Judgment :- SENGOTTUVELAN, J. :— 1.The differing views expressed by Sathiadev J. and Maheswaran J. in the course of the disposal of the above appeal gave rise to the present reference. 2. The appellants herein as plaintiffs instituted the suit O.S. 191 of 1985 for possession, past mesne profits for three years prior to the suit and future mesne profits with costs. The entire estate comprising of 2987.31 acres belonged to one Rajah Sankar Royal. The said Rajah Sankar Royal entered into a long term lease with one English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Society Ld, herein after referred to as the Society, which expired on 30-9-1940. By means of the document Ex.A1 the said Rajah Sankar Royal executed another lease deed for a period of 48 years from 1.10.1940 for the above said entire area to the Society. Out of the above said larger extent the Society executed a sub-lease for rubber estate in respect of 300.41 acres, viz, an extent of 149.03 acres in S. No. 284/4 of Cherangode village, 195.95 acres in S. No. 573/1 in Nelliyalam village, together with the waste land of 21.43 acres as per the lease deed Ex.A2. According to clause 13 of Ex. A3, the lessees will have to surrender the leasehold right without any claim for compensation. As per clause 14 of Ex.A2, the sub-lessee is bound to surrender the sublease in case the Society surrenders the leasehold right to the owner. By means of Ex.A4, dated 23.5.1960 the Society surrendered the leasehold right in favour of the lessor in respect of 2987.31 acres. On the same date the lessor sold an extent of 163.84 acres of the said land to the Society by means of a sale deed. The consideration for the surrender under Ex.A4, is said to be Rs. 1,00,000. 3. By means of sale deeds dt. 16.8.1960, marked as Exs.A5 to A10, the said Rajah Sankar Royal sold the entire 2987.31 acres to 16 persons. There had been subsequent arrangements between the purchasers, according to which the first appellant is entitled to 1/4th share, appellants 2 to 7 are entitled to 1/2 share and the 8th appellant is entitled to 1/4th share. By means of registered notices Ex.A27 dated 16.11.1962, and Ex.A28 dated 26-11-1962, the appellants called upon the respondents to surrender the rubber estate. The respondents issued a reply Ex.A29 dated 7.12.1962. By means of registered notices Ex.A27 dated 16.11.1962, and Ex.A28 dated 26-11-1962, the appellants called upon the respondents to surrender the rubber estate. The respondents issued a reply Ex.A29 dated 7.12.1962. Soon after the appellants herein filed the suit O.S. 191 of 1965 in 27.10.1965. On 6.12.1968 the learned Subordinate Judge, who tried the suit, dismissed it on the ground that the surrender deed Ex.A4 surrendering the leasehold interest by the Society was not genuine and as such clause 14 of Ex.A2 cannot come into operation. As against the said judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge the appellants herein filed A.S. 185 of 1970 before this Court. This Court on a reappraisal of the evidence came to the conclusion that the surrender deed Ex. A4 is perfectly valid and binding and the appellants are entitled to invoke clause 14 of Ex.A2, and as such they are entitled to possession. The matter was remitted back to the trial court for deciding the value of the improvements and the mesne profits. Subsequently, the respondents herein filed C.M.P. 6437, of 1976 on the file of this Court to review the judgment in the light of the provisions contained in the Gudalur Jenmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXIV of 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Act 24 of 1969. The appellants also filed another C.M.P. 10389 of 1975 for granting a decree in A.S. 185 of 1970. On 4.10.1976 a common order was passed in all the above applications wherein the trial court was directed to decide the issues 4, 5, 6 and 8, in the suit in the light of the provisions contained in Act 24 of 1969. As per the said order the learned Subordinate Judge took up consideration of the issues referred to above and came to the conclusion that by virtue of Act 24 of 1969 the respondents who are tenants of the property have prima facie become eligible for the grant of Ryotwari patta and the appellants predecessor the Jenmi of the land have lost their title and their title vests in the Government and therefore the appellants are not entitled to recover possession from the respondents. In view of the above findings the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. In view of the above findings the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. As against the said judgment the appellants filed the above appeal which was taken up before the Division Bench consisting of Sathiadev, J. and Maheswaran, J. Sathiadev J. concurred with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court and thought fit to dismiss the appeal; but Maheswaran, J. took a different view that the respondents possession cannot be recognised in law and as such they cannot take advantage of the provisions contained in Act 24 of 1969 and held that the appellants are entitled to the relief of recovery of possession and other reliefs. In view of this conflict of views the matter is posted before me. 4. The points that arise for determination in the light of the contention of parties and the arguments advanced in this appeal are as follows— 1. Whether the suit for possession filed by the appellant is maintainable inspite of the provisions contained in Act 24 of 1969 against the respondents whose tenancy has come to an end on account of the deed of surrender Ex A4 by the Society in favour of Rajah Sankar Royal? 2. Whether the respondents possession is protected under the provisions contained in Act 24 of 1969, the Malabar Tenancy Act XIV of 1930, and the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act 1 of 1900?’ 