Brij Bhushan Gupta v. State Of Bihar — 1987 DIGILAW 314 (PAT)

Judgment N. P. Singh, J. 1. The petitioner has filed this writ application for quashing an order, dated 28-3-1987 passed by the Collector, Bhojpur, withdrawing the licence for country liquor shop granted to the petitioner and the order, dated 30-6-1987 passed by the Commissioner, Excise, dismissing the appeal of the petitioner against the order of the Collector. 2. On 24-2-1987, a notice was published inviting applications for settlement of retail of country liquor, in the district of Bhojpur, for the year, 1987-88. One of such shop which is the subject-matter of controversy, in the present writ application, was Arrah Chowk Country Liquor Shop. Pursuant to the notice the petitioner submitted his application for participation in the auction to be held on 13-3-1987. One Vikash Prasad (Respondent No.6) was also an applicant. On 12-3-1987, a list of approved candidates, who were entitled to participate at the auction to be held on 13-3-1987, was prepared by the Collector, Bhojpur. The name of said Vikash Prasad was not included in that list. On 13-3-1987, said vikash Prasad filed an application bsfor the Collector for reconsideration of his case. That request was turned down, by an order, dated 13-3-1987 passed by the Collector, Bhojpur. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that on 13-3-1987 a bid with respect to the shop aforesaid was held in which apart from the petitioner three more persons participated. It appears that the other three persons, who participated at the auction along with the petitioner, were the father of the petitioner and his two sons. At that auction the petitioner offered the highest bid of an amount of rs.27,600 per month. It is said that the money could not be deposited because of some "hue and cry raised by said Vikash Prasad and his associates on the very day of the auction". In spite of being the highest bidder at the auction aforesaid, when no settlement was made in favour of the petitioner, he filed a petition on 19-3-1987 before Shri Thomas Hansda, the State Minister of Excise, for a direction to the Collector for taking further steps on the basis of the auction held on 13-3-1987. In spite of being the highest bidder at the auction aforesaid, when no settlement was made in favour of the petitioner, he filed a petition on 19-3-1987 before Shri Thomas Hansda, the State Minister of Excise, for a direction to the Collector for taking further steps on the basis of the auction held on 13-3-1987. The State Minister of Excise, by a letter, dated 21-3-1987, a copy whereof has been annexed to the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Officials, requested the Collector, Bhojpur that if the petitioner had offered the highest bid on 13-3-1987, then he should be allowed to deposit the money and the licence be issued to him. On the basis of the aforesaid direction, the Collector, Bhojpur, passed an order on 23-3-1987 that the licence be issued to the petitioner. On 23-3-1987 itself, a licence was issued to the petitioner which was commence with effect from 1-4-1987. 4. Vikash Prasad (Respondent No.6), who was not allowed to participate at the auction said to have been held on 13-3-1987, had filed an appeal under the provisions of the Bihar Excise Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the excise Commissioner, Bihar, for a direction to the Collector, Bhojpur, to include the name of said respondent in the list of approved persons for participating at the auction which was to be held on 28-3-1987 for taking settlement of the country liquor shop in question. The petitioner appeared in the said appeal and supported the order of the Collector excluding said Vikash Prasad from participating at the auction for the shop in question. However, the Commissioner, after hearing said Vikash Prasad and the petitioner, passed an order on 23-3-1987, the relevant part whereof is as follows : "i am convinced that the case of the petitioner deserves reconsideration by the learned Collector not only on the merit of the case submitted in his favour but also in the interest of the State Revenue, in case the settlement of the shop was not already finalized on 13-3-1987 in course of auction settlement by the learned Collector. The case is accordingly remanded to the learned Collector for disposal in accordance with the existing rules prior to the next date fixed for auction i. e. , 28-3-1987. The case is accordingly remanded to the learned Collector for disposal in accordance with the existing rules prior to the next date fixed for auction i. e. , 28-3-1987. " It is surprising that although the petitioner had appeared before the Commissioner when the appeal filed on behalf of Vikash Prasad (Respondent No.6; was heard and disposed of on 23-3-1987, it was not brought to the notice of the Commissioner about the orders passed by the Minister of State on 21-3-1987 and the collector on 23-3-1987 itself directing grant of the licence to the petitioner. 