Achyut Kumar Banerjee v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL — 1987 DIGILAW 307 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal (F. M. A. T. . No. 3759 of 1986)has been heard along with another appeal being F. M. A. T. No. 2874 of 1986. The writ petitioners Sri Achyut Kumar Banerjee and others are the appellants in F. M. A. T. No. 3 759 of 1986 and the said appeal arises out of the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge on 4th December, 1986 in Civil Rule No. 4711 (W) of 1982 dismissing the writ petition made by the appellants Sri Achyut Kumar Banerjee and others. The other appeal viz. F. M. A. T. No. 2874 of 1986 has been preferred by the State of West bengal and other State Respondents against an interim order passed on 6th September, 1986 in the aforesaid writ petition. As in view of the dismissal of the writ petition in C. R. No. 47ll (W) of 1982, F. M. A. T. No. 2874 of 1984 arising out of an interlocutory order had practically lost its importance and became infructions, the said F. M. A. T. No. 2874 of 1986 was not heard separately and the same is disposed of along with other appeal being F. M. A. T. No. 3759 of 1986. For the purpose of appreciating the disputes involved in F. M. A. T. No. 3759 of 1986, some salient facts are required to be stated. 2. THE writ petitioners Sri Achyut Kumar Banerjee and eight others are employees of this High Court and they are holding the posts of Assistant Registrars (Court) in the Appellate Side. All these writ petitioners have obtained' LL. B. Degree and under the existing rules of the University" they had to study the LL. B. Course after their graduation. The writ petitioners have contended that the degree in law of the University of Calcutta since obtained by the writ petitioners is a post graduate degree and such post graduate degree in law is "not an essential and requisite qualification for being appointed to the post of Assistant Registrar (Court) but for efficient discharge of the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Registrar (Court), such post graduate degree in law is undoubtedly an added qualification for better and efficient discharge of their duties and functions. The Government of West Bengal, Finance Department, Audit branch had issued a Memorandum being No. 10035-F, dated 21st October, 1974 by which the Government after considering the recommendation submitted by a Committee which was constituted to give a report as to the alleged anomalies of pay scale of the State Government employees inter alia decided that in order to attract men of quality and also for removing frustration, six incremental benefits would be given to those who would obtain post graduate degree of recognised University subject to certain conditions as mentioned in paragraph 2 (iii) of the said memorandum and a copy of such memorandum has been annexed to the writ petition being Annexure 'c'. 3. IT is the case of the writ petitioners that after coming to learn of "the aforesaid memorandum issued by the Finance Department, government of West Bengal, the writ petitioners made a joint representation on 4th March, 1977 for getting six incremental benefits as they have not got such incremental benefits earlier although they are entitled to get such benefits on the basis of such memorandum. The Chief Justice of this Court thereafter forwarded the said Joint representation to the. Government of West Bengal, Judicial Department. 4. SOME employees of the State Government, viz. Bholanath Khasnobis and others also claimed such incremental benefits on the basis of the said memoransum dated 21st October, 1974 and they moved a writ petition before this Court for appropriate redress and mandates on the State government for giving incentive increments and a Rule being Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 was issued by this Court on the writ petition presented by the said Bholanath Khasnobish and others. The petitioners came to know that in view of the pendency of the said Civil Rule before this court, the representation of the petitioners since forwarded by the Chief justice to the Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal for approval had been kept pending and the petitioners thereafter got themselves added as parties respondents in the said Rule by making an application to that effect. The said Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 (Bholanath khasnobis and Ors. v. S. Mukherjee and Ors.) was finally heard and disposed of by Mr. The said Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 (Bholanath khasnobis and Ors. v. S. Mukherjee and Ors.) was finally heard and disposed of by Mr. Justice T. K. Basu (as His Lordship then was) and by the judgment and order dated 29th April, 1981, the said Rule was made absolute and it was held inter alia that the petitioners in the said writ petition and also the added respondents viz. the said Assistant Registrars (Court)were entitled to six incremental benefits in terms of the Finance Department memorandum dated 21st October, 1974. The State of West Bengal and other State Respondents to the said Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 preferred an appeal in this court against the judgment passed in Civil rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 and the said appeal was numbered as F. M. A. T. No. 1990 of 1981. The State of West Bengal and other appellants however chose not to imp lead the added respondents in the said Rule viz. the Assistant Registrars (Court) in the said F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981, although by the judgment passed in Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 the said Assistant Registrars (Court) were given six incremental benefits in terms of the Finance Department Memorandum dated 2 1st October, 1974. In the said F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981, an application for stay of the operation of the judgment passed in the writ proceeding was also made by the State of West Bengal and other appellants and the said stay application appeared before a Division Bench presided over by Mr. Justice M. M. Dutt (as His lordship then was) on 30th November, 1981 and a submission was made before the Appeal Court on behalf of the said added respondents in the said writ proceeding viz. the Assistant Registrars (Court) that they had not been made parties in the appeal preferred by the State of West Bengal and others although they are necessary parties in the appeal. The said division Bench was pleased