Judgment :- 1. The Subordinate Judge, Kasaragod passed a decree far possession of immovable property as if it is a final decision of the case. Mesne profits was allowed without specifying the period from or upto which it was granted. Rate of mesne profits was directed to be decided in execution. A.S.130 of 1975 filed by the defendant was partly allowed by this court. The decision of this court also proceeded as if it is a final decision of the case. While confirming the decree for possession and the direction to ascertain mesne profits in execution, the claim of the defendant for value of improvements was allowed fixing the same at Rs. 65,708.41. Plaintiff was held entitled to get possession only on payment of value of improvements. Though the decree for mesne profits was confirmed, this court also did not specify the period from or upto which the plaintiff was entitled to the same. 2. Plaintiff then moved the trial court under 0.20 R.12 C.P.C. for a final decree under sub-rule (2) as if the decree already passed is a preliminary decree directing an inquiry regarding mesne profits under 0.20 R.12 (1) (c). Though the prayer was opposed by the defendant it was allowed by the trial court. On the ground that the direction to ascertain mesne profits in execution is a nullity the trial court took the stand that the decree already passed is only a preliminary decree. Though the decree did not specify the period from which mesne profits was allowed, the trial court held that the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits from the date of suit namely 20-3-1968. A commission was ordered to be issued for ascertaining mesne profits. The question whether mesne profits could be allowed to be set off towards value of improvements was directed to be decided in execution. That is the order challenged by the defendant in this revision petition. 3. It is true that under the present Code e decree for possession and payment of rents or mesne profits should be as provided in 0.20 R.12(1) and thereafter there should be a final decree as provided in sub-rule (2). But it so happened that a final decree itself was passed directing inquiry into mesne profits in execution and the same was confirmed by this court with the modification mentioned above. But it so happened that a final decree itself was passed directing inquiry into mesne profits in execution and the same was confirmed by this court with the modification mentioned above. The question for consideration at present is whether such a direction is a nullity entitling the trial court to ignore the same and proceed under 0.20 R.12(2). 4. Before dealing with the question whether the direction is a nullity or not some ether questions also arise for consideration. A final decree under sub-rule (2) could be passed only when there is a preliminary decree directing an inquiry under 0.20 R.12 (1) (b) or (c). In this case there is no such preliminary decree and no such direction to have such an inquiry in a final decree proceedings. The decrees passed by the trial court and cor firmed by this court with modification are final decrees directing inquiry only in execution. So far as the trial court is concerned the suit has been finally disposed of and it has become functus officio to entertain an application for passing a final decree. Further the decree of the trial court was superseded by its merger with the appellate decree of this court. Though this court confirmed the decree for mesne profits to be ascertained in execution, both the trial court and this court did not specify from which point of time there is liability for the defendant for mesne profits. When the prayer in the plaint is for mesne profits from the date of suit and mesne profits was allowed without specifying the time from which it was allowed, normally it may be legitimate to conclude that it was allowed as prayed for. But this Court, though it also did not specify the period from which mesne profits was allowed, said that plaintiff is liable to pay value of improvements and he is entitled to possession only en payment of the same. 5. When both the Courts did net specify the period from which liability for mesne profits arose and when this Court specifically stated that plaintiff is entitled to get possession only en payment of value of improvements, the necessary inference is that this Court awarded mesne profits only to the extent legally due. Such an inference is inevitable in order to harmonise the different provision of the decree of this Court. Such an inference is inevitable in order to harmonise the different provision of the decree of this Court. Otherwise it may lead to absurd results not intended or granted. While considering the claim of the defendant for mesne profits this Court definitely found that be is a tenant under Act 29 of 1958 in the sense that he is one who came into possession of land belonging to another person and made improvements in the bonafide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements, thus attracting the definition in S 2 (d) (iii). It was on that finding that he was found entitled to value of improvements. In assessing value of improvements also this Court modified the valuation made by the commission in order to make it in tune with the