P. P. BOPANNA, J. ( 1 ) A Division Bench of this Court consisting of My Lord the Chief Justice and Venkatesh, J. has referred the following question for the opinion of Full bench. "whether a permit granted in violation of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, can be validated solely on the ground that the operator has operated the stage carriage services on the route for a long period and that interference with such unlawful grant on a hypertechnical ground would not be in public interest ?" ( 2 ) THE facts leading to this reference are succinctly stated in the order of reference made by the Division Bench. Therefore, it is not necessary to burden the record by repeating them in our order. ( 3 ) THE permits in question which were the subject matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge were admittedly granted in violation of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act (in short 'the Act' ). But, they were sought to be validated on the ground that the Petitioners/operators had operated the stage carriage services on the routes in question for a long period and, therefore, this Court should not on a Technical ground interfere with the grants made in violation of subsection (3) of Section 47 of the Act, as the same would not be in public interest. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in these petitions is that subjection (3) of Section 47 of the Act is a procedural provision and an order made in violation of the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Act is not ab initio void but only voidable and public interest being the dominant factor in the grant of permits, the same would suffer by setting aside the permits in question under which the petitioners have been operating the services for a long period. In support of this proposition he has placed reliance on the decisions of the supreme Court in M. Chinnaswamy v. M/s. Dhandayuthanpani Roadways (P) ltd. (A. I. R. 1977 S. C. , 2095) and Abdul rahman And Others v. The State Transport appellate Tribunal And Others (A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 949) which were followed by a division Bench of this Court in W. A. Nos. 136 and 137 of 1973. (A. I. R. 1977 S. C. , 2095) and Abdul rahman And Others v. The State Transport appellate Tribunal And Others (A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 949) which were followed by a division Bench of this Court in W. A. Nos. 136 and 137 of 1973. He also relies on a decision of Rajasthan High Court in smt. Shakuntala Devi v. Transport appellate Tribunal. Jaipur And Others (A. I R. 1971 Rajasthan 226 ). It is further submitted by him that regard being had to the matters to be taken into account in terms of Section 47 (1) of the Act and the procedure to be followed as per Section 57 (3) of the Act, while considering an application for grant of stage carriage permit and condit ons to be imposed on stage carriage permit in terms of Section 48 (3) of the Act. Section 47 (3) of the act is deemed to have been complied with. In support of this proposition, he relies on para 21 of the judgment of the supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v State transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras ( AIR 1970 SC 1542 ). He also maintains that the permits were granted initially for a period three years and now the same have been in operation for a period of more than 8 years, that by itself is sufficient to show that the permits are granted in public interest and by annulling the same, public interest would suffer. ( 5 ) PER contra, learned counsel for the respondents, submits that provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Act make it incumbent on the Regional Transport authority to determine first the number of permits to be granted on an intra-regional route which is not opened up in accordance with the provisions of Section 47 of the Act with particular reference to sub-section (3) thereof that unless the route is opened and number of stage carriages to be operated on the route is determined as per Section 47 (3) of the act, the Regional Transport Authority does not get jurisdiction to grant permit on an intra-regional route. Therefore, the impugned orders are void and not voidable. He relies on the observations of the learned author Wade on Administrative law at page 310, 4th Edition, and the decisions of this Court in T. M. Rangappa and Bros. v. Mysore Revenue Appellate tribunal and Others (1971 (2) Mys. Therefore, the impugned orders are void and not voidable. He relies on the observations of the learned author Wade on Administrative law at page 310, 4th Edition, and the decisions of this Court in T. M. Rangappa and Bros. v. Mysore Revenue Appellate tribunal and Others (1971 (2) Mys. L. J. 302 at 309) and Revanappa Sangappa v. R T. A. Bidar, andothers 1979 (1) Kar L J. , 171) and also on a decision of the supreme Court in Messrs. Shiv Chand amolak Chand v. The Regional Transport authority and Another (A. I. R. 1984 S C. 9 ). He further maintains that the Supreme court in Abdu! Rehman case (A. I. R. 1978 sc 949) was concerned with inter-regional routes and it was not called upon to lay down any principle which could be followed in the case of intra-regional routes. ( 6 ) IN the light of these competing contentions, we will first consider the scope of section 47 (3) of the Act. Is it merely a procedural provision and as such