Judgment :- 1. The petitioner who was an officer of the State Bank of Travancore in the Middle Management Grade II, was reduced by way of punishment, to the Junior Management Grade I Scale I, after a disciplinary enquiry held under the provisions of the State Bank of Travancore (Officers) Service Regulations, 1979. And the imposition of the above penalty is challenged in this Writ Petition on the ground of violation of natural justice, in as much as the petitioner was denied the assistance of a legal practitioner at the enquiry, while the Presenting Officer of the Back was a trained prosecutor, an officer of the CBI 2. There were five items of complaints against the petitioner, and they related to irregularities in the manner in which the accounts of one Indo Sales Corporation was allowed to be operated, while the petitioner was functioning as Manager of the Bank's Parassala Branch. Broadly stated, the charges were two in nature: the petitioner bad wilfully violated the terms of sanction of the "cash credit leek and key hypothecation accounts", and he had also abused the "bills purchased facility", with a view to extend undue favour to the party. The Inquiring Authority found that some of the lapses in respect of the cash-credit accounts were proved; but it was of the view that the petitioner alone was not responsible for the same. The Authority however found that the petitioner was guilty of serious negligence in not having reported the true position to the Head Office in time. It was also of the view that the borrower had obtained undue benefits, but in its opinion, mala fides was not established. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings generally, but disagreed on the question of mala fides. It said: "Regarding the bills purchased transactions, the allegations have been substantiated and the inquiring authority has found that the charge of wilful abuse of this facility with a view to extend undue favour to the borrower, stands proved. I agree with this. However, the inquiring authority has also stated that no mala fides were established. It said: "Regarding the bills purchased transactions, the allegations have been substantiated and the inquiring authority has found that the charge of wilful abuse of this facility with a view to extend undue favour to the borrower, stands proved. I agree with this. However, the inquiring authority has also stated that no mala fides were established. It has been brought out in the enquiry that you bad purchased a number of cheques far in excess of the sanctioned limits to favour the party in an unauthorised manner, had freely permitted the shady transactions with full knowledge, and for extending further benefit, had delayed despatch of some purchased instruments and retained returned cheques for long periods without adjustment or collecting overdue interest ultimately. Attempts were also made to manipulate accounts, evidently with a view to hiding the borrowers liability under this head. In the circumstances of the case, absence of mala fides cannot be accepted and I disagree with the inquiring authority's conclusion in this regard". It was in the above view that the punishment of reduction was awarded. 3. Before proceeding to examine the question of law raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is also necessary to notice that he had specifically asked, before the commencement of the enquiry, for permission to engage a legal practitioner. He was told that he could engage another officer of the Bank to assist him, or a public servant, under Regulation.63(2). In other words, permission to engage a lawyer was not granted. The petitioner thereupon engaged another officer of the Bank, and it is common ground that the officer bad fully participated in the proceedings. 4. Clauses (vi) and (vii) of Regulation.68(2) read: "(vi) Where the Disciplinary Authority itself enquires or appoints an Inquiring Authority for holding an enquiry, the Bank may, by an order appoint an officer, or a public servant to be known as the "Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support of the articles of charge." "(vii) The Officer may take the assistance of an officer as defined In the clause 0) of Regulation.3 (hereinafter referred to as officer's representative) but shall not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose. Provided that where the presenting Officer is a public servant other than an officer of the Bank, the Officer may take the assistance of any public servant." And the Bank's justification for rejecting the petitioner's request for engaging a legal practitioner is to be found in the following averments in its counter-affidavit: " According to Regulation.68(2)(vii) the officer can take the assistance of an officer of the Bank but is not entitled to engage a legal practitioner for the purpose. It is further provided that where the Presenting Officer is a public servant other than an officer of the Bank the officer might take the assistance of any public servant. It was in accordance with the said proviso that an officer of the Central Bureau of Investigation who is a public servant was appointed as the presenting Officer. Under the said Regulations the petitioner bad the right to have the services of any officer of the Respondent Bank. It is submitted that there are several officers in 1st Respondent-Bank who are legally qualified and/or are well versed and experienced in conducting or defending in domestic enquiries and disciplinary proceedings and the petitioner had the right to choose any such officer of the Bank. Further, the petitioner also had the right to choose any public servant since the Bank bad chosen a public servant as the Presenting Officer. There are several public servants who are legally qualified or legally trained and having considerable experience in the matter of defending employees in the domestic enquiries or in the conduct of domestic enquiries. The petitioner wanted to have the assistance of a legal practitioner