Judgment :- 1. Crl. R.P. 64/83 is by the first accused and the other by the second accused. They were convicted and sentenced by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Manjeri in CC 231/79 for rigorous imprisonment for six months each for offences punishable under S.408, 409 and 477A IPC directing the sentences to be suffered concurrently. Criminal Appeals filed by them were dismissed. 2. They were respectively Cashier and Accountant in the Manjeri Cooperative Urban Bank. The charges are temporary misappropriation of Rs. 250/ remitted by pw. 4, a subscriber of kuri conducted by the Bank, on 2-3-1976 towards instalment and falsification of accounts in relation to that amount. 3. The contention of the revision petitioners is that there is no evidence of entrustment. Prosecution case was that pw. 4 paid the amount to the first accused and though Ext.P2 receipt issued for that purpose was signed by both accused, second accused did not credit the same in the accounts and first accused did not show it in the cash balance. The emission to enter these amounts in the accounts and cash balance is proved and it is not disputed also. Revision Petitioners are the persons bound to make these entries is also a fact which h admitted and proved. If so the only question is whether there was entrustment. 4. Though the prosecution case was that payment was made by pw. 4, he said in the box that payment was made by him only through his son-in-law. The son-in-law who made the payment was not examined. Therefore it was argued that entrustment is not proved. But pw. 4 said that the son-in-law actually made the payment and Ext, P2 receipt obtained for that purpose was handed over to him. pw. 2, the Chief Accountant of the Bank, who is "conversant with the writing and signature of both the revision petitioners, was the Secretary of the Bank at the relevant time. Ext.P3 is the pass-book retained for the remittances made by pw.4. pw.2 proved the entries and initials in Exts.P2 and P3 as those of the revision petitioners. Receipt of the amount and omission to account the same was actually proved. It is true that the son-in-law of pw.4 who made the payment ought to have been examined. But the omission to examine him has not affected acceptability of the evidence regarding entrustment. Receipt of the amount and omission to account the same was actually proved. It is true that the son-in-law of pw.4 who made the payment ought to have been examined. But the omission to examine him has not affected acceptability of the evidence regarding entrustment. Further there is the evidence of Pw.S, collection agent that on 1-9-1976 the disputed amount of Rs. 250/ was paid to him by the first accused and he issued Ext. P11(a) receipt. On the basis of these and other items of evidence the trial court and the appellate court found that offences under all the counts were established. I do not find any reason to interfere with those findings in revision subject to the contention regarding illegality of the trial which I am going to consider hereunder. 5. This is a warrant case instituted on a police report. S.238 to 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appearing in Chap.19 deal with the procedure for the trial of such cases. In the same chapter S.244 onwards deals with the procedure for trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report. In a warrant case instituted on a police report, after satisfying that the provisions of S.207 are complied with, the Magistrate has to consider the police report and the documents sent with it under S.173. If he thinks it necessary he can examine the accused also. In this connection he will have to give the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard. All these are for the purpose of considering whether the charge is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused committed an offence triable under that chapter which be is competent to try and adequately punish. If upon such consideration, examination, if any, and bearing the Magistrate finds the charge groundless he will have to discharge the accused without framing charge. Otherwise he will have to frame a charge in writing which will have to be read over and explained to the accused and his plea recorded. Recording of the prosecution evidence could only be thereafter. Defence evidence, if any, comes in only subsequently. The consideration, examination, if any, and hearing provided in S.239 and 240 and the consequent satisfaction are conditions precedent to the framing of charge. Only after such satisfaction the Magistrate cm frame the charge and only after framing charge trial could commence. Recording of the prosecution evidence could only be thereafter. Defence evidence, if any, comes in only subsequently. The consideration, examination, if any, and hearing provided in S.239 and 240 and the consequent satisfaction are conditions precedent to the framing of charge. Only after such satisfaction the Magistrate cm frame the charge and only after framing charge trial could commence. Application of the mind of the Magistrate and the consequent framing of charge alone invests him with authority to try the accused for the offence. If the charge is groundless the accused has a right to be discharged. Charge is not an empty formality. It is the basic record which gives notice to the accused on what accusation he is going to be tried so that be could shape his defence accordingly. When there is no charge and when no charge is read over and explained to the accused, legally he has no notice on what accusations he is being tried. In such cases it is no trial at all and the trial is vitiated. No prejudice need be proved in such cases. It is not a case of irregularity and there is no question of irregularity being cured under S.464 or 465. 6. It is true that as held in Bhoor Singh v. State of Punjab (1974 SCC (Cri) 664) the object of charge is to give notice to the accused of the matter he is charged with. If the necessary information is conveyed to him in other ways and there is no prejudice, the trial may not be vitiated by the mere fact that charge was not formally reduced to writing. In other words when the Magistrate follows substantially the provisions laid down in Chap.19 for the trial of warrant cases on police report but commits some irregularity in following those provisions the irregularity will be curable in the absence of prejudice. For example if the police charge is read over and explained after satisfaction that there is ground for proceeding, without framing a charge in writing, that may be a case of substantial compliance and the irregularity could be cured in the absence of prejudice. But when the trial is conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code, the trial is bad and no question of curing an irregularity arises. 7. But when the trial is conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code, the trial is bad and no question of curing an irregularity arises. 7. There are substantial differences between procedures in the trial of warrant cases instituted on police report and otherwise. id the latter case there is no question of framing charge before trial. In such cases the first step is to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence it produces. Then that evidence has to be considered to decide whether, if unrebutted, the evidence would warrant a conviction. If so charge will have to be framed, otherwise the accused will have to be discharged. The question of reading and explaining the charge, recording the plea and proceeding further arises only at that stage. 8. In the present case the Magistrate proceeded as if it is a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report. Therefore without complying with the formalities enjoined by S.239 and 240 he straightaway recorded all the prosecution evidence. The mistake was realised by him only when the accused were questioned on the evidence under S.313 of the Code. At that time a charge was framed and the accused were asked whether they want to further cross-examine the prosecution witnesses who were already examined even without framing a charge. The accused did not have the advantage of the consideration by court whether the police charge is groundless or not and they did not have the advantage of the charge being framed and read over to them. At least when the defect was noticed the Magistrate ought to have realised that the trial conducted so far was no trial at all in the absence of even a show of compliance of S.239 and 240. After framing charge he could have very well started the trial afresh alter ignoring what happened, till then as non-est. When the accused said that they do not want to further cross-examine the prosecution witnesses already examined the Magistrate questioned them and proceeded to decide the case on the basis of the evidence recorded without compliance of S.240. As held in Kottaya v. Emperor (AIR 1947 PC 67), Bandulal v. State (AIR 1962 Bombay 258) and a host of other decisions such a procedure makes the trial bad and there is no question of curing the irregularity. As held in Kottaya v. Emperor (AIR 1947 PC 67), Bandulal v. State (AIR 1962 Bombay 258) and a host of other decisions such a procedure makes the trial bad and there is no question of curing the irregularity. As held in State of Kerala v. Bhaskaran (1970 KLT 650), though in a different context, when such a trial ends in conviction after depriving the valuable rights under S.239 and 240, it is a case of the accused being prima facie prejudiced. The evidence recorded during such a trial cannot be the basis of conviction because it has to be treated as non-est in the circumstances. The criminal revision petitions are therefore allowed and the convictions and sentences are set aside. The case is sent back to the Magistrate. He will take the case back to file and proceed to try and dispose of the same afresh on the merits according to law in the light of what is stated above.