HIREMATH, J. ( 1 ) THE second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Court of the Additional Civil Judge, Hubli, in R. A. No. 116/74 arising out of the judgment and decree of the II Addl. Munsiff, Hubli, in o. S. No. 376/72. ( 2 ) THE brief facts are that the present respondent-1 had filed H. R. C. No. 27/1970 before the Court of Principal munsiff at Hubli for eviction of the opponents therein i. e. , the present appellants on the ground under Sec. 21 (1) (h) of the mysore Rent Control Act, from the petition premises which is CIS 3152 of ward no. 3 at Hubli City. The applicant therein alleged that he had purchased the suit property on 25-4-1959 from the heirs of davoodsab Sudaraji opponent No. 1 on 25-4-1969. There was an agreement that opponent-1 should pay a rent of 24/- per month. Opponent-1 denied title of the said Davoodsab Sudaraji to the petition premises. Notice was issued before filing the petition. The opponent contended that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them and denied that the property bearing CTS No. 3152 belongs to them. That Laxman murkote husband of opponent-1 and the father of opponents-2 to 4 were in need of money. They executed an ostensible sale deed in favour of Davoodsab Sudaraji ; that it was in the nature of mortgage and opponent-1 and her husband had purchased the property from Laxman danappa Bhingekar dated 23-2-1960 and therefore they were residing in the suit property as owners. They thus challenged the competence of the petitioner to approach the court under the Rent Control act for eviction. Having considered these rival contentions the learned Munsiff directed by his order dated 17-1-1971 the applicant add the opponents to establish their rights in such manner as they found it possible to do so in a properly instituted suit by approaching the competent civil court, though it was competent for the H. R. C. court to decide the status of the parties unless it was so complicated as not to enable it to decide the HRC court may order. These facts are not challenged by the parties. ( 3 ) IN pursuance of this direction the present respondent-1 filed 0 S. No. 367/ 1972 before the Munsiff Court, Hubli. These facts are not challenged by the parties. ( 3 ) IN pursuance of this direction the present respondent-1 filed 0 S. No. 367/ 1972 before the Munsiff Court, Hubli. and contended that the present appellant is a tresspaser ; that he was in possession of the property without any right or title. He had denied his title and therefore sought declaration of his title and also actual possession of the property from the present appellant. In the written statement defendant-1 i. e. , the appellant raised some contentions as before the hrc court. The Trial court found that the respondent's title was established and at the same time found that the appellant is the tenant over the suit property and not a trespasser. But in view of the prayer made it declared that the plaintiff therein was entitled to recover Rs. 864/- as past mesne profits and also directed to hand over possession of the property to the plaintiff. The appeal preferred before the first appellate court failed. Now the appellant-tenant has preferred the second appeal. ( 4 ) IN second appeal, it is mainly contended that termination of tenancy by forfeiture under Sec. 111 (g) of the transfer of Property Act was not applicable because the disclaimer of title of plaintiff by defendant was not bona fide. Even assuming that the appellants are tenants of respondent they cannot be evicted by the civil court in asmuch as sec. 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control act gives protection to the tenant and decree for eviction cannot be passed unless there is proof of any of the grounds enumerated in the H. R C. Act. Since there is absolutely no proof under sec. 21, the plaintiff is not entitled for decree for possession. This is all the contention in the appeal. ( 5 ) DURING admission, the following substantial question of law has been set down on the arguments advanced at that time. Since there is absolutely no proof under sec. 21, the plaintiff is not entitled for decree for possession. This is all the contention in the appeal. ( 5 ) DURING admission, the following substantial question of law has been set down on the arguments advanced at that time. "in the circumstances of the case, whether the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to maintain the suit for possession without terminating the tenancy by issuing notice under Sec. 111 (g) of transfer of Property Act ?"this in my view is besides the point for the simple reason that once there is a proof or admission about the status of the appellant that he is a tenant then Transfer of Property Act is not attracted, as admittedly Hubli City is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Though in para-9 of the appeal memo this contention has been raised perhaps it was not canvassed at the time of admission. That does not however preclude this Court now to consider this aspect of the matter. While the appellant's counsel maintains that there is lack of jurisdiction for the civil Courts to order eviction of the appellant the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 Sri B. V. Jiggini has urged that the present appellant is estopped from raising a contention that he is not a tenant and therefore it is the rent Control Court which has jurisdiction. He has referred to some decisions to support his point. ( 6 ) IN the case of Eranna and anr. v. S. Bheemanna and ors. (1968 (1) Mys. L. J. page-188), the facts though not similar were with regard to Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act. Sec. 3. The courts below, as the report reads recorded a finding that what was payable by the defendant therein was land revenue and not rent and that finding which is a finding on question of fact is not open to discussion in this Court. When the plaintiff made an application U/s. 30 of the mysore Tenancy Act, to the Tahsildar the contention raised by the defendant was that what was payable was land revenue and not tent and he succeeded in their contention with the result, the application presented to the Tahsildar was dismissed. When the plaintiff made an application U/s. 30 of the mysore Tenancy Act, to the Tahsildar the contention raised by the defendant was that what was payable was land revenue and not tent and he succeeded in their contention with the result, the application presented to the Tahsildar was dismissed. But when the plaintiff filed suit in the civil Court defendants reversed the position which they took before the Tahsildar and contended that Sec. 30 of the Tenancy Act was a bar to the Tenancy Act. Thus they were precluded from urging it. On analogy, it is urged that the appellant cannot now say that he is a tenant, when