5. In so far as the first point is concerned, it is contended on behalf of the appellants, that in view of the surrender of land leased out by Rajah Sankar Royal to the Society under Ex. A1, dated 20.11.1944, the subtenancy created by the Society in favour of the respondents under Ex.A2 stands extinguished even according to the recitals contained in Ex.A2. After the surrender of the lease by the Society under Ex.A4, dated 23.5.1960 the continuance of possession of the suit property by the respondents is w rongful. The respondents are no better than that of a trespasser after 23.5.1960. Reliance is placed upon the observation made in para 1207 of the Halsburys Laws of England (page 741 of III Edn. After the surrender of the lease by the Society under Ex.A4, dated 23.5.1960 the continuance of possession of the suit property by the respondents is w rongful. The respondents are no better than that of a trespasser after 23.5.1960. Reliance is placed upon the observation made in para 1207 of the Halsburys Laws of England (page 741 of III Edn. of volume 38) which is as follows— “If a tenancy determines by effluxion of time or otherwise, and the former tenant remains in possession against the will of the rightful owner the former tenant is, apart from statutory protection, a trespasser from the date of the determination of the tenancy.” Reliance is also placed upon a passage in Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant (page 287, volume 1) which is as follows— “.A under-tenant who is in possession at the determination of the original lease and is suffered by the reversioner to hold over, is only a tenant on sufferance Simpkin v. Asburst 1 where a tenancy at will is determined by the landlord exercising acts of ownership and the tenant remains in possession he becomes a tenant on sufferance only.” The case reported in J.J. Paschal v. Sridharjee 2 was cited for the proposition that a tenant at sufferance is no better than a trespasser. The same view had been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in Hadji Abdulla Sait v. Sanjeevi Rao 3. This judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court only on the ground that the tenant in that case became a statutory tenant in view of the amendment to S.3 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960. Hence, the possession of the respondent in the present case is wrongful and the respondents can be ranked no better than that of a trespasser. But the respondents take shelter under the provisions of Act 24 of 1969 and contend that the appellants are not entitled to claim possession since the coming into force of Act 24 of 1969 on 27.11.1974 the Janmam estate had vested with the Government as per S.3 of the said Act, and consequent to such vesting, the rights of the appellants in respect of the suit property had come to an end. In this connection, it can be stated that Act 24 of 1969 was enacted for the acquisition of the rights of janmis in janmam estates in the Gudalur taluk of the Nilgiri Dt. and the introduction of ryotwari settlement in such estates, Act 24 of 1969 contains provisions similar to the provisions contained in Tamil Nadu Act Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, XXVI of 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Act 26 of 1948. 6. Hence, the cases decided under Act 26 of 1948 dealing with the rights of parties after the vesting of estates in pursuance of notification issued by Government are helpful in coming to a conclusion in this case, according to the appellant. As per Act 26 of 1948 and Act 24 of 1969 with effect on and from the appointed day the estate concerned including all communal lands, poromboke lands, etc, shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all in-encumbrance and all other enactments applicable to ryotwari lands shall apply to the estate. All the interest created by the land holders or the jenmi before the appointed day shall as against the Government cease and determine. A provision has also been made for the Government taking over the lands vested in it. After the vesting and taking over both the Acts provide for issue of ryotwari patta (1) in favour of the landholder or other Jenmi in respect of the lands proved to have been cultivated by them or by the members of their family or by servants or by hired labour; (2) to the tenants in respect of the said land on the appointed date subject to certain conditions; and (3) if the persons in actual possession do not come in the categories 1 and 2 then for the issue of patta to such persons if they had been personally cultivating the lands for a continuous period of three agricultural years prior to the appointed date. 7. A question arose under Act 26 of 1948 as to what should happen in the case of suits filed for the relief of possession in respect of such lands and pending before the courts on the appointed day. 7. A question arose under Act 26 of 1948 as to what should happen in the case of suits filed for the relief of possession in respect of such lands and pending before the courts on the appointed day. In the case reported in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan 1, Ramachandra Iyer, J., as he then was, after considering the legal provisions and the previous decisions came to the conclusion that the Tribunals constituted under the Act for the purpose of issuing patta are created only for a certain specific purpose and they became functus officio after their work is completed and the civil courts jurisdiction to entertain the suit in other matters cannot be taken away merely because in deciding such matters the court has to incidentally decide a matter which is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act. In as much as the Tribunal cannot entertain an action for the relief of possession this Court held that such suit for possession is not barred since the aim of the Act 26 of 1948 is to recognise certain rights established prior to the appointed day and not to extinguish the same, and in the above cited case the plaintiffs are found to be entitled to kudivaram right. The Andhra Pradesh High Court also in the case reported in Sivakutumba Rao v. Sarvalakshmamma 2 held that if the plaintiffs were the owners immediately before the notified date and had not lost their right to recover possession or occupation of such land, they will be deemed to be the owners in possession or occupation of such land as on the notified date. As such, their right to recovery of possession from the trespassers is still intact. The relative position of the parties and their mutual rights and obligations have not suffered any set back. The plaintiffs may be liable to dispossession by the government in case they are not prima facie considered to be entitled to ryotwari patta; but that is a matter exclusively within the discretion of the Government. If the plaintiffs had a right to recover possession from the defendants, the right will not be lost by reason of mere vesting of the estate under the notification, under Act 26 of 1948. If the plaintiffs had a right to recover possession from the defendants, the right will not be lost by reason of mere vesting of the estate under the notification, under Act 26 of 1948. In the case reported in Sonawati v. Sri Ram 3, a similar case arising under Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, where a provision was made for the persons in cultivatory possession to get patta, the Supreme Court held that a trespasser who has no right to be in possession within the provisions contained in the said Act cannot be said to be a person in “cultivatory possession’. A person who has no right to occupy land may rely upon his occupation against a third person who has no better title, but he cannot set up that right against the owner of the land. By forcibly occupying the land after 1358 Fasli, a person cannot acquire any-right as against the bhumidar of the land. In the case reported in Stale of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga 4, the Supreme Court after giving due consideration to the powers given to the Settlement Officers under Act 26 of 1948 came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits for determination of title in respect of the notified lands are not taken away by the provisions contained in the Act 26 of 1948. Considering the provisions contained in the above Act to the effect that the decision of the hierarchy of officers in the matter of grant of patta is final and shall not be called into question in a court of law, the Supreme Court observed as follows— “Even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the special tribunal the Civil courts jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to what the civil court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special tribunal one will have to see whether such special tribunal has powers to grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of civil court s jurisdiction. It lies within the power and the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer merely to grant or refuse to grant the patta on the materials placed before him. It lies within the power and the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer merely to grant or refuse to grant the patta on the materials placed before him. But such a person even after the refusal of the ryotwari patta would be entitled to protect his possessory title and long enjoyment of the land and seek an injunction preventing Governments interference otherwise than in due course of law and surely before granting such relief the civil court may have to adjudicate upon the real nature or character of the land if the same is put in issue. In other words, since the settlement Officer has no power to do what the civil curt would normally do in a suit it is difficult to imply ouster of civil courts jurisdiction simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officers order under S.64.C of the Act 26 of 1948.” 8. Relying on the above decisions, it is Contended on behalf of the appellants that in spite of vesting of the Jenmam estate in the Government yet they are entitled to the relief of recovery of possession since they are prima facie entitled to patta under S.8 of Act 24 of 1969, and as such is entitled to retain possesion of lands in question under S.3. S.8 of the Act 24 of 1969 is as follows— “6. Lands in which the Janmi is entitled to ryotwari patta—The janmi shall with effect on and from the appointed day, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of all lands proved to have been cultivated by the Janmi himself, or by the members of his tarwad, tavazhi, illam or family or by his own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stock in the ordinary course of husbandry for a continuous period of three agricultural years immediately before the 1st day of June 1969.” The appellants also relied upon the proviso to S.3(d) which is as follows— “3. Vesting of janmam estates, etc., in Government with effect on and from the appointed day and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act— (a)(b)(c).. Vesting of janmam estates, etc., in Government with effect on and from the appointed day and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act— (a)(b)(c).. (d) the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take possession of the janman estate and all accounts, registers, pattas, muchilikas, maps, plans and other documents relating to the janmam estate which the Government may require for the administration thereof; Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in the janmam estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta pending the decision of the appropriate authority under this Act as to whether such person is entitled to such patta.” 9. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that the effect of the vesting of janmam estate as per Act 24 of 1969 is that the rights of the proprietor of the janmam estate cease and determine and the same is vested in the Government of Tamil Nadu and the only right left to the jenmi is to apply for a patta under S.8. Only if the janmi is in possession he shall not be dispossessed. But in this case, the janmi is out of possession. The fact that the appellants are not in possession on the date of vesting of the janma estate in the Government is not disputed and in fact the respondents are in possession of the suit lands for many years as narrated above and as such the appellants are not entitled to claim possession in view of the legal consequences that flow from the vesting of the janmam estate in the Government. To substantiate their contention, reliance is placed upon the following decisions rendered under the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 and M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated lands) Act 1 of 1951. In the case reported in Madanlal v. Asst. Controller 1, the Supreme Court held that in view of S.6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the appellants are not entitled to obtain a decree for possession of the suit properties as the same had vested in the Government. In the case reported in Gurucharan Singh v. Kamala Singh and others 2, a case arising under Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950, a similar question relating to jurisdiction of civil courts came up for consideration. In the case reported in Gurucharan Singh v. Kamala Singh and others 2, a case arising under Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950, a similar question relating to jurisdiction of civil courts came up for consideration. In that case, there had been disputes, among the members of the family with reference to certain lands that vested in the Government under provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950. According to the division in the family the suit land fell to the share of the