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1987 DIGILAW 315 (RAJ)

Mohammad Zaki v. Lekhraj

1987-03-19

G.M.LODHA

body1987
JUDGMENT 1. - This is a defendant's second appeal against the judgment of Additional District Judge, Bundi in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1972 reversing the judgment of Munsif, Bundi in Civil Suit No. 227 of 1961. 2. The plaintiff's case is that he gave on rent his one house described in Para No. 1 of the plaint to deceased Mustafa Hussain on monthly rent of Rs. 4.50, which was later raised to Rs. 5/- per month and this Mustafa Hussain remained in possession of the house till death : Mustafa Hussain expired in 1951 and after his death defendant No. 1, his wife Smt. Shahzadi Begum and defendant No. 2 Mohammad Zaki, his brother came in possession of this house and continued as tenants. A registered notice was given terminating the tenancy and thereafter the suit was filed for arrears of rent and eviction. 3. Both the defendants filed a joint written statement denying the plaintiff's suit allegation and alleged that Mustafa Hussain was never a tenant in the house. The defendants also alleged that Mustafa Hussain was in possession of the house as owner. After the death of Mustafa Hussain the respondents remained in possession of the house jointly, continuously and peacefully for last 30 years. The allegations of improvements were also made. 4. The following issues were framed : The issue regarding title and ownership were deleted and no grievance was made by either side in the appeal preferred before the District Judge and similarly in this Court. 5. The trial Court on discussion of evidence came to the conclusion that tenancy was not proved and consequently the suit was dismissed. The first appellate Court reversed that finding on the ground that tenancy was proved. 6. The first and the foremost question and the only question argued by Mr. Mehta is that tenancy has not been proved and the approach of the first appellate Court is perverse and, therefore, interference should be made in second appeal. Mr. Tikku on the contrary submitted that the question whether the relationship between the plaintiff and defendants is of landlord and tenants is pure question of fact and the finding of the first appellate Court even on reversion of the judgment of the trial Court is binding howsoever erroneous or inexcusable it may be. 7. Now coming to the merits of the case, it was pointed out by Mr. 7. Now coming to the merits of the case, it was pointed out by Mr. Mehta that no date of tenancy has been given. Similarly no receipt has been produced and it is impossible to believe that for a long period of 30 years when there is no proof of payment of rent and there is no document in writing of tenancy, simply by some circumstantial evidence believed by the first appellate Court, tenancy cannot be held to be proved Mr. Mehta's contention is that even the documents relied upon by the first appellate Court nowhere show that there was a tenancy. Mr. Mehta has taken me through the judgments of both the Courts and relevant evidence and vehemently challenged the finding of the first appellate Court. 8. Mr. Tikku on the contrary submits that apart from Ex. 1, a document of 1930 whose genuineness is beyond doubt Ex. 5 receipt of the rent deposited in the Court further proves that the relationship was that of landlord and tenant. Mr. Tikku also pointed out that a notice was given for eviction and payment of rent by registered post before filing of the suit, but the defendants never challenged the correctness of relationship of landlord and tenants by sending a reply to the notice. 9. Undoubtedly in a case where the relationship of landlord and tenant existed for a long period of three decades, is sought to be established on the basis of a few circumstances and the oral evidence believed by the first appellate Court consists of primarily the plaintiff and it is not known as to what was the exact date of tenancy. 10. However, the crucial limitations with which the second appeal is to be considered under Section 100 C.P.C. require to be first considered. Whether this Court is competent to interfere even if it finds that appreciation of evidence for establishment of relationship of landlord and tenant is based primarily on evidence which may be called erroneous. Before I proceed to analyse the submissions and adjudicate them. Whether this Court is competent to interfere even if it finds that appreciation of evidence for establishment of relationship of landlord and tenant is based primarily on evidence which may be called erroneous. Before I proceed to analyse the submissions and adjudicate them. I must mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again has warned against such interference and in Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 707, relying upon the earlier judgments in R. Ramchandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettair, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 302, D. Pattabhiramaswamy Hanymayya, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 57 and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1097, the oft-quoted limited jurisdiction laid down by the Privy Council was extracted namely:- "But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower Appellate Court, however, erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court, because, as the Privy Council observed, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be there is no jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error." 