at one stage he contended that he is not a tenant. He is clearly estopped from saying so under Sec. 115 of the Evidence act. ( 7 ) SECONDLY, in a decision of the andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of amritlal N. Shah v. Alia Annapurnamma ( AIR 1959 AP 9 ), it was held that in proper cases the Court is entitled to take note of subsequent events and grant reliefs to the parties accordingly. Ordinarily the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the time of the date of the institution. In that case there was a cinema theatre involved and the provisions of madras Buildings Lease and Control Act, sec. 2 were involved. The lease was a composite lease of the talkies house necessary to run the cinema. The definition of building in the Act included furniture and not fittings and therefore the lessee was not a tenant entitled to benefits of the Act. When an application for eviction U/s. 7 of the said Act was rejected on the tenant's plea that premises did not fall within the definition of a building and he was not a tenant within the meaning of the Act, it was not open to him to turn round and contend in the subsequent civil suit for eviction that the lease relates to a building within the meaning ot the act and that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. A tenant cannot be allowed to take in-consistent positions. The principle of estoppel will apply even on the footing that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. A tenant cannot be allowed to take in-consistent positions. The principle of estoppel will apply even on the footing that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. ( 8 ) IN my view these decisions are not attracted in the instant case for the simple reason that the appellant throughout maintained that he was not the tenant and contended that he was in possession of the property in his own right claiming under some other sale deed set up by him. Therefore, there is no question of the tenant taking inconsistent stands as was available in the case before the andhra Pradesh High Court. The plaintiff contended in the HRC case that the defendant is a tenant which the defendant denied. Therefore, he came to the civil court to get his title established. The civil court while discussing the evidence on record led by the plaintiff negatived the contentions of the defendant-appellant that he was the owner of the property and gave a clear finding that he is a tenant. Therefore it is not estoppel against the tenant to say that he cannot contend now that he is a tenant. It is a clear finding of the Civil Court that he is a tenant which is again un-challenged and has become concluded now as a finding of fact. ( 9 ) WHEN there is such a finding of the court whether the civil court could have jurisdiction to order his eviction is the next point for consideration. In this behalf the decision of our High Conrt in the case of Md Khasim v. Md. Moinud- din and Ors (1974 (1) Kar. L. J. 316) rendered by Justice Malimath (as His Lordship then was) is quite helpful and I respectfully agree with the observations of His Lordship. It was found that the plaintiff averred that he had purchased the property from the original owner, and defendant-3 who was a tenant under the original owners, had forfeited his tenancy rights as he disclaimed plaintiff's title and set up title in himself and therefore the defendant-3 was in possession as a trespasser and sought for a decree of title and possession. It was held that the third defendant, as a person in possession of the premises after the determination of the lease in his favour was also tenant for the purpose of the Act and the plaintiff whose title has been established was entitled to rent and therefore he was the landlord within the meaning of the act. Hence the bar under the first part of sub-sec. 1 of Sec. 21 of the Act was attracted and no decree to recover possession could be made in favour of the plaintiff Since the bar contained U/s. 21 (1) is against the court if the Court comes to the conclusion that it is required to make a decree in favour of the landlord and against the tenant in respect of a premises to which the Act applies, the bar contained in Sub-sec. 1 gets attracted whether or not the defendant has taken the plea that he is a tenant of the premises. ( 10 ) THESE observations are clearly apposite to the case at hand because irrespective of the contention of the appellant the bar contained under sub- sec. 1 of sec. 21 as His Lordship puts it gets attracted whether or not the defendant has taken the plea that he is a tenant of the premises. Nextly, in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Rao v. Cecilia Pereir a (I L. R. 1987 (Karnataka) 450) of the edition dated 1-2-1987. It was clearly held that provisions of Rent Control legislation being beneficial to the tenant have to be given a liberal interpretation. The question was whether in view of sub-sec. 1 of sec. 21 of the Act, the decree that was obtained before applicability of this Act to a particular area was executable in view of the subsequent or supervening event of the Rent Act being made applicable to the area. The Supreme Court found that the Act clearly applied and unless the provisions of S. 21 (1) of the act were complied with the decree will not be executed. ( 11 ) IN my view the position is quite clear in this case as well. The Supreme Court found that the Act clearly applied and unless the provisions of S. 21 (1) of the act were complied with the decree will not be executed. ( 11 ) IN my view the position is quite clear in this case as well. Both the courts below found that the appellant is the tenant and when the HRC court directed the parties to settle their rights in a properly constituted suit in a civil court it perhaps meant that after the decision if it is found that the opponent before it was a tenant perhaps it could assume jurisdiction. This is precisely the scope of such a reference and mainly it was the duty of the landlord to get his title decided as it was seriously disputed by the tenant. In that view of the matter, the courts below were clearly in error in making a deciee for possession having found that the appellant is a tenant in an area where rent Control Act; is applicable. Therefore, that part of the decree awarding possession to respondent-1 cannot be maintained and is liable to be set aside. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is partly allowed maintaining the decree of declaration of title of the first respondent, setting aside that part of the decree awarding actual possession to respondent-1. In case the tenant has been dispossessed in pursuance of decree of the courts below he is entitled to restitution leaving the parties to their remedy under the law. Parties to bear their respective costs. --- *** --- .