plaintiff. Defendants are the purchasers from some other sharers. There was scramble for possession of these properties and a proceeding under S.145 Crl.P.C. and the possession of the defendants was upheld by the Magistrate. The plaintiff brought a suit for declaration, possession and mesne profits. The defendants put forth a plea feat the plaintiff had lost his title on account of operation of Ss .3 and 4 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended by the appellant-plaintiff that under S.6 of the Act, there is no vesting of the title in the State of the suit land. S.6 is as follows— “6. Certain other lands in khas possession of intermediaries to be retained by them on payment of rent as raiyats having occupancy rights—(1) On and from the date of vesting all lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, which were in khas possession of an intermediary on the date of such vesting, including— (a)(i) proprietors private lands let out under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year, referred to in S.116 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (8 of 1885); (ii) landlords privileged lands let out under a registered lease for a term exceeding one year or under a lease, written or oral for a period of one year or less, referred to in S.43 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act 1908 (Ben. Act 6 of 1908); (b) lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes and held in the direct possession of a temporary lease of an estate or tenure and cultivated by himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock, and (c) lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes forming the subject matter of a subsisting mortgage on the redemption of which the intermediary is entitled to recover khas possession thereof:—shall, subject to the provisions of S.7-A and 7-B be deemed to be settled by the State with such intermediary and he shall be entitled to retain possession thereof and hold them as a raiyat under the State having occupancy rights in respect of such lands subject to the payment of such fair and equitable rent as may be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner; Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall entitle an intermediary to retain possession of any naukarana land of any land recorded as chaukidari or goraiti jagir or msfi goraiti in the record-of-rights or any other land in respect of which occupancy right has already accrued to a raiyat before the date of vesting. Explanation : For the purpose of this sub-section ‘naukarana land’ means land held as a grant burdened with service in lieu of rent or held simply in lieu of wages for services to be rendered.” On the consideration of the materials placed before it the Supreme Court in construing the above legal possession observed as follows— “The purpose and purport of S.6(1) is to allow the large land holders to keep possession of small areas which may be designated as the private or privileged or mortgaged lands traditionally held directly and occasionally made over to other, often servants or others, in the shape of leases or mortgages. It is obvious that S.6(1) uses the word ‘Including’ to permit enlargement of the meaning of khas possession for the limited purpose of that section, emphasising thereby that, but for such enlargement, the expression khas possession excludes lands outstanding even with temporary leases. It is perfectly plain, therefore, that khas possession has been used in the restricted sense of actual possession and to the small extent it bad to be enlarged for giving relief to proprietors in respect of ‘private’ ‘privileged’ and mortgaged lands, inclusive expressions had to be employed. It is perfectly plain, therefore, that khas possession has been used in the restricted sense of actual possession and to the small extent it bad to be enlarged for giving relief to proprietors in respect of ‘private’ ‘privileged’ and mortgaged lands, inclusive expressions had to be employed. Khas possession is actual possession. Constructive possession or possession in law is what is covered by sub-clauses of S.6(1). It is not correct to say that possession is so wide as to include a mere right to possess, when the actual dominion over the property is held by one in hostility to the former.” The Supreme Court is of the view that when there is a bare right to possess bereft of any dominion or factum of control, it will be a strange legal travesty to assert that an owner is in possession merely because he has a right to possess when arrival, in the teeth of owners opposition, is actually holding dominion and control over the land adversely, openly, and continuously. The Supreme Court rejected the theory that the possession of” a trespasser was that of the owner. ‘Khas possession’ is defined in S.2 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, which is as follows:— “2. Definitions:— In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context— (k) ‘khas possession’ used with reference to the possession of a proprietor or tenure, holder of any land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes means the possession of such proprietor or tenure-holder by cultivating such land or carrying on horticultural operations thereon himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock; Explanation—‘Land used for horticultural purposes’ means lands used for the purpose of growing fruits, flowers or vegetables.” Interpreting S.2 the Supreme Court observed as follows— “what is meant is actual possession with ones feet on the land, plough in the field and hands in the soil, although hired labour is also contemplated This basic idea banishes the importation of the right to possess as tantamount to khas possession”. In the case reported in Ramkhilawandar v. Gajodhar Prasad 1, a case arising under M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated lands) Act 1 of 1952, the Supreme Court held that a reversioner who had succeeded to an estate on the death of a female limited owner could not claim possession of the land as ‘home farm land’ in view of the fact that such land was not in his physical possession on the specified date. In the case reported in Ram Ram Bijay Singh v. Behari Singh 2, a Full Bench consisting of five Judges, in a case arising under Bihar Land Reforms Act 30 of 1950, observed as follows— “It is only lands in the ‘khas possession’ of the proprietor that are saved from vesting in possession in the State under S.6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950. Under the terms of S.6(1)(c) the