Shivashankar Bhat, J. ( 1 ) W. A. No. 1269/1981 is by the owner Ramappa against the order in W. P. No. 4269/1977. Respondent, Sangappa's Writ Petition was allowed by a common order made in W. P. Nos. 4268 and 4269 of 3977. W. P. No. 4268/77 was the Writ Petition of another claimant to the status of tenant in respect of another land belonging to the appellant. ( 2 ) IN the year 1942, father of the appellant died. Lands are situated in the erstwhile Jamkhandi state, which was a princely State in 1942. In 1943, Court of Wards of Jamkhandi State took the management of the estate left by the father of the appellant, since appellant was a minor at that time. The Court of Wards leased the lands for cultivation. On 8-3-1948 Jamkhandi State merged with the erstwhile Bombay State and with effect from 1-8-1948, Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands Act, 1939 was made applicable to the areas of the merged State. The Bombay tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred as 'the Bombay Tenancy Act)' came into force in the area on 25-12-1948. This Act as amended upto 31-10-1956 was in force in the Bombay area of the present Karnataka State till 2-10-1965, when Karnataka Land Reforms act, 1961 (Act 10 of 1962) (hereinafter referred to as the 'land Reforms Act') came into force, subject to certain other Acts like Mysore Act 13/1957. ( 3 ) THE management of the lands continued after merger with the Bombay State, under the provisions of the Bombay Court of Wards Act, 1905, and for all purposes of this appeal (as also in the connected appeals) Court of Wards is referred as under the said Bombay Act (for convenience referred hereinafter as 'court of Wards Act' ). ( 4 ) ON 18-7-1957, appellant attained the age of majority. In the year 1958, management by the court of Wards was withdrawn. Since the Court of Wards thought that the tenants could not be evicted in view of the provisions of Bombay Tenancy Act, only symbolic possession was given to the appellant. The appellant did not accept the position of the person inducted as tenant by the court of Wards and sought possession of the lands by filing O. S. No. 61 of 1959 and 68 of 1961 (against the two persons who claimed to be the tenants ). The appellant did not accept the position of the person inducted as tenant by the court of Wards and sought possession of the lands by filing O. S. No. 61 of 1959 and 68 of 1961 (against the two persons who claimed to be the tenants ). These persons inducted by the Court of wards to cultivate the lands who claim the status of tenants, is hereinafter referred as the claimants. Ultimately by an order of this Court, it was directed that question of tenancy should be decided by the Land Tribunal under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act. ( 5 ) THE Land Tribunal, Bijapur, considered the issues referred to it and held that the claimants were not the tenants and they were not entitled to be registered as occupants under Section 45 of the Land Reforms Act. ( 6 ) THE claimants challenged this order of the Land Tribunal in W. P. Nos. 4268 and 4269/1977. ( 7 ) THE Land Tribunal's view, that, such a person cannot seek the benefit of Land Reforms Act was reversed by the Learned Single Judge. It was held by the learned Single Judge that the claimants were "deemed tenants" under Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act, as they were lawfully cultivating the lands when the said Act came into force. Alternatively, it was held that they were deemed to have purchased the lands under Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy Act on or after 17. 7-1958,. e. after the expiry of one year after the appellant attained majority, in view of the proviso to Section 88 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. ( 8 ) HAVING reversed the view taken by the Land Tribunal, the cases were remitted back to the land Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the order. This order of the learned Single Judge is questioned in W. A. No. 1269 81. ( 9 ) W. A. Nos. 470 and 470a of 1982 :- These appeals are also by Ramappa the owner of the lands in question. The proceedings commenced as stated already, after he attained the age of majority and the lands were released from the Court of Wards on 5-6-1958. ( 10 ) THE respondents filed applications under Section 48a of the Land Reforms Act seeking registration as occupants under Section 45. The proceedings commenced as stated already, after he attained the age of majority and the lands were released from the Court of Wards on 5-6-1958. ( 10 ) THE respondents filed applications under Section 48a of the Land Reforms Act seeking registration as occupants under Section 45. The Land tribunal rejected the application. This was challenged in W. P. No 4266/27 By an order dated 24-8-1981, this Writ Petition was allowed and proceedings were remitted back to the Land Tribunal for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made in the order. ( 11 ) IN the meanwhile, the appellant had sought possession of the lands from one Venkappa by filing an application under Section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. The Court rejected this application, against which an appeal was filed before the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal which allowed the appeal. The aggrieved parties filed W. P. No. 1149/65. Earlier, this Writ petition was allowed on 15-4-1968. The appellant went up in appeal before the Supreme Court. In the said appeal, Civil Appeal No. 2594 (N) of 1969, the Supreme Court set aside the order of this Court and remanded the matter with a direction to bear it with