violation of it could be tolerated In public interest or alternatively whether such violation would render the order granting permit voidable as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners ? before doing so, we shall first deal with the decision of the Division Bench in Writ appeals Nos. 136 and 137 of 1973 which has led to this reference. ( 7 ) IN those appeals a joint memo was filed by the Appellant and Respondents 4 and 5 therein as follows :"the appellant is operating a Stage carriage on the route Bokkanakere to byloor and back viz. K. R. S. , Mysore, t. N. Pur, Kollegal etc. , ever since 8-1-1967. The permit was set aside on the ground of non-compliance with section 47 (3) of the Act. Meanwhile curing the pendency of these appeals, the authorities have held that there is need for an additional service. The authorities have granted a Stage Carriage permit between K. R. Sagar to byloor and back. The distance between bookkanakereto K. R. Sagar is curtailed because fresh permits should not be granted to ply on the K. R. S. Dam. The old operators including the appellant have been permitted to operate on k. R. S. Dam. The authorities have granted a Stage Carriage permit between K. R. Sagar to byloor and back. The distance between bookkanakereto K. R. Sagar is curtailed because fresh permits should not be granted to ply on the K. R. S. Dam. The old operators including the appellant have been permitted to operate on k. R. S. Dam. The appellant submits that the permit issued on 8-1-1967 only need be maintained and the appellant will surrender the permit granted on the route K. R. S. to Byloor and withdraw the W. P. No. 6900 of 1978. The appellant also agrees for the modification of timings as to leave Mysore at 12-15 P. M. and arrive at T. N. Pur at 1-25 P. M. and depart at 1-30 P. M. This may be recorded and the memo sent to R. T. A. for assignment of this modification of timing. It is also clear that the order of S. T. A. T. regarding new entrants being not entitled to ply on K R. S. Dam remains unaffected. The above writ appeals may be allowed. "in those appeals also the subject matter for consideration was the permits which were set aside on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of section 47 (3) of the Act. Notwithstanding the above memo, the Division Bench examined the facts of the case and held that as a result of the interim orders issued throughout in the proceedings by the authorities under the Act, the appellant therein was continuously operating his stage carriage since 1968. Accordingly, the Division Bench following the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Chinna- swamy's case ( AIR 1977 SC 2095 ) and also the subsequent decision in Abdul rehman's case (1978 SC 949) ruled that it would be hypertechnical to set aside the permit granted to the appellant on the sole ground that there was no prior determination as to the number of stage carriage permits to be granted on the route as required by Section 47 (3) of the act. Thus the order of the learned Single judge taking a contrary view was reversed in the appeals by the Division Bench. ( 8 ) THIS takes us to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Chinnaswamy's case ( AIR 1977 SC 2095 ). Thus the order of the learned Single judge taking a contrary view was reversed in the appeals by the Division Bench. ( 8 ) THIS takes us to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Chinnaswamy's case ( AIR 1977 SC 2095 ). In that case the Supreme Court found that although the permit to be granted was only one, but by orders of court or other authority, both the parties had been allowed to ply their buses. The Supreme Court observed that in public interest, if two stage carriages had been plying on the route for about 16 years, there was no reason to confine it to one. Further, both sides had agreed that there was need for two permits on the route and in that view the Supreme court found that the dispute was academic and directed the status quo to continue and allowed both the parties to ply their stage carriages on the route taking appropriate permits from the authorities concerned. ( 9 ) THE second case relied upon by the Division Bench is also a decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman's case reported in AIR 1978 SC 949 . In that case, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions in Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd. v. C. Chandrasekharan (A. I. R. 1965 SC 107) and Kishanchand Narsinghdas bhatia v. State Transport Authority (A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1461) and Mohd. Ibrahim v. State Transport Appellate tribunal. Madras (A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1542) and observed :"after all section 47 of the Act emphasises the interest of the travelling public as the dominant consideration in the grant of permits and no order in exercise of powers under Article 226 or article 136 of the Constitution will ordinarily be passed if the public is likely to suffer. And, surely, in this case, after all these years when all these buses having been plying, it will be, ritualistic to direct second consideration of the need to increase the number of permits for the route which is now admittedly an inter-regional route. And, surely, in this case, after all these years when all these buses having been plying, it will be, ritualistic to direct second consideration of the