JUDGMENT L.M. Ghosh, J. On the 27th January 1976, the plaintiffs filed an Ejectment Suit no. 90 of 1976 in the City Civil Court at Calcutta, against the defendant appellant. The grounds for ejectment. as act out in the plaint, were, default, sub letting, using the premises for illegal or immoral purposes, reasonable requirement, waste or negligence and nuisance to the neighbours. A notice dated 17th July, 1975 was referred to. By that notice, the defendant was required to vacate the suit premises with the expiry of the last date of the month of August 1975 As the defendant failed to vacate, the plaintiffs filed the suit for ejectment 2. The defendant, in her written statement, denied all the allegations in the plaint. Particularly she denied that the plaintiffs had grounds for asking for a decree for eviction. As to default, the defendant mentioned that the was depositing lent with the Rent Controller from July, 1975. 3. The learned Judge, presiding over the 3rd Bench of the City Civil Court, decreed the Suit on the grounds of reasonable requirement and default the other grounds pleaded by the plaintiffs were rejected. 4. Not accepting the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the defendant/tenant/appellant has preferred this appeal. 5. Mr. S.P. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, has submitted that at this stage, in this appeal. We are concerned only with the ground of default, as the other grounds no longer survive. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the case of default has not been established at all and so the suit is liable to be dismissed. 6. Mr. S.C. Pain, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, has accepted the position that at this stage, we are only concerned with the ground of default But, according to him, the ground of default has clearly been established. 7. By now, the ground has been cleared of the ramifications. The learned trial court did not accept the grounds of nuisance, sub letting etc There has been no cross objection against such findings. The learned Advocate for the respondents has also not sought to support the judgment on grounds decided against the plaintiffs Therefore, there remain two other grounds the ground of default and the ground of reasonable requirement. As to the ground of reasonable requirement also, it no longer survives in view of the subsequent events. The learned Advocate for the respondents has also not sought to support the judgment on grounds decided against the plaintiffs Therefore, there remain two other grounds the ground of default and the ground of reasonable requirement. As to the ground of reasonable requirement also, it no longer survives in view of the subsequent events. It is an admitted position that after the decree, the plaintiffs transferred the property to Certain transferee. It is also borne out by the record that the said transferees have been substituted in place of the original plaintiffs. That being the position, the substituted/appellants cannot avail of the ground of reasonable requirement on the basis of the subsequent purchase. Indeed, Mr. Pain has also not urged the ground of reasonable requirement 8. Thus, we are left with the ground of default it is one of the grounds un which the learned court below has passed the decree. 9. As to the ground of default, Mr. Roy Chowdhury has pointed out that there is no evidence Whatsoever as to default Going through the record we find that indeed that is the position P.W.1 is one of the original plaintiffs She has adverted to the other grounds, but has never mentioned that the defendant was a defaulter P.W. 2 is another plaintiff, originally borne on the record She also does refer to the ground of default And P.W.3 is the Advocate Commissioner As Mr. Roy Chowdhury has rightly pointed out, if the ground of default is relied upon, there must be evidence to established that ground. It is for the party alleging default to establish that that fact affirmatively. It has been noticed that on the plaintiffs' side, there is no evidence that the defendant became a defaulter. In the notice to quit, Ext.1 also, there is no reference to the ground of default. On the other hand, the defendant, in reply, (Ext 4), has categorically stated that she had been plying the lent regularly. If we go by this state of the record, it can be safely said that default has not been established. 10. Even probing further, notwithstanding the absence of oral evidence on the point, we notice that the default for the requisite period hits not been established. If we go by this state of the record, it can be safely said that default has not been established. 10. Even probing further, notwithstanding the absence of oral evidence on the point, we notice that the default for the requisite period hits not been established. The challans, showing the deposit of rent with the Rent Controller, have been filed and they have been marked Exhibit-A series it is noticed that the rent for the month of August, 1975, was deposited on the 3rd October, 1975 Therefore, the defendant became a defaulter for that month. But Mr. Pain has argued that all other deposits must be held to be invalid. Because under s.4 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, rent has the paid within the time fixed by the contract or in the absence of such contract, by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable Mr. Pain has pointed out that in paragraph 2 of the plaint. It has clearly been averred that there was a contract that rent for each month was to be paid within the first week of every current month All the deposits are made beyond that. But it is clear that s.4 of the Act is out of play, once it has been made out that there was valid reason for depositing rent with the Rent Controller. The defendant, in her additional evidence in this Court, has clearly stated that she tendered the rent for August 1975 in the first week of that very month Further, exhibit a evidences that the rent for the month of August, 1975, was sent by Money Order, which