JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS writ petition has been filed by the Secretary, Timber merchants Association, 14, Timber Stall, Navlakha, Indore, asserting that it is registered society and all the timber-merchants and saw mill owners in the Navlakha and connected area are its members. One of its members Sobhagmal Jadaochand Jain was served with a notice, a copy whereof has been attached to the writ petition as annexure P-2 requiring that member to show cause as to why its registration under the m. P. Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the adhiniyam) may not be cancelled for non-submission of the return contemplated by section 8 of the Adhiniyam. The prayers made in the writ petition are that the adhiniyam may be declared to be non-existing, ineffective and a nullity; the respondents may be restrained from implementing the provisions of the Adhiniyam and taking any action against the members of the petitioner society for alleged contravention of the provisions of the Adhiniyam and for quashing the notice (Annexure P-2) referred to above. ( 2. ) THE validity of the Adhiniyam has been challenged inter alia on the ground that the relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam are in contravention of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. A similar challenge was made in Itarsi Timber Merchants association, Itarsi and another vs. Stateof M. P. andothers, 1986 M. P. L. J. 307, and was repelled by a Division Bench of this Court. For the reasons already recorded in the aforesaid decision, we find no substance in the challenge to the Adhiniyam made by the petitioner on grounds similar to those which were raised in the case of Itarsi Timber merchants Association (supra ). ( 3. ) PROVISIONS of Sections 9 and 10 of the Adhiniyam have been challenged also on the ground that they are in contravention of the provisions contained in Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution. These two sections read as hereunder :. "9. ( 3. ) PROVISIONS of Sections 9 and 10 of the Adhiniyam have been challenged also on the ground that they are in contravention of the provisions contained in Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution. These two sections read as hereunder :. "9. Keeping of account of stock of wood in saw mill and saw pit.- All wood whether sawn or not, found in or brought to the saw mill or saw pit or at the site of sawing at any time or during any period by any person in any manner or by any means for purpose of sawing or for any other purpose shall always be properly accounted for and all relevant evidence, documents, receipts, order and certificate as are necessary to show that the wood is legally obtained shall be maintained and made available at the time of inspection. It shall be presumed in respect of the stock of wood which is not accounted for satisfactorily that the same has been obtained unlawfully and the stock of wood shall be liable for confiscation. 10. Prohibition of electric connection etc. in un-licensed saw mill.- (1) On and from the appointed day and notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment relating to electricity for the time being in force, no electric energy shall be consumed and no electric connection shall be installed for the purpose of a saw mill or continued for that purpose unless such saw mill is duly licensed or deemed to be licensed in accordance with the provisions of this act and such electric connection shall be continued so long as the saw mill operates under a valid licence granted or deemed to be granted or under this Act". Having gone through the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 aforesaid, we find nothing in these two sections which may be said to contravene any of the provisions contained either in Article 301 or Article 304 of the Constitution. It was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the requirement of maintaining meticulous accounts as contemplated by Section 9 of the Adhiniyam works out great hardship. In our opinion, however, the said section cannot be held to be ultra vires on such a ground. That apart, when there is a requirement of maintaining accounts in the very nature of things the requirement is to maintain correct accounts meticulously. In our opinion, however, the said section cannot be held to be ultra vires on such a ground. That apart, when there is a requirement of maintaining accounts in the very nature of things the requirement is to maintain correct accounts meticulously. Maintaining inaccurate or incomplete accounts can obviously not satisfy the requirement of maintaining accounts. ( 4. ) IT was then urged that the M. P. Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Sanshodhan adhyadesh, 1984, (No. 17 of 1984) prescribing the day of commencement of the adhiniyam was ultra vires and consequently the Adhiniyam has not come into force at all and action under the Adhiniyam namely the issue of notice Annexure P-2 to the writ petition is illegal. In this connection, two submissions have been made by learned counsel for the petitioner Firstly it has been urged that since the requirements of Article 213 of the Constitution which deals with promulgation of an Adhyadesh by the governor have not been complied with, the said Adhyadesh was illegal. Secondly it has been urged that even though the Adhiniyam is of the year 1984. bv virtue of Section 3 of the Adhyadesh which subsuiutes clause (a) of Section 2 of the Adhiniyam containing the definition of the term "appointed day" makes the Adhiniyam applicable with effect from 15th December 1983. In support of the first submission, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the proviso to Article 213 (1) which reads as hereunder: "provided that the Governor shall, not, without instruction from the president, promulgate any such Ordinance if - (a) a Bill containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have required the previous sanction of the President for the introduction thereof into the Legislature, or tb) he would have deemed it necessary to reserve a Bill containing the same proviions for the consideration of the President, or (c) an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have been invalid unless having been reserved for the consideration of the President, it had received the assent of the President. " On its basis it has been urged that since instructions from the President had not been obtained before promulgating the Adhyadesh No. 17 of 1984, it was invalid. We find it difficult to agree with this submission also. " On its basis it has been urged that since instructions from the President had not been obtained before promulgating the Adhyadesh No. 17 of 1984, it was invalid. We find it difficult to agree with this submission also. Sections 2 and 3 of the Adhyadesh No. 17 of 1984 read as hereunder : "2. Madhya Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1984 to be temporarily amended.-During the period of operation of this Ordinance, the Madhya Pradesh Kashtha chiran (Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984 (No. 13 of 1984) (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), shall have effect subject to the amendment specified in section 3. 3. Amendment of Section 2.