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1987 DIGILAW 315 (KER)

MALANKARA RUBBER & PRODUCE CO. LTD. v. STATE OF KERALA

1987-07-17

BHASKARAN NAMBIAR, MALIMATH

body1987
Judgment :- 1. Does the Kerala Land Acquisition Act contemplate, and permit more than one award to be made when there is only one declaration under S.6 ? Whether one declaration and one award alone can satisfy the statutory requirements ? A question of jurisdiction arising out of an interpretation of the provisions of the Act alone arises for consideration. We shall, therefore, tackle this question of law first and then decide how it applies to the facts of this case. 2. The Act does not expressly limit the number of awards that can be passed after a declaration is made. Is there, however, any implied limitation in this regard, on the power to make an award? It is, therefore, necessary to understand the scheme of the Act to fix the frontiers of the award jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act. 3. S.3 of the Act provides for a preliminary notification published in the Gazette and in two daily newspapers, notifying that the lands specified therein are needed or are likely to be needed for a public purpose. This provision envisages a preliminary investigation, paves the way for an enquiry and consideration of the objections regarding acquisition (unless expressly dispensed with in cases of urgency), specifies the locality, but does not firmly and finally identify that any particular land is needed for the public purpose. The Collector can make further enquiries as he thinks necessary and he has to submit his report to the Government, where S.3(1) notification was published by the Government, or to the Board of Revenue, where the S.3(1) notification was published by himself. The Collector can make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under S.3(1) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of land. (Section S). Thereafter, when the Government or the Board of Revenue as the case may be, are or is satisfied, after considering the report made by the Collector, a declaration is issued under S.6 of the Act that a particular land is needed for the public purpose in view. Thus S.6 declaration declares, identifies, locates and particularises the land needed to be acquired for the public purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification under S.3(1). S.6 declaration marks a definite stage in the acquisition process, when it is finally declared that the lands determined, described and specified are needed for the public purpose. Thus S.6 declaration declares, identifies, locates and particularises the land needed to be acquired for the public purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification under S.3(1). S.6 declaration marks a definite stage in the acquisition process, when it is finally declared that the lands determined, described and specified are needed for the public purpose. This declaration continues in force till it is cancelled by virtue of the powers so conferred under the General Clauses Act or till the acquisition proceedings are withdrawn, before possession is taken, under S.52 of the Act. Where thus a declaration has already been made, S.7 insists that the Government or the Board of Revenue shall direct the Collector to take order for the acquisition of the land. It is this Collector, who takes the order for acquisition, who has to proceed thereafter and S.8 directs that he shall thereupon cause the land to be marked out unless it was already marked out. He gives notice to the persons interested stating it is intended to take possession and inviting claims to compensation. He makes enquiries regarding the measurements of the land, the value of the land on the date of S.3(1) notification and the respective interest of the persons claiming the compensation and an award is made showing the true area of the land, the compensation which, in his opinion, shall be allowed for the land and the apportionment of the said compensation amount among the persons interested. The award is filed in the Collector's office and is final and conclusive between the Collector and the persons interested. This, in short, is the scheme of the Act. 4. Now, a decision of the Privy Council and another of the Supreme Court require to be noticed. In Prag Narain v. Collector of Agra (AIR 1932 Privy Council 102), it was held thus: "The Act does not appear to contemplate that where more than one person is interested in a parcel of land there should be more than one award relating thereto. In Prag Narain v. Collector of Agra (AIR 1932 Privy Council 102), it was held thus: "The Act does not appear to contemplate that where more than one person is interested in a parcel of land there should be more than one award relating thereto. Their Lordships do not by this mean that the whole of the land at any one time to be acquired under the Act must necessarily be dealt with in one award: but only that any one piece of land (forming part of the whole) in which more than one person has an interest for which he can claim compensation, ought not to be made the subject of more than one award. Bach award should contain within its four corners the fixing of the value of the land with which it deals and the apportionment of that value between the various persons interested in that land." 5. In State of M. P. v. Vishnu Prasad (AIR 1966 SC 1593) it was held thus: "Therefore as we read these three sections we are of opinion that they are integrally and intimately connected and the intention of the legislature was that one notification under S.4(1) should be followed by survey under S.4(2) and objections under S.5A and thereafter one declaration under S.6." "It seems to us clear that once a declaration under S.6 is made, the notification under S.4(1) must be exhausted, for it has served its purpose. There is nothing in S.4, 5A and 6 to suggest that S.4(1) is a kind of reservoir from which the Government may from time to time draw out land and make declarations with respect to it successively. If that was the intention behind S.4, 5A and 6 we would have found some indication of it in the language used therein." 