to hold that as the added respondents in writ proceeding had not been made parties, the said appeal (F. M. A. T, no. 2290 of 1981) stood barred by limitation against the said added respondents. The said division Bench was pleased to hold that as the added respondents in writ proceeding had not been made parties, the said appeal (F. M. A. T, no. 2290 of 1981) stood barred by limitation against the said added respondents. No interm order; however, was passed in the said appeal but the court of Appeal had directed that any benefit that might have been received by the writ petitioners in terms of the judgment passed in the said writ proceeding would abide by the result of the appeal and in the event, the State of West Bengal would succeed in the appeal, the benefits that would received by the petitioners in the writ proceeding would be adjusted against their future pay and allowances. The appellant Court Officers have contended that despite the aforesaid fact of specific submission made on behalf of the added respects viz. the Assistant Registrars (Court) that they had not been impleaded as parties in the said appeal, although they were parties in the writ proceeding and were benefitted by the judgment passed in the writ' proceeding and although the Appeal Court had observed in disposing of the application for interim order made in the appeal that the appeal stood barred by limitation against the said added respondents in the writ proceeding, the State of West Bengal and other appellants chose not to take any steps for bringing the said added respondents in the appeal by making an application for addition of the said added respondents; as parties in the said appeal after condonation of delay, as a result, the added respondents had never been affected by the adjudication made in the said F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981. 5. AS the concerned authorities failed to give effect to the judgment passed in the said Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 by giving incremental benefits to the said Court Officers another writ petition was moved by them before this court for a mandate to give effect to and/or implement the order passed m the earlier writ proceeding viz. Civil Rule No. 19816 (W)of 1975 and on such, writ petition a Rule being Civil Rule No. 4711 (W)of 1982 was issued and interim order was passed in the said Civil Rule directing the authorities to grant six incremental benefits to the writ petitioners viz. ' the said Assistant Registrars (Court. Civil Rule No. 19816 (W)of 1975 and on such, writ petition a Rule being Civil Rule No. 4711 (W)of 1982 was issued and interim order was passed in the said Civil Rule directing the authorities to grant six incremental benefits to the writ petitioners viz. ' the said Assistant Registrars (Court. As the authorities failed and neglected to give the said incremental benefits to the writ petitioners, an application for contempt of court was also filed by the said Court Officers, whereupon a Rule being Civil Rule No. 6853 (W) of 1983 was issued. The said contempt Rule was disposed of by the learned trial Judge directing the Registrar, Appellate Side of this Court to draw bills in respect of arrears of increments of the writ petitioners and send the same to Pay and Accounts Section within one week from the date of the order. Thereafter, the respondents to the said Civil Rule No. 47ll (W)of 1982 viz. the State of West Bengal and other State Respondents made an application for vacating the interim order dated 7th June, 1982 passed in the said Civil Rule No. 4711 (W) of 1982. The said application for vacating the interim order was disposed of by the learned trial Judge on 5th october, 1983 inter alia directing that the payment of incremental benefits would be subject to adjustment if it is found that the respondents are not entitled to the same. The State of West Bengal and other State respondents preferred an appeal against the said order dated 5th October, 1983 and a Division Bench prescribed over by the then Chief Justice Mr. Satish chandra maintained the order dated 5th October, 1983 passed by the learned trial Judge with- some modifications and the State of West Bengal thereafter moved the Supreme Court, whereupon Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10514 of 1984 arose and the Supreme Court disposed of the said Special Leave Petition without restraining the writ petitioners in civil Rule No. 4711 (W) of 1982 viz. the said Assistant Registrar (Court)from obtaining the benefits of increments in terms of the judgment passed in Civil Rule No. 1 9816 (W) of 1975. 6. THE appeal preferred by the State of West Bengal and other State respondents against the original writ petitioners Sri Bholanath Khasnobis and others (without impleading the added respondents viz. the said Assistant Registrar (Court)from obtaining the benefits of increments in terms of the judgment passed in Civil Rule No. 1 9816 (W) of 1975. 6. THE appeal preferred by the State of West Bengal and other State respondents against the original writ petitioners Sri Bholanath Khasnobis and others (without impleading the added respondents viz. the Assistant registrars (Court) came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this court and the said Appeal viz. F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 was allowed inter alia holding that the LL. B. degree of the University of Calcutta is not a post graduate degree and the writ petitioners were, therefore, not entitled to incremental benefits on the basis of the said LL. B. degree. It may be noted in this connection that as the added respondents in the civil Rule viz. the said Assistant Registrars (Court) were not impleaded as parties in the said F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981, the Division Bench in disposing of the said appeal specifically held that the judgment under appeal in so far as the same was in favour of the original writ petitioners (the respondents Nos. 1 to 5- in the said appeal) was set aside and the writ petition to that extent was dismissed by the Appeal Court. As aforesaid, the learned trial Judge by a judgment dated 4th December, 1986 discharged the said Civil Rule No. 4711 (W) of 1982, The learned trial, judge has inter alia held that although the writ petitioners who arc added respondents in" the 'earlier Rule viz. C. 