Judgment N. P. Singh, J. 1. The appointment of respondent Nos.5 to 88 (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) as Munsif in the Bihar Judicial Service has been challenged on behalf of the petitioners on the ground that they did not fulfill the criteria laid down by the Bihar Judicial Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules ). 2. The respondents have been appointed by the State Government by a notification dated 28-10-1986 on the recommendation of the Bihar Public Service commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) on the basis of the result of the 21st Judicial Service Competitive Examination. According to the petitioner as the respondents did not produce certificates from the Registrar of the high Court of Judicature at Patna (hereinafter referred to as the Patna High court) or from the District Judges of the districts in the State of Bihar, that they were practitioners at the Bar of at least one years continuous standing, on the date of advertisement, their applications should not have been entertained by the commission in view of Rule 6 (c) of the Rules. It may be pointed out that there is no dispute that the respondents were not practising either in the Patna High court or before any Court subordinate thereto. They were practising in Courts which are not subordinate to the Patna High Court and had produced certificates from the Registrar or District Judges of those Courts along with their applications regarding their one year continuous practice. 3. The Rules have been framed under Article 234 of the Constitution of india by the Governor of Bihar, after cumulation with the Patna High Court and the Commission. The relevant part of Rule l (b) (iv) is as follows ;- "1. (b) Definition.-In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) high Court means the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The relevant part of Rule 6 which lays down the criteria for appointment as munsif is as follows :- "6. (b) Definition.-In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context- (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) high Court means the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The relevant part of Rule 6 which lays down the criteria for appointment as munsif is as follows :- "6. A candidate may be of either sex, and must- (a) (b) be a graduate in Law of a University recognised by the governor or a Barister-at-Law or a member of the Faculty of advocates in Scotland, or an Attorney on the rolls of a High court, or possess other educational qualifications which the governor may, after consultation with the High Court and the commissions, decide to be equivalent to those prescribed above ; and (c) be a practitioner at the Bar of at least one years continuous standing on the date of the advertisament. " rule 9 prescribes the documents and certificates which are to be submitted along with the application, the relevant part whereof is as follows :- "9. With his application a candidate must submit- (i) evidence that he holds one of the educational qualifications referred to in clause (b) of Rule 6 in the form of a certificate from the Registrar of the University in which he took his degree in Law, or a certificate that he is a Barister-at-Law or a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, or an Attorney on the rolls of a High Court or a certificate that he possesses any other educational qualification which the Governor may have decided under clause (b) of Rule 6 to be equivalent to the above qualifications; (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) a certificate showing the duration of the candidates practice at the bar and also his suitability for appointment to the service- (a) in. the case of a candidate who has ordinarily practised in the high Court, from the Registrar of that Court, or (b) in the case of a candidate who has ordinarily practised in courts subordinate to the High Court, from the District judge of the district in which he ordinarily practises. " 4. the case of a candidate who has ordinarily practised in the high Court, from the Registrar of that Court, or (b) in the case of a candidate who has ordinarily practised in courts subordinate to the High Court, from the District judge of the district in which he ordinarily practises. " 4. It was urged that on a plain reading, Rule 9 (vi) (a) and (b) require that every candidate along with his application must submit a certificate showing the duration of his practice at the bar and about his suitability for the appointment to the Service either from the Registrar of the High Court where he has ordinarlly practised or from the District Judges of the District Courts concerned which are subordinate to the High Court. It was pointed out that the expression "high court" in view of Rule l (b) (iv) shall mean High Court of Judicature at Patna. As none of the respondents had produced certificates along with their applications saying that either they had practised in the Patna High Court or before any Court subordinate thereto, according to the petitioners, their applications should not have been entertained and appointments of such persons who did not fulfill the mandatory conditions, in the eye of law shall be null and void. I must say at the outset that if the expression "high Court" used in the different rules have to be read to mean Patna High Court" in view of the definition given in the rule itself, then every candidate had to submit a certificate showing that for the requisite duration either he had practised before the Patna High Court or before any Court subordinate thereto. 