need to increase the number of permits for the route which is now admittedly an inter-regional route. It is hardly necessary in this connection to reiterate the observations made by this Court in Kishanchand Narasinghdas bhatia v. State Transport Appellate authority (1968) 3 SCR 605 : ( AIR 1968 sc 1461 ) that the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution should be reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specialty constituted authorities or tribunals under the Act especially when the Legislature has entrusted the task of granting or renewing the stage carriage permits to the aforesaid authorities or tribunals which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice and the relevant matters which should engage their attention under the provisions contained in the Act. " ( 10 ) THE object and purpose of Section 47 (3) of the Act is considered by the Supreme Court in a series of cases. In Abdul Mateen v Ham Kailash Pandey (A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 64 ). the Supreme Court has observed :"section 47 (3) gives power to the regional Transport Authority having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-S. (1) to limit the number of stage carriages generally etc. It would be clear therefore that when the Regional Transport authority proceeds in the manner provided in Sec. 57 to consider an application for a stage carriage permit and eventually decides either to grant it or not to grant it under S. 48 its order has to be subject to the provisions of S. 47, including S. 47 (3) by which the Regional Transport Authority is given the power to limit the number of stages generally etc Therefore, if the regional Transport Authority has limited the number of stage carriages by exercising its power under S. 47 (3), the grant of permits by it under S. 48 has to be subject to the limit fixed under S 47 (3 ). We cannot accept the contention on behalf of the appellant that when the Regional Transport authority following the procedure provided in S. 57, comes to grant or refuse a permit it can ignore the limit fixed under S. 47 (3), because it is only the authority making the order under S. 48. Sect/on 47 (3) is concerned with a general order limiting stage carriages generally etc. on a consideration of matters specified in S. 47 (1 ). That general order can be modified by the Regional transport Authority, if it so decides, one way or the other. But the modification of that order is not a matter for consideration when the Regional Transport authority is dealing with the actual grant of permits under S. 48 read with S. 57, for at that stage what the Regional Transport Authority has to do is to choose between various applicants who may have made applications to it under Sec 46 read with Sec. 57. That in our opinion is not the stage where the general order passed under s. 47 (3) can be reconsidered for the order under S. 48 is subject to the provisions of S. 47, which includes S. 47 (3) under which a general order limiting the number of stage carriages etc. may have been passed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The scheme of the Act therefore is that a limit is fixed under S. 47 (3) and the applications received are dealt with in the manner provided by Section 57 and permit can be granted under Section 48 subject to the limit fixed under Section 47 (3 ). "in M/s. Jayaram Motor Service v. Rajarathinam (C A. 95/1965 decided on 27-1-67 and reported in 1967 (2) S. C. W. R. 857) the scheme of Section 47 of the Act was considered and it was held that Section 47 envisaged two stages of enquiry : (i) the fixing of the number of permits under Section 47 (3) and (ii) the consideration thereafter of the application for grant of the permit and the representation if any by the persons mentioned in Section 47 (1 ). This decision was considered by the Supreme Court in R. Obliswami Naidu v. Addl. S. T. AT. Madras (A. I. R. 1969 s C. 1130 ). In R. Obliswamy Naidu's case, the consequences of non-compliance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act directly fell for consideration. The decision in M/s. Jayaram Motor Service and in Abdul mateen (AIR 1963 S. C. 64) were also referred to. In Obliswamy Naidu's case the High Court had held that the grant of permit without complying with sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act was invalid. The question that was raised for decision in that case was whether the determination as to the number of stage carriages required on a route should be done at the stage anterior to that of entertaining the application for stage carriage permits or that it could be done at the time it considers applications made by the operators for stage carriage permits in that route. The High Court held that the determination of the number of stage carriages was required to be made at a stage anterior to that of entertaining the applications for stage carriage permits. The Supreme Court approved the view taken by the High Court as correct and held thus :"on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act and the purpose behind Sections 47 and 57, we are convinced that before granting a stage carriage permit two independent steps have to be taken. Firstly there should be determination by the R. T. A. under section 47 (3) of the number of stage carriages for which stage carriage permits may be granted in that route. Thereafter applications for stage