further observed : "It was, however, urged by the learned counsel for the company that the Life Insurance Corporation was an instrumentality of the State and was therefore, debarred by Article 14 from acting arbitrarily. It was, therefore, under an obligation to state to the Court its reasons for the resolution once a rule nisi was issued to it. If it failed to disclose its reasons to the Court, the court would presume that it has no valid reasons to give and its action was therefore, arbitrary. The learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court in Sukhdeb Singh, Menoka Gandhi, International Airport Authority and Ajay Hasia. If it failed to disclose its reasons to the Court, the court would presume that it has no valid reasons to give and its action was therefore, arbitrary. The learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court in Sukhdeb Singh, Menoka Gandhi, International Airport Authority and Ajay Hasia. The learned Attorney General, on the other hand, contended that actions of the State or an instrumentality of the State which, do not properly belong to the field of public law, but belong to the field of private law are not liable to be subjected to judicial review. He relied on O’ Reilly v. Mackman, Davy v. Spelthone, 1 Congress del Partide, R v East Borkshire Health Authority, and Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar. While we do find considerable force in the contention of the learned Attorney-General it may not be necessary for us to enter into any lengthy discussion of the topic, as we shall presently see ………………………………………….. While we do not for a moment doubt that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State must be informed by reason and that, in appropriate cases, actions uniformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution, we do not construe Article 14 as a charter for judicial review of State actions and to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such actions". 37. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta & Anr. v. Union of India & ors reported in AIR 1987 SC 1086 the Supreme Court observed. "We were, during the court of arguments, addressed at great length by counsel no both sides on the American doctrine of State Action. The learned counsel elaborately traced the evolution of this doctrine in its parent country. We are aware that in America since the Fourteenth Amendment is available only against the State, the Courts in order to thwart racial discrimination by private parties, devised the theory of State action under which it was held that wherever private activity was aided, facilitated or supported by the State in a significant measure, such activity took the colour of State action and was subject to the constitutional limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The historical context in which the doctrine of Sate action evolved in the United States is irrelevant for our purpose especially since we have Article 15(2) in our Constitution. But it is the principle behind the doctrine of State aid, control and regulation so impregnating a private activity as to give it the colour of State action that is of interest to us and that also to the limited extent to which it can be Indianized and harmoniously blended with our Constitutional jurisprudence. That we in no way consider ourselves bound by American exposition of constitutional law is well demonstrated by the (act that in Ramana Shetty (supra) this Court preferred the minority opinion of Douglas, J in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company 42 Led (2d) 477 as against the majority opinion of Rehnquist J. And again in Air India v. Nergesh Mirza (1983) 1 SCR 438 this Court whilst preferring the minority view in General Electric Company Martha v Gilbert 50 Led (2d) 343 said that the provisions of the American Constitution cannot always be applied to Indian conditions or to the provisions of our Constitution and whilst some of the principles adumbrated by the American decisions may provide a useful guide, close adherence to those principles while applying them to the provisions of our Constitution is not to be favoured, because the social conditions in our country are different. The learned counsel for Shriram stressed the inappositeness of the doctrine of State action in the Indian context because, according to him, once an authority is brought within the purview of Article 12, it is State for all intents and purposes and the functional dichotomy in America whore certain activities of the same authority may be characterised as State action and other as private action cannot be applied here in India. But so far as this argument is concerned, we must demur to it and point out that it is not correct to say that in India once a corporation is deemed to be 'authority', it would be subject to the constitutional limitation of fundamental rights in the performance of all its functions and that the appellation or 'authority' would stick to such corporation, irrespective of the functional context". 38. 38. Against the backdrop the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojanath Ganguly (1986) 3 Supreme Court Cases 156 ought also to be noted. As a matter of fact though the Escort's case was decided at an earlier point of time but the same was not noticed by the Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation. In that decision the Supreme Court observed : "It was, however, submitted on behalf of the appellants that this was a contract entered into by the Corporation like any other contract entered into by it in the course of its trading activities and the court, therefore, ought not to interfere with it. It is not possible for us to equate employees with goods which can be bought and sold. It is equally not possible for us to equate a contract of employment with a mercantile transaction between two businessmen and much less to do so when the contract of employment is between a powerful employer and a week employee. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants that Rule 9(1) was supported by mutuality inasmuch as it conferred an equal right upon both the parties, for under it just as the employer could terminate the employee's service by giving him three months' notice or by paying him three months’ basic pay and dearness allowance in lieu thereof, the employee could leave the service by giving three month, notice and when be failed to give such notice, the Corporation could deduct an equivalent amount from whatever may be payable to him. It is true that there is mutuality in Rule 9(1)-the same mutuality as in a contract between the lion and the lamb that both will be free to roam about in the jungle and each will be at liberty to devour the other. When one considers the unequal position of the Corporation and its employees, the argument or mutuality becomes laughable. The contesting respondents could, therefore, have filed a civil suit for a declaration that the termination of their service was contrary to law on the ground that the said Rule 9(1) was void. When one considers the unequal position of the Corporation and its employees, the argument or mutuality becomes laughable. The contesting respondents could, therefore, have filed a civil suit for a declaration that the termination of their service was contrary to law on the ground that the said Rule 9(1) was void. In such a suit, however, they would have got a declaration and possibly damages for wrongful termination of service but the civil court could not have ordered reinstatement as it would have amounted to granting specific performance of a contract of personal service. As the Corporation is "the State", they, therefore, adopted the far more efficacious remedy of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution." 38A. As regards the decision of Radhakrishna Agarwal (supra) the Supreme Court observed: "We fail to see what relevance that decision has to the case before us Employees of a large organisation form a separate and distinct class and we are unable to equate a contract of employment in a stereotype form entered into by "the State' with each of such employees with the "lease" executed in Radhakrishna Agarwal case. Further, the contract or the lease between the parties in that case was a legally valid contract. In that case what the appellants were doing was to complain of any breach of contract committed by the State of Bihar acting through its officers. The contesting respondents are not complaining of any breach of contract but their contention is that Rule 9(i) which is a term of their contract of employment is void. They are not complaining that the fiction of termination of their service is in breach of Rule 9(i). Their complaint is not merely with respect to the State Action of State in entering into a contract of employment with them which contains such a clause or rather forcing upon them a contract of employment containing such a clause. As we have held earlier, Rule 9(1) is void even under the ordinary law of contracts". 39. The Supreme Court in Escort's case however categorically recorded that they are not expressing any opinion in regard to the private and public law field excepting, however, with an indication that Article 14 cannot be construed as a charter for judicial review of State actions. 39. The Supreme Court in Escort's case however categorically recorded that they are not expressing any opinion in regard to the private and public law field excepting, however, with an indication that Article 14 cannot be construed as a charter for judicial review of State actions. In Central Inland's case also the scope of private and public law field was neither considered nor even however referred to by the Supreme Court". 40. The issue after the decision in Central Inland's case which arises for consideration as to whether a Judge of the High Court would be within his jurisdiction to deal with an allied issue in a manner contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland. Mr. Solicitor-General however submitted that the two judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that Central Inland is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and, therefore amenable to the writ jurisdiction for enforcement of rights under Chapter 3 of the Constitution arid the other issue which has been dealt with by the Supreme Court is whether the term of an employment being an unconscionable term was void. It was further contended that from a close perusal of the judgment, the distinction between public and private law field in regard to an action of an authority or a State does not appear to have been dealt with by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, it was submitted that the Constitutional Bench in Escorts Case clearly recognised the distinction between actions of State pertaining to public law domain and actions pertaining to private law field. 41. At this juncture however after having dealt with the Indian law on the subject, let us now consider the speech of Sir John Donaldson (MR) in the decision of R.V. East Berkshire Health Authority : ex p Walsh (supra). Donaldson (MR) observed : “The ordinary employer is free to act in breach of his contracts of employment and if he does so, his employee will acquire certain private law rights and remedies in damages for wrongful dismissal, compensation for unfair dismissal an order for reinstatement or re engagement and so on. Donaldson (MR) observed : “The ordinary employer is free to act in breach of his contracts of employment and if he does so, his employee will acquire certain private law rights and remedies in damages for wrongful dismissal, compensation for unfair dismissal an order for reinstatement or re engagement and so on. Parliament can underpin the position of public authority employees by directly restricting the freedom of the public authority to dismiss, thus giving the employee "public law" rights at least making him a potential candidate for administrative law remedies Alternatively, it can require the authority to contract with its employees on specified terms with a view to the employees acquiring private law rights under the terms of the contract of employment. If the authority falls or refuses thus to create private law rights for the employee, the employee will have public law rights to compel compliance, the remedy being mandamus requiring the authority so to contract for a declaration that the employee had those rights. If, however, the authority gives the employee the required contractual protection, a breach of that contract is not a matter of public law and gives the to no administrative law remedies”. 