W. P. No. 4266/ 77. Hence both the Writ Petitions were heard together and a common order passed, wherein substantially, the claim of the claimants were upheld. These two appeals (W. A,nos. 470 and 470a of 1982) are against the said common order. Contesting respondents in all these Writ Appeals are referred hereinafter as the claimant for the sake of convenience. ( 12 ) IT is necessary to state here, that the Counsel for both the opposing parties addressed their arguments on the above basis without going to details of the facts and also without another facet of the case urged in W. P. No. 1149/65 to the effect that, whether Venkappa was the real person or he was a benamidar to Siddappa. The common appeal memo and the facts narrated therein in these appeals also do not make any such distinction. The learned Single Judge has held that venkappa was the real person entitled to claim the tenancy right as he had been cultivating the land for nine years preceding the year 1958 59. The finding was that he was the real lessee and not Siddappa. The learned Single Judge has held that venkappa was the real person entitled to claim the tenancy right as he had been cultivating the land for nine years preceding the year 1958 59. The finding was that he was the real lessee and not Siddappa. On this basis, the learned Single Judge restored the order of the Assistant commissioner. It was observed that Venkappa was not a trespasser and therefore Section 84 of the Bombay Tenancy Act cannot be invoked by the appellant. ( 13 ) SINCE the legal issues involved in W. P. No. 4266/77 are identical to the one decided by the learned Single Judge in W. P. Nos. 4268 and 4269/77, following the order made in those Writ petitions, matter was remitted back to the Land Tribunal for disposal according to the directions issued therein. ( 14 ) THE appellant is common in all these appeals and the question involved is identical. ( 15 ) THE point for consideration is, whether a person inducted as a tenant by the Court of Wards in 1943 during its period of management of the lands, can claim the status of a tenant under the bombay Tenancy Act and whether said status continues to confer on such a person a right to get registered as an occupant under Section 45 of the Land Reforms Act, on release of the lands from the management of Court of Wards in 1958. ( 16 ) THE line of argument of the Counsel for the claimant may be stated thus : (A) : In 1958, when the management by Court of Wards ceased, the claimant was lawfully cultivating the lands which did not belong to him. Therefore, by virtue of Section 4 of the bombay Tenancy Act, he became a deemed tenant from the said date. This status of 'deemed tenant' continued even after the coming into force of the Land Reforms Act on 2-10-1965. Therefore as on 1-3-1974, he was a deemed tenant cultivating the lands and by virtue of the definition of a 'tenant' which includes a 'deemed tenant', the cultivation by him as on 1-3-1974 was as a tenant, therefore, Sections 44 and 45 of the Land Reforms Act are applicable to his claim. Therefore as on 1-3-1974, he was a deemed tenant cultivating the lands and by virtue of the definition of a 'tenant' which includes a 'deemed tenant', the cultivation by him as on 1-3-1974 was as a tenant, therefore, Sections 44 and 45 of the Land Reforms Act are applicable to his claim. (B) : Alternative argument was, that under proviso to Section 88 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, the land owner should have issued a notice terminating the tenancy within one year from cassation of management by Court of Wards. By the failure to issue the notice, the claimant got a vested right under Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, as a deemed purchaser. At any rate, the failure to issue the notice within one year, created a legality to his cultivation as a tenant, which continued even after 2-10-1965 (the date when land Reforms Act came into force ). ( 17 ) ADMITTEDLY the management of lands in question vested in the Court of Wards up to 1958. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the scope of the said management, which in turn depends on the purpose of the vesting of management of an estate in the Court of Wards. ( 18 ) MINORS and disabled persons are the special preserve of the State ; State being in the situation of 'parens patriae'. Under the provisions of the Court of Wards Act, the Collector is the Court of wards for the limits of his District. Power is given to the State Government to appoint a special officer or to constitute a Board or any other officer, to be the Court of Wards (Section 3 ). As per section 4, sanction of the Government is needed for the Court of Wards to assume superintendence of the properties of the landholders who are deemed to be disqualified to manage their own properties under Section 5 (1 ). Section 9 provides for assumption of management by Court of Wards, even in a case where, on an application to it, the State government opines that it is expedient in the public interest to 'preserve' the property, under certain circumstances. ( 19 ) ASSUMPTION of superintendence extends to whole of the Ward's properties. It may be noticed here that the Ward is always referred as 'government Ward' as defined in Section 2 (a ). ( 19 ) ASSUMPTION of superintendence extends to whole of the Ward's properties. It may be noticed here that the Ward is always referred as 'government Ward' as defined in Section 2 (a ). Section 13 makes it clear that what is vested in the Court of Wards is the superintendence over the properties of the Government Ward. ( 20 ) SECTION 17 enables the Court of