5. The learned Advocate General app earing for the State submitted that although the expression "high Court" has been defined in the rules to mean as "patna High Court" but as the same rule l (b) opens with the expressions "in these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context", as such the expression "high Court" has to be read as "patna High Court" till that expression is not repugnant in the context in which it has been used. If in any such rule giving the meaning to expression "high Court" as "patna High Court", becomes repugnant in the context in which it has been used, then it shall mean any High Court within the Union of India. 6. If in any such rule giving the meaning to expression "high Court" as "patna High Court", becomes repugnant in the context in which it has been used, then it shall mean any High Court within the Union of India. 6. Whether an expression which has been defined in the Act or the Rules can be interpreted to mean something different in context of a section or rule of that very Act or Rules has been examined from time to time. Craies in his book on Statute Law observes at page 101 (Seventh Edition) as follows :- "it follows from the rule thus variously stated that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification, variously expressed, in the definition clauses which create them, such as : unless the context otherwise requires ; or "unless a contrary intention appears" ; or "if not inconsistent with the context or subject-matter. " Again at page 216 it has been said : "another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is, that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly-defining what the meaning of a term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so comprehended. "if, therefore, an interpretation clause gives an extended meaning to a word, it does not follow as a matter of course that, if that word is used more than once in the Act, it is on each occassion used in the extended meaning, and it may be always a matter of argument whether or not the interpretetion clause is to apply to the word as used in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration. it appears to me, said Lord Selborne in Meux V/s. Jacobs, that the interpretation clause does no more than say that, where you find these words in the Act they shall, unless there be something repugnant in the context. . . . . . . . . " 7. The Supreme Court in the case of V. F. and G. Insurance Co. V/s. Mjs. . . . . . . . . " 7. The Supreme Court in the case of V. F. and G. Insurance Co. V/s. Mjs. Fraser and Ross (AIR 1960 Supreme Court 971) had to consider whether expression "insurer" defined in Sec.2 (9) of the Insurance Act, 1938 has to be read in different sections of the Act as defined or in some sections somewhat different meaning could be given in the context it has been used in those sections. In that connection it was pointed-out as follows :- "it is well settled that all statutory definitions or abbreviations must be read subject to the qualification variously expressed in the definition clauses which created them and it may be that even where the definition is exhaustive inasmuch as the word defined is said to mean a certain thing, it is possible for the word to have a somewhat different meaning in different sections of the Act depending upon the subject or the context. That is why all definitions in statutes generally begin with the qualifying words similar to the words used in the present case, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore in finding out the meaning of the word insurer in various sections of the Act, the meaning to be ordinarily given to it is that given in the definition clause. But this is not inflexible and there may be sections in the Act where the meaning may have to be departed from on account of the subject or context in which the word has been used and that will be giving effect to the opening sentence in the definition section, namely, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. In view of this qualification, the court has not only to look at the words but also to look at the context, the collocation and the object of such words relating to such matter and interpret the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the words under the circumstances. There fore, though ordinarily the word insurer as used in the Act would mean a person or body corporate actually carrying on the business of insurance it may be that in certain sections the word may have a somewhat different meaning. There fore, though ordinarily the word insurer as used in the Act would mean a person or body corporate actually carrying on the business of insurance it may be that in certain sections the word may have a somewhat different meaning. " In the case of Shambatta V/s. Narayana (AIR 1951 Madras 917) it was observed : "the function of an interpretation clause is not, as is very often supposed, to substitute one set of words for another or to apply the meaning of the term under all circumstances, but merely to declare what may be included in the term when the circumstances required that it should be so interpreted. " A Full Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of V. K. Balakrishan V/s. Asoka bank Ltd. (AIR 1966 Kerala 42) said : "a definition clause does not necessarily apply to all possible contexts in which the word may be found in a particular statute. A strict adherence to the definition may lead to an anomaly or even repugnancy. " recently the Supreme Court has again examined in the case of Central Inland water Transport Corporation Ltd. V/s. Brojo Nath (AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1571)the same question and has said "where an interpretation clauss defines a word to mean a particular thing, the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive ; and whenever an interpretation clause defines a term to include something, the definition is extensive. While an explanatory and restrictive definition confines the meaning of the word defined to what is stated in the interpretation clause, so that wherever the word defined is used in the particular statute in which that interpretation clause occurs, it will bear only that meaning unless where, as is usually provided, the subject or context otherwise requires. . . . . . . . " (Emphasis added ). 