- For clause (a) of Section 2 of the Principal Act, the following clause shall be substituted and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from llth April 1984, namely :- (a) appointed day means the 15th day of December 1983 on which the madhya Pradesh Kashtha Chiran (Viniyaman) Adhyadesh, 1983 (No. 11 of 1983) came into force throughout the State of Madhya Pradesh. " A perusal of these sections indicates the 15th December 1983 has been prescribed as the "appointed day" for the enforcement of the Adhiniyam inasmuch as it was on this day that the Madhya Pradesh Kashtha Chiram (Viniyaman) Adhyadesh, 1983 (No. 11 of 1983) had come into force. It is this Adhyadesh No. 11 of 1983 which was replaced by the adhiniyam. It would thus be seen that the Adhiniyam had been brought into force with effect from the same date on which the Adhyadesh which was replaced by the adhiniyam had come into force. At this place we may point out the necessity of the promulgation of Adhyadesh No. 17 of 1984. A perusal of clause (a) of Section 2 of the adhyadesh No. 11 of 1983 which was replaced by the Adhiniyam indicates that the said clause defined "appointed day. " According to this definition, "appointed day" means a date appointed under sub-section (3) of Section 1 and where a different date is appointed in respect of any area, the date appointed for such area. Sub-section (3) of section 1, on the other hand, provided that the Ordinance shall come into force on such date as the State Government by notification may appoint and different dates may be appointed for different areas. Sub-section (3) of section 1, on the other hand, provided that the Ordinance shall come into force on such date as the State Government by notification may appoint and different dates may be appointed for different areas. In exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (3) of section 1 of Adhyadesh No. 11 of 1983, the State Government had by notification appointed 15th December 1983 as the date on which the Ordinance came into force. When the said Adhyadesh was replaced by the Adhiniyam even though Section 2 (a) of the Adhyadesh containing the definition of "appointed day" was retained in section 2 (a)of the Adhiniyam, Section 1 of the Adhiniyam contained only two sub-sections and not sub-section (3) of the Adhyadesh which enabled the State Government to appoint a date of enforcement of the Adhyadesh by issuing a notification. The effect of this omission was that no day was expressed in the Adhiniyam on which it was to come into force. This being so, in view of Section 3 of the M. P. General Clauses Act, the day of commencement of the Adhiniyam would be 11th April 1984, namely the date on which it received the assent of the President and was published in the Official Gazette. Adhyadesh No. 11 of 1983, which was replaced by the Adhiniyam, however, had come into force on 15th December 1983. It is this lacuna which was removed by issuing adhyadesh No. 17 of 1984 as is apparent from Sections 2 and 3 of the said Adhyadesh already quoted above. This Adhyadesh was subsequently replaced by M. P. Act No. 44 of 1984. Here we may point out that even if Adhyadesh No. 17 of 1984 was illegal it cannot be said that the Adhiniyam would, for that reason, be deemed to have never come into force, as has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioner, inasmuch as in that event 11th April would still be the day of its commencement in view of Section 3 of the M. P. General Clauses Act, as pointed out above. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since the Adhiniyam had been reserved for the assent of the President and had received his assent, Adhyadesh No. 17 of 1984 amending Section 2 (a) of the adhiniyam could be promulgated only after obtaining instructions from the President as comtemplated by the Proviso to Article 213 (1) of the Constitution. In our opinion, keeping in view the nature of the provision contained in Adhyadesh No. 17 of 1984, namely, to prescribe the date of the commencement of the Adhiniyam as the day on which Adhyadesh No. 11 of 1983 which was replaced by the Adhiniyam had come into force, none of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the Proviso to Article 213 (1) of the constitution is attracted. The said Adhyadesh cannot, therefore, be held to be ultra vires on the ground that it had been promulgated without obtaining instructions from the President. ( 5. ) AS regards the second submission, namely, that even though the Adhiniyam was of the year 1984, it has been made applicable retrospectively with effect from 15th December 1983 which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, could not be done, the reason why 15th December 1983 was fixed as the date on which the adhiniyam came into force has already been indicated above. Since the Adhiniyam had replaced Adhyadesh No. 11 of 1983 which had come into force on 15th December 1983, there was no illegality in fixing that very date as the date of the commencement of the adhiniyam. This has been held to be a valid consideration and criteria by the Supreme court in Ambika Prasad vs. State of U. P. , AIR 1980 SC 1762 , where while dealing with almost a similar submission with regard to fixation of various dates on which different provisions of the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act had been brought into force, it was inter alia held in paragraph 35 of the report that "the other dates mentioned above do not create any problem being rationally related to the date of a preceding Ordinance or the date of introduction of the Bill. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore vs. D. Achiah Chetty, AIR 1969 SC 477 , where the power of State Legislature to validate retrospectively acquisitions of land was considered. In our opinion, that decision is of no assistance so far as the point involved in the instant case is concerned. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on Koteshwar Vittal Kamath vs. K. Rangappa baliga and Co. , AIR 1969 SC 504 , in regard to the scope of the Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution. That case again in our opinion is of no assistance inasmuch as we have already pointed out above that Sections 9 and 10 of the Adhiniyam which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner contravene Articles 301 and 304 of the constitution contain no such provision which may be said to be in derogation of either of these two Articles. ( 6. ) AS regards the challenge to the notice (Annexure P-2), suffice it to say that the person to whom the notice had been issued being a licensee under the Adhiniyam had to comply with the requirements of Section 8 and if the authority issuing the notice was of the opinion that there was breach in compliance of the requirement of the said section, it was competent to issue the said notice and the proper course for the person to whom the said notice has been issued, accordingly, is to show cause in pursuance of the said notice. We do not find any ground to quash that notice. ( 7. ) LASTLY, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that a person could not be prosecuted for an offence by introducing a penalty provision with retrospective effect. In the instant case, since no prosecution under the Adhiniyam has been challenged, the plea raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is only academic. Consequently, we do not find it necessary to exercise our opinion on any aspect of the aforesaid question including as to whether any penal provision has in fact been incorporated with retrospective effect in the Adhiniyam. ( 8. ) IN the result, we find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.