JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the indian Penal Code for the murder of his elder brother Dayach and and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. ( 2. ) THE appellant is a resident of village Banpur where he used to live with his another elder brother Divia alias Devilal and mother Mst. Rona. The deceased dayachand, who was also an elder brother of the appellant, used to live separately in the same village and his cultivation was also separate from that of the appellant, Divia and mst. Rona. There was no enmity between the appellant, Divia and Mst. Rona on the one hand and Dayachand on the other. An agricultural field of the appellant adjoined an agricultural field of Vetal (P. W. 1 ). A nallah existed in between those fields. The dispute giving rise to this case took place at about 6 or 7 p. m. on 17-7-1983 on the field of Vetal (P. W. 1) near-about the Nallah. In that incident, injuries were caused to Dayachand as a result of which he died soon afterwards on way to police station Mayapur, where, first information report of the incident was lodged by Vetal (P. W. 1 ). The external injuries caused to the deceased Dayachand were as follows : i) Bruise around the right eye; ii) Lacerated wound, 3"x 1", on the top of the scalp; iii) Lacerated wound, 4" x 1"x 1", extending from the right mastoid process upto the right parietal bone. The internal injuries comprised of depressed and comminuted fracture of the skull involving part of the right parietal, right temporal and upper part of the occipital bone. There was sub-dural haemorrhage. The membranes of the brain were conjested. There was also laceration of the right parietal and temporal lobe of the brain with diffusion of the blood in the brain substance. The death occurred due to cerebral haemorrage and shock. The injuries were attributed to the appellant. ( 3. There was sub-dural haemorrhage. The membranes of the brain were conjested. There was also laceration of the right parietal and temporal lobe of the brain with diffusion of the blood in the brain substance. The death occurred due to cerebral haemorrage and shock. The injuries were attributed to the appellant. ( 3. ) THE trial Court has found the evidence of the eye-witnesses Vetal (P. W. 1), dhanua (P. W. 2), Ratna (P. W. 3) and Jagna (P. W. 4) shows and it is also no longer disputed before us that, immediately prior to the alleged assault on Dayachand, the appellant had obstructed the course of the nallah water by putting stones in that water course, as a result of which the nallah water started flowing into the field of Vetal (P. W 1), whose maize crop was standing on the field. With a view to prevent the crop from being damaged thereby, Vetal (P. W. 1) raised an embankment towards that side of the nallah so that the water may not enter into his field. That enraged the appellant, who insisted upon flowing of the nallah water into the field of Vetal (P. W. 1 ). During the course of that brief altercation, Dayachand reached the spot and advised the appellant not to do so and allow the nallah water to flow as before in normal course. At that, the appellant, who was armed with a lohangi (iron shod lathi), dealt three blows and thereby caused the above mentioned injuries to Dayachand. The internal injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. In fact, an unconscious dayachand died on way to the police station that night. ( 4. ) THE appellants learned counsel did not challenge - and rightly so - the aforementioned fact situation appearing in the prosecution evidence but argued the appellants act amounted to an offence punishable under Section 304 (Part-II) Indian penal Code, and not that of murder, punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. ( 5. ) IT is undisputed that there was culpable homicide. The prosecution has to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 Indian Penal Code under which culpable homicide becomes murder. . ( 6. ( 5. ) IT is undisputed that there was culpable homicide. The prosecution has to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 Indian Penal Code under which culpable homicide becomes murder. . ( 6. ) ON carefully considering the entire evidence in its totality, we find that the case is governed by the third clause of Section 300 Indian Penal Code which is as follows : "300 Murder. . . . culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused. ). . . Thirdly.- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. " ( 7. ) IN Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 , the aforementioned ingredients of the aforementioned provisions of law were crystallised in paragraph 12 as follows : "to put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 "thirdly"; first, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type/just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. " ( 8. ) THEN it was pointed out in paragraph 13 that once these four elements are established by the prosecution, the offence is murder under Section 300 "thirdly". It was then pointed out that certain extraneous considerations have to be excluded. It was said ". . . It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. ) THEN it was pointed out in paragraph 13 that once these four elements are established by the prosecution, the offence is murder under Section 300 "thirdly". It was then pointed out that certain extraneous considerations have to be excluded. It was said ". . . It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two ). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. " ( 9. ) IN para 16 a caution was sounded that the intent required under Section 300 thirdly" has to be delinked with the fact of the seriousness of the injury. It was said : "the learned counsel for the appellant referred us to Emperor vs. Sardarkhan jawaharlal, ILR 41 Bom. 27 at p. 29 = AIR 1916 Bom. 191 at p. 192 (B) where Beaman J. , says that : "where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much more difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily injury the offender intended". With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the intent required with seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap. With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the intent required with seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap. The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. " ( 10. ) NOW, in the case before us the medical evidence proves existence of three head injuries on deceased Dayachand. ( 11. ) THE medical evidence proves the nature of those head injuries namely; the presence of 2 lacerated injuries on the scalp and a bruise around the right eye with extra dural haemorrhage and a depressed and communited fracture in an area covering the right parietal, right temporal and upper part of the occipital bone, laceration in the membranes of the right parietal and right temporal lobe of the brain with diffusion of the blood in the brain substance. ( 12. ) THE eye-witnesses have proved that the appellant gave three blows with his lohangi on the head of deceased Dayachand. ( 12. ) THE eye-witnesses have proved that the appellant gave three blows with his lohangi on the head of deceased Dayachand. There is nothing in their cross-examination or in the statement of the accused to suggest that the head injuries were accidental or otherwise unintentional. Similarly no evidence or explanation was given about why the appellant hit so hard that extensive fractures were caused in the skull. It is, therefore, proved that there was an intention to inflict the aforementioned particular head injuries. The proved facts that Dayachand became unconscious on the spot and -without regaining consciousness - died within, hours while being carried from the village to the police station that night fully confirm the opinion of Dr. H. P. Jain (P. W. 7) that the head injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. ( 13. ) THUS, the requisite ingredients of Section 300 "thirdly" are established. ( 14. ) THE appellants learned counsel has relied on Jagrup Singh vs. State of haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1552 ; Randhir Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 198$ SC 55, jawahar Lal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 284 , Jagtar Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 463 , Tholan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1984 Criminal Law Journal 478 (SC), radhakishan vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 761 and State of Orissa vs. Bhagaban bank, AIR 1987 SC 1265 . ( 15. ) IN Jagrup Singhs case, the case was found covered by exception 4 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code - a case of one head injury only after an altercation between the deceased and the accused. ( 16. ) IN Randhir Singhs case the assault was made by the accused, a college going boy aged 18 years, who had come unarmed to the spot where an altercation had been going on between the deceased, the accuseds father; who had a Kassi. The accused took this Kassi and gave a single blow causing a head injury resulting in death after 6 days. ( 17. ) IN Jawahar Lais case a short quarrel occurred between the accused and the deceased before a dagger blow given in dim light landed in the epigastrium area. ( 18. The accused took this Kassi and gave a single blow causing a head injury resulting in death after 6 days. ( 17. ) IN Jawahar Lais case a short quarrel occurred between the accused and the deceased before a dagger blow given in dim light landed in the epigastrium area. ( 18. ) IN Jagtar Singhs case there was an exchange of abuses in the course of a sudden quarrel which ended with the appellant giving a blow with a knife which pierced the chest of the deceased. ( 19. ) IN Tholans case there was a sudden altercation between the accused and the deceased after an exchange of hot words between them ending in one stab of knife causing death. ( 20. ) IN Radhakishans case there were no eye-witnesses to the shooting and the court inferred from surrounding circumstances that the case was seemingly covered by the situations posited either in exception 1 or exception 4 of Section 300 Indian Penal Code. ( 21. ) IN Bhagaban Banks case there was no eye-witness but there was a dying declaration. It was a case of a single lathi-blow on head. ( 22. ) BUT in the case before us, the appellant struck three lohangi blows resulting in the snapping of the lohangi when there was no fight, that is, no combat between the appellant and the deceased because before the appellant had begun the assault, the deceased had merely asked the appellant to let the nallah water flow freely. There is no evidence that even any abuses were exchanged between them. Hence, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the rulings relied on by the appellants learned counsel. We, therefore, reject his plea for conversion of the conviction into one under Section 304 Indian Penal Code. It is a clear case of murder, punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. ( 23. ) IN the result, we dismiss the appeal and affirm the appellants conviction and sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. Appeal dismissed.