6. Plurality of awards under the Land Acquisition Act is judicially recognised by the Privy Council in Prag Narain v. Collector of Agra (AIR 1932 PC 102). The legislative intent and indication seem to follow the same direction. An award under the Land Acquisition Act is an offer made by the Government to pay a certain amount of compensation for a well defined land acquired for public purpose. The legislative intent and indication seem to follow the same direction. An award under the Land Acquisition Act is an offer made by the Government to pay a certain amount of compensation for a well defined land acquired for public purpose. The party may accept the offer and receive the compensation; or he may accept under protest or refuse to accept the compensation and he may choose to claim enhanced compensation as provided under the Act. The enquiry conducted after the S.6 declaration is thus limited to the nature of the respective interest in the land, the particulars of the claim to compensation for such interests and the objections, if any, to the measurements already made. This is thus a post declaration enquiry, in no way affecting the validity of the declaration, in no way, attempting to reopen questions regarding identity of the land acquired or the public purpose sought to be achieved. If an offer relating to compensation can be made in respect of a definite piece of land covered by the declaration, more than one offer can be made with respect to different pieces of land and it cannot be said that the offers are without jurisdiction and the Act does not contemplate piecemeal offers. The character and content of the award, therefore, lead to the conclusion that there can be more than one award arising out of the same declaration. 7. When once a declaration under S.6 is made, the Act insists that thereafter the Collector has to take "order for the acquisition of the land." The jurisdiction of the Collector to make award thus stems from this direction. The Act does not state that only one direction can be issued in respect of a declaration under S.6. When, therefore, more than one direction can be issued to the Collector "to take order for acquisition," the Collector can, in pursuance of the direction, make an award in respect of that land covered by that direction. This provision also indicates that the Act contemplates the making of more than one award even where there is only one declaration. 8. It is said that the principle stated by the Supreme Court that there can be only one declaration when there is only one preliminary notification, should be extended to the making of awards also, so that there can only be one award for each declaration. 8. It is said that the principle stated by the Supreme Court that there can be only one declaration when there is only one preliminary notification, should be extended to the making of awards also, so that there can only be one award for each declaration. The Supreme Court stated that S 4(1) notification exhausts itself when S.6 declaration is made and the preliminary notification is not a reservoir from which several declarations can be made subsequently. The reason for this conclusion is that S.4 notification is only preliminary in nature and it is only the S.6 declaration that identifies and particularises the property to be acquired. When once that specification of the land is made under the Act, the declaration does not depend thereafter on the earlier notification. The purpose of the preliminary notification is achieved with the declaration under S.6. There are at least two reasons why this principle cannot be applied to the making of award. The making of an award does not extinguish or exhaust the declaration. The declaration does not lose its vitality or utility when an award is made under the Act. The declaration is the soul of the Land Acquisition proceedings. The declaration has to be annulled if the acquisition proceedings have to end or the acquisition has to be withdrawn, when the declaration does not survive. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad (AIR 1966 SC 1593) cannot, therefore, help the appellant and the Supreme Court did rot consider the question raised in this appeal. 9. Moreover, soon after the decision of the Supreme Court, the Central Land Acquisition Act was amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 and the Kerala Act was amended by Act 29 of 1968. These amendments provided that different declarations may be made from time to lime in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same preliminary notification. The amendments thus effected leave no room for doubt about the legislative intention that more than ore declaration is contemplated in respect of the same land covered by the same notification under S.3(1). The amendments also provided that the Collector under S.5 of the Kerala Act or S.SA of the Central Act can make more than one report and it is acting on those reports that declarations are made. The amendments also provided that the Collector under S.5 of the Kerala Act or S.SA of the Central Act can make more than one report and it is acting on those reports that declarations are made. No integrity of the acquisition process is broken when more than one declaration follow one preliminary notification. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court is thus no longer available in view of the subsequent legislative amendments. It has, therefore, to be held that the Land Acquisition Act admits making more than one award even when there is only one single declaration. One notification, one declaration was the judicial concept before 1968. Thereafter, the statutory clearance is for one notification and many declarations. The statutory index and intention also seem to favour the view that there can be more than one award whether there was one declaration or many declarations. 10. Even then, while the existence of the jurisdiction to make more than one award has to be thus conceded, the exercise of this jurisdiction may be open to judicial review. The power to make successive supplementary awards is not a power to be exercised prejudicially against the persons interested, malafide or arbitrarily, subjecting them to hostile discrimination. The guiding guaranteed right under Art.14 of the Constitution cannot be infringed while making more than one award when there is only one declaration. The surveillance of Art.14 will pervade the making of one award or more awards. Thus when the making of award was inordinately delayed and it took more than 10 years, this Court has unhesitatingly quashed the entire Land Acquisition Proceedings in Pokker Haji v. The Union of India (ILR 1985 (2) Kerala 122), on the ground that the delay of five years in making award was unreasonable and unjustifiable visiting the petitioner with dire consequences. 