5. It appears that when Vikash Prasad (Respondent No.6) learnt about the order, dated 23-3-1987 passed by the Collector directing issuance of licence in favour of the petitioner, he filed another appeal, before the Commissioner, excise. The Commissioner called for a report from the Collector, Bhojpur about the allegation made by said Vikash Prasad regarding the holding of the auction on 13-3-1987 and grant of the licence to the petitioner. The Collector, in his report, dated 25-3-1987 stated that on 13-3-1987 auction was held in respect of the said shop in which this petitioner was the highest bidder but, as he had offered only Rs.27, 600, it was decided that the said shop be put for auction on 28-3-1987, so that the State should not suffer loss of revenue. He further stated, in his report, that although 28-3-1987 had been fixed for auction of the shop in question but as in the meantime the aforesaid order of the minister of State, dated 21-3-1987 was received to settle the shop with the petitioner, after getting the matter examined by the Excise Superintendent and the Government Pleader, he passed an order for settlement of the shop with the petitioner. Thereafter the Collector stated, in his report, that he received the aforesaid order, dated 23-3-1987 of the Commissioner, Excise, on 24-3-1987, meaning thereby after he had passed an order for grant of licence to the petitioner. Towards the end he sought for a direction from the Commissioner saying that he had passed the order for issuance of licence to the petitioner in view of the direction of the Minister of State. 6. Towards the end he sought for a direction from the Commissioner saying that he had passed the order for issuance of licence to the petitioner in view of the direction of the Minister of State. 6. On 27-3-1987, the Commissioner, Excise, after referring to the order of the Minister and the report of the Collector, observed that from the report of the collector it appeared that the settlement of the shop had not concluded merely by the highest offer of the petitioner on 13-3-1987. He further pointed out that the Minister of State had simply directed that if the settlement had been finalised with the petitioner, then licence be issued to him but from the report of the collector it was apparent that settlement had not been finalised and the auction had been postponed to 28-3-1987. On the aforesaid finding, he issued the following direction : "the report of the learned Collector clearly shows that the settlement of this shop was yet to be finalised on 28-3-1987. The petitioner should therefore, be allowed to take part in the bid to be held on 28-3-1987 not only on the merit of his case but also in the interest of State Revenue. " 7. Pursuant to the orders of Commissioner, Excise aforesaid, dated 23-3-1987 and 27-3-1987 the Collector, Bhojpur, by order, dated 28-3-1987, withdrew the licence granted to the petitioner in exercise of the powers under Section 43 (1) (b) of the Act which is under challenge in the present writ application. 8. On 28-3-1987 the auction could not be held and it was postponed to 31-3-1987. At the auction held on 31-3-1987 Rajiv Kumar Gupta (Respondent No.5) who is the son of the petitioner and Vikash Prasad (Respondent No.6) participated. Rajiv Kumar Gupta (Respondent No.5) offered the highest bid of Rs.1,25,000 per month against Rs.27,600 offered by the petitioner on 13-3-1987. Vikash Prasad (Respondent No.6) offered Rs.)1 ,24,000 per month. The highest bid of Rajiv Kumar Gupta (Respondent No.5) was accepted and the licence has been granted to him. 9. Being aggrieved by the order, dated 28-3-1987 the petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner Excise. He also filed a writ application (C. W. J. C. No.1058 of 1987) before this Court on 30-3-1987. Oh 2-4-1987, the petitioner for reasons best known to him, withdrew the said writ application. 9. Being aggrieved by the order, dated 28-3-1987 the petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner Excise. He also filed a writ application (C. W. J. C. No.1058 of 1987) before this Court on 30-3-1987. Oh 2-4-1987, the petitioner for reasons best known to him, withdrew the said writ application. The appeal filed before the Commissioner was dismissed on 30th June, 1987, who affirmed the order, dated 28-3-1987 passed by the Collector withdrawing the licence of the petitioner. 10. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that as there is no dispute, in the present case, that the petitioner had offered the highest bid on 13-3-1987 which was accepted by the Collector on 23-3-1987 and a licence was granted to the petitioner the same day, that licence could not have been withdrawn, there being a valid settlement in favour of the petitioner. 11. It is well-known that the primary purpose for holding auction for settlement of any property vested in the State is to fetch the highest revenue for the State and a welfare State being the owner of such public property has to make settlement as a trustee of public and any settlement must be done at the best price so that the public revenue is not affected. In the case of Ram and shyam V/s. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147 , the distinction between the settlement of a private property by an individual and the property owned by the state has been explained and it was pointed out "disposal of public property partakes the character of a trust in that in its disposal there should be nothing hanky panky and that it must be done at the best price so that larger revenue coming into the coffers of the State administration should serve public purpose viz. , the welfare State may be able to expand its beneficent activities by the availability of larger funds". In order to achieve the aforesaid object the State is not bound to accept the highest oifer given at an auction, because on some occasion the highest bid may not represent the exact price which the State Government may be entitled to get. In order to achieve the aforesaid object the State is not bound to accept the highest oifer given at an auction, because on some occasion the highest bid may not represent the exact price which the State Government may be entitled to get. The Supreme Court, in the cases of T. Mishra V/s. State of Orissa, AIR 1971 SC 733 ; State of Orissa v, Harinarayan jaiswal, AIR.1912sc 1816 and State of Uttar Pradesh V/s. Vijay Bahadur Singh, air 1982 SC 1234 , has held that the Government is under no obligation to accept the highest bid and that no rights accure to the bidder merely because his bid happened to be the highest. The same view was reiterated in the case of ram and Shyam Co. V/s. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147 case (supra ). 12. In the present case, it is an admitted positon that the highest offer given by the petitioner on 13-3-1987 was not accepted by the Collector. From the report submitted by the Collector on 25-3-1987 to the Commissioner it appears that OE 13-3-1987 he had decided to hold a fresh auction on 28-3-1987 because the offer given at the auction held on 13-3-1987 although above the reserve jama fixed, but was low in the opinion of the Collector. The most interesting part of the auction said to have been held on 13-3-1987 is that the four participants were the petitioner, his father and two sons. This fact has been stated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Vikash Prasad-intervenor respondent. which has not been challenged. The auction was collusive is apparent from the fact that although Rajiv Kumar Gupta (Respondent No.5), the son of the petitioner, participated at the auction held on 13-3-1987, did not offer an amount higher than Rs.27,600 per month on that day but the same Rajiv Kumar Gupta (Respondent No.5) offered an amount of rs.1,25,000 per month in the auction held on 31-3-1987 and settlement has been made in his favour. The difference between the offer given by the petitioner on 13-3-1987 and his son (Respondent No.5) on 31-3-1987 is of about Rs.12,00,000 (twelve lacs) in a year. As such, in my view, the Collector, Bhojpur was justified in coming to the conclusion that there was no proper offer at the auction held on 13-3-1987 which should have been accepted. 13. The difference between the offer given by the petitioner on 13-3-1987 and his son (Respondent No.5) on 31-3-1987 is of about Rs.12,00,000 (twelve lacs) in a year. As such, in my view, the Collector, Bhojpur was justified in coming to the conclusion that there was no proper offer at the auction held on 13-3-1987 which should have been accepted. 13. While justifying the withdrawal of the licence granted to the petitioner, the learned Government Pleader pointed out the manner in which the settlement has been made in favour of the petitioner. It appears that the aforesaid letter, dated 21-3-1987 addresed by the Minister of State from Patna to the Collector, bhojpur was received by the Superintendent Excise, Bhojpur, the same day. The superintendent Excise put up a note on 21-3-1987 to the Collector drawing his attention to the direction of the Minister State for accepting the offer of the petitioner and sought the direction from the Collector in that respect. The collector on 23-3-1987 passed an order for seeking opinion of the Government pleader. On 23-3-1987, the Government Pleader gave his opinion that settlement can be made in favour of the petitioner. The file was put up before the Collector on 23-3-1987 itself when he approved the proposal forsettlement. The Excise superintendent, on 23-3-1987 itself, passed on order for deposit of Rs.1,65,600 as the amount for a period of six months at the rate of Rs.27,600 per month. That amount was deposited in the treasury on 24-3-1917 but licence was granted to the petitioner on 23-3-1987 itself. The manner in which the authorities of the state have taken undue interest ia making settlement in favour of the petitioner is really shocking. The most reprehensible conduct is of the Superintendent of excise. From the letter, dated 21-3-1987 of the Minister State it appears that it was the Superintendent Excise, who informed the Minister Excise about the highest offer of the petitioner on 13-3-1987. Again on 21-3-1987 it was the same Superintendent of Excise who put up the note before the Collector drawing his attention to the direction of the Minister State and on 23-3-1987 he passed an order accepting the amount offered by the petitioner and directed that it may be deposited in the office and a receipt be granted to him. Again on 21-3-1987 it was the same Superintendent of Excise who put up the note before the Collector drawing his attention to the direction of the Minister State and on 23-3-1987 he passed an order accepting the amount offered by the petitioner and directed that it may be deposited in the office and a receipt be granted to him. It is said that even the licence was granted to the petitioner on 23-3-1987 itself under the signature of the superintendent Excise. 