but in view of the specific provision contained in Regulation.68(2)(vii) he could not be allowed the assistance of a legal practitioner but was allowed to have an officer of the 1st Respondent Bank or a public servant. Petitioner's contention that the Officer of the Central Bureau of Investigation was a trained prosecutor is not correct. If at all, the said officer had only training in investigation of crimes and not as a prosecutor. According to the relevant provisions of the Regulation the petitioner was entitled to have any experienced and competent officer of the Bank well acquainted with the domestic proceedings or any public servant with such experience and competence as legal training and qualification. If at all, the said officer had only training in investigation of crimes and not as a prosecutor. According to the relevant provisions of the Regulation the petitioner was entitled to have any experienced and competent officer of the Bank well acquainted with the domestic proceedings or any public servant with such experience and competence as legal training and qualification. The petitioner had however chosen a Senior Officer of the Respondent-Bank itself who was quite competent and experienced in the matter of defending employees at domestic enquiries. The said officer chosen by the petitioner has also been an office bearer of the Officers' Association for considerable time apart from the fact that he has had experience of defending officers in several disciplinary proceedings." 5. The question is whether in the background of the relevant Regulations and the facts and circumstances disclosed in the case, there was such violation of natural justice or such denial of fairplay in action, as to invite this Court's interference with the imposition of the penalty. 6. Counsel for the petitioner heavily relies on the Division Bench decision of this Court in Union of India v. Karunakaran Nair (1985 KLT 680) to contend that it is an invariable rule of natural justice that where an employer appoints a trained prosecutor to function as Presenting Officer in the course of an enquiry held against an employee, the latter should also be allowed to get assistance from a legally trained person, as otherwise it will amount to a failure to hold the scales even, by pitting a specialist against a layman. I do not think that such a very broad proposition emerges from the case. In fact, the Division Bench had only confirmed in appeal the common judgment I had rendered in OP Nos. 1899/80 and 3414/81, filed by an employee of the Coffee Board, found guilty of receiving illegal gratification. R.11(8) of the Coffee Board Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules), 1967 provided that a delinquent employee could get the assistance of a legal practitioner at a domestic enquiry where the Presenting Officer happened to be a legal practitioner or where the Disciplinary Authority, having due regard to the circumstances of the cases, permitted the taking of such assistance. R.11(8) of the Coffee Board Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules), 1967 provided that a delinquent employee could get the assistance of a legal practitioner at a domestic enquiry where the Presenting Officer happened to be a legal practitioner or where the Disciplinary Authority, having due regard to the circumstances of the cases, permitted the taking of such assistance. In Karunakaran Nair's Case, the employee was refused permission to engage a legal practitioner on the ground that the CBI, official appointed as Presenting Officer was not a legal practitioner, and I took the view this was too technical an approach to the object of the Rule. I said: "Sub-rule (8) is not a mere skeleton without flesh and blood; it is a live provision inserted with a purpose. The purpose is to ensure to the delinquent employee a fair opportunity of defending himself. When the Presenting Officer is a legal practitioner, the employee should also be allowed to take assistance from a legal practitioner, for otherwise the scales will remain loaded against him. Even if the Presenting Officer is not legally trained, the nature of the charge, the evidence to be adduced and the questions arising for consideration may be such that an ordinary Board servant without any legal background may not be able to effectively handle them; and in such a case also, the delinquent can claim legal assistance. In other words, the object is to secure fairness. It seems to me that in the inquiry under consideration, the CBI officer was chosen to present the case in support of the charge for the only reason that he was better qualified than an ordinary Board servant. He might not have actually functioned as a prosecutor in court on earlier occasions, but there a no denying of the fact that all CBI inspectors are imparted training in the techniques of adjudication. In order to hold the scales even, therefore, the Board should have allowed the petitioner's request for assistance from an equally qualified person." In other words, the employee's right to be defended by a legal practitioner was upheld only by construing the relevant rule and by attempting to discover its true object by taking into account the relevant circumstances. As Tucker Q. said in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk - (1949) 1 All. As Tucker Q. said in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk - (1949) 1 All. ER 109, the requirement of natural justice "must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth". It was not suggested, either by me or by the Division Bench, in Karunakaran Nair, that irrespective of the rules governing the enquiry, the right to engage a legal practitioner should always be recognised. In fact, the only contention in the case was that the CBI official was not a legal practitioner and that R.11(8) was not consequently attracted; and what was held was that one should go by the context and object, in interpreting the rule. 7. The provisions of Regulation.68(2) which are relevant for the present case are however different; Clause (vii) specifically stipulates that the delinquent officer shall not engage a legal practitioner. He can engage another officer of the Bank, or a public servant, when the Bank's nominee is also a public servant (like a CBI officer), but never a legal practitioner. When the rule prohibits a particular course, the Disciplinary Authority or the Bank could not have adopted such a course; and the courts also cannot insist that the rule should be disregarded. 