11. There may, however, be justifiable and acceptable reasons for making more than one award in a given case. But it has to be borne in mind that where the award pertains to the entire land covered by a direction issued after the declaration, and when several awards are based on different directions so issued in respect of the same declaration, the awards are not liable to be challenged on the ground that more than one award could cot have been made. The challenge under Art.14 may arise only in those cases where several awards are made in respect of different pieces of land covered by the same single direction and not when several directions are issued after the declaration. Usually, the authorities can make only one award in respect of the same lands covered by the same direction "to take orders for acquisition" and only in those rare cases where there is a departure, the question may arise whether the action violates Art.14. 12. When a declaration is made and a direction is issued later "to take orders for acquisition", even if the Collector were to make any mistake in making the award or in following the direction, the action of the Collector can only be an irregularity not vitiating or invalidating the valid declaration. The validity of the declaration cannot depend on the irregular mode of complying with the direction issued under S.7 of the Act. Even when a direction to take orders for acquisition has not been carried out, there is nothing preventing the Collector rectifying the mistake and issuing a fresh award in accordance with the direction issued. In any case, the mode of implementation of the direction issued under S.7, cannot affect the validity of the declaration issued earlier under S.6. 13. We shall new advert to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Corporation of Calcutta v. Omeda Khatun (AIR 1956 Calcutta 122) on which considerable reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant. Reaching the same conclusion, the two learned judges of the Calcutta High Court have rendered two separate judgments. Justice Lahiri recognises the jurisdiction to pass more than one award, when it is stated: "As the true area of the land under the ownership of different persons and the compensation to be allowed to different persons must be different according to the nature and extent of their interest there can be no doubt that where the land declared under S.6 belongs to different persons the Collector is required to make different awards in respect of each". But, goes on to add that there can be only two classes of cases where more than one award can be made: 'But from the very nature of the case more than one award has to be made only in the two classes of cases referred to above, i.e. (a) where the land in respect of which the declaration under S.6 has been made is under the ownership of different individuals and (b) where the acquisition proceeding In respect of the declared land (whether under the owner-ship of a single or different individuals) is held up by circumstances over which the acquiring authority has no control, e.g. by an injunction or the decision of a superior court and that injunction is subsequently dissolved or the decision overruled". Chief Justice Chakravartti also agrees that there can be plurality of awards: "An area of land covered by a declaration under S.6 may comprise different plots of land owned by different persons or more than one plot owned by the same person. In such a case, claims with regard to the several plots have necessarily to be considered separately and separate awards have necessarily to be made. If there be any piecemeal acquisition in such cases at all, it is piecemeal only in the lateral sense, if I may use that expression, the Collector proceeding at the same time as respects the whole area but making the acquisition in parts by a series of parallel proceedings for reasons inherent in the composition of the land". and then proceeds to state thus: "The piecemeal acquisition which we are considering is of a different type. It occurs when after the declaration under S.6, the acquiring authority takes up only a portion of the land for immediate acquisition, keeps the acquisition of the remainder in abeyance and seeks to resume the acquisition as respects the remainder or a portion of it at some future date". "In my opinion, the Land Acquisition Act lends no countenance to the procedure of a portion of a holding, included in a declaration under S.6, being acquired in the first instance and the remainder or a further portion being acquired at a future date at the option of the requiring or acquiring authority". "In my opinion, the Land Acquisition Act lends no countenance to the procedure of a portion of a holding, included in a declaration under S.6, being acquired in the first instance and the remainder or a further portion being acquired at a future date at the option of the requiring or acquiring authority". "The answer to that argument is that since piecemeal acquisition is unknown to the Act, the acquisition of only a portion in the first instance would itself be invalid unless it was presumed that the acquisition of the remainder was intended to be abandoned and since the portion first acquired would not be given up but would be sought to be retained as validly acquired, the acquisition of the remainder must be deemed to have been abandoned." 14. We are afraid that even this decision does not help the appellant, for it recognises the right to make more than one award. We are, however, with great respect, not inclined to agree with Lahiri, J., when it is said that only in two classes of cases, specified by him, can there be more than one award. It is not possible to visualise all situations where more than one award can be issued, and it is not possible to limit the exercise of that power to two specified instances by any judicial dictum. It is then not judicial interpretation, but judicial legislation. We shall presently show that a third category can arise when two or three awards are required to be made in view of subsequent legislations in allied fields, the Land Reforms Act, as in this case. Possibly, the purpose and effect of the directions to take order for acquisition do not seem to have been stressed before the learned judges of the Calcutta High Court. If one declaration can give rise to several directions, several awards can follow these several directions. 