JUDGMENT : H.H. Kantharia, J.—Petitioner No. 2 was in the employment of the third respondent as a Stenographer for about 10 years. He was charge-sheeted vide letter dated 12th November, 1979 alleging against him that he received certain sum of money towards leave travel concession, for air- travel, for himself and for his parents but did not effect the return journey to Bombay by air and thus misappropriated money on account of the difference in air-fare and other mode of travel which constituted gross misconduct involving fraud and dishonesty. He was immediately suspended. He submitted an explanation by his letter dated 15th November, 1979 refuting the allegations levelled against him and stating that the action of the third respondent in initiating disciplinary steps against him was with mala fide intentions. Thereafter, a domestic enquiry was held against him and on the findings dated 11th December, 1980 by the enquiry officer holding him guilty of the charges levelled against him he was, vide a letter dated 28th February, 1981, dismissed by the third respondent. He preferred an appeal before the appellate authority against the order of dismissal but the same was turned down and his dismissal was con firmed. 2. Thereafter, an industrial dispute demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service was raised. The said demand was admitted in conciliation. However, the parties could not arrive at a settlement and, therefore, the Conciliation Officer submitted his failure report on 20th August, 1981 to the Ministry of Labour, Government of India. The second respondent working as a Desk Officer in the office of the Ministry of Labour, Union Government, New Delhi, by his letter, dated 26th February, 1982, informed the parties that the Central Government decided not to refer the said dispute, raised on behalf of the second petitioner, to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The said order made by the Central Government (the first respondent) refusing to refer the dispute of the second petitioner to an Industrial Tribunal has been impugned in this petition under Article 226 or the Constitution of India by the first petitioner-union and the second petitioner-workman. 3. Now, the impugned order dated 26th February, 1982 (Exh.'H' to the petition) reads as under: "No. L-12012(250)/81-D, II(A) Government of India/Bharat Sarkar, Ministry of Labour, I Shram Mantralaya, New Delhi, Dated the 26th February, 1982 1. 3. Now, the impugned order dated 26th February, 1982 (Exh.'H' to the petition) reads as under: "No. L-12012(250)/81-D, II(A) Government of India/Bharat Sarkar, Ministry of Labour, I Shram Mantralaya, New Delhi, Dated the 26th February, 1982 1. The Personnel Officer, American Express International Banking Corpn., Vice President's Office, P.B. No. 507, Bombay 400 001. 2. The Jt. Secretary, American Express (Bank) Employees' Union, Oriental Building, 364 Dadabhoy Naoroji Rd., Fort, Bombay 400 001. Subject:- I.D. between the management of American Express International Banking Corporation & American Express (Bank) Employees' Union over alleged illegal termination of service of Shri Anthony Fernandez. Sir, In continuation of this Ministry's letter of even number dated the 23-9-1981, I am directed to say that the Central Government have decided not to refer the above dispute to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication because the contention of the Union and the statements of the workman at the various stages go to prove that he had actually made a false claim in respect of Leave Travel Concession. Since, the guilt was accepted and also established during the domestic enquiry, the action of the management in terminating the services of Shri Anthony Fer-nanez-was not mala fide and unjustified." Yours faithfully, Sd/-N. K. Verma (N.K. VERMA) DESK OFFICER". 4. Mr. Dharap, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits. that the reasons given in refusing to make a reference are irrelevant, unjust and extraneous and travels beyond the competency of the Government and also tantamounts to adjudication of a dispute and that the Government have no powers to say what is just or unjust and whether the act of Delhi, Dated the 26th February, 1982. the employer is mala fide or bona fide and whether the misconduct is proved or not and whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate to the misconduct alleged against the workman. Mr. Dharap further submits that in the impugned order only two grounds are made out, viz. (i) validity or correctness of the enquiry and (ii) admission of guilt by the second petitioner and the impugned order does not say that the demand made by the petitioners was frivolous, bogus or grossly delayed. In the submission of Mr. Dharap, from these reasons given in the impugned order it will not be open for this Court to consider that the said order is correct. In the submission of Mr. Dharap, from these reasons given in the impugned order it will not be open for this Court to consider that the said order is correct. He further submits that the returns filed on behalf of the first respondent does not disclose any additional ground for refusing to make a reference. Mr. Dharap, therefore, urges, that this is a fit case in which this Court should interfere with the impugned order, it being unreasonable and based on irrelevant considerations and direct the first respondent to make a reference or in any case direct them to reconsider the matter all afresh with a view to find out whether a reference u/s 10(1) read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") should be made. 5. Mr. Vyas, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the first and second respondents, submits that this is a gross case in which the second petitioner who was an employee of a financial institution like a bank was held guilty at the domestic enquiry for misappropriation of bank money and as such no useful purpose will be served by either asking the Government to reconsider the matter or by directing them to make a reference because in the facts and circumstances of this particular case it will be difficult for any judicial forum to grant any relief to the second petitioner. Mr. Kapadia, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the third respondent-bank, concurs with the views expressed by Mr. Vyas and he further submits that it would be an exercise in futility to allow this petition by granting any of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioners, as canvassed by Mr. Dharap. According to Mr. Kapadia, one does not expect any judicial forum to grant any relief to the second petitioner who was working in the Travel Department of the third respondent-bank and after getting sufficient knowledge as to the travelling rules, and regulations, he indulged in a dishonest act of misappropriating bank's money not only once, in his own case and in the case of his mother, but also on the second occasion thereafter in the case of his father. The submission of Mr. The submission of Mr. Kapadia is that prima facie the second petitioner is guilty of misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and he cannot be retained in the services of the bank where he has to deal with money and money transactions. Mr. Kapadia, therefore; submits that Government used its discretion wisely and reasonably in not making a reference about the dispute raised for and on behalf of the second petitioner and there are no compelling reasons to interfere with the impugned order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. Now, after the Conciliation Officer submits a failure report u/s 12(4) of the Act, the appropriate Government is required to consider whether a reference should or should not be made to the appropriate authority. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act provides: "If, on consideration of the report referred to in Sub-section (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that mere is a case for reference to a Board (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal), it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefore." It may be noted here that if the Government decides to make a reference, it has to be done u/s 10(1) of the Act which provides: "Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing- (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more man one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so minks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under Clause (c): ........................... A plain leading of these provisions of law makes it clear that the powers vested in the Government to make a reference are discretionary. But when the Government chooses not to make a reference, it has to record reasons for not doing so and communicate the same to the concerned parties. This is a mandatory duty of the Government. 7. In our case, a mere glance at the impugned order shows that the second respondent gave convincing reasons for refusing to make a reference. Thus, regard being had to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Government was of the view that from the contentions raised by the union representing the second petitioner and the statements made by the second petitioner himself at various stages it was proved that the second petitioner had made a false claim in respect of leave travel concession and had misappropriated the bank's money. The second petitioner had also admitted his guilt in this regard. These facts were also proved at the domestic enquiry. In the opinion of the Government, the action of the management of the bank in terminating the services of the second petitioner was not mala fide and unjustified. In my judgment, the impugned order passed by the Government is neither arbitrary nor capricious nor fanciful nor unreasonable so as to interfere with. I find no compelling reasons to exercise discretionary, though quite wide, jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the second petitioner by interfering with the well-considered impugned order. 8. To support his contentions, Mr. Dharap invited my attention to a number of authorities viz. (i) K.P. Kshatriya Vs. Khandelwal Udyog Limited and others, (1980) 2 LLJ 261 , (ii) Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras Vs. Government of India and Another, AIR 1985 SC 1667 , (iii) Suresh Shantaram Joshi Vs. Regional Manager Bank of Maharashtra Baroda and Another, (1985) 1 LLJ 487 , (iv) M.P. Irrigation Karamchari Sangh Vs. State of M.P. and Another, (1985) 2 SCC 103 , (v) Ram Avtar Sharma and Anr. and State of Haryana and Anr. AIR 1985 SC 915 and Ram Avtar Sharma and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, AIR 1985 SC 915 , (vi) The Tamilnadu Co. Op. Milk Producers Federation Ltd Madhavaram, Madras represented by its Managing Director and the Tamilnadu Dairy Development Corpn. and State of Haryana and Anr. AIR 1985 SC 915 and Ram Avtar Sharma and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, AIR 1985 SC 915 , (vi) The Tamilnadu Co. Op. Milk Producers Federation Ltd Madhavaram, Madras represented by its Managing Director and the Tamilnadu Dairy Development Corpn. Employees' Union represented by its General Secretary and Anr. between The State of Tamilnadu represented by the Commissioner and Secretary to Government Labour and Employment Dept., Madras-9 and the Tamilnadu Dairy Development Corporation Employees' Union represented by its The Tamilnadu Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. and The State of Tamilnadu Vs. The Tamilnadu Dairy Development Corporation Employees Union and Another, (1985) 2 LLJ 532 , (vii) Srikanth Rao Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (1986) 1 LLJ 197 , (viii) National Council of Applied Economic Research Parisila Bhawan Indraprastha Estate, New Delhi Vs. Delhi Administration and others, (1986) 2 LLJ 90, (ix) V. Veerarajan and others Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, (1987) 1 SCC 479 and (x) S. Gopal v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. 1987 (54) FLR 632. A careful perusal of these authorities shows that the well settled law on the point is that for not making a reference, Government should give adequate and satisfactory reasons and the Government cannot take upon itself to adjudicate an industrial dispute which can be done only either by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be. Further, the powers of the Labour Court and/or the Industrial Tribunal u/s 11A of the Act cannot be usurped by the Government by refusing to make a reference and that the workmen, in such cases, have a legal right to justify the demands before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal as to how their dismissals from service were invalid, improper and incorrect in law and they cannot be deprived of this legal right by refusing to make a reference to the appropriate forum. These authorities further show that if a reference is made, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal could also go into the question of adequacy of the punishment qua the misconduct alleged against the workmen and that the functions of the Government in exercising powers u/s 10(1) read with Section 12(5) of the Act should be done reasonably and with utmost care and caution and also that while exercising such powers, the Government should be slow in declining to make a reference because that would deprive the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal in going into the merits of the matter. It is only when the Government is of the considered opinion and comes to the conclusion that the claims preferred by the workmen were perverse or frivolous or bogus or were inordinately delayed that the Government may exercise its discretion and refuse to make a reference. These are the general principles of law which are enunciated in the above quoted authorities. 