zeraiti land of a proprietor will be deemed to be in his ‘khas possession’ as defined in S.2(k) if it were the subject matter of a usufructuary mortgage subsisting on the date of the estate of the mortgagor proprietor vested in the service by virtue of a notification published under S.3(1) of the Act, and the mortgagor had a right to recover possession of the same. However, if the mortgagee by some overt act renounces his character as mortgagee and sets up title in himself, to the knowledge of the mortgagor, his possession would not thereafter continue as mortgagee but as a trespasser and the suit for recovery of the property from him would be governed by Art 144 of the Limitation Act. the starting point of limitation being the date at which by the overt manifestation of intention the possession became adverse .” In the case reported Surajnath Ahir v. Prithinath Singh 3, a case arising under Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, certain mortgagees continued in possession even after redemption. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the proprietor had a subsisting title to recover possession over certain land on the date of vesting would not make that land under his ‘Khas possession’. In the case reported in Haji Sk Subhan v. Madhorao 4 a case arising under M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the proprietor had a subsisting title to recover possession over certain land on the date of vesting would not make that land under his ‘Khas possession’. In the case reported in Haji Sk Subhan v. Madhorao 4 a case arising under M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals. Alienated Lands) Act 1950, where the Supreme Court held that after the vesting in the State the plaintiff who is having a decree for possession cannot execute the same and the executing Court can refuse the execution in cases of lands which are not held as home-farm land by the decree holder. Reliance is also placed in Somasundaram Pillai v. Dorairaj 5, where a Division Bench of this Court held that under the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963, a similar enactment for abolition of Inam Estates, a suit for possession in respect of gramanatham land is not sustainable. On the other hand on behalf of the appellants reliance is placed upon the following cases—In Ramunadar v. Sundararaja Iyengar 6, a single Judge of this Court held that the provisions contained in Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1963 will not bar the rights of othidar to seek redemption of the property in which kudiwaram right is other by the Inamdar. In Meharbansingh v. Nareshsingh 7, a case arising under M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act (13 of 1951), the Supreme Court held that during the pendency of a suit for redemption and possession of the mortgaged land by the proprietors, the plaintiffs were not only entitled to redeem the mortgage, but it is also open to them to show that the land in question was Khad-Kasht and they are entitled to possession thereof notwithstanding that their rights, title and interest in the land had vested in the State from the date of notification. 10. The question to be decided is whether the above decisions of the Supreme Court rendered under the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 are to be applied to the facts of this case. That again depends on the question whether the relevant provisions in both the Acts are analogous. Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950, the land-holders or the tenants who are in khas possession are only entitled to retain possession even after vesting. Certain types of possession set out in S.6 are termed as khas possession. That again depends on the question whether the relevant provisions in both the Acts are analogous. Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950, the land-holders or the tenants who are in khas possession are only entitled to retain possession even after vesting. Certain types of possession set out in S.6 are termed as khas possession. In view of the above provisions contained in Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 the Supreme Court held that mere entitlement to possession will not entitle a person to retain possession even after vesting consequent to the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950, since such entitlement to possession without actual possession will not amount to khas possession. But in Act 24 of 1969, there is a specific S.55 which clearly lays down that the owner or the occupier who temporarily parts with possession on the notified date and who had not lost his right to recover possession shall for the purpose of the Act be deemed to be the owner in possession and the said section can usefully be extracted hereunder:— “55. Rights of owner or occupier not to be affected by temporary discontinuance of possession or occupation—Where a person:— (a) is entitled to the ownership or to the possession or occupation of any land or building immediately before the appointed day but has transferred his right to the possession or occupation there of or has been temporarily dispossessed or deprived of his rights to the occupation there of; and (b) has not on that day lost his right to recover the possession or occupation of such land or building, he shall, for the purposes of this Act and subject to the provisions thereof, be deemed to be the owner or to be in possession or occupation of such land or building; Provided that, any lawful transferee of the right to the possession or occupation of such land or building shall save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, continue to have the same rights against his transferor as he had immediately before the appointed day: Provided further that any lawful transferee of the title to such land or building shall be entitled to all the rights under this Act of his transferor.” Because of the deeming provision contained in S.55 any owner or occupier who is entitled to ownership or possession on the appointed day, but was not in actual possession on account of his transferring his right to possession had not lost his right to recover the same or he was temporarily dispossessed or he was deprived of his right to occupation will be deemed to be in possession and such provision is not to be disturbed as per proviso to S.3. Such deeming provision is also contained in Act 26 of 1948 also. The incorporation of S.55 in Act 24 of 1969 which is not in the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, alters the situation in the sense