JUDGMENT Krishna Ballabh Sinha, J. - This appeal arises out of the money suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent against the defendant-appellant for realisation of amount due for the work done under a contract. 2. The appellant-defendant is a Limited Company with its head office at Ranchi and having a Steel Project at Rourkela. The Plaintiff-respondent is a contractor and claims to be engaged in contract business since the year 1955. 3. The appellant issued notice on 29.5.1962 inviting quotations (tender) regarding Breaking and Loading of Slags and all Dobris produced in Steel Melting Shop and Transporting and Unloading the same from one place to the other within the plant area. The plaintiff-respondent submitted his tender on 5.5.62 with a demand draft of Rs. 15,000/- as earnest money. The offer made by the respondent, being the lowest, was accepted by the appellant and first he was verbally asked to make arrangement to start his work with effect from 26.6.1962. In pursuance of the said verbal order, the respondent started his work from 27.6.62. Subsequently a written order was given to him on 17/18.8.1961 by the appellant directing him to execute an agreement and accordingly an agreement was executed. The original agreement was retained by the appellant-company. A plain copy of the same was filed with the plaint as Annexure-B. 4. In course of execution of the work, according to the system prevalent there, trip cards (for each Truck load of the Slags and Debris loaded and removed) duly filled up and signed by the Officers of the defendant company were maintained and subsequently, they were deposited in the office of the Superintendent, Steel Melting Shop. The appellant had been also maintaining measurement book written and signed by their officers mentioning therein the actual quantity of slags and debris removed by the trucks with the Trucks number. According to the terms of the agreement, the respondent submitted bills from time to time which were passed by the competent officer of the appellant, after verifying the same with the trip cards and the measurement book. The case of the respondent further is that he submitted in all 8 (eight) bills covering the total amount of Rs. 2,84,598/-, for the work done by him. Plain copy of the said bills were filed as annexures C to C/7 with the plaint. He received payment of a sum of Rs. 2,06,710.55P. The case of the respondent further is that he submitted in all 8 (eight) bills covering the total amount of Rs. 2,84,598/-, for the work done by him. Plain copy of the said bills were filed as annexures C to C/7 with the plaint. He received payment of a sum of Rs. 2,06,710.55P. only on the basis of the bills submitted by him from time to time and a sum of Rs. 77,880.35 remained due. In spite of repeated demand the defendant did not pay the said amount and the earnest money and so a Pleader's Notice was sent to the defendant on 17.1.1966. Neither any reply was received by the respondent nor any payment was made to him and so he instituted the suit. The plaintiff further claimed interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the amount due as the same was withheld by the appellant illegally in spit of repeated demand. According to the respondent, the cause of action arose on the date when the tender was submitted by him and he started his work and executed agreement and finally on the day when the work was completed on 24.2.1963. Besides the amount due for the work done by the plaintiff-respondent and the earnest money, a sum of Rs. 32,550/- was claimed as interest and thus the total claim was for Rs. 1,25,438.35 P. 5. A written statement was filed on behalf of the defendant-appellant in which besides taking the point of jurisdiction and absence of cause of action, the frame of the suit was also challenged. The defendant also took the plea of limitation. However, it was accepted that the tender notice was issued by the appellant in response to which the respondent submitted his tender which was accepted and subsequently an agreement was executed by the parties. It was not denied that the respondent had been doing the work of loading, transporting and unloading, according to the terms of the agreement. The procedure for payment of the bills with reference to the trip cards and the measurement book was also not denied. However, it was stated that the plaintiff or his agent used to obtain blank trip-card-forms from the office of the Superintendent, Steel Melting Shop and place the same before the Officer-in-charge at the site of loading after obtaining signature on them within 24 hours. However, it was stated that the plaintiff or his agent used to obtain blank trip-card-forms from the office of the Superintendent, Steel Melting Shop and place the same before the Officer-in-charge at the site of loading after obtaining signature on them within 24 hours. On the basis of the trip card forms, truck-wise entries used to be made in the measurement book. It was admitted that the plaintiff submitted 8 (eight) bills for a total sum of Rs. 2,84,598.90P. but the correctness of the amount claimed was challenged. It was also admitted that only a sum of Rs. 2,10,689.38 P. was paid to the respondent inclusive of the security deposit of Rs. 3,987.83P. which was in addition to Rs. 15,000/- deposited at the initial stage as earnest money. The appellant, however, denied that a sum of Rs. 77,888.35P. of the plaintiff• respondent was due with it. It was net denied that the earnest money and the security deposit, totalling Rs. 18,987.83P. was due, but, according to the defendant it was not payable till the account was finally settled and the advance payment made was adjusted. The liability to pay interest was denied as there was no such stipulation in the agreement. According to the appellant, when the bills and account of the respondent was audited by the Internal Audit Party, it transpired that the respondent had adopted various fraudulent tactics and thereby managed to obtain more trip card forms, as a result of which more quantity of slags and debris were shown to have been removed than what was actually carried from one place to the other and on that basis bill for inflated amount was submitted which was not legally payable. The Special Police Establishment at Bhuwaneshwar made investigation in this matter and seized the relevant papers relating to this contract. The respondent having come to know about the institution of the case with the Police, filed the suit as counter blast to save himself. 