Wards to sell, exchange, mortgage, charge or let the properties of a Government Ward and it may do all such thirds as it may judge to be best for the benefit of the properties and the advantage of the Government ward, provided that,- (a) the previous sanction of the Commissioner shall be required to any sale, exchange or mortgage of, or charge on immovable property and to any lease of such property for a term exceeding ten years, and (b) where one-third of the immovable property of a Government ward has been sold or exchanged no further sale or exchange shall bo made". ( 21 ) SECTION 26 also may be repeated here, as it guides the exercise of the power by the Court of wards. It is as follows : "26 The Court of Wards, or the manager (if any) appointed by it under this Act, shall manage the property of every Government Ward under its superintendence or under bis management diligently and faithfully for the benefit of the Government Ward, and shall in every respect act to the best of its or his judgment for the Government Ward's interest as if the property were its or his own". ( 22 ) HAVING regard the various provisions of the Court of Wards Act, it is clear that, the Court of ward is actually a delegate of the State Government, to manage the property of the Government ward. The property does not vest either in the Court of Wards or in the State Government. It is only the power of superintendence of the property that vests in the Court of Wards. The object is to preserve the property and for this purpose it has to manage the same. On cessation of the disqualification in the Government Ward, superintendence is 'withdrawn', which means, the landholder is entitled to enter his property and manage its affairs as he deems fit. The object is to preserve the property and for this purpose it has to manage the same. On cessation of the disqualification in the Government Ward, superintendence is 'withdrawn', which means, the landholder is entitled to enter his property and manage its affairs as he deems fit. During its management, the Court of Ward has to manage the property diligently and faithfully for the benefit, of the Government Ward and to act to the best of its judgment for the Government ward's interest as if the property was its own. The power to sell or exchange the immovable property, even if it is to the advantage of the property and to the advantage of the Court of Ward, is restricted under proviso (b) to Section 27. ( 23 ) THE Learned Counsel for the claimant pressed into service the analogy of the lease granted by a limited owner like a Hindu Widow, to urge that, when the tenant under such a lease is entitled to the occupancy right, there is no reason to deprive his client of the benefits of Land reforms Act, He also drew our attention to the cases arising out of the claim made by the tenants inducted by a usufructuary mortgagee. It is not necessary to refer to all the citations. In the case of a limited owner like a Hindu widow, the estate itself vests in the said limited owner. It is not mere right of management. She holds the proprietory interest for life. She can alienate the property for legal necessity as also for the benefit of the estate. ( 24 ) IN the case of mortgage, there is a transfer of an interest in the immovable property (vide section 58 of T. P. Act ). In Prabhu-v.-Ramdeo and ors. , AIR1966 SC 1721 , [1966 ]3 SCR676 the Supreme Court pointed out that normal relationship of a mortgagee and mortgagor, rendered a lease granted by a mortgagee in possession, limited to the period of mortgagee's interest only. But, it was further held that, this may get modified enlarging the rights of a tenant by statutory provisions. ( 25 ) IN Dahya Lal and Ors.-v.- Rasul Mahomed Abdul Rahim and Ors. , 1962 Mys. But, it was further held that, this may get modified enlarging the rights of a tenant by statutory provisions. ( 25 ) IN Dahya Lal and Ors.-v.- Rasul Mahomed Abdul Rahim and Ors. , 1962 Mys. L. J. 958 (SC), the Supreme Court had to consider the effect of Section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, and held that, a tenant inducted by a mortgagee in possession is a 'deemed tenant' and therefore, even after the redemption, such a deemed tenant is entitled to continue in possession The relevant passage is at page 961 which is extrated below : "but a tenant of the mortgagee in possession is inducted on the land in the ordinary course of management under authority derived from the mortgagor and so long as the mortgage subsists, even under the ordinary law he is not liable to be evicted by the mortgagor. It appears that the legislature by restricting the exclusion to mortgagees in possession from the class of deemed tenants intended that the tenant lawfully inducted by the mortgagee shall on redemption of the mortgage be deemed to be tenant of the mortgagor". (Underlining is ours) ( 26 ) THE said decision is based on the fact that legislature having expressly provided the exclusion of a mortgagee in possession from the concept of deemed tenant, impliedly included his tenant in the said concept. The ratio of said decision has no bearing to the facts of these appeals, having regard to the status of a tenant inducted by a Court of Wards and the nature of his possession immediately after the withdrawal of management by the Court of Wards unlike a mortgagee, Court of wards does not derive authority from the Government Ward. ( 27 ) THE decision of this Court in Bhimaji virupax Patil -v.