15. Bearing these principles in mind, we shall now advert to the facts of this case. There are three notifications, three declarations and six awards, the brief particulars of which are given below: 16. It can thus be seen that in all the three cases, there was only one S.3 notification and one declaration in each case. There was also only one direction to take order for acquisition in each. There are three notifications, three declarations and six awards, the brief particulars of which are given below: 16. It can thus be seen that in all the three cases, there was only one S.3 notification and one declaration in each case. There was also only one direction to take order for acquisition in each. But there are two awards in each set and it is agreed that the total extent covered by the awards does not, in fact, exceed the extent shown in the relevant declarations and the small difference seen is not material, as they represent the area noticed after correct measurement. The explanation for making more than one award is stated thus in the counter affidavit:- "The acquisition proceedings for the whole area mentioned in the Exts. P1. P2 and P3 were dealt with from the 3(1) stage up to the detailed valuation statement stage as a whole. When Detailed Valuation Statement was approved by the 2nd respondent, it was ordered that the awards for the lands mentioned in Exts. P17, P.19 and P20 should not be passed and compensation effected till the surplus lands to be surrendered by the Company are determined. Hence awards for that extent have not been passed and compensation not given to the party. After a few months, the list of lands coming under the purview of the ceiling provisions has been finalised and the District Collector Idukki the 2nd respondent in his Lr. No. C7.7116/81 dt. 2-2-81 has informed to make payment in respect of the exempted category of lands. Accordingly notices form No. 20 and notices under S.12(2) of the KLA Act were issued to the petitioners directing to hand over possession of the lands and to receive the compensation. Hence the question of abandonment of acquisition does not arise in this case. Acquisition proceedings for the entire area including lands mentioned in Exts. P7, P8 and P9 have been dealt with as a whole from the 3 (1) stage up to the Detailed Valuation Statement stage. The payment of compensation for the lands in question was withheld as it was to be determined whether the lands under acquisition are included in the surplus lands to be surrendered by the Company. Since the intention was for acquiring the whole area, the question of 'abandonment' does not arise." 17. The payment of compensation for the lands in question was withheld as it was to be determined whether the lands under acquisition are included in the surplus lands to be surrendered by the Company. Since the intention was for acquiring the whole area, the question of 'abandonment' does not arise." 17. Under the Land Reforms Act, excess lands vested in the State from the appointed date, namely, 1st January, 1970. Properties sought to be acquired under S.3 notifications issued in 1977 and 1978 need not be acquired if before that date, they vest in the Government from 1970 onwards. The determination of the extent of excess land, was left to the Land Boards under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. If the Land Acquisition Collector, therefore waited for the culmination of the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, and therefore awards had to be made piecemeal, it cannot be held that the action so taken is without jurisdiction and was not warranted by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In such circumstances, mala fides cannot be imported, (none is alleged) and discrimination and arbitrariness cannot be inferred. More than one award was required in the exigencies of the circumstance to safeguard the interest of the State and the affected parties under the Kerala Land Reforms Act as well. 18. Assuming that the second awards, Exts. P17, P19 and P21, could not have been issued separately and the properties mentioned there should have been included in Exts. P13, P14 and P15, the best that can be said in favour of the appellant can only be that an irregularity was committed by the Collector, notwithstanding the limitation under S.7 of the Act. That irregularity can be cured and the Collector can be directed to cancel all the awards and make a fresh consolidated award in respect of all the properties covered by the same direction issued under S.7. This is only an exercise in futility. 19. It has also to be noted that the appellant does not have any complaint regarding the Land Acquisition notification under S.3(1), and the declarations made under S.6 or the awards Exts. P13, P14 and P15. The complaint regarding valuation and the claim for enhanced compensation are pending consideration before the civil court on references made under the Act. 20. 19. It has also to be noted that the appellant does not have any complaint regarding the Land Acquisition notification under S.3(1), and the declarations made under S.6 or the awards Exts. P13, P14 and P15. The complaint regarding valuation and the claim for enhanced compensation are pending consideration before the civil court on references made under the Act. 20. The appellant has a contention that the Collector has abandoned acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands covered by the impugned awards (Ext. P17, P19 and P21), as the earlier award did not specifically include those properties. The Collector has no power to abandon acquisition without resorting to the legal processes available to him. The declaration has not been cancelled and the acquisition proceedings have not been withdrawn under the Act. Acquisitions hold good and the declarations remain in force. Even otherwise, the mere fact that two awards were made in each case does not imply that there was an abandonment as contended. This contention also is without force. 21. We are not satisfied that the appellant is prejudicially affected by the making of two awards. He was given an opportunity for a hearing before the awards were made. His contention regarding measurements etc. seems to have been partly upheld also. He does not challenge the public purpose behind the acquisition. He does not dispute about the identity of the properties required to satisfy the public purpose. Thus S 6 declaration is not in challenge. The mode of making the award cannot affect him prejudicially. His right to make a reference for enhanced compensation is not denied. There is thus no case made out for any interference under Art.226 of the Constitution. In the result, we affirm the decision of the learned single judge and dismiss the appeal with costs of the 1st respondent.