that the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court that under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, that persons who are in khas possession or actual possession only are not affected by the vesting of the estate in the Government, cannot be applied to a case under Act 24 of 1969, since S.55 lays down that the entitlement to possession also will amount to possession for the purpose of S.8 of Act 24 of 1969. This aspect had been missed by the trial court. This aspect had been missed by the trial court. On behalf of the respondents, it is contended that what is contemplated under S 55 is temporary dispossession and in the present case the possession of the respondents is not temporary. A reading of S.55 indicates that a land holder or janmi, who had transferred his right to possession but had not lost his right to recover possession will be deemed to be in possession for claiming relief under Act 24 of 1969. In the present case, the janmi had not lost his right to possession and his successors-in-interest the appellants had also not lost their right to recover possession at the time of the vesting of the jenmam estate in the Government under S.3. Under the circumstances the decisions cited above rendered by the Supreme Court under Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950 cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. 11. On behalf of the respondents it is contended that in any event they are entitled to get patta under S.9 of Act 24 of 1969 since they were in possession and occupation at all relevant times, cultivating personally for more than three agricultural years prior to 1st June, 1969. It is also contended that they are tenants as defined under the Malabar Tenancy Act 1929 (Act No. XIV of 1930) hereinafter referred to as the Act 14 of 1930; which defines tenant as verumpattamdar and the verumpattamdar is defined as a tenant other than a kanamdar, etc. of a holding. The respondents had agreed to pay rent as per lease deed Ex.A2. It is also contended that the respondents are also tenants under the Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act 1 of 1900, hereinafter referred to as the Act 1 of 1900, which includes a sub-lessee. Since Act 24 of 1969 seek to repeal both the Act 14 of 1930 and Act 1 of 1900, the respondents are entitled to the rights as on the date of the repeal, viz., the date of commencement of the Act 24 of 1969, and as such they are tenants in possession entitled to ryotwari patta. Since Act 24 of 1969 seek to repeal both the Act 14 of 1930 and Act 1 of 1900, the respondents are entitled to the rights as on the date of the repeal, viz., the date of commencement of the Act 24 of 1969, and as such they are tenants in possession entitled to ryotwari patta. In view of my conclusion that on account of the legal consequences flowing from S.55 the appellants will be deemed to be in possession on the notified date, the appellants as the successors in interest of the jannmi are prima facie entitled to ryotwari patta under S.8 of the Act 24 of 1969. The respondents cannot claim ryotwari patta under S.9, as they were not in possession as tenants on the appointed day, as the tenancy had been found to have been determined by this Court even prior to the appointed day. The contention that the respondents as persons in actual possession in any event are entitled to ryotwari patta under S.10 cannot be accepted on a proper reading of S.10 which is as follows:— “10. Grant of ryotwari patta on the basis of personal cultivation in certain cases—(1) Where no person is entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of a land in a janmam estate under S.8 or S 9 and the land vests in the Government, a person who had been personally cultivating such land for a continuous period of three agricultural years immediately before the 1st day of June 1969, shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of that land;”! The above section enables the person in personal cultivation for a continuous period of three agricultural years immediately before the 1st June 1969, to get ryotwari patta only in case if no person is entitled to ryotwari patta under S 8 or 9. Though the rights of the transferees (lessees in this case) are safeguarded in S.55, the lease hold rights of the respondents came to an end before the Act came into force. In this case, the appellants are prima facie entitled to ryotwari patta under S.8 and hence the contention of the respondents based upon S.10 will have to be negatived. 12. In this case, the appellants are prima facie entitled to ryotwari patta under S.8 and hence the contention of the respondents based upon S.10 will have to be negatived. 12. Consequently the appellants as persons prima facie entitled to patta under S.8, are not liable to be dispossessed consequent to the vesting of the estate on the appointed day and as such their right to recover possession is unaffected by the vesting of the estate. 13. The second question that arises for consideration is whether the respondents possession is protected as per the provisions contained in the Malabar Tenancy Act 24 of 1930, Malabar Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act 1 of 1900 and as such on the date on which Act 24 of 1969 came into force the respondents are statutory tenants and as such tenants the respondents are prima facie entitled to ryotwari patta under S.9 of Act 24 of 1969. The Head lessee of the Society surrendered the entire estate including the suit property on 23.5.1960 under Ex.A4. The respondents were also obliged to surrender the suit property on that date as per covenants contained in the lease deed in favour of the respondents marked as Ex.A2. But they refused to surrender which necessitated the appellants to file the suit under appeal alleging that the respondents are in wrongful and unlawful possession sin ce 23.5.1960. The contention of the respondents is that they are not in wrongful and unlawful possession because of the provisions contained in Act 14 of 1930 and Act 1 of 1900 which protect their possession. S.3(v) of Act 14 of 1930 defines ‘tenant’ as follows— “ ? “145Tenant’ means any person who has paid or has agreed to payment, or other consideration, for his being allowed by another, to enjoy the land of the latter, and includes an intermediary, a kanamdar, a kuzhikanamdar, and a verumpattamdar of any description”. Kanam is defined in S.3(1) of Act 14 of 1930 as follows— “Kanam’ means the transfer for consideration in money or in kind or in both by a landlord of an interest in specific immovable