8 Rule 1 (b) of the Rules which defines the expression "high Court" to mean "patna High Court" opens with the expressions "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". In that view of the matter, it has to be held that the expression "high Court" used in the different rules have not to be given restricted meaning in terms of the definition given in 1 (b) (iv) but meaning in context of the rule concerned. In that view of the matter, it has to be held that the expression "high Court" used in the different rules have not to be given restricted meaning in terms of the definition given in 1 (b) (iv) but meaning in context of the rule concerned. From a bare reference to the different rules it shall appear that if the expression "high Court" used in those rules are interpreted to mean the "patna High Court", it will create anomalous position. Rule 6 (b) while prescribing the requisite qualifications says that a canditate must "be a graduate in Law of a University recognised by the Governor or a Barister-at-Law or a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, or an Attorney oh the rolls of a High Court, or possess other educational qualifications which the Governor may, after consultation with the High Court and the Commission, decide to be equivalent to those prescribed above" (emphasis added ). In the aforesaid clause (b) of Rule 6 "a High Court" as well as "the High Court" have been used. There cannot any dispute that where "the High Court" has been used it means Patna High Court because the Governor in consultation with the high Court and the Commission has to decide any other educational qualification to be equivalent to those prescribed. But if the expression "a High Court" is also interpreted to mean "panta High Court", it will lead to an anomalous and absurd position. It cannot be said that in same clause (b) of Rule 6 at one place "a High Court" has been used whereas at another place "the High Court" has been used without any significance. As such "a High Court" in the context it has been used in Rule 6 (b) shall mean any High Court. Similarly, Rule 9 (i)requires the candidate Jo submit evidence in form of a certificate that he was "an attorney on the rolls of High Court". Again here the expression "a High court" shall not mean only Patna High Court" but any High Court. The expression "a High Court" in the context in which it has been used in Rule 6 (b)and Rule 9 (i), it has to be given an extended meaning in context in which it has been used. Again here the expression "a High court" shall not mean only Patna High Court" but any High Court. The expression "a High Court" in the context in which it has been used in Rule 6 (b)and Rule 9 (i), it has to be given an extended meaning in context in which it has been used. The framers of the rule keeping that thing in view while defining the different expressions in Rule 1 (b) qualified by saying that the meanings given in those definition shall be given unless there was anything repugnant in the subject or context. 9. Now coming to the relevant clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 9 (iv) it may be pointed out that if the expression "high Court" used in clause (a) was to mean only "the Patna High Court" then there was no necessity to say "in the case of a candidate who has ordinarily practised in the High Court, from the Registrar of that court" (emphasis added ). The framers of the rule could have used the expression "the High Court" instead of "that court". In other words, that court pre supposes the existence of more than one High Court. In my view, the expression "the High Court" used in Rule 9 (vi) clause (a) has also to be given an extended meaning to inclde even High Courts other than the Patna High Court. So far clause (b) of Rule 9 (vi) which relates to the candidates ordinarily practising in courts subordinate to the High Court, the same extended meaning has to be given otherwise it will lead to an anomalous position inasmuch as a candidate practising in High Courts other than the Patna High Court become eligible to be considered for the appointment to the Bihar Judicial Service but those practising in the courts subordinate to such High Courts shall be debarred from being considered for such appointments. As such clause (b) of Rule 9 (vi) has also to be interpreted to mean courts subordinate to Patna High Court or any other High Court. 