carriage permits in that route should be entertained. The R. T. A. is not competent to grant stage carriage permits for more carriages than fixed under Section 47 (3 ). Our above conclusion accords with the view expressed by this court in Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1965 (SC) m/s. Jaya Ram Motor Service v. Raja rathinam. . . . . . . . "thereafter the question 'again arose before the Supreme Court in Mohammed ibrahim v. S. T. A. T. Madras (A. I. R. 1970 s. C. 1542 ). Our above conclusion accords with the view expressed by this court in Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1965 (SC) m/s. Jaya Ram Motor Service v. Raja rathinam. . . . . . . . "thereafter the question 'again arose before the Supreme Court in Mohammed ibrahim v. S. T. A. T. Madras (A. I. R. 1970 s. C. 1542 ). After referring to the decisions in Abdul Mateen (A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 64), M/s. Jaya Ram Motor Service (C. A. 95/1965 D. D. 27-1-1967 reported in 1967 (2) S. C. W. R. 857) and Obliswami Naidu (A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1130) it was held that the determination of the limit of number of permits was to be made before the grant of permits. It was also pointed out therein that that is why Section 48 of the Act is prefaced with the words "subject to the provisions of Section 47 of the act" meaning thereby that the jurisdiction of the R. T. A. to grant permits is subject to the determination of the limit of number of permits made under Sec. 47 (3) of the Act. Thus it was categorically held that the jurisdiction of the R. T. A. to grant permits is subject to and is dependent upon the determination made under section 47 (3) of the Act. In other words, the jurisdiction to grant permits cannot at all be exercised in respect of an intra-regional route in the absence of determination as to number of permits to be granted on the route, made as per subsection (3) of Sec. 47 of the Act. It was further held by Ray. J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench thus :"an order under S. 47 (3) of the Act is not a matter of mere form but of substance. When it became a question of fact as to whether the Regional transport Authority fixed limit of number of permits before the grant of permits, the State Transport Appellate tribunal fell into the error of overlooking the substance of the matter. When it became a question of fact as to whether the Regional transport Authority fixed limit of number of permits before the grant of permits, the State Transport Appellate tribunal fell into the error of overlooking the substance of the matter. "in para 63 of the judgment, the learned judge further observed :"it is in this context that this Court said in Obliswami Naidu's case (1969) 1 SCR 730- ( AIR 1969 SC 1130 ) (supra) that the limit could not be fixed at the time of consideration of applications because thereby public interest might not gain the dominant consideration and on the contrary the decision of the regional Transport Authority might be influenced by personal consideration of or predilection for the applicants. There should not be any room for elasticity of the number of permits at the time of consideration of application for the grant. It is in the scheme of the Act that limit should be fixed before the grant of permit and proper effect can be given to these provisions by deciding upon the permit of number of permits before applications for grant of permits are invited under Sec. 57 (2) of the Act and in other cases before applications for grant of permits are published under s. 57 (3) of the Act to enable persons to make representations. The central idea is that applications and those who will make representations should all know the limit of number of permits to be granted in order to ensure free and fair competition. "on ihe facts of that case, it is very relevant to note that the Supreme Court found that there was a valid order made under Section 47 (3) of the Act. At this stage, we can dispose of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the finding recorded as to need in the proceeding for grant of permit must also necessarily lead to an inference that there was substantial compliance with sec 47 (3) of the Act and as such it is permissible to draw such an inference, having regard to what is stated in paras 21 and 22 of the judgment in the aforesaid case. It is not possible to accept this contention. It is not possible to accept this contention. The Supreme Court has observed in paras 21 and 22 thus :"in this appeal the State Transport appellate Tribunal set aside the grant of permit on the ground that there was no valid order under S. 47 (3) of the act. The High Court also took the same view. In the present case there was proposal based on satistics to show the need for an additional bus. The regional Transport Authority itself invited applications under Section 57 (2) of the Act for the grant of an additional permit on the route. It is significant that there was no application by any operator for the grant of an additional permit but that the Regional Transport authority itself under section 57 (2) of the Act invited applications for the grant of an additional permit and appointed dates for reception of applications in that behalf. This invitation of applications indicates in the facts and circumstances of the case that there was a valid determination under section 