- Kashappa Veerabhadrappa Javali and anr. , 1967 (1) Mys. L. J. 10 is distinguishable. In that case, the tenant was inducted by a maintenance-holder, to whom land was allotted in lieu of maintenance and therefore land vested in her. It was not a case where lease was created by a person in whom only management was vested. ( 28 ) FOR registration as an occupant under Section 45, the land should have been held by a 'tenant' as on 1-3-1974. It was not a case where lease was created by a person in whom only management was vested. ( 28 ) FOR registration as an occupant under Section 45, the land should have been held by a 'tenant' as on 1-3-1974. The word 'held' may include a case, where, a tenant was illegally dispossessed earlier, so that, in the eye of law, such a person can be said to be in possession 'de jure'. But, if the cultivation of a person as on 1-3-1974 was nut a lawful cultivation, in the sense, he had no legal right to be in possession as on the said date, Sections 44 and 45 are not attracted at all to confer any right on such a person. ( 29 ) AS already pointed out, the property never vested in the Government, or in the Court of wards. Only the power of superintendence vested in the Court of Wards. When the said power is withdrawn, nature of possession will have to be relegated to the earlier position. It the claimant was legally obliged to surrender possession, on the withdrawal of the management by the Court of Wards in the year 1958, but railed to do so, his possession and cultivation thereafter cannot be termed as lawful. In such a case as on 2-10-1965 he could not be cultivating the land lawfully, to attract Section 4. ( 30 ) SOME of the provisions of Bombay Act 47/1948 before the amendment by Bombay Act 13 of 1956 may be referred before considering the said amendment and their effect on the rights of the parties. Section 2 (18) defined 'tenant' as an agriculturist who holds land on lease and includes a person who is deemed to be tenant under the provisions of the Act and the word 'landlord' has to be construed accordingly. As per Section 2 (17),'tenancy' means the relationship of landlord and tenant. Section 4 deems a person Lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person, as a tenant, subject to exceptions stated therein. Section 5 states that no tenancy shall be for a period of less than 10 years, with a proviso which renews the tenancy for further period of 10 years each at a time. Section 5 (2) provides for notice of termination of tenancy, before the end of the tenancy period created by the statute. Section 5 states that no tenancy shall be for a period of less than 10 years, with a proviso which renews the tenancy for further period of 10 years each at a time. Section 5 (2) provides for notice of termination of tenancy, before the end of the tenancy period created by the statute. Section 14 enables landlord to terminate the tenancy on other grounds. There are provisions, fixing the rent payable, creating machinery to solve the disputes etc. Chapter III governed the 'protected tenant' defined as such, under Sections 3, 3a or 4 of the Act 1939. Concept of protected tenant has to be drawn from those provisions of the 1939 act as incorporated in the Schedule to the 1948 Act. Section 32 enabled a protected tenant to purchase the land from the landlord. Section 34 provided for the termination of the tenancy of a protected tenant by the landlord under certain circumstances. Chapter IV starting with Section 44 empowers the State Government to resume management of landholders estate under circumstances stated therein. A similar provision is also found in Section 65. Section 88 (1) excluded the provision of the Act in respect of certain lands. ( 31 ) ACT 13/1956 effected drastic amendments. The main change is in Chapter III commencing with Section 31. Certain amendments were also made in the definition clauses. After this amendment Section 31 provided for the termination of tenancy by the landlord. Inter alia, as per section 31 (2), the notice required to be given by the landlord shall be served on the tenant on or before 1st day of December 19 (sic)6 and an application for possession under Section 29 shall be made to Mamlatdar on or before 31st March 1957 for possession. Section 31 (3) provided for an extended period to issue notices in the case of a landlord who is a minor, widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability etc. Sections 31-A to 31-D are other provisions governing the termination of tenancy and apportionment of rent. Section 32 is an important amended provision which deems that every tenant subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Sections, to have purchased from his landlord, the land held by him as tenant under certain circumstances on the Tillers Day,. e. , 1-4-1957. Section 31 has a direct bearing on Section 32. Section 32 is an important amended provision which deems that every tenant subject to the provisions of the next succeeding Sections, to have purchased from his landlord, the land held by him as tenant under certain circumstances on the Tillers Day,. e. , 1-4-1957. Section 31 has a direct bearing on Section 32. The deemed purchase on the 'tillers day' (1-4-1957) under Section 32, depends upon the failure of the landlord under Section 31. The right given to the landlord is also, dependent on his action in initiating proceedings and the requisite notice to be issued before 31-12-1956. These provisions are very relevant to the construction of the proviso to Section 88. ( 32 ) SECTION 88 was substituted by the Bombay Act 13 of 1956 with effect from 1-8-1956. It reads as follows : "88. Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply- (a) to lands belonging to, or held on lease from, the Government ; (b) to any area which the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, specify as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development ; (c) to an estate or land taken under management by the State Government under Chapter IV or section 65 or under the management of the Court of Wards or to the lands taken under management temporarily by the Civil, Revenue or Criminal Courts by themselves or through the receivers appointed by them till the decision of the title of the rightful holders. Provided that with effect from the date on which such estate or land is released from such management, the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply thereto and in the case of a tenancy (other than a permanent tenancy) subsisting on such date in respect of any land in such estate or such land, the landlord shall be entitled to terminate such tenancy under Section 31 within one year from such date and the tenant shall have the right to purchase the land under Section 32 within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31. The provisions of Sections 31 to 31d both inclusive) and 32 to 32r (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such termination of tenancy and to the right of the tenant to purchase the land". The provisions of Sections 31 to 31d both inclusive) and 32 to 32r (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to such termination of tenancy and to the right of the tenant to purchase the land". ( 33 ) ALL the provisions of the Act from Sections 1 to 87a are thus inapplicable to lands belonging to the Government or to lands held on lease from the Government. Same effect is given over any area covered by a Notification issued under Section 88 (b ). As per Section 88 (c), Sections 1 to 87a will not apply to an estate or land (i) taken under management by the State Government under Chapter IV (. e. , Sections 44 to 62) or under Section 65 ; (ii) under the management of court of Wards ; and (iii) taken under the management temporarily by the several Courts directly or through Receivers. Thus, this Section excludes the operation of the main provisions of the Act from the lands under the management of Court of Wards from 1-8-1956. Similarly a few more persons are also classified for exclusion from those provisions of the Act. ( 34 ) THE object of Section 88 (c) is to save those lands which are under the management of governmental or State authorities from being burdened with the claims of tenancies created by those authorities. The act of the State in the course of management shall not result in creating a permanent burden or loss to the owner ; as otherwise, the very purpose of management by these agencies will be last. ( 35 ) EARLIER to the amendment by Act 13/1956, only a "protected tenant" had a right to purchase the land held by him as a tenant, under certain circumstances ; in other cases, landlord was not deprived of his ownership. Drastic change was effected by Act 13/1956 and therefore, legislature in its wisdom thought it necessary to protect the interest of land owners by enacting a provision like Section 88 (c ). This is, as much a beneficial and equitable provision, as any other preceding provisions of the Act. ( 36 ) THE contention of the claimant proceeds from the proviso to Section 88, specially the first part of it. It is contended that when the estate or land is released from such management, the earlier revisions of Act shall apply thereto. This is, as much a beneficial and equitable provision, as any other preceding provisions of the Act. ( 36 ) THE contention of the claimant proceeds from the proviso to Section 88, specially the first part of it. It is contended that when the estate or land is released from such management, the earlier revisions of Act shall apply thereto. This attracted,- the contention proceeded - all the provisions of the Act to the person who was in possession of the land as a tenant under the Court of Wards and such a tenant is entitled to seek the status of a tenant under the land owner. ( 37 ) IF this contention is correct then, there is absolutely no reason to have the subsequent clause in the proviso Further, the earlier part relied by the learned Counsel, refers to "the land" or "the estate". Provisions of the Act thereafter, (on release from the management) will govern such an estate or land and not the erstwhile tenancy created by the Court of Wards. To appreciate the impact of any other interpretation put forward by the claimant, the operative field of entire section 88 (c) will have to be seen. Section 88 (c) comprises of atleast three categories of management of lands. It includes lands taken under management temporarily by a Court directly or through a Receiver. Can it be said that, even in such a case, when a Court Receiver created a tenancy in the course of his management (whose tenure, Can be in the very nature of things be very limited), can burden the estate permanently? As is well known, duration of a Court receiver's management may be a very short duration like a few months or in some cases, extend till the long litigation reaches an end. The Receiver is appointed to preserve the property for the benefit of a successful litigant. It cannot be the intention at all of the legislature, that, an estate or land which is exposed to a litigation for whatever reason, if managed by the Court through a receiver Should result in the title holder losing the title, under Section 32 of the Act. ( 38 ) THE latter portion of the proviso will have to be understood in the background of these factors. ( 38 ) THE latter portion of the proviso will have to be understood in the background of these factors. Suppose