14. The provisions of the Act provide the manner in which licence is to be granted, to be cancelled or to be withdrawn. The Act also vests power in different authorities of the State Government to grant, cancel or withdraw licences in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It also prescribes the forum for appeal and revision against orders passed granting, cancelling or withdrawing licences. The relevant part of Sec.7 of the Act is as follows : - "7. Establishments and delegation and withdrawal of powers.- (1) The administration of the Excise Department and the collection of the excise-revenue within a district shall ordinarily be under the charge of the Collector, (2) The State Goverment may by notification applicable to the whole of the State or to any specified local area, - (a) appoint an officer who shall, subject to such control as the state Government may direct, have the control of the administration to the Excise department and the collection of the excise-revenue. . . . . . " Sec.8 of the Act is as follows : - "8. Control appeal and revision.- (I) The Control shall, in all proceedings under this act, be subject to the control of the Excise Commissioner, and shall, in such matters as the State Government may direct, be subject also to the control of the Commissioner of the division. (2) Orders passed under this Act or under any rule made hereunder shall be appealable in such cases, to such authorities and under such procedure as may be prescribed by rule made under Sec.89, clause (c ). (3) The Board may revise any order passed by a Collector, the Excise commissioner or the Commissioner of a Division. " In view of Sec.7 (1), the administration of the Excise Department and the collection of the excise revenue within a district shall ordinarily be under the charge of the Collector. (3) The Board may revise any order passed by a Collector, the Excise commissioner or the Commissioner of a Division. " In view of Sec.7 (1), the administration of the Excise Department and the collection of the excise revenue within a district shall ordinarily be under the charge of the Collector. However, the State Government may by notification appoint an officer who shall subject to such control as the State Government may direct, have the control of the administration of the Excise Department and the collection of the excise-revenue. In view of the aforesaid statutory provision, the collector of the district is to exercise his statutory power while making settlement of any excise shop taking into account the collection of the revenue for the State. While exercising powers vested in him, he is subject to the control Excise Commissioner. He cannot surrender his discretion merely at the bid of the Minister of State. In the instant case, the Collector, in his report, dated 25-3-1987, has clearly stated that the settlement in favour of the petitioner had been made merely on the direction of the Minister State. The counsel for the respondents has rightly referred to the well-known judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police V/s. Gordhandas, AIR 1952 SC 16 where the Supreme court pointed out that if an authority has been vested with the power to grant licence he cannot act merely on the order or direction of any superior officer. In my view, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the auction said to have been held on 13-3-1987 in which the petitioner, his father and two sons had participated cannot be held to be a public auction in the eye of law. Similarly, the grant of licence to the petitioner at the request/direction of the Minister state, Excise, cannot be held to be a grant of licence in accordance with the provisions of the Act because the Collector, who is the licensing authority has on his own statement acted at the bid of the Minister State, Excise, without applying his independent mind on the question of settlement in favour of the petitioner. The Minister State had addressed a letter to the Collector, Bhojpur which can be held to be demi-official, if not personal, to accept the order, if the petitioner had given the highest offer on 13-3-1987. The Minister State had addressed a letter to the Collector, Bhojpur which can be held to be demi-official, if not personal, to accept the order, if the petitioner had given the highest offer on 13-3-1987. Any such direction given by the State minister, Excise cannot be said to be a Government order which was binding on the Collector, This aspect of the matter has been examined on several occasions by the Supreme Court and this court. Reference in this connection may be made to the well-known judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395 , 15. It was then submitted on behalf of the petitioner that even if the licence could have been withdrawn by the Collectar in exercise of the power under section 43 of the Act, before the withdrawal of the licence a show cause notice was a must. The relevant part of Sectiou 43 of the Act is as follows : - "43. Power to withdraw licences.