V. GOPALASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has preferred the present revision with the prayer that the order dated 21-9-1983 passed by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial magistrate, Bargarh in the Case ICC No. 90/82 taking cognizance against him under Section 341, Indian Penal Code should be quashed. ( 2 ) THE opposite party had filed the complaint petition on 5/8/1982 complaining against the petitioner that on 18-7-1982 the petitioner had wrongfully restrained him and thereby rendered himself liable under Section 341, I. P. C. The S. D. J. M. posted the case to 11-8-1982 for recording the initial sworn statement of the complainant. That on 11-8-1982 as the S. D. J. M. found the accused in the complaint -petition to be his friend, requested the C. J. M. , Sambalpur to withdraw the case from his file and thereafter the case was adjourned to several dates for necessary orders from the C. J. M. That in the mean while the then D. D. J. M. was transferred and the S. D. J. M. who took his charge posted the case to 21/9/1983 for recording the initial statement of the complainant. That on 21-9-1983 the S. D. J. M. took cognizance against the petitioner under Section 341, I. P. C. and it is against the order of taking cognizance the present revision is preferred. ( 3 ) ON the complaint petition of the opposite party alleging that the petitioner had wrongfully restrained him on 18/7/1982 the learned S. D. J. M. had taken cognizance of the offence under Section 341, I. P. C. the punishment prescribed for the offence of wrongful restraint under Section 341, I. P. C. is either simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or fine which may extend to Rs 500/- or with both. Section 468 (2) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( hereinafter referred to as the Code) provides that if the accused is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, the period of limitation shall be one year and according to Section 469 (1) (a) of the Code, the period of limitation, in relation to an offenders shall commence on the date of the offence. In the present case even according to the alleged offence was committed on 18-7-1982. In the present case even according to the alleged offence was committed on 18-7-1982. But the cognizance of the offence was taken by the court only on 21-9-1983 that is, long after the expiry of the period of limitation of one year from the date of offence. So in the facts of the present case it is clear that by 21/9/1983, the period of limitation having expired, the Magistrate had already lost his power to toke cognizance. So in case the learned S. D. J. M. wanted to toke cognizance on 21-9. 1983 he could have done so by extending the period of limitation by invoking the provision of Section 473 of the Code. ( 4 ) UNDER Section 473 the court is given the judicial discretion to take cognizance of an offence even after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. The impugned order passed by the learned S. D. J. M. is quoted below: 21/9/1983 Complainant is present on call. He is examined on S. A. Perused his statement. It reveals a prima facie case under Section 341, I. P. C. Accordingly cognizance is taken under Section 341. I. P. C. Summon the accused fixing 25-10-83. Complainant to toke steps within 3 days. Dictated Sd/ T Purohit S. D. J. M. T There is nothing in the above quoted order to suggest that the learned S. D. J. M. had invoked the provisions of Section 473 and on the other hand it reveals that the aspect of limitation did not occur to mind of the S. D. J. M. at all at the time of passing the impugned order. ( 5 ) SECTION 468 of the Code has been newly added for the purpose of protecting citizens against unnecessary harassment by filing vexatious complaints. The section should be construed strictly. It is the settled position of law that the right which has accrued In favour of the accused under Section 468 by afflux of time can be denied only on an order for the extension of period of limitation not when an objection is taken by the accused but at the time of issuance of the process itself. It is the settled position of law that the right which has accrued In favour of the accused under Section 468 by afflux of time can be denied only on an order for the extension of period of limitation not when an objection is taken by the accused but at the time of issuance of the process itself. In the case of Subhash Chandra Mohapatra v. M. S. Jaggi1, it was held that condoning delay retrospectively is illegal. So in the instant case, when the opposite party (complainant) was very much present in the court on 21/9/1983 he ought to have filed an application for the condonation of delay under Section 473 to enable the court to decide whether at all, in the facts and circumstances of the case. Cognizance should be taken even after the expiry of period of limitation. But instead of that the impugned order discloses that the court had straightaway taken cognizance of an offence under Section 341 I. P. C. against the petitioner long after the expiry of period of limitation without applying its mind to the aspect of limitation and such a course adopted by the learned S. D. J. M. is, therefore contrary to law and opposed to the mandatory provisions of Section 468, Cr. P. C. and the impugned order is therefore liable to be set aside. ( 6 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I find that this is a fit case for exercising the revisional powers in favour of the petitioner and in exercise of the same, I hereby set aside the order of the S. D. J. M. dated 21-9-1983 taking cognizance against the petitioner under Section 341, I. P. C. and quash the proceedings in the case I. C. C. No. 90/82, on the file of the S. D. J. M. , Bargarh, and accordingly I allow the revision. Revision allowed. .