already the land was tenanted when management was taken over by any one of the three categories coming under Section 88 (c), then during the period of management the tenant is deprived of invoking the provisions of the Act. Similarly the landowner is also deprived of has rights during the said period, to seek possession of the land by terminating the tenancy under Section 31. Thus both the landlord and the subsisting tenant are denied recourse to sections 31 and 32. The proviso to Section 88 avoids such a hardship and renders a machinery to restore status quo ante It enables the landlord to terminate the tenancy within one year from the date of the cessation of the management by the authorities referred in Section 88. It also restores the benefit of Section 32 to the subsisting tenancy as stated in the proviso. ( 39 ) THE 'subsisting tenancy' referred in the proviso can only be a 'tenancy' which withstood the management referred under Section 88 (c) on cessation of such a management. The purpose of the proviso is to revive the benefits, deprived by the operation of the main provision of Section 88. Its object cannot be to extend the benefits of the Act to a person, whose tenancy is created by the authorities who were managing the land temporarily by virtue of statutory powers. If a person is inducted as a tenant by such an authority, the 'tenancy' status gets terminated immediately when the said management ceases. ( 40 ) DEFINITION of 'tenancy' under Section 2 (17) is relevant here Tenancy is the 'relationship of landlord and tenant'. It is this relationship that should be subsisting when the management by any one of the authority stated in Section 88 (c) ceases, to attract the latter part of the proviso. It is the relationship between two sets of persons called landlord and tenant. It is not a mere relationship between a person called 'tenant' and the land, be cultivates. It is this relationship that should be subsisting when the management by any one of the authority stated in Section 88 (c) ceases, to attract the latter part of the proviso. It is the relationship between two sets of persons called landlord and tenant. It is not a mere relationship between a person called 'tenant' and the land, be cultivates. A person inducted as a 'tenant' by the Court of Wards or a Court Receiver, to cultivate the land, may have a lawful relationship, status or privity, vis-a-vis the said land during the period he cultivates the land, but that relationship cannot extend to create a privity of relationship with the land owner, who did not induct him into the land. Till the management by the Court of Wards, etc. , continues, all relevant provisions of the Act are inapplicable. That means, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the title-holder and the person cultivating the land on behalf of the Court of wards. On cessation of the management, therefore, there is no question of such a relationship subsisting. The contention of the claimant, if correct, results in 'creating' such a relationship, which is quite different from a 'subsisting' relationship. ( 41 ) COURT of Wards is not an agent of the land owner. Court of Wards is a statutory authority. Land does not vest in the Court of Wards. Only the management of the estate vests in the Court of Wards and the management is as provided by the Court of Wards Act. Both the Bombay Act and the Land Reforms Act have treated the lands taken under Court of Wards or by Court receivers etc. , on par and therefore any interpretation given to these provisions will have to be tested alike. ( 42 ) THE Court of Wards Act, is both a beneficial and protective legislation. The State as parens patriae, has, obviously, stepped in with such a legislation to protect the estate of disabled persons (including a minor ). The power of the Court of Wards and the scope of the relevant enactment are to be understood in the context of this object. The State as parens patriae, has, obviously, stepped in with such a legislation to protect the estate of disabled persons (including a minor ). The power of the Court of Wards and the scope of the relevant enactment are to be understood in the context of this object. ( 43 ) VIEWED from the object of the Court of Wards Act and that of the provisions of Section 88 of bombay Act of 1948 it cannot be said that the phrase 'subsisting tenancy' in the proviso to section 88, refers to a tenant inducted by the Court of Wards during the course of its management, unless the said tenant pre-existed by induction as a tenant by the title-holder earlier to the take over of management by the Court of Wards. ( 44 ) THE ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kamble's case, AIR1966 SC 538 , [1966 ]1 SCR618 is against the contentions of the claimants. In that case, the tenant inducted by Court of Wards in the year 1946, invoked his status as a protected tenant under the Act of 1939 and asserted that said status continued even under the 1948 Act. Therefore, he asserted that the amendment by Act 13/1956 could not affect his rights, as these legislations saved the accrued rights. At page 541 the Supreme Court observed,- "in effect therefore the legislature which had conferred by the 1939 Act the status of a protected tenant on certain persons was taking away that status by enacting Section 88 in the 1948 Act so far as inter alia lessees from a local authority were concerned". Supreme Court in this case over-ruled certain observations made in the earlier two cases, viz. , AIR1963 SC 354 , (1962 )64 BOMLR403 , [1962 ]2 SCR59 and AIR1963 SC 358 , [1963 ]2 SCR707. ( 45 ) ANOTHER decision which has to be referred is the one reported in Musamia Imam Haider Bax razvi v.