47 (3) of the Act for an additional permit on the route. . . . . . . . . . . . . The State Transport Appellate Tribunal found that there was no valid order under S. 47 (3) of the Act before considering applications for grant of permits. The High Court also upheld the view. This was a case of a new route. In this case there was a notification under section 57 (2) of the Act asking for applications for the grant of a permit on the new route. This will, in our opinion, indicate that there was a determination of the limit of number of stage carriage permits under section 47 (3) of the Act. The State Transport Appellate tribunal also considered the appeals on merits and held that M/s. M. K. S. and brothers, Mettur Dam was the best suited person for the permit. In view of that decision, the appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the High court to deal with the application on merits on the basis that there is a valid order under section 47 (3) of the Act. In view of that decision, the appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the High court to deal with the application on merits on the basis that there is a valid order under section 47 (3) of the Act. "thus in the aforesaid decision, the supreme Court has made a clear distinction between a case where the R T. A. on the material before it as to the need to introduce a service on an intra-regional route issues a notification calling for applications under Sec. 57 (2) for grant of stage carriage permits mentioning therein the number of permits proposed to be granted; and a case where no applications are invited by issuing notification under sec. 57 (2) but an operator voluntarily makes an application for grant of a stage carriage permit. In the former case, as held by the Supreme Court, even in the absence of independent prior determination under sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act, it is possible to draw an inference from the statement contained in the notification calling for the applications, that such a statement as to the number of permits proposed to be granted would be indicative of the determination of the number of permits required to be granted on the route. In other words, in such a case, on the material available, it is possible to hold that there was substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Act before entertaining the applications for grant of stage carriage permits. Whereas in the case of voluntary applications by the operators, there will be no material whatsoever to draw any such inference. The case on hand falls in the latter category. Here the petitioners had made applications voluntarily for grant of three stage carriage permits on three intra- regional routes. Prior to the making of the applications, no determination was made under Section 47 (3) of the Act. Therefore no material whatsoever on record existed as on the date of filing of the applications which would enable the court to hold that there was substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 47 (3 ). Prior to the making of the applications, no determination was made under Section 47 (3) of the Act. Therefore no material whatsoever on record existed as on the date of filing of the applications which would enable the court to hold that there was substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 47 (3 ). Again in Rattanlal Gupta and Others v. Suraj Bhan and Others (A. I R. 1974 S. C. 391), the Supreme Court after referring to the earlier decisions on Section 47 (3) and quoting with approval the relevant portions from the decision in Obliswamy naidu's case held thus :"as the R. T. A. had not fixed the number of permits for the longer route, we agree with the High Court that the grant of permits for the longer route is invalid. "this decision also makes it clear that a grant of permit made on an intra-regional route without prior determination as per sec. 47 (3) is invalid. The matter was again considered in m/s. Gajendra Transport v. Anamallias bus Transport (A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 386) In this case also, the view taken in Mohd. Ibrahim ( AIR 1970 SC 1542 ) was reiterated and it was held that the R. T. A. would be acting without jurisdiction in granting a stage carriage permit in the absence of substantial compliance with Section 47 (3) of the Act. On the facts and circumstances of that case, it was found by the supreme Court that there was substantial compliance with Section 47 (3) of the Act before the applications were taken up for consideration and the order was made granting a stage carriage permit. It was held that the Tribunal was therefore not right in setting aside the order of the r. T. A. on the ground that there was no valid order under sub section (3) of Section 47 and the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the Madras high Court were in error in confirming the order made by the Tribunal. But as already pointed out, the above decision confirmed the view that compliance with section 47 (3) of the Act in one form or the other or atleast in substance is necessary before entertaining the application for grant of stage carriage permit. But as already pointed out, the above decision confirmed the view that compliance with section 47 (3) of the Act in one form or the other or atleast in substance is necessary before entertaining the application for grant of stage carriage permit. Lastly in