42. Lord Denning, however, in O’ Reilly v. Mackman (1982) 3 All ER 680 stated the law to be as follows : “In modern times we have come to recognise two separate fields of law, one of private law and the other of public law. Private law regulates the affairs of subjects as between themselves Public law regulates the affairs of subjects vis-à-vis the public authorities. For centuries there were special remedies available in public law. They were the prerogative write of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. As I have shown, they were taken in the sovereign against a public authority which had failed to perform its duties to the public at large or had performed it wrongly. Any subject could complain to the sovereign and then the Kings Courts, at their discretion, would give him leave to issue such one of the prerogative writs as was appropriate to meet his case. But, these writs, as their names show, only gave the remedies of quashing, commanding or prohibiting. They did not enable a subject to recover damages against a public authority nor a declaration nor an injunction. But, these writs, as their names show, only gave the remedies of quashing, commanding or prohibiting. They did not enable a subject to recover damages against a public authority nor a declaration nor an injunction. This was such a defect in public law that the Courts drew on the remedies available in private law, so as to see that the subjects secured justice. It was held that if a public authority falls to do its duty and in consequence, a member of public suffered particular damage therefrom he could sue for damages by an ordinary action in the Courts of common law. And this remedy has been applied right up-to the present time in ordinary actions brought without leave. I always thought that this great reform should be done-by statute as the Law Commission recommended. When the Rule Committee made Order 53, some of us on the Committee had doubt about whether some of it was not ultra vires, but we took the risk because it was so desirable. Now that the statute has been passed, I may say that it has in several respects altered the substance for the law of the better.............................................. It includes all public authorities and public officers and indeed any one acting in exercise of a public duty, including a University. It also enlarges the scope of a declaration end injunction so as to apply wherever it is just end convenient and s 31 (3) gives the remedy to anyone who has a sufficient interest, which is very wide in its scope. Those provisions rid us of a whole mass tactical limitations which were thought previously to exist. Now the judicial review is available to give every kind of remedy, I think it should be the normal recourse in all cases of public law where the private person is challenging the conduct of a public authority or a public body or of anyone acting in the exercise of a public duty”. 43. From the above enunciation, it is clear and apparent that Lord Denning's observations in O’ Reilly's case (R) v East Berkshire Health Authority (supra). The English law after considering the above noted two decisions have been very succinctly dealt with in Foulkes’ Administrative Law, 6th Edition. 43. From the above enunciation, it is clear and apparent that Lord Denning's observations in O’ Reilly's case (R) v East Berkshire Health Authority (supra). The English law after considering the above noted two decisions have been very succinctly dealt with in Foulkes’ Administrative Law, 6th Edition. “In R v. East Berkshire Health Authority, ex p Walsh was employed by the Authority, Ministerial regulations made under the National Health Services Act provided that where conditions of service....of any class of officers have been the subject of negotiations by a negotiating body and have been approved by the Secretary of State....the conditions of service of any officer belonging to that class shall include the conditions so approved". We belonged to a class, that of senior nursing officer, whose conditions had been so approved, and his conditions of service therefore included the conditions in question. His employment was terminated by an employee senior to him, the district nursing officer. He sought review, under order 53, of his dismissal on the ground that there had been breaches of the rules of natural justice in the procedure leading to his dismissal. Had be chosen the correct procedure? Hedgson J. accepting that there is no public law element in the 'ordinary' master servant relationship, thought there where the servant ‘hold office in a great public service’, the public was property concerned that he should be treated lawfully and fairly by his employer, and this justified judicial review. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Mere employment by a public authority does not inject any element of public law, nor the fact that the employer is an ‘officer or is in a higher grade’ Was there anything here that took W’s status out of 'mere employment'? No. The effect of the ministerial regulations was that the authority's contracts with certain employees, including W, were required to be on certain terms. This did not take the relationship Hodgson J. had relied on Vine v. National Dock Labour Board, Ridge v Bladwin and Balloch v Aberdeen Corpn in coming to his conclusion, but in those cases stature directly restricted the authority's freedom to dismiss and in such a case the employee could acquire public law rights in respect of the power of dismissal. W's complaint had merely been that be had been dismissed in breach of the conditions referred to. W's complaint had merely been that be had been dismissed in