11. In the instant case the first appellate Court placed reliance on Ex. 1, which cannot be lightly brushed aside though speaking for myself as a trial Court or first appellate Court it may not have been sufficient to prove the tenancy. Ex. 1 is a document whose genuineness was not challenged before the first appellate Court and which is a certified copy of the judicial record in a suit of 1930. It is significant to note that in this document the Munsif, Bundi's Court was seized of this property in which the present plaintiff was the judgment-debtor and there was a decree of Sahib Ram Daulat Ram against him. It was mentioned that on the satisfaction of this decree the house of the judgment-debtor in which Court Inspector Mustafa Hussain is living as a tenant has been sold by the decree-holder and, therefore, Court Inspector Mustafa Hussain is directed that he should not pay the rent to Chaturbhuj but pay to decree holder. The report of compliance shows that this was sent to the Police Department as Mustafa Hussain was transferred to another Police Station and thereafter in Police Station, Barudhan the compliance was made. The report of compliance shows that this was sent to the Police Department as Mustafa Hussain was transferred to another Police Station and thereafter in Police Station, Barudhan the compliance was made. True it is that such a compliance cannot be an evidence of binding nature of a legal tenancy as all that it can show was that a certain fact happened in 1930. However, a few circumstances which give importance to this particular document cannot be ignored. For example, firstly Mustafa Hussain was a Prosecuting Sub-Inspector and not a rustic villager. This document is part of judicial record and, therefore, the chances of any fabrication or forgery or concoction was ruled out. Thirdly, the genuineness of this document was not challenged before the first appellate Court and rightly so, because looking to the history of the origin of this document, there can hardly be any doubt about its genuineness. 12. I am also of the opinion that when the question comes of proof of such document, which provides circumstantial evidence of undisputed character and that too of a period when there was no dispute between the parties, should be given due importance. It is well known that it not difficult to procure oral evidence as respect for truth is not of that standard which is expected in the Court of justice, but the documents coming from the custody of the Court and that too of a period prior to three decades, certainly inspires confidence. It is a different thing whether merely on such a document a conclusion of tenancy can be arrived at, because all said and done, the evidence is to be looked into in its entirety in a given case and one document cannot be conclusive. 13. Yet another document relied upon by the first appellate Court is Ex. 5. This document, read with the oral statement of the plaintiff Ex. 5, undoubtedly contains no admission of the tenancy, but when it is read with the statement of the plaintiff, it shows that by this receipt rent of Rs. 4.50 was deposited by the plaintiff on behalf of Mustafa Hussain on June 24, 1938. According to the plaintiff this amount was given to him by Mustafa Hussain. This document is dated June 24, 1938. 4.50 was deposited by the plaintiff on behalf of Mustafa Hussain on June 24, 1938. According to the plaintiff this amount was given to him by Mustafa Hussain. This document is dated June 24, 1938. It is common ground that Mustafa Hussain died some () where in 1951 and, therefore, the first appellate Court was justified in dispelling and rejecting the argument of the defendants that this document was created for creating false evidence of tenancy and it is not of significance that Ex. 1 is of 1930 and Ex. 5 is of 1938. As stated earlier, these documents are read with the statement of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's statement supported by these documents inspires confidence. 14. It is true that the date of tenancy has not been given and so also for a long period of more than three decades there is no evidence of regular or irregular payment of rent. It is also true that one of the witnesses of the plaintiff stated that there was written rent note, but then the same was not produced as stated and now it was not with him. This witness was Mool Chand decree-holder. These circumstances undoubtedly would have created circumstantial evidence in support of the tenants, but I am deeply impressed by Ex. 1 and Ex. 5 and I am convinced that the present one is a case of tenancy, although it may be that rent might have been paid or not paid for quite a long time. It is also well known established law that when a person enters as a tenant, he continues to be a tenant unless he starts asserting his right as an owner openly, commit acts of hostility against the owner and is allowed to do so uninterruptedly for the prescribed period by which he can claim adverse possession. Mere non-payment of rent and non-filing of suit for rent or eviction or inactivity or absence of legal action by a landlord against a tenant for a long period for realisation of rent would not result in the tenant's status being converted into that of the owner. That being so I am inclined to hold that merely because there is no evidence for payment of rent for a long period, no presumption should be drawn that the relationship was not of landlord and tenant, but the appellant was the owner of this property. 15. That being so I am inclined to hold that merely because there is no evidence for payment of rent for a long period, no presumption should be drawn that the relationship was not of landlord and tenant, but the appellant was the owner of this property. 15. Now coming to the oral evidence, much stress was laid by Mr. Mehta on the fact that adverse inference should not have been drawn on account of non-production of Mst. Shahzadi Begum. Mst. Shahzadi Begum undoubtedly is widow of Mustafa Hussain and I fail to understand the submission of Mr. Mehta as to how she loses the character of an important witness. She undoubtedly is living in this house. She conducted marriage with Mustafa Hussain and lived in the house with him and, therefore, she was the best witness to know in what capacity Mustafa Hussain was living in this property, even though she may not be able to tell the original story of induction of Mustafa Hussain in this house. I an in agreement with the finding of the first appellate Court that Mst. Shahzadi Begum is a material witness, who could have unfolded the story of defence, but she had no courage to come in evidence, and assert that her husband was not a tenant. 16. It is not necessary to discuss the other oral evidence in detail, because as mentioned above, I am conscious of my limitations and fetters of Section 100 C.P.C. and would not like to overstep the limits repeatedly asserted by and reminded by the Apex Court. 17. The result of the above discussion is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs. In terms of the stay order the amount deposited in the lower Court by the appellant should be paid to the respondent-landlord.Appeal dismiss. *******