M/s. Shiv Chand Amolak chand v. R. T. A. (A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 9) the supreme Court authoritatively ruled thus :"it is undoubtedly true that having regard to the several decisions of this court and particularly the decision in mohd. Ibrahim v. State Transport appellate Tribunal, Madras (1971) 1 scr 474 ( AIR 1970 SC 1542 ) the law must now be taken to be well settled that an application for grant of a new permit cannot be entertained by the regional Transport Authority under section 48 unless the limit of the number of stage carriages for which permits may be granted is first determined under S. 47 sub sec. (3 ). There are two independent steps required to be taken in connection with the grant of a permit, the first being the determination by the Regional Transport authority under Section 47 sub section (3) of the number of stage carriages for which permits may be granted and the second being that 'thereafter applications for stage carriage permits can be entertained and therefore, it would mean that before an application for grant of a permit can be entertained by the Regional Transport Authority, there would be a determination under Section 47 sub-section (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The requirement spelt out in sub-section (3) of Section 47 that the number of stage carriages for which permits may be granted on any particular route must be first determined before an application for grant of a stage carriage permit can be entertained by the Regional transport Authority under Section 48 is obviously not a part of the procedure for considering an application for grant of a permit ; it is a condition precedent before an application for grant of a permit can be considered and granted. This condition precedent cannot be said to have been incorporated by reference under sub-section 8 of section 57. This condition precedent cannot be said to have been incorporated by reference under sub-section 8 of section 57. "thus having regard to the catena of decisions of the Supreme Court, it is well-settled now that the application for grant of new stage carriage permit on intraregional route cannot at all be entertained unless a determination is first made as to the number of stage carriages for which permits may be granted under Section 47 (3 ). In the absence of such determination and in the absence of there being any material to draw an inference that there was substantial compliance with sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act, the grant of permit would be without jurisdiction as the condition precedent for entertaining the application for stage carriage permit on intra-regional route is not satisfied. The R. T. A. does not get or acquire jurisdiction to entertain an application for grant of a stage carriage permit on an intra-regional route in the absence of compliance or at any rate substantial compliance with Section 47 (3) as such determination is not a part of the procedure for consideration of the application for grant of a stage carriage permit on an intra-regional route. ( 11 ) IN R. Obiiswami Naidu v Additional state Transport Appellate Tribunal, madras and others (Al R 1969 SC 1130 ). the object of Section 47 (3) of the Act was considered by a Bench of three learned judges of the Supreme Court. Hegde, J. speaking for the ourt observed :"sub-SECTION (3) of Section 47 of the Act if read by itself does not throw any light on the controversy before us but if Sections 47 and 57 of the Act are read together it appears to us to be clear that the view taken by the Appellate tribunal and the High Court is the correct view. If contrary view is takan it will throw open the door for manipulations and nepotism. There may be possibility of the personality of the applicant influencing the decision of the R. T. A. on the question of need for a stage carriage permit in the route and thereby public interest which should be the main consideration while taking a decision under Section 47 (3) may suffer. There may be possibility of the personality of the applicant influencing the decision of the R. T. A. on the question of need for a stage carriage permit in the route and thereby public interest which should be the main consideration while taking a decision under Section 47 (3) may suffer. If we accept the view taken by the R T. A. as correct, an operator who happens to apply for the route first will be in a commanding position. The r. T. A. will have no opportunity to choose between competing operators and hence public interest might suffer. ". Again in para 8 of its judgment it was observed :"on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act and the purpose behind Sections 47 and 57, we are convinced that before granting a stage carriage permit two independent steps have to be taken. Firstly there should be a determination by the RTA under section 47 (3), of the number of stage carriages for which stage carriage permits may be granted in that route. Thereafter application for stage carriage permits in that route should be entertained. The R. T. A. is not competent to grant stage carriage permits for more carriages than fixed under Sec. 47 (3 ). " ( 12 ) AS noticed by the Supreme court in the aforesaid decision in R. OBLISWAMI NAIDU's case (AIR 1989 sc 1130), Section 47 (3) was enacted to protect the interest of the public and it has to be first complied with independently before