10. On behalf of the respondents. It has been rightly pointed out that if clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 9 (vi) interpreted to mean only "the Patna High Court" the validit y of that rule shall itself be in jeopardy inasmuch as it can be urged that they are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 10. On behalf of the respondents. It has been rightly pointed out that if clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 9 (vi) interpreted to mean only "the Patna High Court" the validit y of that rule shall itself be in jeopardy inasmuch as it can be urged that they are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It need not be pointed out that the effect of the restrictive interpretation shall be that all such persons who have not practised within the State of Bihar are disqualified from applying for considerations for appointment in the Bihar Judicial Service. Article 16 guararl-tees equal opportunity to all citizens in matters relating to the employment or appointment to any office under the State. It says that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, shall be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State, Under Article 16 (3) only Parliament has been vasted with power to make any law prescribing in regard to a class or classes of employ ment or appointment to an office within a State prescribing any requirement as to residance with in that State prior to such employment or appointment. This power cannot be exercised by a rule framed under Article 234 of the constitution. 11. In the case of Pandurangarao V/s. Andhra Pradesh Public Service commission, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 268, a controversy has arisen in connection with the appointment to the Judicial Service in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The relevant rule framed under Article 234 of the constitution provided a special qualications and said that no person shall be eligible for appointment to the post of District Munsif unless he possesses the qualifications specified in that rule. One of the qualifications so prescribed amongst others was that the applicant must be practising as an Advocate of the High Court. The expression "the High Court" in the context of the rule was interpreted to mean "andhra pradesh High Court". Thereafter it was held that asthe rule had introduceds a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and as the said classification is irrational inasmuch as there was no nexis between the said classification and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant rule it was held to be unconstitutional and ultra vires. Thereafter it was held that asthe rule had introduceds a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and as the said classification is irrational inasmuch as there was no nexis between the said classification and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant rule it was held to be unconstitutional and ultra vires. In my view, if the expression "the High Court" used in Rule 9 (vi) (a) and (b) is interpreted to mean "the patna High Court" it will not only amount to shutting the eyes to the expression "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" used in Rule l (b)which precedes the definition of the High Court, but it shall also make Rule 9 (vi) (a) and (b) vulnerable on the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that a provision of an act or Rule should be so interpreted as to give full effect to the different pro-visions of the Act and the Rule and not to render it invalid unless there is no escape from such a situation except to declare it invalid. In the instant case, in my view, if the expression "high Court" is interpreted in the context in which it has been used in Rule 9 (vi) (a) and (b) it shall mean and include even a high Court other than Patna High Court. As such the appointment of the respondents cannot be declared invalid on the ground that they did not produce a certificates along with their applications showing that they had practised for the requisite period either in the Patna High Court or any court subordinate thereto. 12. It was then submitted on behalf of the petitioners, who were applicants for the posts aforesaid, that still several posts are lying vacant against which the cases of the petitioners and others can be considered. It was pointed out that many candidates who had been selected and appointed either did not join or having joined have later resigned. This court in connection with the appointment of the Munsif earlier has observed that it will be a rational rule to fill up all the vacancies available till the last day of the interview of the batch appearing at the competitive examination in question from the suitable candidates of that examination. This court in connection with the appointment of the Munsif earlier has observed that it will be a rational rule to fill up all the vacancies available till the last day of the interview of the batch appearing at the competitive examination in question from the suitable candidates of that examination. Accordingly, we direct the respondents to fill up the vacancies which had occurred upto the last day of the interview held of the candidates appearing at the 21st Judicial Service Competitive Examination, if suitable candidates who had appeared at the said examination are available. However, I make it clear that before the cases of such candidates are considered by the State Government their names must have been recommended by the commission. If necessary, the State Government may require the Commission to forward names of more suitable candidates in order of merit who had appeared in the aforesaid 21st Judicial Service Competitive Examination for being appointed against the vacancies which have not yet been filled up. Subject to the directions aforesaid, this application is dismissed. Application dismissed.