was refused. Therefore, as per the evidence of the defendant/tenant, there was tender to the landlord. Once the acceptance of rent is refused, the appropriate provision which would govern the matter would be s.22 of the Act As per s.22. rent has to be deposited within the 15th day of the time fixed by the contract in writing or in the absence of any such contract in writing, within the last date of the month following that for which the rent was payable' There is no written contract. Any verbal contract would not compel the tenant to deposit the rent within the 15th of the next month. Any verbal contract would not compel the tenant to deposit the rent within the 15th of the next month. That is to say, contract or no contract, if there is no written contract, the rent Can be deposited with the Rent Controller by the last date of the month following. Except for the month of August 1975, the rents for all the months were deposited with the Rent Contractor by the last of the months following Therefore, was notice that there was delay as to deposit of rent of one month only, that is, the month of August 1975 And. it stands out that the rent for July 1975 was not paid or deposited. Now, Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Advocate for the appellant, has argued that for considering the ground of default, the state of things as obtained upto July 1975, is to be considered In short, according to Mr. Ray Chowdhury, any post notice default would be irrelevant mutter The ejectment notice, as we have had occasion to observe, is dated the 17th July, 1975. If post notice default is not to be taken into consideration, obviously we cannot go into the question of default for the month of August 1975 it seems that the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the Post notice default is irrelevant, is quit substantial. The notice, as per s.13(6) of the Act, must be based on grounds and the suit itself must be based to the notice in the Single Bench decision reported in AIR 1967, Calcutta, 390 it has been observed that the notice to quit is a condition precedent within offer 6 rule 6 CPC and should be implied in pleading it has further been observed that it is also a part of the cause of action with respect, we agree. Now if the notice is to be a part of the cause of action, events subsequent to the notice cannot be relevant. The reasoning seem to be simple the grounds of ejectment need not he set out in the notice but the grounds must be existing and available for issuance of a notice to quit in another Single Bench decision, reported in 1974 (Vol-l) Calcutta High Court Noted, page 48, It has been clearly held that the grounds must be in existence when the notice is issued. His Lord ship has observed that jurisdiction to decide a suit is further circumscribed by a condition which is the service of a notice of suit as a condition precedent to the In8tltutlon of the suit if the suit cannot be decreed except on specific grounds and no suit can be filed without such notice, It is only obvious that the grounds must be in existence when the notice is Issued, Again, with respect, we subscribe to the view expressed by the learned Single Judge. The notice is intended to be effective. It must be able to effectuate the end for which it is issued if there is no ground for ejectment and if a notice is still issued, that would be ineffective, it is not the intention of the Act that the notice should be au empty barrel. That is why by the reasoning of s.13(6) of the Act, the notice to be based on the grounds existing and the suit is to be grounded on the notice it self. If post notice default cannot be considered, the default for the month of August, 1975 becomes irrelevant for the purpose of the suit in that Case, there is default for one month only, that is the month of July, 1975 if there is default for one month only, that does not enable the landlord even to file the suit under section 13(1) (l) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The suit fur ejectment, therefore, was itself incompetent. The learned court below shou1d not have passed a decree on such grounds 11. Mr. Pain, the learned Adv cafe for the respondents, has referred to the decision reported in 67 CWN page 977. It was held in that decision that it was not necessary to mention in a notice under s.13(6) of the Act the grounds of ejectment for which a suit was to be Instituted for recovery of possession We have not observed that the ground must be set out in the notice. But we have made it clear that the ground, whether mentioned or not, must be existing on the date the notice is issued. Therefore the decision cited by the learned Advocate is of no assistance to him again, another decision reported 71 CWN page 686 has been cited by Mr. Pain. But we have made it clear that the ground, whether mentioned or not, must be existing on the date the notice is issued. Therefore the decision cited by the learned Advocate is of no assistance to him again, another decision reported 71 CWN page 686 has been cited by Mr. Pain. That decision reiterates the same principle, namely, that the notice need not contain the ground, We have already made our observations with reference to that the notice need not mention the grounds but the grounds must be existing on the date of the notice. 12. Having considered the entire materials on the record, we find that the defendant has been defaulter for one month only, that is, for July, 1975 such being the position, the suit on the ground of default was not maintainable. The learned trial court fell into error in granting a decree on that ground. We have noted before that the other grounds do no longer survive. The last ground the ground of default, falling through, the decree for recovery or possession cannot be maintained. 13. The appeal is allowed on contest. The judgment and the decree of the learned trial court are hereby set aside. The suit for recovery of possession is dismissed. We make no order as to cost. S.P. Das Ghosh : J- I agree Appeal allowed. Suit dismissed.