entertaining the applications for stage carriage permits and the violation of the same would substantially affect the public interest. In this view of the law, could it be said that an order granting a stage carriage permit passed without complying with the condition precedent as to determination of the number of permits under Sec. 47 (3) of the Act can be validated in the interest of travelling public ? What is meant by the words 'public Interest' in the context of Section 47 ? As pointed out by the supreme Court in Obliswami Naidu, the determination of number of permits under section 47 (3) of the Act is necessary to prevent all manipulations and nepotism in the grant of permits. What is meant by the words 'public Interest' in the context of Section 47 ? As pointed out by the supreme Court in Obliswami Naidu, the determination of number of permits under section 47 (3) of the Act is necessary to prevent all manipulations and nepotism in the grant of permits. It is necessary to prevent the possibility of personality of the applicant influencing the decision of the R. T. A. It is necessary to prevent the 'operator who happens to apply for the route first from occupying a commanding position. It is necessary to give an opportunity to the R T A. to choose between the competing operators which is also in public interest. Therefore, the order granting a permit in violation of the provisions of Section 47 (3), as in this case, is manifestly an order not only against public interest but it is without jurisdiction in as much as without there being an independent determination under Section 47 (3) of the Act, or at any rate a substantial compliance with the said provision, the R. T. A. does not acquire jurisdiction to grant permits in respect of an intra-regional route Public interest should not be confused with the convenience of the travelling public. The contenience of travelling public is only one aspect of public interest which requires protection by the courts. ( 13 ) THIS takes us to the question whether the decisions of the Supreme court in M. Chinnaswamy (A I. R 1977 s. C. 2095) and Abdul Rahman (A I. R. 1978 S. C. 949) which were relied upon by the Division Bench really lay down the proposition that grant of stage carriage permits made in violation of the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Act could be sustained because the travelling public would suffer by the cancellation of the permits granted in violation of the said provisions. In M. Chinnaswamy s case (A I R. 1977 S. C. 2095) the public interest that would suffer by the violation of Sec. 47 (3) of the Act did not arise for consideration. From the judgment it is not at ail clear as to whether the route involved was an intra-regional route and whether there was violation of Section 47 (3) of the Act. On the agreement between the parties, it was found that there was a need for two permits on the route. From the judgment it is not at ail clear as to whether the route involved was an intra-regional route and whether there was violation of Section 47 (3) of the Act. On the agreement between the parties, it was found that there was a need for two permits on the route. So, the dispute between the parties was found to be academic. ( 14 ) THE decision in Abdul Rahman's case (A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 949) did not turn upon Section 47 (3) of the Act. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the provisions of Section 47 (3) were not applicable to the facts of that case as the route concerned therein had assumed thg character of an amalgamated inter-regional route as observed in the decision itself. However, an observation was made by Jaswant singh J. for the court that Section 47 of the Act emphasised the interest of the travelling public as a dominant consideration for the grant of permits. But what is the legal effect of violation of Section 47 (3) did not arise for consideration in that case nor was it considered. Section 47 (3) is not applicable to inter-regional route. As in this decision the Supreme court has not considered the effect of violation of Section 47 (3) of the Act, the same cannot be an authority for the proposition that permits in question can be validated notwithstanding the fact that the same had been granted in violation of section 47 (3) of the Act. In our view, that decision is an authority for the proposition that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution should not lightly interfere with the order made by the authorities if the travelling public is likely to suffer. This is clear from the following observations of the Supreme Court which read thus :"in dealing with the applications for writs of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases of the present kind, it is necessary to bear in mind that the High Court does not exercise the jurisdiction of an appellate Court and the findings or conclusions on question of fact could hardly be re- examined or disturbed by it under Article 226 of the Constitution unless the well recognised tests in that behalf were satisfied. " ( 15 ) WE are of the view that these two decisions do not lay down that permits granted on an intra-regional route without independently first complying with the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Act can be validated or allowed to stand merely because the service is being operated for a long time. Our view is also