JUDGMENT T. N. Singh, J l. This is defendant's appeal. The suit was dismissed by the Court below, but the lower appellate Court having decreed the same, the defendant has assailed the decision rendered in appeal. 2. Although long arguments are made in this matter, the law has to be appreciated properly which exercise was not undertaken erroneously by the Court below. Because I have taken the view that on a misappreciation of the correct legal position, the Court below erroneously reversed the decree passed by the trial Court, I have no hesitation to say that the long arguments of counsel has a short answer in law. Appellant's counsel Shri K. N. Gupta has made a short submission to the effect that the lower appellate Court, even after holding that the defendant, on plaintiff's own admission, was in possession of the suit land since 1963 and also bolding that the defendant had paid rent for the suit land for one year, failed to bold that the plaintiff lost his right, title and interest in the suit land in virtue of the provisions contained in sections 168 (1), 169 (1), 250 (1-A), 190 (2-A) and 190 (3) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, for short, the 'Code'. 3. Respondent's counsel Shri Arun Mishra bas assailed the finding of the lower appellate Court though the said Court has decreed the plaintiff's suit. He bas urged that the Court below was wrong in holding that the defendant was plaintiff's lessee for a period of one year having paid rent for the wit land for a period of one year. It is his contention that more importance bas to be attached to Ex. D-1 and D-2 which are khasra entries and be wanted me to look at those, but I have refused to oblige him as those are of no consequence. Indeed, I do not think it competent for me to reappreciate evidence in Second Appeal because I am bound by the settled law reiterated ad infinitum by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that unless a finding of the Court below is perverse and not based on any evidence, it is no business of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence. I do not see bow I can hold the finding of the Court below to be perverse when the finding is based on plaintiff's own evidence and admission. 4. I do not see bow I can hold the finding of the Court below to be perverse when the finding is based on plaintiff's own evidence and admission. 4. Counsel bas relied on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Beohar Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. 1970 RN 16. He has relied on the observation in that case that where the owner is shown in the Khasra as the State 'Milkiyat Sarkar', the column regarding tenancy right is blank, but a person is enterd as in possession in the remarks column, the possession cannot be attributed to ownership or tenancy of the property. I do not see how this holding can at all be pressed in service in this appeal merely because in the khasra, according to learned counsel, the name of the defendant is shown in the Remark column to be "in possession of the land". Counsel was asked to look at the khasras himself and to point out to me if the entry was positive that defendant was shown as "trespasser". But, after looking at the khasras, he could only submit that there was no such positive entry naming the defendant as "trespasser" while the entry, admittedly, was that the defendant was "in possession" of the suit land. In that view of the matter, reliance on the decision cited would evidently not avail learned counsel. Merely because the entry is in Remark column showing defendant as to be "in possession" of the suit land and that he has not been shown in the khasras as a "tenant", would not establish, according to me, positively and affirmatively that the defendant was not "tenant" of the suit land and oral evidence and admission to the contrary cannot be looked into and that the Court below committed a grave error of law in relying on the oral evidence. Indeed, the holding of the Court below cannot at all be said to be contrary to what is to be found in Ex. D-1 and D-2. Because, the khasras do Dot positively negative the position that the defendant was "tenant" inasmuch 'as "possession" of the defendant is nevertheless recorded in the khasras and even more than that is recorded there in that the defendant was not recorded as a "trespasser'. D-1 and D-2. Because, the khasras do Dot positively negative the position that the defendant was "tenant" inasmuch 'as "possession" of the defendant is nevertheless recorded in the khasras and even more than that is recorded there in that the defendant was not recorded as a "trespasser'. I think that is too much for the day on this contention of learned counsel to satisfy him that the decision cited bas little relevance to the contention. 5. Now, the law. I have tried to read legislative intent by reading conjointly the provisions above referred as I am of the view that the Code was enacted in 1959 after abolition of Zamindaris with the avowed object of perfecting the right, title and interest of the actual tiller of the soil Indeed, all measures enacted point of the single object of avoiding intermediaries and extinguishing rights of intermediaries at different stages as and when such transactions take place and rights crop up making it necessary to take care of the situation to kill effectively such rights which run counter to the legislative intent. I quote, therefore, section 168 (1). etc. sec. in that order. “168. Leases-(1) Except in case provided for in sub-section (2) no Bhumiswami shall lease any land comprised in his holding for more than one year during any consecutive period of three years. 