9. Now, there is absolutely no quarrel about these principles of law to which Mr. Dharap has invited my attention. However, harmonious reading of Section 10(1) 11A and 12(5) of the Act clearly shows that the powers of the Government in the matter of making reference are absolutely discretionary. It is no doubt true that the Government should be slow in declining to make a reference but everything would depend upon facts and circumstances of each individual case. There cannot be a straight jacket formula for granting and refusing to grant a reference by the Government. Every case has to be examined on its own merits. I am not able to persuade myself to agree with a proposition of law made by Mr. Dharap that in view of the introduction of Section 11A of the Act, reference in cases of individual workmen is a must. It is important to note that the introduction of Section 11A of the Act does not take away the discretionary powers of the Government u/s 10(1) read with Section 12(5) of the Act. Despite the introduction of Section 11A, the Government will be within its powers, in a given case, depending upon the facts and circumstances, to refuse a reference. It is important to note that the introduction of Section 11A of the Act does not take away the discretionary powers of the Government u/s 10(1) read with Section 12(5) of the Act. Despite the introduction of Section 11A, the Government will be within its powers, in a given case, depending upon the facts and circumstances, to refuse a reference. It cannot be said that in view of the introduction of Section 11A, a reference is a must in the matter of demand of individual workman and the Government is duty bound to make a reference in such cases of a proposition, as propounded by Mr. Dharap, is accepted it would render the provisions of Sections 10(1) and 12(5) nugatory because the Government then would be left with no alternative but to make a reference. That could not have been the intention of the legislature in introducing Section 11A. Introduction of Section 11A in the Act only empowers the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal to grant appropriate relief to the discharged or dismissed workman and even modify the punishment by lessening it and while doing so, the material on the record alone would be looked into thus prohibiting the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal from taking any fresh evidence in relation to the matter in question. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am more than convinced that the impugned order passed by the Government is quite reasonable, fair and just so as not to interfere with. The second petitioner was a bank employee. He was working in the travel department of the bank. He was familiar with the leave travel concession procedure and the purchase of air-tickets and the cancellation of the same. He purchased air tickets for himself and his mother from Bombay to Bangalore and back and travelled by air but got the tickets for the return journey cancelled at Bangalore. He repeated such an exercise on the second occasion in the case of his father and did not refund the difference in money on account of return journeys on both occasions by a mode other than air travel and misappropriated the bank money. His explanation was a further indication of his dishonest intention. He repeated such an exercise on the second occasion in the case of his father and did not refund the difference in money on account of return journeys on both occasions by a mode other than air travel and misappropriated the bank money. His explanation was a further indication of his dishonest intention. Thus while explaining the charge-sheet he wrote back to the bankp as under: "At the outset I wish to submit that mere cancellation of open dated air tickets would not tantamount to fraud and dishonesty. The fact that I travelled to Bangalore by air and resumed duty is sufficient proof that I travelled from Bangalore to Bombay. At the most the Management can call for proof of travel and cost involved. Similar is the case with regard to the leave fare a concession availed for my' father Mr. L.J. Fernandez. In both the above cases I had explained personally in detail and in good faith to the Management. You were satisfied with my explanation and the matter I thought was closed. Had I been informed that the mode of travel undertook by me and my father was unacceptable to the Bank for the purpose of reimbursement of the fare, I would have refunded the money. No objections were raised then and even when I availed of leave fare for my father as late as November 1979. This is proof enough that there is no earlier case." This explanation offered by the second petitioner shows that he was not repentant for his act in not refunding the bank money and misappropriating the same. He repeated his fraudulent and dishonest intentions even in this explanation. One can understand if he were to say, as and by way of an explanation, that it was on account of some misunderstanding or mistake or some circumstances beyond its control or on account of some exigency such as not getting a berth in a particular flight that he was compelled to travel by a mode other than air travel for which he had taken money and that he was ready and willing to refund the difference. It has been pointed out to me that on the return journeys, he and his father and mother travelled by taxi, friend's car and bus. It has been pointed out to me that on the return journeys, he and his father and mother travelled by taxi, friend's car and bus. If that is so, he must have retained with him quite a handsome amount being the difference in the air-fare and such modes of travel. In my judgment, a person of such a shabby character is undesirable as an employee in a financial institution like a bank where he has to deal with money and money transactions. In my opinion, no judicial authority in such circumstances can persuade itself to grant any kind of relief to a workman like the second petitioner and, therefore, as submitted by Mr. Vyas and Mr. Kapadia it would be an exercise in futility to make a reference to the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. Thus finding that the impugned order passed by the Government is neither arbitrary nor fanciful or unreasonable and unjust, I am unable to persuade myself, in this particular case, to order the Government to reconsider the matter or make a reference about the dispute raised for and on behalf of the second petitioner. 11. In this view of the matter, the writ petition fails and stands dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged but, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.