JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) AN order passed by the District Judge under Section 32 (7) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, for short, ("the Act") is challenged on a short ground. Indeed, only a part of the order is impugned in this revision. ( 2. ) PETITIONERs counsel, Shri J. D. Suryawanshi, submits that the District Judge had no discretion in the matter of decreeing interest because of the statutory duty cast on him under Section 31 of the Act. Counsels contention is that under the terms of the "agreement", the non-petitioner was obligated to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum on the loan advanced by the revisionist-Corporation against mortgage of his property. Therefore, the learned District Judge was duty bound to enforce that obligation and he had no discretion, in adjudging the loan and the interest due in respect thereof, to grant a decree for interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum abrogating the agreement between the parties which contemplated interest at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum. ( 3. ) THE contention advanced by learned counsel appears to me unanswerable because of what is to be read in Sections 31 and 32 of the Act. Under Sub-section (6) of Section 32, the District Judge is required to investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in so far as those provisions may be found applicable to the claim. The relevant provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, which would operate in such a case, would be Rule 4 of Order 34, Civil Procedure Code, when a prayer is made for sale of the mortgaged property. But this provision has to be read not in derogation of but in conjunction with Section 31 of the Act. Special procedure for enforcement of any agreement made with a Financial Corporation and for determination of the claim made by such Corporation is envisaged under the special law enacted in the Act and those provisions must be accorded primacy. But this provision has to be read not in derogation of but in conjunction with Section 31 of the Act. Special procedure for enforcement of any agreement made with a Financial Corporation and for determination of the claim made by such Corporation is envisaged under the special law enacted in the Act and those provisions must be accorded primacy. Under Section 31 (1), a right is vested in the Corporation to make a claim for enforcement of the terms of the agreement which the debtor has entered into with it, and indeed he is no ordinary debtor who is covered by the provisions of the Act because loans are advanced by the Corporation only to "industrial concerns". Sub-section (2) explicitly contemplates that the nature and extent of liability of an industrial concern to the Financial Corporation shall be staged in the application and requisite particulars in respect thereof shall be provided so that, in accordance with the provisions of Section 32, the application made under Section 31 may be dealt with by the District Judge. ( 4. ) I have no doubt that the statutory provisions aforesaid are meant to ensure that the finances of the Corporation are not blocked and the industrial development of the State for which the institution is set up is not halted. An expeditious trial of the application is evidently contemplated by the special procedure but what is further contemplated is the duty of the court to enforce the terms of the agreement which the industrial concern makes with the Financial Corporation. Thus, when an order in passed under Sub-section (7) of Section 32 for sale of any mortgaged property for the failure of the industrial concern to discharge its liability under the agreement, the liability adjudged shall be with respect to the principal sum as also the interest payable in accordance with the agreement, if it is so contemplated under the agreement. And, needless to say, as to what the principal sum was and also the interest under this agreement, the District Judge shall have no discretion to make out a new "agreement " for the parties ; he shall be duty bound to enforce the "agreement" which the parties had already concluded. And, needless to say, as to what the principal sum was and also the interest under this agreement, the District Judge shall have no discretion to make out a new "agreement " for the parties ; he shall be duty bound to enforce the "agreement" which the parties had already concluded. Unless the validity or genuineness of the agreement is challenged in any manner, the District Judge shall have no discretion to downgrade or scale down the liability either in respect of the principal sum or the rate of interest. This position, according to me, is reflected very clearly in the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of Sections 31 and 34 aforesaid. ( 5. ) IN the instant case, the agreement between the parties, exhibit P-1, is referred to in the impugned order, and it is submitted that in that agreement the provision of payment of the interest on the loan advanced is duly contemplated and what is also contemplated categorically is the rate of interest which is specified as the rate of 9 per cent. per annum. That being the position, I have no hesitation to take the view in this case that the learned District Judge acted without jurisdiction in down-scaling the interest and decreeing interest payable by the non-petitioner at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum. The impugned order has to be, accordingly, modified to correct the said jurisdictional error. ( 6. ) SOME authorities are cited at the Bar and I would only say that the view taken by me finds support in the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Bharat Chemical Works v. Gujarat State Financial Corporation, AIR 1983 Guj 104 , wherein it was held that the Corporations claim to be investigated by the District Judge was not a monetary claim but the application of the Corporation would require consideration of matters of "attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree". My attention is also drawn to two other decisions in which the question of payment of interest was directly in issue. My attention is also drawn to two other decisions in which the question of payment of interest was directly in issue. In M/s. Jyoti Cold Stores v. Punjab Financial Corporation, AIR 1973 P and H 38, the court repelled the contention that penal interest was contemplated under the agreement which the debtor had entered into with the Corporation and enforced the Financial Corporations claim for the enhanced rate of interest contemplated in the agreement, because, as a term of the agreement, the debtor agreed to pay enhanced rate for his default in repayment of loan. A Division Bench decision in the case of Karnataka State Financial Corporation v. Sri Nithyananda Bhavan, AIR 1982 Kar 179 , is almost to the same effect. But, in that case, their Lordships have taken note of the provisions of Section 34, Civil Procedure Code, and have held that the provision was not applicable on the ground that in respect of commercial transactions even under Section 34 proviso, the higher rate of interest of 11 per cent. as agreed, could be awarded. Both decisions evidently support the view taken by me. But I shall say that Section 34, in clear and express terms, refers to a plain and simple money decree and when a mortgage debt is enforced, even according to Sub-section (6) of Section 32 of the Act, resort to the provisions of Rule 4 of Order 34, Civil Procedure Code, would be more appropriate. Indeed, Shri Lahoti may be right in contending that under the said Rule 4 which uses the word "may", investing jurisdiction in a civil court to adjudge any mortgage debt, the interest decreed could be at, the discretion of the court. But, as I have earlier said, Rule 4 cannot be read in derogation of the provisions of Section 31 (1) of the Act. That will suffice for the day. ( 7. ) IN the result, this revision succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the impugned order stands modified partially. The property mortgaged shall be sold but the decretal dues of the revisionist as respects interest stand modified by the direction that the petitioner-Corporation would be entitled to interest as per the agreement at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum on the principal amount, from the date of application till date of realisation. No costs.