169. Unauthorised lease, etc-If a Bhumiswami- (i) leases out for any period any land comprised in his holding in contravention of section 168; or 250…… (1-A) If a Bhumiswami is dispossessed of the land otherwise than in due course of law or if any person unauthorisedly continues in possession of any land of the Bhumiswami to the use of which such person has ceased to be entitled under any provision of this Code the Bhumiswami or his successor in interest may apply to the Tahsildar for restoration of the possession (a) …………. (b) In case of a Bhumiswami not covered by clause (a), within two years from the date of dispossession or from the date on which possession of such person becomes unauthorised, as the case may be. (b) In case of a Bhumiswami not covered by clause (a), within two years from the date of dispossession or from the date on which possession of such person becomes unauthorised, as the case may be. 190 (2-A) Where the land of a Bhumiswami is held by an occupancy tenant other than an occupancy tenant referred to in subsection (1), the rights of a Bhumiswami shall accrue to the occupancy tenant In respect of such land- 190 (3) Where the rights of a Bhumiswami accrue to an occupancy tenant under sub-section (1), sub-section (2) or sub-section (2-A) such occupancy tenant shall be liable to pay to his Bhumiswami compens1tion equal to fifteen times the land revenue payable in respect of the land in five equal annual instalments, each instalment being payable on the date on which the rent payable under section 188 for the corresponding year falls due and, if default is made in payment, it shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue:- 6. Why it is that in sub-section (1) of section 168, it is mentioned that for "any consecutive period of three years" the bhumiswami shall not lease his land except the bhumiswami of the class categorised in sub-section (2), such as a widow or unmarried women, a married, but deserted woman, a minor and a person subject to physical or mental disability etc.? Again, why it is that in clause (b) of section 250 (1-A) the disability of a bhumiswami is measured with reference to a period of "two years from the date of dispossession or from the date on which possession of such person becomes unauthorised"? In my view the Legislature meant that even if a person was inducted on land by bhumiswami as his lessee for a period of one year, such a lessee can validly claim that in the absence of any proceeding taken to evict him within a period of two years after expiry of the period of the "lease", it shall be deemed that the lease was made under section 168 (1) for a period exceeding one year and Was for three years or more. Otherwise, I do not see any sense in the Legislature contemplating that when a bhumiswami "leases out" any land for a period in contravention of section 168, the person in possession of the land shall acquire the rights of "occupancy tenant" in that land. Otherwise, I do not see any sense in the Legislature contemplating that when a bhumiswami "leases out" any land for a period in contravention of section 168, the person in possession of the land shall acquire the rights of "occupancy tenant" in that land. The Legislature meant that the bhumiswami must himself cultivate the land or even if any need arises for him to lease out the land that right would be limited to one year's lease in a block of three years. The land must not be kept fallow was one object while the other object was to reward the tiller. Indeed, if he is not minded to cultivate himself the land and does not take proceeding under section 250 to resume possession of the land from the person in possession thereof, it shall be deemed that the lease was to continue and such a lessee could be sued only for the rent reserved in the lease. 7. For the view I have taken, I also find sufficient support in the provision contained in clause (ii) of section 169 which deals with the case of an "arrangement", defined in Explanation (b) appended to section 168 (1). Herein also, the limit of the "arrangement" is fixed statutorily to a period of two years. The Legislature, in my opinion, wanted to make it clear that if for eonsecutively three years any person other than the bhumiswami had been in possession of the land either under a lease or an "arrangement" and if the landlord had not resumed the land for cultivating himself personally, the right of an "occupancy tenant" would accrue to such a person. Indeed, something more is also done to enlarge the corpus of the right and interest of such an "occupancy tenant" making provision in section 190 to confer upon him the right of "bhumiswami". Indeed, this is done by extinguishing the right of ownership of erstwhile bhumiswami giving the latter only compensation for extinction of his right, as per sub-section (3) of section 190 of the Code. The Code confers the right of a bhumiswami on the occupancy tenant, to whom such a right accrued in virtue of section 169 according to sub-section (2-A) of section 190. And, the new bhumiswami is saddled under sub-section (3) with a liability to pay compensation to the old bhumiswami for statutory transfer to him of latter's right. 8. The Code confers the right of a bhumiswami on the occupancy tenant, to whom such a right accrued in virtue of section 169 according to sub-section (2-A) of section 190. And, the new bhumiswami is saddled under sub-section (3) with a liability to pay compensation to the old bhumiswami for statutory transfer to him of latter's right. 8. Because the Court below evidently misdirected itself in law, it came to render a wrong decision reversing the decree passed by the trial Court. On the facts proved in the case and on the finding arrived by the two Courts below, I am fully satisfied that the plaintiff having ceased to be a bhumiswami by operation of law, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The trial Court having rightly dismissed the suit, that decision was illegally reversed by the court below. 9. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Court below are set aside and those of the trial Court restored. There shall, however, be no order as to costs in this appeal.