- (I) Whenever the authority who granted any licence under this Act considers that the licence should be withdrawn for any cause other than those specified in Sec.42, it shall remit a sum equal the amount of the fees payable in respect thereof for fifteen days, and may withdraw the licence either - (a) On the expiration of fifteen days notice in writing of its intention to do so, or (b) forthwith, without notice. (2) If any licence be withdrawn under clause (b) of sub-section (1) the said authority shall, in addition to remitting such sum as aforesaid, pay to the licensee such further sum (if any), by way of compensation, as the Excise Commissioner may direct. " The power to withdraw licence under Sec.43 of the Act is distinct and separate from power of cancellation under Sec.42 of the Act. Sec.42 of the Act mentions different grounds on which the licence granted can be cancelled or suspended. Whatever may be said in respect of application of principles of natural justice while cancelling a licence under Sec.42 of the Act, Sec.43 (1) (b) of the Act enables the authority who has granted any licence under the Act to withdraw the said licence forthwith, without notice. Whatever may be said in respect of application of principles of natural justice while cancelling a licence under Sec.42 of the Act, Sec.43 (1) (b) of the Act enables the authority who has granted any licence under the Act to withdraw the said licence forthwith, without notice. It is well-known that it is open to the Legislature to exclude the necessity of giving a show cause notice by a statutory provision ; of course I hasten to add that such statutory provisions must stand the test of Article 14 of, the Constitution. A statutory provision dispensing with the requirement of issuing a show cause notice has to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14, in the context of the provisions of the Act, the object for which the enactment has been made. 16. In the case of Union of India V/s. J. N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40 , it was pointed out: "rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. As observed by this court in kraipak V/s. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 , "the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law but supplement it. " it is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power," Again in the case of Union of India V/s. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , it was said : "not only, therefore, can be principles of natural justice be modified but in exeptional cases they can even be excluded. There are well-defined exceptions to the nemo judex in cause sua rule as also to the audi alteram partem rule. The nemo judex in causa sua rule is subject to the doctrine of necessity and any yields to it as pointed out by this court in J. Mohapatra and Co. V/s. State of Orissa, (1985) 1 SCR 322 , 334 So far as the audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both in England and in India, it is well established that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action, such a right can be excluded. This right can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion nor can the audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out in Maneka Gandhis case at page 681 (of 1978) 2 SCR 621 : AIR 1978 SC 597 at p.629 ). " While considering a case of Sec.43 (1) (a) the Supreme. " While considering a case of Sec.43 (1) (a) the Supreme. Court in the case of amar Chandra V/s. Excise Collector, Tripura, AIR 1972 SC 1863 observed : "the submission that a separate order withdrawing the licence after the expiry of 15 days period from the order, dated July 6, 1970 was necessary has also not appealed to us. Sec.43, does not provide any such procedure. All that this section contemplates is that whenever the authority concerned considers that the licence should be withdrawn for any cause other than those specified in Sec.42 it may withdraw the same but to do so it must remit a sum equal to the amount of fees payable in respect of the licence for 15 days. It is not complained that this amount was not remitted as required. Now if the licence is withdrawn under Sec.43 (1) (a) on the expiration of 15 days written notice of the authoritys intention to do so then nothing further need be done. It is only when the licence is desired to be withdrawn forthwith without notice as contemplated by Sec.43 (1) (b) that the authority is under a further obligation to pay compensation as may be directed by the Excise Commissioner. Here the licence stood withdrawn on September 1, 1970 as stated in the intimation contained in the order, dated July 6, 1970. That intimation fully complies with the provisions of Sec.43. " This Court in respect of Sec.43 of the Act itself has rejected the contention regarding a show cause notice prior to withdrawal of the licence in the cases of mohammad Hussain V/s. N. Baksi, 1961 BLJR 55 and Bishwanath Prasad V/s. State of Bihar, 1982 PLJR 123. It was observed that such provision was meant for taking action immediately in respect of licence granted for dealing in liquor. 