6. In the trial court no witness was examined on behalf of the respondent. The defendant examined two witnesses out of them D.W. 1 Gopal Krishna was an internal auditor at the relevant time and had audited the account in connection with the contract of the respondent. 6. In the trial court no witness was examined on behalf of the respondent. The defendant examined two witnesses out of them D.W. 1 Gopal Krishna was an internal auditor at the relevant time and had audited the account in connection with the contract of the respondent. D.W. 2 P.K. Mitra was working in the Security Department of Hindustan Steel Company and stated that his duty was on the main gate of the factory during the period of contract of the respondent. According to him no vehicle was allowed to enter or go out of the factory premises without gate-pass which used to be issued on the application filed by the person requiring the same. 7. The following issues were framed in the trial court: "(1) Has the plaintiff any cause of action for the suit? (2) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (3) Has this Court jurisdiction to try this suit? (4) Is the suit barred by limitation? (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for the amount claimed or any amount at all ? (6) Is the plaintiff entitled to get the interest, as claimed ? (7) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? 8. The issue regarding defect in the frame of the suit and the issue on the point of limitation were not pressed by the appellant and so they were decided in favour of the respondent. Admittedly, the Head Office of the defendant was situated at Ranchi so the point of jurisdiction was also decided in favour of the respondent. 9. From the pleadings of the parties it is manifest that there was no dispute between the parties that the tender of the plaintiff was accepted and consequently the agreement was executed and the plaintiff started the work of Breaking and Loading of Slags and Debris produced in the Steel Melting Shop and removing the same within the plant area from one place to the other on his own Truck and with his own labourers. It was also admitted that for the work done by the plaintiff he had submitted bills from time to time. The bills submitted by him were marked as Exts. 4 to 4 (c) in the court below. The procedure for preparation and submission of the bills has also been admitted in the written statement. It was also admitted that for the work done by the plaintiff he had submitted bills from time to time. The bills submitted by him were marked as Exts. 4 to 4 (c) in the court below. The procedure for preparation and submission of the bills has also been admitted in the written statement. According to the plaint, the Superintendent, Steel Melting Shop, was empowered to pass the bill. It was not the case of the appellant that the bills submitted by the respondent were not passed by the competent officers. It is also admitted that bulk of the amount claimed in the bills was paid to the respondent. 10. According to the case of the parties, controversy, primarily, centers round the issue as to whether the respondent is entitled to get payment of Rs. 77,888.35 P. ? In course of the internal audit of the account of the appellant it was detected that the respondent had played fraud for unlawful gain. By committing fraud, the respondent is said to have obtained more trip cards of truck and on the basis of which he submitted the bills of inflated amount. As the allegation was made by the appellant that fraud was prayed by the respondent so the onus to prove the allegation was on the appellant. 11. Mr. S.C. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the respondent did not choose to come in the witness box to face cross examination and as a result of which the appellant was handicapped in proving the allegation of fraud made against him. Mr. Janardan Prasad Singh, learned counsel for the respondent argued that it was entirely the responsibility of the appellant to prove the allegation of fraud alleged to have been committed by the respondent. It was not necessary for the respondent to appear in the trial court as a witness as his case was admitted by the other side. He also submitted that having failed to prove its own case, the appellant could not be legally allowed to take advantage of non-examination of the respondent as a witness in the case and to adverse inference could be drawn against him on this score. 12. On plain reading of the plaint and the written statement it may be noticed that the scope of controversy between the parties is on a limited point. 12. On plain reading of the plaint and the written statement it may be noticed that the scope of controversy between the parties is on a limited point. The whole case of the respondent was practically admitted by the appellant except that the respondent was not entitled to get the amount claimed in this case because he committed fraud. The trial court after perusing the bills has recorded the finding that they were duly checked and passed for the amount mentioned therein by the Superintendent or the Assistant Superintendent of the Steel Melting Shop. It appears that in view of the scanty material on the record, Mr. Ghosh did not pursue the argument to its logical end. It has been held by the learned Subordinate Judge that the appellant failed to establish the allegation of fraud against the respondent. I do not find any reason to disturb the said finding and as such the submission made on behalf of the appellant is not tenable. 13. Next it was contended by Mr. Ghosh that the suit was barred by limitation and, therefore, the impugned judgment was not sustainable in the eye of law. It was stated that Ext. 4(e) dated 14.3.63 was the only bill which was submitted within the period of three years prior to the date of institution of the suit. The other bills (Exts. 4 to 4 (d)) were submitted between 23.10.62 to 5.2.63 and so claim for payment of the said bills was made beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the law. Submission was made that as regards the said Bills (Exts. 4 to 4(d) the period of limitation had to be reckoned from the date of submission of each Bill. It was urged that in the case of such contract the provision of Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would be applicable according to which the prescribed period of limitation was three years from the time when the work was done. 14. In order to meet the contention raised on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Singh advanced two fold arguments. His first contention was that a specific issue was framed in the trial court regarding limitation and that issue was not pressed at that stage. The appellant deliberately relinquished a known right and thus it could not be allowed to raise the point of limitation at the appellate stage. Mr. Singh advanced two fold arguments. His first contention was that a specific issue was framed in the trial court regarding limitation and that issue was not pressed at that stage. The appellant deliberately relinquished a known right and thus it could not be allowed to raise the point of limitation at the appellate stage. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the case of M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and ors. (1979 S.C. 621). In that case a news item was published in which it was stated that the State Government had decided to give exemption from sales tax for a period of three years under section 4-A of the D.P. Sales Tax Act to all new Industrial Units in the State with a view to enabling them to come on firm footing in developing stage. This news item was based on a statement made by then Chief Secretary. On the basis of the announcement the appellant of that case addressed a letter to the Director of Industries and a reply was received confirming that no sales tax would be charged for three years on the finished product of the proposed Vanashpati Factory of the appellant. In view of the assurance given on behalf of the State Government, the appellant started setting up a Vanashpati Factory. The State Government went back upon the assurance and intimated that by a policy decision it had been decided that the new Vanashpati Units in the State would be given partial concession in sales-tax at certain rates. Factually it was found that the appellants relying upon the assurance of the Government borrowed money from the various financial institutions, purchased plant and machineries from (sic) the business concerned and set up a Factory at Kanpur. It has been held that the fact necessary for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel were clearly present and therefore the Government was bound to carry out the representation and exempt the appellant from sales-tax. The fact of that case is absolutely different from the instant case. As regards principle of waiver it has been held that the waiver is a question of fact. Waiver means abandonment of a right which may be either expressed or implied from the conduct, but its basic requirement is that it must be an intentional act with knowledge. The fact of that case is absolutely different from the instant case. As regards principle of waiver it has been held that the waiver is a question of fact. Waiver means abandonment of a right which may be either expressed or implied from the conduct, but its basic requirement is that it must be an intentional act with knowledge. There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of such right, he intentionally abandoned it. So, in my view the principle of waiver is not attracted to the facts of this case. 15. It is well settled that it is not within the competence of the court or the parties to ignore or by pass the effect of statute of limitation. When the counsel of a party waives the objection regarding limitation, the party is not estopped from raising the objection as the admission of the counsel on the point of law is not binding on the party. In my view, the plea of limitation, therefore, can be raised at the appellate stage. The difficulty, of course, arises where the plea of limitation is dependent on the determination of facts. I am unable to accept that on the principle of waiver, the appellant in this case is estopped from raising the point of limitation. 16. The question which still remains for determination in the instant case is whether the claim of money of the respondent for the work done by him is barred under the law of limitation. 17. On behalf of respondent Mr. Singh did not dispute the contention of the appellant regarding applicability of Article 18 of the Limitation Act to this case. He, however, contended that the date mentioned in each bill (Exts. 4 to 4 (b)) could not be taken as the starting point for counting the period of limitation. He urged that the period of limitation would be counted from the date of the submission of the last bill. 18. In order to appreciate the submission made on behalf of the parties, it is useful to notice Article 18 of the Limitation Act. Under this provision three years period of limitation has been prescribed for the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request where no time has been fixed for payment. 18. In order to appreciate the submission made on behalf of the parties, it is useful to notice Article 18 of the Limitation Act. Under this provision three years period of limitation has been prescribed for the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request where no time has been fixed for payment. As provided under this Article time of limitation runs from the date when the work is done. 19. Before dealing with the point of limitation it is worth while to recall that the case was instituted on 21.2.66 and plain copies of 8 bills were filed along with the plaint. On the prayer of the respondent an order was passed by the trial court directing the appellant to produce the original deed of agreement, the said bills and some other documents. From the order-sheet dated 12.7.67 of the trial court it appears that the original bills produced by the appellant were marked as Exts. 4 to 4 (b) without any objection. The deed of agreement was marked as Ext. 1. As the documents were marked without objection, there can be no doubt about their admissibility, even though no witness was examined on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent to prove the same. 20. In the deed of agreement there is a clause regarding mode of payment which says that the quantity of work executed shall ordinarily be measured and payment will be made once a month and on completion of this work or on the determination of agreement, final measurement will be made and the account will be adjusted accordingly. From the terms of the agreement, as mentioned above, it appears that it was agreed