- Rabari Govindbhai Ratnabhai and Ors. , AIR1969 SC 439 , (1969 )71 BOMLR681 , (1969 ) GLR421 (SC ), [1969 ]1 SCR785. Here, certain lands were leased by the Court of Wards. The owner on coming of age sued for possession. Defendants contended that they became statutory owners by virtue of Bombay Act 13/1956. It was held that sections 1 to 87a. , AIR1969 SC 439 , (1969 )71 BOMLR681 , (1969 ) GLR421 (SC ), [1969 ]1 SCR785. Here, certain lands were leased by the Court of Wards. The owner on coming of age sued for possession. Defendants contended that they became statutory owners by virtue of Bombay Act 13/1956. It was held that sections 1 to 87a. did not apply to the lands between 1-8-1956 and 11-5-1958 (the date when management by Court of Wards ceased) and the Act applied only thereafter. The lease was created on 24-8-1956 and therefore on 1-4-1957 defendants were not tenants. Hence the 'kabulyat' under which lease was granted, provided for the termination of lease on 31-5-1957 and therefore on 11-5-1958 there was no subsisting lease. The decision in this case rests on the facts of the case. In fact, if an analogy is to be applied, it is clear that on the facts of the case before us also, on 1-4-1957 the relevant provisions of the Act (Sections 3) and 32 etc.) did not apply as the management of Court of Wards was in existence. Thereafter also, in view of several Mysore acts, provisions of Sections 31, 32 etc. , were not in operation and therefore the claimants could not claim statutory ownership at all and claim the benefit of deemed purchase. ( 46 ) THE contention that provisions of Bombay Act 13/ 1956 and Section 108 of the Land reforms Act are not retrospective and therefore cannot take away the rights accrued to the claimants earlier, has to be rejected. Here the law operates prospectively. It affects the rights and liabilities, on the date of its enforcement. It does not reopen any concluded transaction The earlier relationship, as law operated at that time, is in no way altered. The tenancy benefit and the liability of the claimant to surrender possession whenever Court of Wards demanded as per the lease agreement operated during the past period. ( 47 ) WHEN a statute comes into force and operates in future, necessarily it will have an impact on the existing situation, rights and liabilities. That does not make the law retrospective. In New india Sugar Works -v.- State of U. P. , AIR 1981 SC 908 question arose whether imposition of levy khandasari sugar produced earlier to the enforcement of Levy Order is governed by the levy Order. That does not make the law retrospective. In New india Sugar Works -v.- State of U. P. , AIR 1981 SC 908 question arose whether imposition of levy khandasari sugar produced earlier to the enforcement of Levy Order is governed by the levy Order. The contention of the Mock holder that the Levy Order did not apply to the sugar produced earlier and held in stock on the day of the Order, was negatived. It was observed that it was not a question of retrospectivity of the statute but its actual working. The Court quoted the observations made in an earlier case, which said,- "it is relevant to distinguish between an existing right and a rested right where a statute operates in future it cannot be laid to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included". ( 48 ) MYSORE Act 13/1957 amended certain provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act and suspended operation of a few of its provisions. It was declared that during the period of suspension, provisions of Sections 31 to 31d and 32 to 32r of the Bombay Tenancy Act and references to any of said provisions in any other provision of the said Bombay Act shall not have effect. ( 49 ) PERIOD of suspension commenced from 2-8-1956 and ended on 31-3-1966 (this date 31-3 1966 came to be sub-stituted to the original date 31-12-1957 by several yearly amendments ). This Act also stated that notices given to tenants under the aforesaid Section 31 before 31-3-1957 shall stand dismissed. ( 50 ) THUS in 1958 it was not possible to invoke the provisions of Sections 31, 32 and other inter-related provisions of Bombay Tenancy Act and no right can be created in favour of the claimant by failure to issue a notice thereunder read with proviso to Section 88. On 2-10-1965 the Land Reforms Act came into force which introduced a uniform law in the State of Karnataka regarding tenancy matters. The Bombay Tenancy Act as in force in 'bombay area' of Karnataka stood repealed. ( 51 ) THEREFORE, it is not possible to hold that proviso to Section 88 of Bombay Tenancy Act, even if applicable, created or vested any right in the claimant. The statute has to be read in a reasonable manner. The Bombay Tenancy Act as in force in 'bombay area' of Karnataka stood repealed. ( 51 ) THEREFORE, it is not possible to hold that proviso to Section 88 of Bombay Tenancy Act, even if applicable, created or vested any right in the claimant. The statute has to be read in a reasonable manner. If compliance with its terms is not possible, no adverse consequence could flow from its non-compliance. Proviso to Section 88 became inoperative by virtue of Section 7 of the Mysore Act 13/1957, which suspended the provisions of Sections 31, 32 etc. , wherever they were referred in the Bombay Act, 1948 with effect from 2-8-1956 itself. The legislative intent in Karnataka is clear from the Karnataka Act 37/1961 - The Mysore Tenants (Temporary protection from Eviction) Act, 1961. Section 3 of this Act enacted a full bar against eviction of any tenant, during its