ORDER Chettur Sankaran Nair, J. 1. Petitioner was concurrently found guilty by the courts below, of offences punishable under S.279, 337, 338 and 304(A) IPC. It was found that the petitioner drove mini lorry KET 2793 at or about 10-20 P. M. on 6-8-1982 in a rash and negligent manner causing injuries to PWs. 6, 7 and one Sukumaran Nair, and causing the death of one Sivanandan. Another lorry KRE 1864 was parked on the road and PW-7 was standing on the platform of the lorry and PW-8 in front of it. Accused, the evidence shows, came like a hurricane and hit the other lorry, pushing it forward causing it to run over. PW-8 and throwing PW-7 off, injuring both. Cabin of the mini lorry was dented and smashed, injuring Sukumaran Nair and Sivanandan, who were in the cabin. The door of the mini lorry flew open due to the violent impact, and P.Ws.2 and 3 saw the accused falling out through the right side door (driver's door). They took the injured and nursed them and gave them water, Sivadandan died. PWs 1 to 4 and 6 to 8 speak to the occurrence while PW12, owner of the mini lorry says that the accused was the driver. PW22 Motor Vehicle Inspector inspected the Vehicle and issued Ext. P15 certificate, noticing that the mechanical condition was good. 2. Court of Session relying on the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 12 found that the accused was the person who drove the mini lorry at the material time. Rashness was found based on the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and the other attendant circumstances. The violent impact, the fact that the parked lorry was pushed ahead, the width of the road and visibility, were noticed as circumstances relevant, to find rashness. 3. Counsel for petitioner assails the findings of fact. He would say that the other lorry was reversed in a careless way, and that this was the cause of accident. This argument has only to be noticed, to be rejected. Were it so, PW-8 who was infront of the lorry, could not have been injured. The facts clearly indicate that the mini lorry came at a tempestuous speed and rammed into the parked lorry, causing the carnage. Fanciful possibilities have no place in a criminal trial and flights of fancy, cannot masquerade under the guise of reasonable doubts. Were it so, PW-8 who was infront of the lorry, could not have been injured. The facts clearly indicate that the mini lorry came at a tempestuous speed and rammed into the parked lorry, causing the carnage. Fanciful possibilities have no place in a criminal trial and flights of fancy, cannot masquerade under the guise of reasonable doubts. Criminal trial is not a fairy tale, and exaggerated devotion to doubts can defeat the raison detre of criminal law. The object of Criminal Law is not crime escape, but the stamping. out of criminal enterprise if possible, in the words of Parker Chief Justice The instrument of criminal law, has a sense of accountability. "Credibility of testimony, oral and circumstantial, depends considerably on a judicial evaluation of the totality, not isolated scrutiny. While it is necessary that proof beyond reasonable doubt should be adduced in all criminal cases, it is not necessary that it should be perfect. If a case is proved too perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial if a case has some flaws, inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty men must be callously allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish and guilty man cannot get away with it because truth suffers some infirmity when projected through human processes. Judicial quest for perfect proof often accounts for police presentation of fool-proof connection. He must be realistic". Inder Singh And Another v. The State (Delhi Administration)- 1978 (4) SCC 161 ). The evidence on record clearly spells out the offence, and due weight must be given to appreciation of evidence made by the trial court (State of UP v. Bharam Chand Jain - (1987) 2 SCC 641 ). 4. Besides, the limits of revisional jurisdiction are well defined. Courts have, time and time again, counselled that the jurisdiction must be exercised with circumspection. In Amar Chand Agarwal v. Shanti Bhai ( AIR 1973 SC 799 ), Supreme Court said: "Jurisdiction is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where there is a glaring defect in the proceeding or there is a manifest error and consequentially a flagrant failure of justice". In Amar Chand Agarwal v. Shanti Bhai ( AIR 1973 SC 799 ), Supreme Court said: "Jurisdiction is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where there is a glaring defect in the proceeding or there is a manifest error and consequentially a flagrant failure of justice". Again, in Pathumma v. Mohammed ( AIR 1986 SC 1436 ) and once again, in Bansilal v. Laxman Singh ( AIR 1986 SC 1721 ) - though a case of acquittal - the limits have been reiterated. Of an appellate court it has been said: "It is constantly said, although not sufficiently remembered that the function of a court of appeal is to exercise its powers where it is satisfied that the judge below is wrong, not merely because it is not satisfied that the judge was right". (Stepney v. Joffe (1949) 2 All ER 256) This is much more so in the case of the revisional court 5. A court of revision is not a third court on facts, nor a court of unlimited jurisdiction on facts. Contours are well set. Innovative liberalism and defined jurisdiction, ill go together. 6. Counsel for petitioner then had a case that provisions of S.242 Cr. PC are violated. I do not see how? Nor, do I see such a case put forward in the courts below or in the grounds of revision. Conviction is not vitiated by any illegality. Sentence, if it erred, erred on the side of leniency. The conviction and sentence are confirmed, and the revision petition is dismissed.