between the parties that ordinarily the quantity of work done by the respondent was to be measured once a month and payment was to be made for the same. It was also agreed that the final measurement would be done after completion of the work. The expression "work done by the plaintiff" as mentioned in Article 18 of the Limitation Act means the work fully done. This Article does not suggest that in case payment is made for the part of the work done by the plaintiff, from time to time, the period of limitation for such work will run separately for each bill from the date they are submitted. This Article does not suggest that in case payment is made for the part of the work done by the plaintiff, from time to time, the period of limitation for such work will run separately for each bill from the date they are submitted. In the instant case, according to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was entitled for payment of the work done by him in each month. The final payment was subject to completion of the entire work. The limitation will thus run from the date when the work was completed. If the work entrusted to a plaintiff by a defendant covers a period of more than three years in its execution, the plaintiff will not be debarred from getting payment of that part of the work which is done by him three years prior to its completion. For the purpose of filing a suit under Article 18 the work will be deemed to have been done, when it is wholly done and duly entered in the measurement book on the basis of which the final bill is prepared. 21. Mr. Ghosh had referred to the case of Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India (1970 S. C. 1433) and the case of Jullundur Improvement Trust v. Kuldip Singh (1984 Punjab & Haryana 185). In both the cases it has been held that Article 18 of the Limitation Act governs the suit instituted for the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request where no time has bee fixed for payment. In the case of Gannon Dunkerley &. Co. Ltd. (supra) a claim was made for extra work done under the direction of the Engineer beyond the contractual work. There was no occasion for deciding the issue as to how the period of limitation would be counted in the case falling within the purview of Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The facts of that case are quite different from the present one. In Jullundur Improvement Trust's case (supra) the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendants to construct road under a development scheme. The work was completed on 21.9.67 and the necessary measurement had been recorded in the measurement book on 7.10.67 by the Engineer-in-charge. Payment of the bill was received by the plaintiff under protest on 14.12.67. The suit was filed on 9.2.71. The work was completed on 21.9.67 and the necessary measurement had been recorded in the measurement book on 7.10.67 by the Engineer-in-charge. Payment of the bill was received by the plaintiff under protest on 14.12.67. The suit was filed on 9.2.71. It has been held that for the purpose of filing the suit under Article 18 the work will be deemed to have been done on 7.10.67 when it was duly entered in the measurement book and on the basis of which final hills was prepared. 22. In my view the decisions cited on behalf of the appellants are not of any avail to him. In the former case there is no finding as to what would be the point of time for computing the period of limitation in the case governed by Article 18 of the Limitation Act. In the latter case what has been stated for computing the period of limitation under the provision of said Article, rather helps the respondent and in no way it is helpful to the appellant. 23. I would like to refer to the case of Sundaram & anr. v. Sankara (I.L.R. 9 Madras 334) in which a similar point fell for consideration. The facts of that case are almost identical to the facts of the instant case. It was a suit by a Zamindar for recovery of the amount spent by him at the request of the defendant for the tank and water channel held by them in common. The repair work spread over a period of three years and there was no fixed time for payment of the share by the defendant. It was held that the price for the repair work would be payable within three years from the date when the work was fully completed. On behalf of the respondent reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court, State of Rajasthan v. Ram Kishan (1977 Rajasthan 165), in which, besides other points, one of the questions for determination was the same which is under consideration in this case. On behalf of the respondent reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court, State of Rajasthan v. Ram Kishan (1977 Rajasthan 165), in which, besides other points, one of the questions for determination was the same which is under consideration in this case. After surveying a large number of cases, including 1970 S.C. 1433, it has been held that where a suit is based on building contract and is governed by Article 56 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, the starting point of limitation would be the date when the Engineer-in-charge issues the certificate of completion and when the final measurements are made. Article 56 of he Act 1908, corresponds to Article 18 of Act, 1963. 24. In the instant case final bill was submitted on 14-3-63. The Superintendent of Steel Melting Shop, who was competent to pass the bill has clearly mentioned in it that this was the final bill and the claim was covered by the price of work done. In other bills the competent Officer, who passed the same, has clearly mentioned that the claim was made for piece work. On bare perusal of the bills, it is manifest that the bills submitted prior to 14-3-63 were for the price of the work partial done by the plaintiff-respondent. So it is not possible to accept the contention that the period of limitation would run separately for each bill from the respective date of their submission. Having regard to the terms of contract and the facts mentioned above, in my concluded opinion, the period of limitation in this case will commence when the final bill was submitted by the respondent on the basis of final measurement done by the Superintendent of the Steel Melting Shop of the appellant. 25. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not find any merit in this appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.