period of operation. Though this Act was initially to be in force till 31-3-1962, it was extended from time to time till the Land Reforms Act came into force. Section 4 stayed all suits, proceedings etc. , for eviction of tenants. However, Section 7 (b) stated that the said Act shall not apply, inter alia, to lands taken under the management of Court of Wards. The lands taken under management of Court of Wards are treated on par with lands taken by Courts temporarily, directly or through the Receivers. Even though a general bar it imposed against eviction and all eviction proceedings, these lands were excluded from the operation such a bar, so that the taking over the management by Court of Wards may not result in depriving the landholder of his right to own and possess the lands. ( 52 ) THE registration as an occupant under Section 45 is sought under the Land Reforms Act. Application for registration is to be filed under Section 48a of the said Act. Therefore, it will be pertinent to refer to any other provision of this Act, to see whether, claimant herein can get the benefits of the Land Reforms Act. Since the claimant's source of right it traced to the tenancy created by the Court of Wards, the immediate provision that is relevant is Section 108. ( 53 ) SECTION 108 of Land Reforms Act excludes all provisions of the Act from the lands taken under management by Court of Wards. Since the claimant's source of right it traced to the tenancy created by the Court of Wards, the immediate provision that is relevant is Section 108. ( 53 ) SECTION 108 of Land Reforms Act excludes all provisions of the Act from the lands taken under management by Court of Wards. That meant the deeming statuts as a tenant under Section 4 also gets excluded The effect of Section 108 is to wipe out any rights if any accrued or vested in a person as a tenant under the Court of Wards. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Parvati v. Fatesinhrao, AIR1986 SC 2204 , (1987 )2 GLR791 , jt1986 (1 )SC 546 , 1986 (2 )SCALE447 , (1986 )4 SCC319 , [1986 ]3 SCR793 , 1987 (1 )UJ5 (SC ) is to the same effect. There, when a Notification under Section 88 (1) of the Bombay Act, 1948 was issued, thereby, provisions of the said Act ceased to apply to the areas covered by the notification, Supreme Court held that the effect of the Notification was that all rights, title, obligation etc. , accrued or acquired under the said Act ceased to exist and the provisions of the act will not apply to such lands. It was also held that in view of the express provisions governing the situation, the provisions purporting to save the rights acquired earlier, also will not apply. ( 54 ) OUR conclusions may be summarised as follows :by virtue of Bombay Act 13 of 1956, the provisions of Sections 1 to 87a of the Bombay Act, 1948 as it stood amended, ceased to apply to the lands in question as they were under the management of Court of Wards, The concept of protected tenant had relevance only for the earlier Section 31 and allied provisions, all of which were substituted by Act B/1956. No right of the claimant was saved in view of the express provisions under the amended Section 88. On the tiller's day (1-4-1957) also this position continued. In 1958, when the management was withdrawn by Court of Wards, Sections 31, 32 etc. , of the Bombay Act, 1948 were not operative in Karnataka, in view of Mysore Act 13/1957. No deemed purchase can be, attributed as there was no 'tiller's day' in Karnataka and the relevant provisions were inoperative. In 1958, when the management was withdrawn by Court of Wards, Sections 31, 32 etc. , of the Bombay Act, 1948 were not operative in Karnataka, in view of Mysore Act 13/1957. No deemed purchase can be, attributed as there was no 'tiller's day' in Karnataka and the relevant provisions were inoperative. Proviso to Section 88 cannot be applied for two reasons. Firstly because, it saved a subsisting tenancy and did not create a tenancy relationship. Here, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted betwen the appellant and the claimant. Secondly, in view of the suspension and inoperativeness of Sections 31, 32 etc. , of the Bombay Tenancy Act, by virtue of Mysore Act 13/1957, proviso cannot be given effect at all. Up to and at the point of withdrawal of management, the claimant did not come under the definition of 'tenant', as stated in the Bombay Tenancy Act. At that particular point, he. was liable to be ejected and the Government Ward (appellant) was entitled to enter possession at the point of such withdrawal of management. Therefore, continuation of possession by the claimant after 1958 (. e. , after withdrawal of the management by the Court of wards) is not lawful. Since the claimant invokes the Land Reforms Act, his source of right has to be seen and if so, said right is governed by Section 108 of the Land Reforms Act, which is an express provision governing his case. Even under Section 108 of the Land Reforms Act, claimant does not derive any right; on the other hand, until he is evicted, the provisions of the said Act are inapplicable to the lands in question. In view of this, the decision of the learned Single Judge is liable to be reversed. ( 55 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, these appeals are allowed and the Writ Petitions are dismissed. ORDER ON ORAL APPLICATION mr. A. V. Albal, learned Counsel, prays that these appeals may be certified as fit ones for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution. In our view, no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court is involved in these appeals. Hence, the prayer is declined.