breach of the conditions referred to. If his complaint had been of the legality of the delegation by the authority of its powers of dismissal, or if his condition of service had differed from those approved by the Secretary of State, the order 53 procedure might have been appropriate. The gravamen of W’s complaint was rather that he had not been heard. The rules of natural justice can however be imported into a private contract. The question then arose : could the matter be allowed to proceed as if begun by writ ? (This is possible under order 53). No The purpose of this anti-technicality’ rule is to preserve the position of an applicant who Intend. to seek the same relief in private law proceedings as he had initially sought by his application for judicial review not to allow him to amend and claim a different relief. The only relief sought here was certiorari, a purely public law remedy. We could not therefore be allowed to switch to an ordinary action”. 43A. In Graham Aldous and Jonn Alder's ‘Application for Judicial Review’-the distinction between public law and private law has been stated to be as follows : “Notwithstanding the judicial activism referred to above, the traditional approach of English Law has been to avoid a general theory of public law in favour of an ad hoc approach based on particular remedies and which envisages Governmental powers as exercised by numerous separate bodies, each with its own characteristics. On this basis, substantive numbers of judicial review has been applied to non-Governmental bodies, such as Universities and Trade Unions which are in a position to exercise power relating to matters of public concern. Conversely Governmental agencies proper exercise powers through the private law mechanisms, as contract, properly and patronage as well as by means of statute it is no longer possible to identify peculiarly Governmental functions since Government not only regulates and punishes but competes in the market. Nevertheless, the introduction of the Order 53 procedure has forced the Courts to develop a separate concept of public law in order to decide what kinds of cases are within the Order 53 jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the introduction of the Order 53 procedure has forced the Courts to develop a separate concept of public law in order to decide what kinds of cases are within the Order 53 jurisdiction. The main factor which determines whether a matter is one of public law or private law is the formal source of power, if a power derives wholly from the contract all opposed to statute it is not a public law power and therefore Order 53 procedure cannot apply. On the other hand, where a body exercises contractual powers which are partially regulated by statute, the matter depends on the statutory intervention. Thus, a wholly statutory powers seems ipso facts to be a public law power. There are also Governmental powers which are neither statutory nor contractual. There are the real prerogative powers and there ale also powers which exist solely by virtue of solely generated Governmental practices concerning matters, such as telephonic surveillance and passport control, where no legal recognised rights exist and therefore no need for the Government to derive its powers from any formal source. The contractual power test is concerned only with the source of particular power and not with the general status of the body exercising the power. Thus, in the absence of statutory regulation, a contract entered into by a statutory authority for public purpose is apparently a private law matter". 44. Cane's Book on Interpretation to Administrative Law (1986) seems to suggest the Introduction of functional criterion. It has been stated : “The fact that some of the activities and functions of the Government agencies are subject to the rules of private law show that we cannot, contrary to the tentative definition of public law suggested earlier would therefore answer this question solely in terms whether we are dealing with governmental agencies. In order to give full account of the scope of public law, it is necessary to add to the institutional criterion : a functional criterion -is it performing of public or governmental function ?”. 45. Judicial activism may or may not be accepted. But does that mean and imply that a later decision of the Supreme Court, may be by a two Judge Bench can or ought to be discarded. 45. Judicial activism may or may not be accepted. But does that mean and imply that a later decision of the Supreme Court, may be by a two Judge Bench can or ought to be discarded. The High Court is bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court and there is no escape from it and this is inspite of the fact that the High Court may have different view and different opinion on that score. It is for the Supreme Court to review the decision of the Central Inland and not by the Judge in the High Court to comment thereon or to by pass the same. The contention of the respondents that the Law Courts ought not to restrict itself to the old Draconian concept and the law must keep pace with the changed structure of the society, changed circumstance. In the country and its economy cannot be brushed aside, but that by itself does not mean and imply that the Law Courts would give a go-by to the procedural aspects absolutely. It was further submitted that the technicalities ought not to out weigh the course of justice, but that also does not clothe Law Courts to go beyond its way and grant a relief. 