'p. . No. 19816 (W)of 1975 wore not impleaded as parties in the appeal preferred by the state Government against the judgment passed in the said Civil Ride no. of 1975, the judgment passed in the said appeal being F. M a. T. No. 2990 of 1981 is a judgment in rote binding no only the parties to it but ail other persons holding LL. B. Degree desiring to claim benefit of the relevant memorandum of tire Finance Department on the tooting that they have obtained a cost graduate decree. The Seemed trial Judge has held that since the Appeal Court has -el: aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge "in C, R. No. ;98!6 (W) of 1975 inter alia on due finding that the LL. The Seemed trial Judge has held that since the Appeal Court has -el: aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge "in C, R. No. ;98!6 (W) of 1975 inter alia on due finding that the LL. B. Degree' of the' University Calcutta is not a post graduate degree and on the basis of. such degree the incremental benefits under the memorandum in question cannot be claimed, the very basis of the claim of the writ petitioners to ask for incremental benefits have been wiped out and the said decision in F. M. A. T. No, 2990 of 1981 being the decision of Division Bench, the learned trial Judge sitting single cannot override the said decision of the Division Bench. 7. IT appears that the learned counsel for the State respondents in C. R. No. 4711 (W) of 1982 had also contended before the learned trial judge that a notification dated 7th June, 1985 was issued by the Governor under article 309 of the Constitution introducing the West Bengal Service (Qualification Pay) Rules, 1985 and giving the said Rule a retrospective effect from 1st August, 1974. Rule 2 (f) of the said Rules provides for that "post graduate degree" or "post-graduate diploma" does not include any degree or diploma in law. 8. THE learned counsel for tine State contended before the learned trial Judge that the said notification issued under Article 309 of the constitution has clearly taken away the right of the petitioners to claim any qualification pay on the basis of the LL. B. degree in terms of the Finance department Memorandum dated 21st October, 1974 or any other similar order or memorandum since Rule- 5 of the said Qualification Pay Rules, 1935 has repealed ail rules, orders and memorandum inconsistent with an repugnant to the provisions' of the said Qualification Pay Rules with effect from 1st August, 1974. The trial Judge however did not make an any observation of finding to the aforesaid contention i. e. the Assistant Registrars (court) in the said civil Rule no. 4711 (w) of 1982 did not have any opportunity to challenge the aforesaid notification issued under article 309 of the constitution. The trial Judge however did not make an any observation of finding to the aforesaid contention i. e. the Assistant Registrars (court) in the said civil Rule no. 4711 (w) of 1982 did not have any opportunity to challenge the aforesaid notification issued under article 309 of the constitution. It also appears that the learned counsel for state respondents have contented before the learned trial judge that the writ petitioners being orders being framed and/or framed and /or issued by this court under the article 229 of the Constitution and as such the memorandum issued by the State government was not applicable to them ipso facto. The learned trial Judge has, however, not made any decision on the said contention on the finding that the writ petitioners not having based their claim on any Rule made by the Chief justice of this Court, the said contention did not arise for the consideration of the Court. The learned trial Judge discharged the said Rule and vacated, the interim order passed in the said Rule on the finding that the writ' petitioners were not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. 9. MR. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has contended that a judgment is binding between the parties to the proceeding. It is immaterial if the said judgment is erroneous and is liable to be set aside if a challenge before: a superior court is made against such judgment. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that it is a sound principle of public policy that once a competent court has decided a lis between the parties, a finality is attached to such lis in terms of the judgment passed by the competent Court and a party to the judgment cannot avoid the effect of such judgment unless such judgment is successfully, challenged before a superiod court either in appeal or in revision in accordance with law. Mr. Mukherjee has also submitted that a correct exposition of law given by a competent court in a later proceeding cannot invalidate the judgment passed by a competent court on the ground that the law as decided by such competent court in the lis involved before such Court has been decided differently by a superior court. Mr. Mukherjee has also submitted that a correct exposition of law given by a competent court in a later proceeding cannot invalidate the judgment passed by a competent court on the ground that the law as decided by such competent court in the lis involved before such Court has been decided differently by a superior court. Unless such finality is attached on a decision given by a competent court, the fate of litigation cannot but remain, in uncertainty which cannot be accepted as a sound public policy. Mr. Mukherjee has -submitted that instances are not rare when the Privy Council 'and/or the Supreme Court has revised its earlier decision and has laid down the correct exposition of law involved in the litigation before it. Such exposition of law becomes binding for all courts in India and governs the future course of litigation but the judgment made in earlier proceedings by a competent court by following a principle of law which stands overruled by the subsequent decision of Privy Council or Supreme Court do not and cannot become illegal and not operative. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that the present appellants were added as parties in the writ proceeding where the original writ petitioners, namely, sri Bholanath Khasnobis and others have contended before this court in the Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction that on the basis of the accepted government Policy, they were entitled to get special increments on acquiring ll. B. Degree of the University because such degree was a post graduate degree of the University. The learned trial Judge disposed of the writ proceeding in favour of the said writ petitioners and also the added respondents. Such decision by the learned trial Judge becomes binding between the parties and it will be a futile attempt to contend that the decision made by the learned trial Judge in the said writ proceeding was not correct and/or the original- writ petitioners and/or the added respondents were not entitled to get such increments in the basis of the LL. B. Degree obtained by them from the University of Calcutta. Mr. B. Degree obtained by them from the University of Calcutta. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that the Stave of West Bengal and others who were bound by the said decision of the learned trial Judge in the said writ proceeding preferred an appeal for the purpose of getting the judgment pased by the learned trial Judge set aside but in doing so, for reasons best known to the Stare of West Bengal and others, the added respondents in the said writ proceeding namely the present appellants had been left out. The said appeal preferred by the State of West Bengal and others was allowed by the Court of Appeal and the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge was set aside, but in law the effect of setting aside. the said judgment must relate to the parties' against whom the appeal was preferred and not against the others against whom no appeal was preferred. The court of Appeal was conscious of the effect of not impleading the present appellants in the said appeal preferred by the Stare of West Bengal and others in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 and it was there-fore held by the court of Appeal in the judgment dated 2nd September, 198 3 passed in the said appeal to the following effect : - " In the result, accepting the contention of learned Advocate general we hold that the term 'post graduate degree' in clause (iii) of the aforesaid Government sanction cannot mean and include ll. B. Degree and the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 are not entitled to the benefit thereof only because they possessed such a degree. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the view taken by the learned trial Judge. " The Court of Appeal therefore held : " The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order, in so far as it is in favour of the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 is set aside and the writ petition to that extent is dismissed. " mr. Mukherjee has therefore submitted that by the judgment of the Court of Appeal the order passed by the learned trial Judge was set aside in so far as the same was in favour of the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 is set aside and the writ petition to that extent is dismissed. " mr. Mukherjee has therefore submitted that by the judgment of the Court of Appeal the order passed by the learned trial Judge was set aside in so far as the same was in favour of the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 namely sri Bholanath Khasnobis and others but the said judgment of the Court of Appeal has not set aside the judgment of the trial Judge in so far as the added respondents namely the present appellants are concerned. Mr. Mukherjee has also contended that the said added respondents viz. the appellants herein did not hold any post under the District Judge because they are the employees of this Court and as such the judgment of the court of Appeal concerning, the post held under the. District Judge or under the State of West Bengal is also not binding on the present appellants. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted in this connection that the employees of this court are not employees of the State Government as such and their conditions, of service are governed under the rules framed for the employees of this Court by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that even if it is assumed that under the existing conditions of service of the employees of this Court, the Assistant Registrars (Court), appellate Side are not entitled to increments in terms of the said government Order in the absence of acceptance by the State Government of the recommendation of the Hon'ble, the Chief Justice to. give increments in terms of the said. Government Policy, the judgment of the learned trial Judge inter aim holding that the present appellants are also entitled to the increments in terms of the said Government Circular cannot cease to be operative simply because such) decision was erroneous and the Court of Appeal has set aside the very basis of the said judgment of the learned trial Judge by holding that holders of LL. B. Degree were not entitled to increments in forms of the said Government order, Mr. Mukherjee has are submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of Juthika Bhaltacharjee v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1. 976 SC page has nor laid down an absolute proposition that in no case, LL. B, degree will not be a post graduate degree. Mukherjee has are submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of Juthika Bhaltacharjee v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1. 976 SC page has nor laid down an absolute proposition that in no case, LL. B, degree will not be a post graduate degree. The Supreme Court, as a matter of fact, has also observed in the said decision that in a wider sense it a degree is obtained after graduation such degree may be treated as post graduate degree but for the purpose of giving benefits under the conditions of service el the Madhya Pradesh Government it was held that the appellant was not entitled to get such benefit of post graduate degree on the basis of LL. B. Degree obtained by her, Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that unfortunately the learned trial judge has proceeded on the footing that the judgment passed by the Court of Appeal in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 is judgment m rem and as such it is binding on all concerned even if some is not a party to the said appeal. Mr. Mukherjee has submitted that the learned trial judge has unfortunately misconceived the true import of a judgment in rem and has therefore proceeded on an erroneous footing that the judgment, passed in Civil Rule No. 19816 (w) of 1975 (Bholanath Khasnobis v. State of West Bengal and Ors.)stood set aside by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in F. M. A. T. . No, 2990 of 1981 and the said judgment of the Court of Appeal is a judgment in rem, The added respondents in civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 via. the present appellants were equally bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal. Mr. Mukherjee