17. The grant of licence under the provisions of the Act to deal in liquor cannot be equated with the grant of licence to deal any other commodities. The supreme Court in the case of Har Shanker V/s. Dy, E. and T. Commr. , AIR 1975 sc 1221 said: "there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. The State under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants-its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. The supreme Court in the case of Har Shanker V/s. Dy, E. and T. Commr. , AIR 1975 sc 1221 said: "there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. The State under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants-its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. In "american Jurisprudence", volume 30 it is stated that while engaging in liquor traffic is not inherently unlawful, nevertheless it is a privilege and not a right, subject to governmental control (page 538 ). This power of control is an incident of the societys right to self-protection and in rests upon the right of the State to care for the health, morals and welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of pauperism and crime, (pp.539, 540, 541 ). " Any such grant is a mere privilege and not in a right in its strict sense. As such when the framers of the Act have vested power in the licensing authority to withdraw the licence even without giving a show cause, then, in my view, that requirement cannot be read as implicit in the said provision. It is difficult to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that Sec.43 (1) (b) of the Act itself be declared ultra vires being hit by Article 14 of the Constution. 18 Taking into the consideration the nature of trade in liquor a power has been vested in the licensing authority to withdraw a licence granted immediately. Of course in approprite cases the person concerned can approach the appellate authority or this Court and can satisfy that the power has not been exercised in the interest of the State or public in general but with an oblique motive. In the instant case, as I have already held, that a collusive auction was held on 13-3-1987 in which the petitioner, his father and two sons participated. The same respondent No.5, who did not challenge the offer of the petitioner for a meagre amount of Rs.27,600 per month on 13-3-1987 offered an amount of rs.1,25,000 per month in the auction held on 31-3-1987. The same respondent No.5, who did not challenge the offer of the petitioner for a meagre amount of Rs.27,600 per month on 13-3-1987 offered an amount of rs.1,25,000 per month in the auction held on 31-3-1987. The grant, of, licence in favour of the petitioner was also not by the Collector but on the direction of the Minister State who could not have issued any such direction through a personal or demi-official letter. As such the Collector was justified in withdrawing the said licence. 19. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The Excise Commissioner, who is the appellate authority of the Collector, had passed the aforesaid order, dated 23-3-1987, after hearing the petitioner and Vikash Prasad the intervenor-respondent, that the case of Vikash Prasad deserved reconsideration by the collector not only on merit of the case but also in the interest of the State revenue. On thai finding the Excise Commissioner remanded the case to the collector for disposal in accordance with the existing rule prior to the next date fixed for auction, i. e. , 28-3-1987. Again, by his order, dated 27-3-1987, referred to above, the Excise Commissioner directed the Collector to hold auction on 28-3-1987 and to allow the intervenor-respandent Vikash Prasad to participate at the said auction for the country liquor shop in question. The Collector was bound by the direction/order given by the appellate authority and had no option but to withdraw the licence granted in favour of the petitioner and to hold a fresh auction. In such a situation there is no question of applying the principle of natural justice and to offer an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause before the licence granted to him was withdrawn by order, dated 28-3-1987. 20. This writ application is, accordingly, dismissed with a cost of Rs.500 to be paid by the petitioner. 21. Before I part with this judgment I may observe that this is a glaring example as to how persons, who have been entrusted to augment the public revenue of the State, enter into collusion with a person who is interested in exploting the public property to the best of his advantage by offering a shockingly low amount at a public auction in which he is allowed to participate along with his father and two sons only. The result of the collusive public auction became apparent only on 31-3-1987 when respondent No.5, the son of the petitioner, who had also participated and had offered a sum less than Rs.27,600 per month, offered Rs.1,25,000 per month. The conduct of the Superintendent of Excise (Respondent No.4) in pursuing the settlement in favour of the petitioner appears to be against the interest of the State. It is not very clear as to how he personally met the Minister State and brought to his notice about the petitioner having given the highest offer of Rs.27,600, a fact mentioned in the letter of the Minister of State, dated 21-3-1987 to the Collector, Bhojpur. Again it is he who put up a note to the Collector on 21-3-1987 itself, the day the Minister had addressed a letter to the Collector. Thereafter he pursued the matter in favour of the petitioner and got deposited the amount offered by the petitioner in his office and a licence was granted in favour of the petitioner on 23-3-1987 itself. If the steps taken for settlement of the shop in question had not been nulified by the excise Commissioner, the State Government would have suffered a loss of rs.12,00,000 (twelve lacs) a year in respect of one country liquor shop only. It is desirable that the Excise Commissioner or any other authority of the State should examine the role of the Superintendent of Excise and others in greater detail. Petition dismissed.