8. The decisions of the Supreme Court in C. L. Subramonian v. Collector of Customs (AIR 1972 SC 2178) and Board of Trustees v. Dilipkumar (AIR 1983 SC 109) were concerned with rules which permitted the engagement of legal practitioners under certain circumstances, like the Coffee Board Rules, and not with Rules prohibiting such engagement. In the latter case, their Lordships had said: "Now if rules prescribed for such an enquiry did not place any embargo on the right of the delinquent employee to be represented by a legal practitioner, the matter would be in the discretion of the enquiry Officer whether looking into the nature of charges, the type of evidence and complex or simple issues that may arise in the course of the enquiry, the delinquent employee in order to afford a reasonable opportunity to defend himself should be permitted to appear through a legal practitioner." That is, it all depends on the rules: where they place an embargo on engaging legal practitioners, different considerations will necessarily prevail. 9. Mr. 9. Mr. Prabhakaran for the petitioner then contends that a rule which denies the right to be represented by counsel in disciplinary proceedings is itself liable to be struck down as offending Art.14 and 21; and reliance for this contention is also placed on some of the observations in the Board of Trustees case (AIR 1983 SC 109). It is however significant that in the very same case, their Lordships had positively indicated that they were not going to the extent of holding that representation through counsel was a must in all disciplinary proceedings; as had been suggested by Lord Denning in Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association (1968) 2 All. ER 545 (CA). The passages in question only show that where the content of fairplay in action is embodied in rules, the court will ordinarily insist on proper compliance with those rules where the action is likely to endanger a person's reputation or livelihood. Art.14 only seeks to eliminate arbitrariness, and does not seek to lay down a set pattern of procedure. And when Art.21 speaks of "procedure established by law", it cannot be interpreted to comprehend a procedure prohibited by the rules. I am therefore not persuaded to hold that Regulation.68(2)(vii) is liable to be struck down. 10. Even otherwise, it is necessary to keep in mind that the rules of natural justice pertain to the realm of procedure, and procedure is often a matter of statutory prescription. It is settled law that subject to constitutional inhibitions, the rules of natural justice can be abridged or even excluded by statutes. In England, where Parliament is supreme, an enactment can expressly authorise a procedure inconsistent with the principles of natural justice. In India and the USA where the powers of the legislatures are limited by the Constitution and where certain rights are also recognised as fundamental or paramount, such statutory exclusion should necessarily stop short of imposing an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of those rights; and beyond that there is no fetter en the legislatures in delimiting rules of procedure. Even where "due process", including procedural due process, is a constitutional right as in the USA, the principle is recognised that the minimum requirements of 'due process' could vary according to "time, place and circumstances". Even where "due process", including procedural due process, is a constitutional right as in the USA, the principle is recognised that the minimum requirements of 'due process' could vary according to "time, place and circumstances". As for the right to be represented by counsel, that is considered as part of the minimum requirement in criminal proceedings but not in other areas, unless it is possible to deduce it as part of "fair hearing", from the circumstances of a given case. 11. In the case on hand, it is impossible to say that the procedure prescribed by Regulation.68(2) is arbitrary or opposed to Art.14. Where the Bank is represented at the enquiry by one of its officers, the employee can also engage one; and where the Bank employs a public servant, the delinquent is also entitled to engage one. The rule itself thus holds the scales even; and in so far as it excludes a legal practitioner from the scene, it is difficult to hold that what is prescribed is something other than "procedure established by law". 12. In Tripathi v. State Bank of India (1984 (1) LLJ 2) a bench of three judges of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of the rules of natural justice in the context of disciplinary proceedings against an employee of the State Bank; and their Lordships had observed: "it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter, the application of natural justice, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth." Two things seem to be important: one, the statutory prescription governing the procedure, and two, the suffering of some prejudice by the delinquent. The rules in this case have already been seen: they do not permit a lawyer's presence at the enquiry. And as for prejudice, no attempt at all was made at the hearing to suggest that despite the engagement of a brother officer experienced in participating in such enquiries, any kind of prejudice was caused to the petitioner because of the appearance of a trained prosecutor on the other side. For the reasons stated above the Original Petition has to fail and I dismiss it. No costs.