has referred to Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence, pages 991 and 992 - edition of 1969 of Robert Cambell. The following observation in the said treatise was referred to by Mr. the present appellants were equally bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal. Mr. Mukherjee has referred to Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence, pages 991 and 992 - edition of 1969 of Robert Cambell. The following observation in the said treatise was referred to by Mr. Mukherjee : - "how the phrase in rem came to acquire this meaning it is not very perceive - It is one of the elliptical expressions with which language abounds and which too frequently obscure the simple and easiest notions in this instance, it might be possible to restore the links which are dropped to connect res (as signifying a thing with a rein (as signifying generality),but I have nether space nor time for merely etymological researches. To mark the important purpose to which the pharse may be turned, is matter of mere moment, Although it is applied by the Roman Lawyers to a considerable number of cases, they always apply it partially. They nowhere use it for the purpose of signifying briefly and unambiguously 'right of every description which avail against persons generally'. The large expression jus in rem is not to be found in their writings. The expression was devised by the Glossators or by the Commentators who succeeded them. Seeing that the phrase in rem always imported generality, and feeling the need of a term for 'rights which avail generally', they applied the former to the purpose of marking the latter and talked of jura in rem. . . . Now, the expression 'jus in rem1 in its analogical meaning, perfectly supplies the desideratum which is stated above. For as in rem denotes generality, jus in rem should signify rights availing against persons generally. Therefore it should signify all rights belonging to that genus, let their specific difference be what they may". 10. IT has been submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that a judgment 'in rem' is a judgment which binds all men and not only the parties to the suit in which it was passed and their privies. The judgment 'in rend is the judgment pronounced by the competent court in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty, or insolvency jurisdiction and where a judgment operates as a judgment 'in rem1 it is not subject to collateral attack; while it remains in force it is conclusive not only on the persons who are parties' lost but upon all person and all Courts. Although the expression "judgment in rem" is not defined in the Evidence Act, yet it. is dealt with in Section 41. That section, however, gives conclusive effect to a "judgment of a competent court only in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction. A. judgment passed in a suit under section 92 CP. C. is not a judgment in the exercise of any jurisdiction and is not covered by section 41 of the Evidence Act. Such judgment may be relevant in a subsequent proceeding but the same will not have conclusive effect, being a judgment 'in rem'. Mr. Mukherjee has therefore submitted that the judgment of the learned trial Judge in Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 in which the present appellants were parties respondents is a judgment 'in personam' and the judgment passed by the Court of appeal in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 is also a judgment 'in personam' and the same cannot affect thee present appellants particularly when the court of Appeal has made it clear that the judgment of the learned trial judge in Civil Rule No. 19816 (W), of 1975 is set aside in so far as the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 are concerned. Mr. Mukherjee has therefore submitted that the present appellants are entitled to get the effect of the increments in terms of the memorandum referred to in the judgment of the learned trial Judge in the said Civil rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 and it is an irrelevant consideration that the basis of the judgment in Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 was found erroneous by the Court of Appeal and such basis is also not in conformity with the exposition of law made by the Supreme Court or the said Circular has been made ineffective and/or has been withdrawn with effect from 1st May, 1977 under the West Bengal Services. (Classification Pay) Rules, 1985. Mr. Mukherjee has therefore submitted that the mandate should be issued by this court directing the State of West Bengal and its officers and servants to give special increments to the appellants in terms of the circular referred to by the" learned trial Judge in Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975. Mr. (Classification Pay) Rules, 1985. Mr. Mukherjee has therefore submitted that the mandate should be issued by this court directing the State of West Bengal and its officers and servants to give special increments to the appellants in terms of the circular referred to by the" learned trial Judge in Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975. Mr. Haider, the learned counsel appearing for the State Respondents has, however, submitted that the appellants are employees of this court and they are not Government employees as such. Hence, they are not entitled to the benefit of the circular issued by the State Government for giving special increments to the holders of post graduate degree in the absence of adoption of such circular as a condition of service of the employees of this Court. Unless the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court accepts the said Government Circular and makes it applicable to the employees of this court with the concurrence of the Governor, the employees of this Court cannot automatically get advantage of a circular of the State Government which may bind the State Government vis-a-vis the State Government employees. Mr. Haider has further contended that the entire basis of the judgment of the learned trial Judge in Civil Rule no. 19816 (W) of 1975 is that the LL. B. Degree is a post graduate degree but the said question was taken into consideration by the Court of Appeal in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 and the Court of Appeal has set aside the finding of the learned trial Judge by holding inter alia that the LL. B. Degree is not a post graduate degree. The Supreme Court in the case of Juthika