property to another (called the ‘kanamdar’,) for the latters enjoyment the incidents of which transfer includes:— (1) a right in the transferee to hold the said property liable for the consideration paid by him or due to him which consideration is called ‘kanartham’. (2) the liability of the transferor to pay to the transferee interest on the kanartham. (3) the payment of ‘micbavaram’ by the transferee; (4) the right of the transferee to enjoy the said property for twelve years or any other period, and (5) the liability of the transferee to pay a renewal fee to the transferee, if the transferee is permitted to enjoy the said property for a further period after the determination of the original period.” Kuzhikanam is defined in S.3(m) of Act 14 of 1930, as follows— “ ? “145Kuzhikanam’ means and includes a transfer by landlord to another (called the Kuzhikanamdar) of garden lands or of other lands or of both, with the fruit bearing trees, if any, standing thereon at the time of the transfer, for enjoyment of these trees and for the purpose of planting such fruit bearing trees thereon, the incidents of which transfer includes (1) the right of the transferee to enjoy lands for twelve years or for any other period and (2) the liability of the transferee to pay a renewal fee to the transferor if the transferee is permitted to enjoy the said lands for a further period after the termination of the original period;” The three kinds of Verumpattamdar are defined in S.3(m) of Act 14 of 1930 as follows— “(1). Verumpattamdar—Verumpattamdar means a tenant other than a kanamdar or kuzhikanamdar of a holding for agricultural purposes which includes wet lands and may or may not include other lands; (2) ‘Cultivating verumpattamdar’—‘Cultivating verumpattamdar’ in respect of a holding means any verumpattamdar who, not being a jenmi, intermediary or customary verumpattamdar of the holding has, expressly or impliedly, contracted to cultivate the hinds in that holding, either as a tenant, at will or during a fixed terms, and actually cultivates the same; (3) ‘Customary verumpattamdar’—‘Customary verumpattamdar’ means any verumpattamdar who is entitled by custom of the locality in which the land is situate to possession of the said land for a definite period of years and for whose continuance thereon after the termination of that period, for a further period, a renewal fee has to be paid to the landlord as an incident of the tenure.” As per the above enactments the possession of any person in actual cultivation of land is protected S.3(1) of Act 1 of 1900 defines tenant as follows— “3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context — (1) ‘Tenant’ with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes a person who as lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in good faith believing himself to be lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee of land, is in possession thereof, or who with the bona fide intention of attorning and paying the customary rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste land, but without the permission of such person, brings such land under cultivation, and is in occupation there as cultivator. Sub-S.(3) to S.3 of Act 1 of 1900 defines ‘Improvements’ as follows— “(3) ‘Improvements’ means any work or product of a work which adds to the value of the building, is suitable to it and consistent with the purpose for which the holding was let, mortgaged or occupied. According to S.5 (1) and (2) of the Act, 1 of 1900, a person whose tenancy is determined and who is entitled to compensation for improvement is entitled to remain in possession until ejectment in execution of decree or order of Court, which reads as follows— “5(1.) Every tenant shall on ejectment be entitled to compensation for improvements which have been made by him, his predecessor-in-interest, or by any person not in occupation at the time of the ejectment who derived title from either of them and for which compensation has not already been paid; and every tenant to whom compensation is so due shall, notwithstanding the determination of the tenancy or the payment or tender of the mortgage money (if any) be entitled to remain in possession until ejectment in execution of a decree or order of Court. (2) A tenant so continuing in possession shall during such continuance hold as a tenant subject to the terms of his lease or of the mortgage, as the case may be.” The trial court found that the respondents had effected improvements by planting rubber trees, etc., and also ascertained the value of the same. In view of the above enactment the respondents are entitled to continue in lawful possession as tenants till the compensation is paid. Since both the enactments had been repealed as per the repealing Section in Act 24 of 1969 and as per S 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, the benefits derived by the respondents under the said Act will not be lost. Since both the enactments had been repealed as per the repealing Section in Act 24 of 1969 and as per S 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, the benefits derived by the respondents under the said Act will not be lost. Hence it is contended that the possession of’ the respondents is lawful which will entitle them to get ryotwari patta under S.9 of the Act 24 of 1969. But the provisions contained by virtue of S.2 of Act 14 of 1930 the provisions of the said Act have not been made applicable to the lands transferred for planting rubber and coffee plantations. Hence the respondents cannot claim any protection under the Act 14 of 1930. Under S.5(1) of Act 1 of 1900 the tenant is given certain rights to continue in possession till ejectment in execution of a decree S.5 would be attracted only if the tenant is entitled to claim compensation as per Ss.15 and 18. The said sections under which the compensation is payable do not include rubber and coffee plantations and no compensation is provided for rubber and coffee. Hence the respondents whose tenancy stand determined cannot become statutory tenants under the provisions of the above said Act. Hence the contention based upon the above said enactments with reference to the nature of possession of the respondents will have to be negatived. 