Judgment S. Samsul Hasan, J. 1. This is an application by the defendant-petitioner against an order dated 28-3-1987 passed by Sri O. P. Singh, 3rd Additional munsif, Darbhanga, in Eviction Suit No.14 of 1985, by which he has refused the petitioner tenant to grant leave to contest the suit and consequently decreed the suit, for eviction filed under Sec.14 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). 2. The suit was under Sec.11 (1) (c) of the Act and it was prayed that the plaintiff required the suit premises to set up his unemployed son in business, particularly, in view of the shortage of space available In the light of the facts that may be brought in the suit, the Court was only required to examine whether factually the claim of the plaintiff would justify, if proved, the eviction of requirement of a son to set up the business is indeed a reasonable requirement but whether the son on facts can and is in a position to set up a business will have to be determined. The defendant filed an affidavit stating broadly that all the sons of the plaintiff are engaged in the business of the plaintiff which they are carrying on in the rest of the building in which the suit premises lines. Further claim is that there is no paucity of space, there being five rooms instead of two as claimed by the plaintiff. 3. The trial court virtually embarking upon the examination of the correctness of the defendants case rejected the affidavit and decreed the suit consequently on merit. What the court was really required to examine was whether the defendant has made out a case in the affidavit which on prima facie examination required adjudication in the suit, If the plea in the affidavit was of such a character that it was untenable in law or on facts, ex facie, the Court could have been right in refusing permission to the defendant but if the plea required examination of witnesses and determination of facts then the Court should have allowed the matter to go to trial by granting leave. The law has been spelt out in this regard in a decision in the case of Precision Steel and engineering Works and another V/s. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, AIR 1982 SC 1518 which related to the provisions of Sec.25-B of the Delhi Rent Control act which is similar to Sec.14 of the B. B. C. Act. Paragraph 12 of this decisions reads thus: "12. The question is whether this burden is in any way diluted or stands discharged or wholly shifted to the tenant because of a different procedure prescribed in Chapter III-A of the Act. Sec.25-B (4) provides that in default of the appearance of the tenant in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground set out in Sec.14 (1) (e ). On a combined reading of Sec.14 (1) proviso (e) with section 25-B (1) and (4) the legal position that emerges is that on a proper application being made in the prescribed manner which is required to be supported by an affidavit, unless the tenant obtains leave to defend as contemplated by sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 25-B, the tenant is deemed to have admitted all the averments made in the petition filed by the landlord. The effect of these provisions is that the Controller would act on the admission of the tenant and there is no better proof of fact as admission, ordinarily because facts which are admitted need not be proved. But what happens if the tenant appears pursuant to the summons issued under sub-section (2) of Sec.25-B, files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application? As a corollary, it would transpire that the facts pleaded by the landlord are disputed and controverted. How is the Controller thereafter to proceed in the matter? It would be open to the landlord to contest the application of the tenant seeking leave to contest and for that purpose he can file an affidavit in reply but production and admission and evaluation of documents at that stage has no case. The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) and the reply, if any. The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question : Does the affidavit disclosed, not proved, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause (8) of the proviso to Sec.14 (1) The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed question of facts or his preference of one set-off affidavits against other set-off affidavits. That is not the jurisdiction conferred on the Controller by subsection (5) because the Controller while examining the question whether there is a proper case for granting leave to contest the application has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosing such facts as would prima facie and not on contest disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. that the stage when affidavit is filed under sub-section (4) by the tenant and the same is being examined for the purposes of sub-Section (5) Controller has to confine himself only to the avermerit in the affidavit and the reply if any and that becomes manifestly clear from the language of sub-section (5) that the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession etc. The jurisdiction to grant leave to contest or refuse the same is to be exercised on the basis of the affidavit filed by the tenant. That alone at that stage is the relevant document and one must confine to the averments in the affidavit. If the averments in the affidavit disclosed such facts which, if ultimately proved to the satisfaction of the court, would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession, that by itself makes it obligatory upon the Controller to grant leave. It is immaterial that facts alleged and disclosed are controverted by the landlord because the stage of proof is yet to come. It is distinctly possible that a tenant may fail to make good the defence raised by him. It is immaterial that facts alleged and disclosed are controverted by the landlord because the stage of proof is yet to come. It is distinctly possible that a tenant may fail to make good the defence raised by him. Plausibility of the defence raised and proof of the same are materially different from each other and one cannot bring in the concept of proof at the stage when plausibility has to be shown. This view taken in B. Kanjhibhai V/s. Mohanraj Rajendra Kumar, air 1970 Guj 32 ; Kishan Singh V/s. Mohd. Shafi, AIR 1964 J and K 39 appears to have been approved in Santosh Kumar V/s. Bhai Mool singh, 1958 SCR 1211 : AIR 1958 SC 321 at p.324, where at page 1217 this Court while commenting upon an order granting conditional leave under Order XXXVII, Rule 3, passed by the trial Judge which was to this effect: In the absence of these documents, the defence of the defendants seems to be vague consisting of indefinite assertions. . . . . . . . . . observed as under : "this is a surprising conclusion. The facts given in the affidavit are clear and precise, the defence could hardly have been clearer. We find it difficult to see how a defence that on the face is clear becomes vague simply because the evidence by which it is to be proved is not brought on file at the time the defence is put in. The learned Judge has failed to see that the stage of proof can only come after the defendant has been allowed to enter an appearance and defend the suit, and that the nature of the defence has to be determined at the time when the affidavit is put in. At that stage all that the Court has to determine is whether if the facts alleged by the defendant are duly proved they will afford a good or even a plausible answer to the plaintiffs claim. Once the Court is satisfied about that, leave cannot be withheld and no question about imposing conditions can arise, and once leave is granted, the normal procedure of a suit so far as evidence and proof go, obtains. " 4. Once the Court is satisfied about that, leave cannot be withheld and no question about imposing conditions can arise, and once leave is granted, the normal procedure of a suit so far as evidence and proof go, obtains. " 4. Without adding anything further, I set aside the impugned order and the decree and direct the Court below to allow the petitioner-defendant to file a written statement within three weeks from today and it should then proceed to dispose of the trial within two months thereafter (vacation excluded) refusing unnecessary adjournments to any party even for coming to this Court. While proceeding further, the Court is also advised to examine the decision in the case of Santosh Kumar V/s. Bhai Mool Singh, 1958 SCR 1211 : AIR 1958 SC 321 at p.324. 5. The application is allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.