Bhattacharjee v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in air 1976 SC, 2534. has specially held that for the purpose of giving benefit to an employee on the score of holding a post-graduate degree, the LL. B. Degree cannot be treated as past graduate degree. Such decision by the "supreme Court is an exposition of law on the question that LL. B,, degree cannot be treated as post graduate degree for conferring any privilege in service- Such decision of the Supreme Court must be held as a judgment in rem and all parties including the present appellants are bound by such decision of the Supreme Court. B,, degree cannot be treated as post graduate degree for conferring any privilege in service- Such decision of the Supreme Court must be held as a judgment in rem and all parties including the present appellants are bound by such decision of the Supreme Court. The learned trial Judge has therefore rightly held that the present appellants though they were not parties in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981, are bound by the judgment passed in 'the said appeal and in the facts of the case, the judgment of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal in the said appeal must be held to be a judgment in rem in so far as the same decided the question as to whether or not LL. B. Degree will be treated as post graduate degree for conferring a privilege on the Government employee or the High Court employee. Mr. Haider has also submitted that the appellants are relying on the Government Circular by which the holders of post graduate degree under certain terms and conditions were entitled to special increments. Even assuming for argument's sake that the employees of this Court, though not strictly Government employees, are entitled to the benefit of the said Circular in the matter of getting special incements, the said circular stands withdrawn with effect from 1st May, 1977 in view of express provision of the West Bengal Service (Qualification Pay) Rules, 1985. If the very basis of the claim for getting increments stands with drawn retrospective by the said West Bengal Services (Qualification Pay)Rules, 1985, it will be a futile exercise to contend that the appellants are still entitled to get special increments on the strength of the LL. B. Degree obtained by them. Mr. Haider has submitted that in the special facts of the case, the benefit of the judgment passed in Civil Rule No. 19816 (W) of 1975 to the present appellants has become nonest and cannot be enforced by presenting a writ petition before this Court. He has, there fore, submitted that the learned trial Judge is justified in dismissing the instant writ petition inter alia for a mandate on the state respondents to make payment of special increments to the present appeal and the appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed with costs. Mr. He has, there fore, submitted that the learned trial Judge is justified in dismissing the instant writ petition inter alia for a mandate on the state respondents to make payment of special increments to the present appeal and the appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed with costs. Mr. Haider has also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of M/s. Shenoy and Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bangalore reported in AIR 1985 SC 621 for the purpose of contending that it is not an absolute proposition that if a party is not impleaded in an appeal preferred against a judgment passed in favour of such party, he cannot be affected by the decision made in the appeal. 11. AFTER considering the respective contentions of the parties, appears to us that the decision of this court made in the earlier writ proceeding [c. R. No. 19816 (W) of 197'5 - Bholanath Khasnobis and Ors v. State of West Bengal and Ors.) in so far as the same benefits the present appellants cannot be held to be decision without jurisdiction and as such void ab-initio. This Court in its constitutional writ jurisdiction was competent to decide the lis raised in the writ petition and issued appropriate mandate consequential to such decision on the concerned executive authorities as to whether or not the appellants were entitled to get incentive increments pursuant to a policy of the State Government as contained in the aforesaid circular dated 21st October, 1974. Such decision may be erroneous, but 'simply on that score the decision of a competent court cannot be rendered void ad initio. In our view, there is force in the contention of the respondents that a circular of the State Government to give incentive increments to its employees on fulfilment of certain terms and conditions as referred to in- the said circular, ipso facto, does not apply to the employees of this court unless the Hon'ble Chief Justice adopts such circular for the employees of this Court and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of Juthika Bhattacharjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1976 SC 2534 ) since relied on by the court of Appeal in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981, the LL. B. Degree obtained by the appellants was not treated as post graduate degree for the purpose of earning incentive increments as referred to in the aforesaid circular and the judgment passed by the learned trial judge in the writ proceeding has been held to be erroneous by the Court of Appeal in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981. But the question which requires decision in this appeal is whether or not the decision made in the earlier writ proceeding (C. R. No. 19816 (W) of 1975) in favour of these appellants automatically stands set aside because such decision was held erroneous in the appeal preferred by the State of West Bengal and other respondents against the original writ petitioners and not against these appellants in F. M. A. T. No. 2 990 of 1981. In our view, the decision made in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 does not affect these appellants and the Court of Appeal in its judgment made in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 was aware of the position that for reasons best known to the appellants in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 these appellants were not impleaded even when the fact of omission in impleading these appellants was made known to the Court of Appeal and the appellants in F. M. A. T. No. 2990. of 1981 had ample opportunity to implead these appellants in the said appeal. It may be noted that precisely for the said reasons, the Court of Appeal in allowing F. M. A. T. No. 2 990 of 1981 directed that the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge in the writ proceeding was set aside in so far as it related to the original writ petitioners in C. R. No. 19816cw) of 1975. The [judgment passed in F. M. A. T. No. . 