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1987 DIGILAW 310 (BOM)

Harihar Ramchandra Sansthan v. House Allotment Officer & another

1987-09-17

H.W.DHABE

body1987
JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---This is a writ petition arising out of the proceedings under the provisions of Chapter III of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (for short the Rent Control Order). The suit premises were allotted to the respondent No. 2 by the House Allotment Officer under Clauses 23 and 24 of the Rent Control Order as per the impugned order dated 26-4-1985, the respondent No. 2 being the Government servant. The petitioner has challenged in this writ petition the aforesaid order of allotment passed by the House Allotment Officer. By the judgment in the case of (Vidharbha (Rent Control) Bhadekaru Sangh, Akola v. State of Maharashtra) 1986 Mh.L.J. 882, this Court has struck down the provisions of Chapter III containing clauses 22 to 27 of the Rent Control Order as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The impugned order is, therefore, illegal, incompetent and void as it is passed under Clauses 23 and 24 of Chapter III of the Rent Control Order. 2. It is, however, urged on behalf of the respondent No. 2 that pursuant to the aforesaid order of allotment, the respondent No. 2 is put in possession of the suit house on 15-5-1985 by the petitioner and thereafter the respondent No. 2 is also paying him the rent regularly. It is, therefore, his submission that in view of these facts, I should not interfere with the order of allotment in the instant case. He contends that the declaration of invalidity of Chapter III made by this Court cannot apply to the orders which are already executed but would apply to the orders which are only prospective. As regards the above submission, it may be seen that there is no declaration made in the aforesaid judgment that the judgment would apply only prospectively. However, what is relied upon on behalf of the respondent No. 2 is the saving made by this Court in the judgment in respect of the proceedings in which a decree or order of eviction has become final and the landlord has already taken possession of the building or any part thereof pursuant thereto. 3. However, what is relied upon on behalf of the respondent No. 2 is the saving made by this Court in the judgment in respect of the proceedings in which a decree or order of eviction has become final and the landlord has already taken possession of the building or any part thereof pursuant thereto. 3. The relevant operative part in para 42 of the above judgment is extracted below : "In the result, the challenge raised in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985 to the continuance of the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 and the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, made thereunder, on account of the existence of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, and Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954; is rejected. The impugned notification dated October 24, 1968 is declared null and void being unconstitutional. The challenge raised in Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985 to the provisions of Chapter III of the C.P. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 framed under the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 as unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is upheld and the said Chapter III is struck down as being unconstitutional. We, however, make it clear that this decision would not affect the validity of any proceedings in which a decree or order of eviction has become final and the landlord has already taken possession of the building or any part thereof, pursuant thereto....." 4. It is clear from the above observation that the saving made by this Court is in respect of proceedings for eviction initiated by the landlord. It may be seen that according to our previous view, when the tenancy was created in contravention of and not in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the Rent Control Order, such a tenancy was void and the suit was therefore filed by the landlord directly without obtaining permission from the Rent Controller on the ground that the alleged tenant was in fact a mere licensee. In many such cases, before the above judgment striking down Chapter III of the Rent Control Order was rendered, the decrees were passed and possession was also taken by the landlords. In many such cases, before the above judgment striking down Chapter III of the Rent Control Order was rendered, the decrees were passed and possession was also taken by the landlords. Since the above judgment declared Chapter III as unconstitutional and void, the tenancies created in contravention of the provisions of Chapter III were valid tenancies and, therefore, the orders obtained for eviction without securing permission of the Rent Controller would have become illegal and void. In order to protect such decrees of eviction and the possession taken by the landlord pursuant to them, this Court declared in the above judgment that their decision about the invalidity of Chapter III would not effect the validity of such proceedings in the decree when the order of eviction had become final and the landlord had already taken possession of the tenanted premises. The said saving was also applicable to the tenancies for the non-residential purposes created in respect of houses constructed after 1-1-1967 which were exempt form the application of the provisions of the Rent Control Order by virtue of the notification dated 24-10-1968 which was struck down by this Court in the above judgment because since the permission of the Rent Controller was not necessary before the above notification dated 24-10-1968 was struck down, the decrees for possession were directly obtained in civil suits and were executed which decrees would have become illegal and void but for the above saving in the above judgment 5. It is thus clear that there is no saving in the above judgment in regard to an allottee who has been in possession pursuant to the order of allotment. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has urged that since he has been put in possession, he is protected from the declaration of invalidity in that judgment. In my view, there is no such saving in the above judgment in the absence of which, by virtue of the declaration that Chapter III of the Rent Control Order is reconstitutional, the order passed thereunder is rendered void ab initio. It cannot, therefore, be held that since the possession is alleged to be taken pursuant to the impugned order it should not be declared as void. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has also raised a plea of estoppel on the basis of the alleged possession given to the respondent No. 2. It cannot, therefore, be held that since the possession is alleged to be taken pursuant to the impugned order it should not be declared as void. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has also raised a plea of estoppel on the basis of the alleged possession given to the respondent No. 2. In my view, there cannot be any estoppel against the petitioner in challenging the order of allotment because the possession is given by him not on his own but pursuant to the impugned order of allotment passed by the House Allotment Officer. However, it may be seen that even according to the facts stated on behalf of the respondent No. 2, it is clear that the petitioner had already challenged the order of allotment before the possession is alleged to be given to the respondent No. 2. The plea of estoppel raised on behalf of respondent No. 2 is, thus rejected. In the result, the instant writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of allotment dated 26-4-1985 passed by the House Allotment Officer, Akola, is set aside. The rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs in this petition. Petition allowed. -----