RAMA JOIS, J. ,, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner - Town Municipal council, Koppa, Chickmagalur district, has presented this petition praying for quashing the award made by the land Acquisition Officer, Chickmagalur, as also the order made by the Civil Judge, Chickmagalur, on a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are as follow : land bearing Sy. Nos. 81 and 83 of koppa village, Chickmagalur district, belonged to one Smt Sharadamma. The said survey numbers measure 3 acres 25 guntas and 3 acres 31 guntas respectively. They were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, at the instance of the petitioner-Town municipal Council, Koppa. After following the prescribed procedure under the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition act, the Land Acquisition Officer and the assistant Commissioner, Chickmagalur sub-Division, Chickmagalur, made an award for payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,500/- per acre which worked out to Rs. 40,700/ -. The award also directed payment of solatium allowance at 15% on the amount of compensation and also Rs. 20,323 85 towards valuation of the trees standing on the lands, in all amounting to Rs. 67,128. 85. The Deputy Commissioner, Chickmagalur district approved the award. Thereafter, at the instance of respondent-4, who appears to be a subsequent purchaser of the lands from its previous owner sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act to the Court. The learned Civil Judge, chickmagalur district, made his order on 6-2-1986. As far as the request of respondent-4 for enhancement of compensation is concerned, it was rejected. The payment of interest at the rate of 9% was also directed, which even otherwise the authorities were bound to pay from the date of taking possession of the lands. As regards payment of solatium in view of the amendment to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act requiring payment of solatium allowance at 30% on the compensation awarded, the amount of solatium awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was doubled. All other claims were rejected. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, the Town Municipal council has presented this petition. The following contentions are raised in the petition. (1) The award was invalid as it had not been approved by the Government. All other claims were rejected. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, the Town Municipal council has presented this petition. The following contentions are raised in the petition. (1) The award was invalid as it had not been approved by the Government. (2) The order of the learned Civil judge is invalid as there has been non- compliance with Section 20 (c) of the Act, as no notice was issued to the petitioner. (3) The award is also invalid as the principles of natural justice demand that the acquiring body should have been heard. ( 4 ) AS far as the first contention is concerned, it should be pointed out that in the present case the award was made by the Assistant Commissioner, Chickmagalur Sub-Division, Chickmagalur, and not by the Deputy Commissioner. In view of the proviso to Section 11 of the Act, it is only when the award was made by the Deputy Commissioner of the District, it requires the previous approval of the Government, but in cases where it was made by an officer below the rank of the Deputy Commissioner, it requires the approval of the Deputy Commissioner of the District concerned. In the present case, in Annexure-A, it is made clear that the award was made by the Assistant Commissioner, who was an officer lower in rank than that of the deputy Commissioner and the award was approved by the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 26th July 1983 (Annexure A ). Therefore, there is no merit in the first contention. ( 5 ) AS far as the second contention is concerned, the matter is covered by the Judgment of the Supreme Court in civil Appeal No. 1045/77 (N. G. E F. v. State of Mysore) decided on 31-7-1980. In that decision the Supreme Court has held that Section 20 (c) makes it obligatory for the Court to issue notise to the person or, authority for whose benefit the acquisition is made. But the question is academic, as far as this case is concerned. If the Civil Judge on reference had enhanced the compensation, there would have been no alternative than to set aside the order of the Civil Judge and remit the matter to the Civil Judge for fresh disposal of the reference in accordance with law. But, in the present case, the reference has been rejected in so far it relates to the quantum of compensation awarded. But, in the present case, the reference has been rejected in so far it relates to the quantum of compensation awarded. The only modification made by the learned Civil Judge in his order was for payment of increased statutory allowance of 30% in view of the amendment to Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act and also for payment of the interest at the rate of 9% from the date of taking possession, if the possession of the land had already been taken, which even without any express order of the Civil Judge the government was bound to pay to respondent-4 in view of the statutory provisions in that regard. Therefore, though the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner ought to have been notified is well-founded, there is no reason to interfere with the order, as no order to the prejudice of the Municipal Council has been passed by the Civil Judge. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that the compensation amount of Rs. 67,000/- had been deposited in the year 1983 itself and therefore the learned Civil Judge was not justified in granting interest even after the date of the deposit. There can be no doubt that the petitioner cannot be compelled to pay interest after the date of deposit. Learned Counsel for respondent-4 also does not dispute this position in law. Therefore, the interest ordered by the learned Civil Judge has to be computed only upto the date of deposit and not after that date. ( 7 ) THE third contention of the petitioner is that the Land Acquisition Officer ought to have given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner for whose benefit the land was being acquired and who had to meet the cost of acquisition. Under Section 20 of the Act there is a specific provision for issue of notice by the Court to which a reference is made under Section 18 of the Act, to the person or body, for whose benefit the land is being acquired while determining the reference. There is no such requirement imposed on the Land Acquisition Officer before making the award. There is no such requirement imposed on the Land Acquisition Officer before making the award. There is no provision in the Act which requires the land Acquisition Officer to issue notice to the person or body for whose purpose the land is being acquired and who has to meet the cost of acquisition The learned Counsel, however, contends that if notice to such person or body is obligatory under Section 20 of the Act, on the same analogy it should be so, in respect of the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer. ( 8 ) THERE is no dispute that whereas the Act provides for the issue of notice to the body or persons for whose purpose land was acquired, in a reference under section 18 of the Act, there is no such provision in respect of proceedings for award of compensation before the Land acquisition Officer. The petitioner, however, contends that principles of natural justice demand that opportunity of hearing should have been given to the petitioner. It is true that there is the possibility of the Land Acquisition Officers themselves awarding a compensation, which the body for whose purpose land is acquired might consider extravagant in which event such body would have no remedy at all because there is no provision under which it can seek a reference for reducing the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, a body or persqn for whose benefit a land is being acquired is entitled to say that it must have an opportunity of hearing before the Land Acquisition Officer, having due regard to the rules of natural justice. But the question is whether the land Acquisition Officer was bound to give opportunity even without the petitioner asking for it. ( 9 ) IT is well settled that rules of natural justice, by their very nature, cannot be rigid. There cannot be an invariable rule or a straight jacket formulae of natural justice. It has to vary having due regard to the text and the context of statutory provision under which the power is exercised. (See: Union of India v. P. K. Hoy, A I R. 1968 S. C. 850 and A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, A I R. 1970 s C. 150. It has to vary having due regard to the text and the context of statutory provision under which the power is exercised. (See: Union of India v. P. K. Hoy, A I R. 1968 S. C. 850 and A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, A I R. 1970 s C. 150. On a careful consideration of the matter, it appears to me, that this case bring-forth a new situation and furnishes the basis for evolving a new principle of natural justice, namely, 'right to hearing on demand'. The circumstances under which this principle could be invoked are the person concerned is fully aware- (I) that an authority is sure to take a decision in respect of any particular matter ; (ii) that the decision might affect his interest adversely; (iii) that there is no specific provision of law requiring the concerned authority to issue notice of hearing to him. In such a case the person concerned is at liberty to make a written request or demand to the authority concerned before-hand that he be intimated of the date of hearing and be heard, and on making such request, it becomes obligatory for the authority to give an opportunity of hearing and failure to give an opportunity of hearing would be a violation of the principles of natural justice. ( 10 ) I shall now proceed to apply the above principle to this case. It was the petitioner-Municipality who initiated action for the acquisition of the land belonging to respondent-4. It was fully aware that after the isssue of final notification under Section 6 of the Act, the land Acquisition Officer would issue notice to the owner of the land and other persons having an interest in the land, under Section 9 of the Act and proceed to determine the compensation payable to them. The petitioner was also aware that whatever be the amount of compensation determined by the land Acquisition Officer as payable by the Government to the land owner, it was the petitioner who had to reimburse it from its funds. The petitioner was also aware that there was no provision in the Act requiring the Land Acquisition Officer to issue notice to the petitioner calling upon it to appear on the date or dates on which the proceeding for compensation would be taken up for hearing. The petitioner was also aware that there was no provision in the Act requiring the Land Acquisition Officer to issue notice to the petitioner calling upon it to appear on the date or dates on which the proceeding for compensation would be taken up for hearing. Therefore, if the petitioner was desirous of having its say regarding the quantum of compensation, it should have sought such an opportunity by making a written request addressed to the Land Acquisition Officer. Such a written request could have been made at any time i. e. , even before or after the issue of the final notification. it the petitioner-Municipal Council had made a request before the Land Acquisition Officer that it should be heard before deciding the quantum of compensation and inspite of it the Land Acquisition officer had failed to intimate the date of hearing and consequently the petitioner had no opportunity of adducing evidence to show as to what would be the appropriate compensation to be awarded, the contention of the petitioner that the award made was in violation of the principles of natural justice would have been unexceptionable. It could have approached this Court seeking the quashing of the award even before the reference was made or decided. The learned Counsel for the petitioner frankly submitted that no such request was made by the Municipal Council. Therefore, I hold that award made by the Land Acquisition officer was not violative of rules of natural justice. ( 11 ) IN the result, I make the following order : the Writ Petition is dismissed, but, subject to the clarification made in paragraph-6 of this order. --- *** --- .