provisions of the said Act. 6. S.4 of that Act provides that every tenant to whom compensation is due shall, notwithstanding determination of the tenancy, be entitled to remain in possession until eviction in execution of a decree or order of Court. In this concretion the provisions of S.5 of Act 29 of 1958 are also relevant because under that prevision eviction could be had only after valuing the improvements and making payment. That means that the tenant is entitled to be in possession till such payment and till then his possession is legal. Mesne profits as defined in S.2(12) of the Civil Procedure Code is profits which the person in wrongful possession of the property actually or constructively received. A person who is legally entitled to be in possession until payment of the amounts due to him cannot he said to be in wrongful possession of the property. Wrongful nature of the possession is the very essence and foundation of the claim for mesne profits. When this court fixed the value of improvements end provided that eviction could be had only on payment of the same, the direction regarding liability for mesne profits without specifying its starting print could only be construed as the point of time from which the possession becomes wrongful. This court cannot be considered to have awarded mesne profits for any period during which the plaintiff was not entitled to get possession or the possession of the defendant was legal. 7. The Subordinate Judge seems to have found that liability for mesne profits is from the date of suit on 20-3-1968. This court cannot be considered to have awarded mesne profits for any period during which the plaintiff was not entitled to get possession or the possession of the defendant was legal. 7. The Subordinate Judge seems to have found that liability for mesne profits is from the date of suit on 20-3-1968. But even now value of improvements is not tendered, paid or deposited. When this court found that plaintiff is entitled to get possession only on payment of value of improvements, I fail to understand bow the Subordinate Judge found that mesne profits has to be paid from the date of suit. When the decree of the trial court has merged in the appellate decree of this court by supersession and modification and when it is clear from the decree of this court that the suit was finally disposed of, the Subordinate Judge definitely went beyond his jurisdiction when he entertained and ordered a final decree application. His finding that mesne profits is due from the date of suit and his direction to ascertain mesne profits on the trial side are definitely transgressions into the judgment and decree of this court. 8. The further strange part of it is that what he found to be a nullity and treated as a preliminary decree is the decree of this Court. When the decree of this Court awarded value of improvements and directed mesne profits to be ascertained in execution the Subordinate Judge ought to have shown the wisdom of net sitting in judgment over it. In this background let me consider the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the decree already passed is only a preliminary decree and the direction contained in it is a nullity. 9. It is true that the direction is not in conformity with 0.20 R.12 and as such irregular. But it cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and as such a nullity. Jurisdiction of the court to direct an inquiry into mesne profits is always there. In exercise of that jurisdiction the procedure adopted could be said to be wrong or irregular, because the inquiry is not a procedure in execution but one in continuation of the original suit. Such a wrong or irregular procedure adopted cannot make the decree one without inherent, jurisdiction. Court can decide rightly or wrongly. In exercise of that jurisdiction the procedure adopted could be said to be wrong or irregular, because the inquiry is not a procedure in execution but one in continuation of the original suit. Such a wrong or irregular procedure adopted cannot make the decree one without inherent, jurisdiction. Court can decide rightly or wrongly. A wrong decree passed with jurisdiction is also binding on the parties unless appealed against and rectified. Such a decree is also binding on the execution Court the duty of which it not to go behind the decree but execute the same. The only exception it in cases where on account of inherent lack of jurisdiction the decree becomes a nullity and as such non-est. Trial Court is lawys having the right to award mesne profits. The Subordinate Judge was, therefore not correct in treating the direction as a nullity and ignoring it. In Kemgam Swamy v. Subbamma (A.I.R. 1930 Madras 30) a Division Bench said: "If the court fails to conform to the provisions of 0.20, R.12, it is Impossible to hold that the defect is one of inherent incompetency. If it passes an order in contravention of that provision, It is not a nullity owing to total want of jurisdiction. That the Court is competent to award mesne profits cannot be doubted, but in exercising that undoubted jurisdiction it adopts a wrong procedure. Thus it is a case of mere irregular exercise of jurisdiction; and from this it follows that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree to which it is bound to give effect In execution." The view taken in K.A. Kunhi v. Pudiya Purayil Veluthambadi and others (AIR 1956 Madras 685): "The order of the trial Court therefore directing the executing Court to assess the mesne profits is an erroneous order. But If a decree erroneously directs mesne profits to be ascertained in execution, the decree for that reason is not a nullity and the Court of execution Is bound to execute It." A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court also took the same view in Ennada Kumar v. Sheikh Madan (AIR 1934 Calcutta 472) where it said: "Even where the decree passed after 1908 directs ascertainment of mesne profits in the course of execution, the effect of the dismissal of the previous application for execution on the ground of default does not amount to a dismissal of the claim for mesne profits and fresh application is not barred. Although the decree be a wrong decree, parties not having appealed. It is binding on the parties." 10. Bombay High Court also affirmed the same view in Lakshmibai v. Ravji (AIR 1029 Bombay 217): "No doubt under 0.20, R.12, the amount of the mesne profits must be determined during the course of the suit and an enquiry as to mesne profits under this rule is not a proceeding in execution, but a proceeding Ia continuation of the original suit. But if the Court instead of passing an order under 0.20 R.12, orders the mesne profits to be recovered In execution then the decree though irregular is binding between the parties. In such a case there Is not any want of jurisdiction In the court passing an order in contravention of 0.20, R.12. but it is merely an erroneous or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Executing Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question whether the Court passing the decree committed any error in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It is incumbent on the executing Court to ascertain the mesne profits." 11. I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed in the above decisions. It is true that there are certain decisions which held that assessment of mesne profits is a duty cast on the trial court by the Code and delegation of that duty to the execution court is therefore without jurisdiction as such a nullity. With due respect I cannot agree with those decisions even though I agree that such delegation is erroneous or wrong. But it cannot be without jurisdiction or a nullity. With due respect I cannot agree with those decisions even though I agree that such delegation is erroneous or wrong. But it cannot be without jurisdiction or a nullity. If at all any authority is required for the position of law that a tenant who is entitled to continue in possession until the last pie due to him is paid is not liable for mesne profits till such payment, it could be had from the decision in Balakrishna Pillai v. Paranjothy (1965 KLT S.N. page 13) wherein it was observed: "S. 5(1) deals with a stage upto the parsing of the decree and S.5 (3) of the Act relates to a subsequent period. When the statute is very clear that the eviction of a tenant, namely recovery of possession from him, can be obtained by a landlord only after complying with the requirements of the provisions contained in S.5(1) and 5(3) of the Act, the possession of the defendants in this case cannot be considered to be wrongful till the entire value of improvements payable to them both under sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of S.5 have been made. The mere fact that there is a direction in the decree passed on 22-6-51 declaring the right of the plaintiff to gel memo profits for the period referred to therein on deposit of the amount which lakes in both the mortgage amount and the value of improvements, as on the date of the decree, is of no consequence whatsoever provided a tenant is found entitled on adjudication to further amounts under S.5 (3) of the Act. If on an Investigation under S.5(3) of the Act, no further amounts hare been found payable by the decree-holder the position may be entirely different because the right of the decree-holder to gel possession has already accrued and the tenant has been continuing in possession without any rights. But if on an adjudication under sub-section (3), a court has recognised his additional claim, till that additional claim is also satisfied, the tenant's possession cannot be considered to be wrongful so as to make him liable for mesne profits." 12. The plaintiff-decree bolder was not entitled to file as application under Order XX R.12 (2) and the trial court was not correct in acting accordingly. The plaintiff-decree bolder was not entitled to file as application under Order XX R.12 (2) and the trial court was not correct in acting accordingly. The only course open to the decree-holder was to take out execution for getting possession on deposit of value of improvements and claim mesne profits after its ascertainment after deposit of the value of improvements. The order passed by the trial court is without jurisdiction. 13. The C.R.P. is allowed and the order of the trial court is set aside. I.A. 1459 of 1981 filed by the respondent before the trial court is dismissed. However I do not make any order as to costs.