supported by the decisions of the supreme Court in Obliswami Naidu ( AIR 1969 SC 1130 ) and Mohd. Ibrahim ( AIR 1970 SC 1542 ) to which we have already adverted to on the proper construction of section 47 (3 ). According to these decisions. Section 47 (3) is not a mere procedural provision whereas it is a provision which is not only intended to protect public interest but it is a provision compliance with it is not only mandatory, but it is a condition precedent for the R. T. A. to acquire jurisdiction to entertain, consider and grant the applications for a stage carriage permit on an intra-regional route. In our view, the decisions of the supreme Court which were relied on by the Division Bench in W. A. Nos. 136 and 137 of 1973 were not the decisions which were rendered on consideration of the protection of public interest envisaged under Section 47 (3) of the Act and the need of the travelling public for continuance of the permits granted in utter violation of Section 47 (3) of the Act. Further, the decision in Writ Appeals Nos. 136 and 137 of 1973 was obiter dicta in as much as, having regard to the joint memo filed by the parties, it was not necessary to consider the appeals on merits as the objectors themselves had no objection for restoring the permits granted by the R. T. A. ( 16 ) AT this stage, we may also refer to a decision of a Division Bench of this court in T. M. Rangappa and Others v. M. R. A. T. and Others (1971 (2) Kar L. J. , 303 ). That was also a case where permits ware granted without there being a prior determination on the question of number of permits under Section 47 (3) of the Act and the R. T. A. by the same resolution disposed of both the questions relating to the number of permits to be issued and the grant of permits at the same sitting. This court held following the decisions of the Supreme Court in R. Olliswamy Naidu's case (A. I. R. 1969 SC 1130) and in Mohd. Ibrahim's case (A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1542) that the grant of permit was invalid. This Court also held that although the objectors had not taken up the ground in their objections under subsection (3) of Section 57, since the contention went to the root of the matter and related to the jurisdiction of the R T. A. and the facts were undisputed, it was open to the appellate authority to permit the new ground to be raised. It was further held that the omission to follow the procedure under Section 47 (3) was not an irregularity curable under Section 134 (2) of the Act. ( 17 ) IN our view, the decision of the supreme Court in M. Chinnaswamys case (A. I. R. 1977 SC. 2095) and Abdul rahman's case (A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 949) are not applicable to a case where there is a grant of a stage carriage permit in violation of Section 47 (3) of the Act. It is also not possible to agree with the contention of the petitioners and hold that Sec. 47 (3) of the Act is a mere procedural provision. It is a mandatory provision which enjoins upon the R. T. A. to determine first the number of stage carriages general or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region. Sec. 47 (3) is enacted in public interest. It is intended to subserve and protect public interest. It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation of statutes that there can be no waiver of compliance with statutory provisions enacted in the public interest. Sec. 47 (3) is enacted in public interest. It is intended to subserve and protect public interest. It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation of statutes that there can be no waiver of compliance with statutory provisions enacted in the public interest. Therefore, compliance with Sec. 47 (3) is not only mandatory but it is a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction by the r. T. A. to entertain and consider the application for grant of stage carriage permits on the intra-regional virgin routes. Thus the jurisdictional fact has to be determined first in the larger public interest and failure to do so would render the proceedings of the R. T. A. relating to grant of stage carriage permits on intra-regional routes a nullity because it is made without jurisdiction. In the view we take, it follows that the impugned decisions of the R. T. A. are void and are not voidable. Accordingly we hold with great respect to their Lordships of the Division Bench that the decision in Writ Appeals Nos. 136 and 137 of 1973 cannot be accepted as laying down the law correctly. ( 18 ) FOR these reasons, we answer the question referred to us as follows : a) A permit granted on an intra-regional route in violation of the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Act is a nullity. Therefore, it cannot be validated on the ground that the operator had operated the stage carriage service on the route for a long period ; and b) Such a permit being invalid, null and void, interference with the grant on the ground of violation of Section 47 (3) of the Act is neither hyper-technical nor it is opposed to public interest. On the contrary, it is in the larger interest of the public Further, interference is also necessary to keep the statutory authority within its bounds and to ensure that it acts in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the statute. The petitions will now go before a division Bench for disposal on merits in the light of our opinion. --- *** --- .