Rukhmabai Bhila Marathe & others v. Valchand Balchand Jain & another
1987-09-16
A.C.AGARWAL
body1987
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - Ashok Agarwal, J.:—Taking exception to the dismissal of Special Civil Suit No. 25 of 1973 of the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dhulia, the Plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal. 2. The said suit was filed for the declaration that the Court auction sale held in favour of the defendant No. 1 was void in as much as the same contravened the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. The Plaintiff prayed for possession of the suit lands which consist of four agricultural lands situate at Villages Dongargaon and Kalmadi. A few facts leading to the filing of the said suit may be stated. 3. The original Plaintiffs Bhila Saila Marathe and Kalu Saila Patil being the original owners of the said lands had on 27th June, 1950 mortgaged the same in favour of the defendant No. 2. In a suit filed by the defendant No. 2 against the Plaintiffs for recovery of the mortgage dues, a compromise decree came to be passed on the 27th September, 1965, in execution whereof the said lands were put to sale and were purchased by the defendant No. 1 in Court auction held on the 16th March, 1970. The defendant No. 1 was put in possession on 6th November, 1970. The present suit thereafter came to be filed on the 12th April, 1973. 4. It was the case of the plaintiffs that the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”; were applicable to the said lands which had been the subject-matter of the auction sale in favour of the defendant No. 1. Neither the defendant No. 1 nor the defendant No. 2 had obtained permission for the transfer of the suit lands as provided in Rule 27 and consequently the said auction sale was void under section 31 read with section 9 of the said Act. Certain other contentions were also raised at the trial but in view of the submissions made in the present appeals which are restricted only to the validity or otherwise of the auction sale no reference to the same is made herein. The aforesaid contention regarding the auction sale being invalid was raised in paragraph 4 of the plaint and the same was denied by a plea contained in Paragraph 8-A of the Written statement.
The aforesaid contention regarding the auction sale being invalid was raised in paragraph 4 of the plaint and the same was denied by a plea contained in Paragraph 8-A of the Written statement. The trial Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the auction in favour of the defendant No. 1 was void under Section 9 of the said Act and proceeded to dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs. 5. Shri Panse, the learned Advocate, appearing in support of the appeal on taking me through the relevant evidence on record, submitted that it had not been pleaded nor proved that the defendant No. 1 was an agriculturist on the date of the auction sale in his favour. According to him the said auction sale in favour of Defendant No. 1 was void in view of the provisions of section 31 read with section 9. In order to appreciate the said contention, it may be convenient to reproduce, in so far as the same are relevant, the said provisions of section 31 and section 9 : “31(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no holding allotted under this Act, nor any part thereof shall save as otherwise provided in this section – (a) be transferred, whether by way of sale (including sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue) or by way of gift, exchange, lease, or otherwise; or (b) be sub-divided, whether under a decree or order of a Civil Court or any other competent authority, or otherwise, so as to create a fragment, without the previous sanction of the Collector. Such sanction shall be given by the Collector circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.
Such sanction shall be given by the Collector circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to any land – (a) which is situated in any area for which – (i) a Municipal Corporation is constituted under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, or the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948; or (ii) a Municipal Council is constituted under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act 1965; or (iii) a cantonment is constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924; or (b) which is situated in a notified area for which a Special Planning Authority is constituted or appointed under section 40 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966; or (c) which is situated in an area designated as a site for a new town for which a Development Authority is constituted under section 113 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act 1966; or (d) which is situated in any area specified by the State Government by notification in Official Gazette, as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development. (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) also apply to any land which is to be tansferred—......to an agriculturist or agricultural labourer, in its entirety,” “Sec. 9(1) The transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be void.” 6. Shri Panse submitted that the impugned auction sale was hit by section 31(1)(a). The lands which were the subject-matter of the auction sale were the holdings of the plaintiffs under the said Act and the same could not be transferred by way of sale, which included sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had not made an application for transfer as contemplated in Rule 27 and hence the said auction sale was void in view of section 9(1) of the said Act. 7. Shri Shastri, the learned Advocate for the defendants, however, submitted that only such transfers as would create a fragment were made void under the provisions of section 31. According to him the phrase “so as to create a fragment, without the previous sanction of the Collector” found in section 31(1)(b) would apply to both sub-clause (a) as also sub-clause (b) of section 31(1).