46. Mr. Solicitor General submitted that the Civil Courts have ample jurisdiction to go into the matter between master and servant and the decision in Satish Chandra Agarwal and Purusottamlal Dhingra cannot be said to be bad law-even after the decision of the Central Inland's case, and in the event there being a proper course open, would it be fair on the part of the Law Courts to decry well established principles of law? 47. It was contended that it is the concept of justice and the long established principles of law ought to he dealt with in a harmonious manner so that concept of justice can live up to this expectation and in the changed context-social and economic. The submission of Mr. Solicitor General is undoubtedly very attractive and can not to be discarded. It was contended that it is the concept of justice and the long established principles of law ought to he dealt with in a harmonious manner so that concept of justice can live up to this expectation and in the changed context-social and economic. The submission of Mr. Solicitor General is undoubtedly very attractive and can not to be discarded. But as noted above, by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Inland's case, it is not for this Court to observe contra or to express any opinion in regard to the jurisdiction of the Writ Court in the matter of private law field, more so when the Supreme Court while dealing with an identical issue has refrained from dealing with it. 48. Considering the matter from another aspect, submissions were made that s 284 of the Companies' Act read with the Article 115 of the Articles of Association of Andrew Yule & Co Ltd, question of challenge in regard to the notice of termination would not arise Strong reliance was placed on she decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1982 Lab. IC 1933 wherein a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court held that by reason of language of Article 97 of the Articles of Association (Equivalent to Article 115 in the case under consideration), it is apparent that the same confers absolute power on the President to dismiss the service of a Director or the Chairman and as the power conferred upon the President is absolute, there is no question of opportunity being given to the petitioner. The Court proceeded on to record that Articles of a Company are the internal regulations of the company and they cannot be enforced by means of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further the Court held that a Director is not an employee of the company and to some extent they are trustees for the company and to a certain extent they are also its agents and even if Article 12 applies to the petitioner, order of removal was in compliance with and not in contravention of any provision of law. As such, the writ petition was dismissed summarily. 49. Mr. Basu strongly commented upon the last noted decision of the High Court in regard to its finding that a Director is not an employee of the company. Mr. As such, the writ petition was dismissed summarily. 49. Mr. Basu strongly commented upon the last noted decision of the High Court in regard to its finding that a Director is not an employee of the company. Mr. Basu submitted that this Court ought not to rely upon the decision as it runs counter to the well settled principle of law. I, however score express no opinion on the submission of Mr. Basu in regard to the decision of the Allahabad High Court noted above excepting however recording that it may be a bit too wide a proposition of law. 50. Coming back to 8 284 of the Companies’ Act, it appears that by and under s. 284 a company may by ordinary resolution remove a Director not being a Director appointed by the Central Government in pursuance of s 408 before the expiry of his period of office. The various sub sections or s 284 specifies the method and procedure to be adopted therefore. It cannot be termed to be an unguided and uncanalised power given to the Board in the matter of removal of a Director Article 115(1)(a) of the Articles of Association of the Company provides that the appointment of the part-time Chairman a Chairman-Cum Managing Director, the Managing Director and any whole time Director shall be appointed by the President and Article 115(l)(f) provides that the president may from time to time or at any time remove the part-time Chairman, Chairman-Cum Managing Director, Managing Director and any whole time Director from his Office in his absolute discretion. Strong reliance was placed on behalf of the respondent that by reason of Article 115(1)(f) read with s 284, the action of the respondent in terminating the service of the petitioner cannot be challenged in a Court of Law. 51. Is it to be considered that the President in terms of Article 115(1)(f) of the Articles of Associations of the Company can remove or terminate the services of any Director without any just cause and in his absolute discretion specially in a Government Company within the meaning of s 617 of the Companies’ Act. 51. Is it to be considered that the President in terms of Article 115(1)(f) of the Articles of Associations of the Company can remove or terminate the services of any Director without any just cause and in his absolute discretion specially in a Government Company within the meaning of s 617 of the Companies’ Act. I need not express any opinion in the view I have taken in regard to the Andrew Yule & Co Ltd. being an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution Suffice however, it to note here that the issue is not free from doubt. 52. By reason of the finding as regards Article 12 of the Constitution, the writ application fails and is dismissed. The petitioner, however would be at liberty to agitate the issues before the appropriate forum if otherwise entitled in law. It is recorded hereby that I have not gore on to the factual aspect of the matter since any observation from this Court may have a prejudicial effect at a subsequent stage. There will be no order, however, as to costs. 53. The prayer for stay made and is granted to this extent that the petitioner's possession of the residential accommodation would not be disturbed for a period of three weeks from date. The Andrew Yule and Co. is however, directed to make available to the writ petitioner all other benefits as is admissible under the law to the petitioner and the petitioner is at liberty to obtain such benefits without prejudice to his rights and contentions. This obligation to make available the benefits to the writ petitioner, however, would arise only in the event of an application strictly in accordance with the formalities as required under the law and the rules of the Company. Application dismissed.