2990 of 1981 cannot, in our view, be treated as judgment in rem thereby affect-ing the present appellants automatically although they were not parties in the appeal. In this context, the; contention made by Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the appellants, appears to be correct and we are inclined to accept the same. 2990 of 1981 cannot, in our view, be treated as judgment in rem thereby affect-ing the present appellants automatically although they were not parties in the appeal. In this context, the; contention made by Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the appellants, appears to be correct and we are inclined to accept the same. It appears that the Supreme Court in the case of Juthika Bhattacharjee was called upon to decide as to whether the appellant Juthika Bhattacharya was entitled to earn certain benefits under the conditions of service of the employees of the Madhya Pradesh government by treating B. Ed. Degree as a post graduate degree. Although supreme Court had observed in the said decision that in wider sense, a degree which can be obtained only after graduation is a post graduate degree but in the context of the circular of the Madhya Mradesh Government, it was held by the Supreme Court that B. Ed. Degree could not be treated as a post graduate degree by the appellant Juthika Bhattacharya for enabling her to derive benefits for such post graduate degree. The court of appeal in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 relying on the said decision of the Supreme Court has held that for getting incentive increments by the State Government employee on the score of possessing a post graduate degree in terms of the circular in question, the LL. B. Degree could not be treated as a post graduate degree and as such the judgment of the learned trial Judge was set aside by the Court of appeal, but as aforesaid, such decision of the Court of appeal was expressly limited to the respondents impleaded in the said appeal. In view of such decision of the Court of appeal it may be reasonably contended that the very basis of the decision of the learned trial Judge in C. R. No. 19816 (W) of 1975 was held to be erroneous so far as it related to the State Government employees but for that reason the decision made in favour of these appellants even if the same was erroneous for the self same reason does not stand automatically set aside. If no appeal had been, preferred by the State of West. If no appeal had been, preferred by the State of West. Bengal and others against the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge in the writ proceeding (C. R, No. 19816 (W) of 1975, could it be contended that the decision of the learned trial Judge was inoperative or void because of the exposition of law made by the Supreme Court in Juthika Bhattacharya's case? In our view, a Court may decide correctly or incorrectly but the decision of the competent court remains operative and binding on parties even if such decision is erroneous on the face of it. For the greater interest of society, a judgment of a competent court, even if it is otherwise erroneous, on questions of law and fact, must be made binding between the parties to the lis and the dispute between the parties covered by the decision must be held to be finally dissolved. If such finality between the parties to the proceeding is not attached to the occasion of a competent court, the judgment of the Court becomes uncertain and of little consequence. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the ease of Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 SC 803 , A Seven judges' Bench in the said decision has held that the mandate of the High Court given in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution was binding between the parties and the right's Mowing from such decision could not be taken away in the in direct fashion. In the instant case, aforesaid, the state of' west bengal challenged the correctness of the decision of the learned trial judge by preferrin F. M. A. T. No. 2990 OF 1981 but for reason best known to the said appellants in F. M. A. T. NO. 2990 of 1981. The present appellants were net impleaded. It may be contender that the state government and other respondents did not intend to challenge the applicability of the said circular in so far as the same relates to the employees of its court. In such circumstances, in our view, the judgment of the learned trial Judge in so far as these appellants are concerned, remains unaffected and the stud decision, which may be erroneous, squarely binds these appellants and the State of West Bengal and other respondents in that writ proceeding. In such circumstances, in our view, the judgment of the learned trial Judge in so far as these appellants are concerned, remains unaffected and the stud decision, which may be erroneous, squarely binds these appellants and the State of West Bengal and other respondents in that writ proceeding. The learned counsel for the State has also contented that the benefit of the circular in question for' giving incentive increments to holders of LL. B. Degree stands withdrawn with effect from May 1, 1977 in view of the provisions of the West Bengal Service (Qualification and Pay) Rules, 1981. hence, in. any event, the appellants cannot claim any benefit out of the said circular and on that score also, the claim of the appellants for a mandate on the State Respondents to release the salary of the appellants after giving effect to the incentive increments cannot be entertained and the subsequent writ petition, out of which the instant appeal arises, has been rightly dismissed by the learned trial judge. Such argument of the learned counsel for the State Respondents runs counter to the contention that the conditions of service of the State government employees do not apply ipso facto to the employees of this court who are governed by the conditions of service framed by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice. It may be reasonably expected that the Hon'ble the chief Justice in framing the conditions of service of the employees of this Court will take into consideration of the conditions of service of the State Government employees similarly circumstanced. But so long such conditions of service of the State Government employees are not adopted or made applicable to the employees of this court the same do not apply to them ipso facto. It has not been contended before, us that the provisions of the West Bengal Services (Qualification and Pay) Rules. 