According to him the phrase “so as to create a fragment, without the previous sanction of the Collector” found in section 31(1)(b) would apply to both sub-clause (a) as also sub-clause (b) of section 31(1). He, on placing reliance on the preamble of the Act, submitted that the object of the Act was to prevent fragmentation of agricultural holdings and not the transfer of lands. According to him since the lands which were the subject-matter of the auction were not a fragment, the auction sale did not fall within the mischief of section 31(1)(a) read with section 9 of the said Act. 8. In my judgment, the phrase “so as to create a fragment” shall have to be read with clause (b) of section 31(1) alone and the same cannot be grafted in section 31(1)(a). However, that part of the clause which follows the phrase “so as to create a fragment” i.e. “without the previous sanction of the Collector” will have to be read both in sub-clause (a) as also sub-clause (b) of section 31(1). If the said section is so read, the said provisions would debar a transfer, sale or sub-division except with the previous sanction of the Collector. Whether the sale or transfer is in regard to a fragment or otherwise will make no difference. What sub-section (b) further prohibits is a sub-division so as to create a fragment and this cannot be done without the previous sanction of the Collector. This construction would be consistent with the provisions of Rule 27. Rule 27 as is relevant is as follows :— “Section 27—(1) No consolidated holding shall be transferred as provided by clause (a) of section 31…except with the permission of the Collector after the making an application to him in that behalf. (2) The transfer of a consolidated holding may be permitted by the Collector subject to the condition…” The aforesaid Rule would indicate that what is prohibited under section 31(1)(a) is the transfer of a consolidated holding and, therefore, the submission of Shri Shastri that it is only the transfer or sale which creates a fragment that is prohibited under Clause (a) of section 31(1) shall have to be negatived. Every statute must be construed ex visceribus actus i.e. within the four corners of the Act.
Every statute must be construed ex visceribus actus i.e. within the four corners of the Act. When construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, the Court is bound to consider other parts of the statute which throw light on the intention of the legislature and serve to show that the particular provisions ought not to be construed as it would be alone and apart from the rest of the statute. Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the statute so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. No part of a statute should be construed in isolation for the intention of the law-maker is to be found not in one part of the stature or another but in the entire enactment and that intention can best be gathered by viewing a particular part of the statute not detached from its context in the statute but in connection with its whole context. 9. Shri Shastri, however, on placing reliance upon section 31(3) and section 31(a), (b) of the said Act, contended that the auction sale in favour of the Defendant No. 1 cannot be termed to be invalid or void. The defendant No. 1 in the present case was and is an agriculturist and the entire Gats had been the subject-matter of auction sale. By introduction of section 31(a), (b) by Maharashtra Act XLI of 1977 sales or transfers in contravention of section 31 made on or after the 15th May, 1965 and before the commencement of the said Maharashtra Act XLI of 1977 were to be deemed to be valid, provided the said transfer was in accordance with the provisions of section 31 as amended by the Maharashtra Act XXXVII of 1966. The auction sale in the present case having taken place on the 16th March, 1970, the same was valid under the aforesaid provision. In my judgment, there is considerable force in the aforesaid contention of Shri Shastri and the same will have to be accepted. The plaintiff has admitted in his deposition that the defendant No. 1 had agricultural lands at Dongargaon and had pleaded ignorance whether he owned land at Songir. He has also admitted that the defendant No. 1 was now cultivating lands.
The plaintiff has admitted in his deposition that the defendant No. 1 had agricultural lands at Dongargaon and had pleaded ignorance whether he owned land at Songir. He has also admitted that the defendant No. 1 was now cultivating lands. The defendant No. 1 in his deposition had described his occupation as agriculture and it was elicited in his cross-examination that after partition he had taken to agriculture whereas his brothers took cloth business. He has six agricultural labourers and he had lands at Salwa, Shiva which admeasured 39 acres, three of which were Bagayat. In view of this evidence on record, the conclusion that the defendant No. 1 was and is an agriculturist is inevitable. If that be so, the auction sale in his favour would be protected in view of the provisions of section 31(a), (b) read with section 31(3)(iii). 10. Shri Panse, however, contended that it was not enough that the transfer should be protected under section 31(a), (b) so as to avoid the consequences contemplated in section 31(1) read with section 9 of the said Act. What was further necessary was the need of making an application for a certificate contemplated under section 31(a), (b)(2). In my judgment, there is no force in the said contention as all that sub-clause (2) of section 31(a), (b) contemplates is the grant of a certificate by the Collector after which the validity of the transfer is made final and conclusive evidence in that behalf. What is provided in Clause (2) of section 31(a), (b) is merely a rule of evidence and not prerequisite for the validity of the transfer contemplated under section 31(a), (b). The provision of section 31(a), (b)(1) is self-contained and does not require an application for a certificate contemplated under sub-clause (2) so as to render the transfer to be valid. In this view of the matter, the decree passed by the trial Court is liable to be confirmed, though on grounds different from the ones that commended themselves to the learned Judge of the trial Court. 11. In the result, I find no merit in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. Appeal dismissed.