14. One other contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the appellants themselves had admitted in the course of the proceedings the lease hold rights of the respondents. On an earlier occasion when the appeal was heard by a Division Bench of this Court, reliance was placed on S.115 of the Transfer of Property Act and the stand taken by the appellants is as follows — “The argument of Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari is simple and can be stated thus. When the headlease (English Society) surrendered the headlessee (Ex.A1) to the head-lessor (Royal), under the latter part of the first paragraph of S.115 ‘the rent payable by and the contracts binding on the under-lessees (i.e., defendants) shall be respectively payable to and enforceable by the lessor (that is to say, Royal). In other words, the rent payable by and the contracts binding on the defendants under Ex.A2, dated 9. 8.1946, became respectively payable and enforceable by Royal. In other words, the rent payable by and the contracts binding on the defendants under Ex.A2, dated 9. 8.1946, became respectively payable and enforceable by Royal. Now, one of such contract was that contained in clause 14 of Ex.A2 namely the liability of the defendants to surrender the sublease, when the head lease itself was surrendered, and under the provision in question in S.115 of the Transfer of Property Act, this contract undertaken by the sub-lessees to surrender their subleases could be enforced by the lessor substituted by the statutory provision in the place of the English Society that is to say, could be enforced by Royal Yeshowanath Bahadur. It seems to us that this argument of Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari is perfectly logical and unanswerable.” It is on such stand taken, the Division Bench held that the owner is entitled to enforce the covenants in the sub-lease against the sub lessees treating them as tenants and on that basis alone, reliance was placed on the provisions of S.115. Again it is stated— “Explaining our point, we would point out that, if the sub-lease had not contained a provision like clause 14 of Ex.A2 the sub lessees would not have been liable to surrender these sub-lease at all and they could well have relied on the first part of the first paragraph of S.115 and continued in possession as sub-lessees, but the head lessor. (Royal) being substituted for the English Society. Their liability to surrender the sub-lease upon the surrender of the head lease arises solely because of the special terms contained in the sub-lease and not as a matter of interpretation of construction of S.115.” Then they proceed to consider whether there was anything in S.115, which would invalidate a term like clause 14 in Ex.A2. They ultimately held that clause 14 is supported by consideration and it is valid and not violative of S.23 of the Contract Act. Hence, they held that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, which relates to leases will apply to the sub leases. On the question of limitation the following stand is taken up by the appellants as evident from the argument of the learned counsel f or the appellants, Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari— “To substantiate the theories that this is a suit by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant, Mr. On the question of limitation the following stand is taken up by the appellants as evident from the argument of the learned counsel f or the appellants, Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari— “To substantiate the theories that this is a suit by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant, Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari recalls his main submission that, under the second part of the first paragraph of S.115 of the Transfer of Property Act a jural relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence on the terms of Ex. A2 between Royal and the defendants upon the surrender of the head case and that therefore the suit by the plaintiffs, who were the successors-in-interest of Royal, was clearly a suit by the landlord to recover possession from the tenant and would all within Art. 67 of the Limitation Act”. Since the appellants had taken such a stand it contended that the status of the tenants had been recognised by the appellants themselves and as such they are prima facie entitled to ryotwari patta under S.9 of Act 24 of 1969. In any event even if the respondents are held to be tenants in possession such tenancy had come to an end and after the tenancy had come to an end such possession of the respondents will be deemed to that of the Janmi as per S.55 of the Act 24 of 1969. Prima facie the Janmi will be entitled to ryotwari patta and as such the rights of the appellants as transferees from the Jenrni will have to be recognised in this regard. The respondents could have made a claim for ryotwari patta under S.9 only if the tenancy had continued. But the tenancy had come to an end long prior to the coming into force of Act 24 of 1969. The contention that possession of the respondents is protected under law and that they cannot be dispossessed as per the provisions contained in Act 24 of 1969 will have to be rejected. 15. In view of the conclusion arrived at on both the points that arise for determination. The contention that possession of the respondents is protected under law and that they cannot be dispossessed as per the provisions contained in Act 24 of 1969 will have to be rejected. 15. In view of the conclusion arrived at on both the points that arise for determination. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the appellants are entitled to recover possession and I am in agreement with Maheswaran, J. In so far as the mesne profits is concerned no argument had been advanced and I concur with Maheswaran, J., in his conclusion regarding mesne profits that the findings of the trial court regarding the same will have to be adopted. In the result, I agree with Maheswaran, J., that the appeal will have to be allowed without costs. 16. Reference is answered and the matter is directed to be posted before the Bench for further orders. Any application for leave to appeal can be made before the Bench. Sathiadev and Maheswaran, JJ.: (Pursuant to the reference having been answered by Sengottuvelan, J. this appeal came up for further orders before the Division Bench and the court delivered the following Judgment:— 17. Maheswaran, J.:— C.M.P. 11728 of 1987 for determining the compensation on the date of order for eviction is dismissed. 18. In view of the majority judgment, this appeal is allowed; but without costs. The cross objections are dismissed. No costs. 19. Sathiadev and Maheswaran, JJ. :—Though an oral application for leave to appeal to Supreme Court is prayed for, as the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance, leave rejected.