1981 has been made applicable to these appellants. Hence the appellant cannot be held to be affected by the said Rules. 12. IT appears to us that the Hon'ble The Chief Justice accepted on principle to give incentive increments in terms of the said Government circular to the employees of this Court and the representation of the Assistant Registrars (Court) to get such increments on the basis of the said circular was forwarded to the Judicial Department of the State government for necessary approval of the Governor. In view of the pendency of the writ petition made by Sri Bholanath Khasnobis and others for getting such increments, the Judicial Department did not consider the said representation of the Court Officers and precisely for the reason they got themselves added in the pending writ proceeding namely, C. R. No. 19816 (W)of 1975. The learned trial Judge accepted the contentions of the original writ petitioners and added respondents that they were entitled to receive increments in terms of the said circular and the rule was made absolute. In the aforesaid facts, it may be held that since the employees of this court were not at par with State Government employees, in the matter of conditions of -service, the State Government chose to prefer appeal only against the State Government employees and for such reason did not impaled these appellants although the fact of omissions in not impleading these appellants was made known to the State Government and other appellants in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981 and they had ample opportunities to impaled these appellants in F. M. A. T. No. 2 990 of 1981. It also appears to us that the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of M/s. Shenoy and Co. ( AIR 1985 SC 621 ) since relief on by mr. Halder the learned counsel for the respondents is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case the Karnataka High court held the provisions of Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into local areas for consumption, use on sale therein Act 1979 as ultra vires. Such challenge was made by a number' of writ petitioners and all such writ petitions were disposed of by the Karnataka High Court inter alia holding that the provisions ' were ultra vires. The State Government thereafter preferred an appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in one case and the hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal upholding that the Act was inter vires. In view of such decision of the Supreme Court upholding the vires Of' the Statute, question arose for decision of the Supreme Court as to whether or not Mandamus issued by the Karnataka High Court on the footing that the Act was ultravires became ineffective also in respect of the parties against which no appeal was preferred. In view of such decision of the Supreme Court upholding the vires Of' the Statute, question arose for decision of the Supreme Court as to whether or not Mandamus issued by the Karnataka High Court on the footing that the Act was ultravires became ineffective also in respect of the parties against which no appeal was preferred. The Supreme Court has held in this decision that an exposition of law by the Supreme Court is binding on all concerned and when the Supreme Court has held that the statute in question is intravires. the said decision has been a. final decision and no one could question the corrctness of that decision. Hence, the statute because operative and the eclipse prevailing for a short duration after the decision of the Karnataka High Court regarding the enforceability of the Statute became clear and as such the mandate of the High Court not to enforce the Statute automatically lost its force. In / the instant case, there has not been any exposition of law on the circular in question in its applicability to the employees of this Court. Hence the question of applying the exposition of law made by the Supreme Court could not and did not arise. In our view, in the instant case the State Government appears to have accepted the contentions of the appellants after they succeeded before the learned trial Judge and set the matter at rest but it challenged the correctness of the judgment of the learned trial Judge in so far as the same related to the State Government employee. The court of appeal in F. M. A. T. No. 2990 of 1981, therefore had no occasion to consider the cases of the employees of this Court in the said appeal. 13. IN the aforesaid circumstances this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the learned trial Judge in C. R. No. 4711 (W) of 1982 is set aside and the respondents are directed to release the salaries of the appellants after giving effect to the increments in terms of the decision made in C. R. No. 19816 (W) of 1975. Let the arrear salaries inclusive of ail allowances be paid to the appellants within two weeks from to day in view of the fact that the Court is closing for long Puja Vacation from 1 9th September, 1987. 14. Let the arrear salaries inclusive of ail allowances be paid to the appellants within two weeks from to day in view of the fact that the Court is closing for long Puja Vacation from 1 9th September, 1987. 14. IN the facts of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Mr. Halder has prayed for stay of the operation of this judgment for at least for four weeks. In the facts of the case, we are not inclined to great any stay because the appellants are employees of this court and over payment of increments if any can be adjusted against future salaries. Mr. Halder has also made an oral prayer for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against this judgment. The principle of law involved in this appeal, in our view, is well settled and it does not appear to us that any authoritative pronouncement by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is called for. Accordingly, we do not think that it is a fit case for grant of leave to appeal to the Hon'ble -Supreme Court. The oral prayer is there fore refused. Let the certified copies of this judgment be delivered to the parties as expeditiously as practicable if application for such copy is made. Appeal allowed.