M. K. CHAWLA, J. ( 1 ) SMT. Savitri Devi, the present petitioner along with her son Naresh Kumar, since deceased, wassummoned on a complaint by respondent No. 2, Smt. Nupur,for allegedly having committed an offence punishable undersection 406 and 498-A of Indian Penal Code. During the trialthe petitioner moved an application on 17-5-1986 for the grantof exemption from personal appearance. The learned trial courtvide its order dated 17-5-1986 allowed the application andexempted her personal appearance in Court till further orders. The complainant, Smt. Nupur, on 8-9-1986, moved an application before the trial court praying for the cancellation of theexemption from personal appearance granted to the petitionerand for the issue of directions of her appearance on. every dateof hearing. This applicati was dismissed vide order dated19-11-1986. Feeding aggrieved, the complainant approachedthe Court of. Sessions by way of filing a revision petition. Shrit. S. Oberoi, Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi accepted therevision petition and modified the order of the trial court tothe extent that the general exemption from personal appearanceto the petitioner was not justified, however, her inability toattend on a particular date for any specific reason to may belooked into and granted by the learned Magistrate. It is againstthis order, the petitioner has approached this Court for settingaside the impugned order. ( 2 ) THE first and, foremost contention of the petitioner isthat the learned Additional Sessions Judge could not and should. not have entertained the revision petition in as much as theorder of the trial court was interlocutory one and a revisionpetition was not maintainable under sub-section (2) of Section397 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the discretionexercised by the learned lower court should not have beeninterferred with, which on the face of it is just proper and legalunder the circumstances of the case. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent does not seeeye to eye to the submissions made in support of the petition. According to her, the order granting exemption to the petitioner is a final order in as much as it has finally determinedthe rights of the parties with regard to their personal appearance. Her further submission is that there is no provision under which the accused can be granted general exemption, whilethe complainant in required to attend the proceedings on everydate of hearing. The discretion has rightly been exercised andthe impugned order does not call for any interference. Her further submission is that there is no provision under which the accused can be granted general exemption, whilethe complainant in required to attend the proceedings on everydate of hearing. The discretion has rightly been exercised andthe impugned order does not call for any interference. ( 4 ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for til parties atlength, I am of the opinion, that the learned Additional Sesions Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose Of therevision petition against aninterlocutory order. ( 5 ) SECTION 205 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure is therelevant provision which confers the powers on the Magistrateto dispense with the personal, attendance of the accused,. if aproper case is made out. The words, "may, if he sees reasons,so to do" shows "that the Magistrate has a discretion to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused or not, thinksfit, though, such a discretion has to be exercised judicially andnot arbitrarily or capriciously, keeping in view the circumstances of the case. ( 6 ) THE question now arises for decision is as to whetherthe order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is an interlocutory one or not. ( 7 ) AN interlocutory order has been defined as the one whichis passed at some intermediate stage of a proceeding, generally to advance the cause of. justice for the final deermination ofthe rights between the party. The Supreme Court in case reportedas Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others 1977s. C. 2185 (1) has defined the term interlocutory order, thus :"the term interlocutory order" in Section 397 (2) hasbeen used in a restricted sense and not in anybroad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders. of a purely interim or temporary naturewhich do not decide or touch the important rightsor the liabilities of the parties . Any order whichsubstantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said tobe an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision tothe High Court against that order, because thatwould be against the very object which formed thebasis for insertion of this particular provision insection 397. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for. bail, calling for reports and such other steps inaid of the pending proceeding, may no doubtamount to interlocutory orders against which norevision would lie under Section 397 (2 ). Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for. bail, calling for reports and such other steps inaid of the pending proceeding, may no doubtamount to interlocutory orders against which norevision would lie under Section 397 (2 ). Followings the observation of the Supreme Court, in myopinion, an order rejecting or accepting an application forexemption from personal attendance is and interlocutory order. However, the privilege of exemption from personal attendanceof the accused, does not impose a corresponding duty on themagistrate, not to interfere with the said liberty, if the circumtances so suggest. A bare perusal of sub-section (2) of Section205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes the pointabundantly clear i. e. . where the. Court has allowed the applicationexempting appearance or allowed the accused to appearthrough pleader, then subsequently if the Magistrate feels thatthe presence of the accused is necessary at any stage of the trialhe will be at liberty to direct their personal appearance, provided he passes a speaking order containing the reasons whythe appearance has been directed. Even this power isdiscretionary which has to be exercised judicially. ( 8 ) ONCE the Magistrate has exercised his discretion, it isnot for the Sessions Judge or for that matter the High Court,to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or toexamine the case on merits with a view to find out whether ornot the discretion has been rightly exercised or not. ( 9 ) UNDER similar circumstances in the case of Jaswant Raivs. State, 1976 Chandigarh Law Reporter 11 (2) the order of the. Additional Sessions Judge cancelling his previous order grantingexemption to the petitioner, without sufficient cause was held tobe bad. In this view of the matter, sub section (2) of Section397 creates a complete bar to entertain or take cognizance of therevision petition against an interlocutory order of the lowercourt. The Additional Sessions Judge was not Justified to modifythe order of the trial court as has been done in this case. I, therefore, accept the revision petition aside the impugnedorder and restore the order of Shri R. S. Arya, Metropolitanmagistrate dated 17/06/1987. Ordered accordingly.