JUDGMENT B. D. Agarwal, J. - 1. Madarsa-Mazahir-Uloom, Saharanpur, (hereinafter referred to as the MADARSA) is an ancient institution founded in the year 1966. The Head of the Institution is known as the Nazim. The governing body is the Majlise-Shura. There are various properties under waqfs dedicated to the Almighty and attached to the MADARSA. The Nazim is also the Mutawalli under the waqfs which are registered with the U. P. Sunni Central Board of Waqfs. 2. On 29th March, 1985, the respondent nos. 2 to 8 applied under Section 3 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Act 21 of 1860) (as amended) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for registration of the society designated as the Madarsa-Mazahir-Uloom, Saharanpur. The Memorandum and the Article of Association submitted are Annexures 3 and 4 to the writ petition respectively. The objects of the Society specified in the Memorandum, as transliterated into English, with the aid of counsel for the parties are :- (A) Providing free education about the teachings of Islam through Arabic language that is Holi Quran, Commentry of Quarn and Hadish, Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic faith and preachings to all the Muslims of the world and also to promote the teachings of Prophet Mohammad. (B) Other branches of knowledges, Arts etc. such as are necessary for the advancement of Arabic Language and religious purposes and imparting free formal requisite knowledge of Persian, Urdu and other languages and for achieving the aims and objects of the Madarsa establishing a library." Objections were raised by the petitioners and others to the aforementioned application on grounds principally that the soeiety is religious in character and could not be registered and also that there being dedication to God there could be no inter-meddling with the same in its management or otherwise. The Assistant Registrar, Firms, Society and Chits, U. P. has nonetheless registered the Society on 18th October, 1985. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on 29th October, 1985, seeking the writ of certiorari to quash the order for registration dated 18th October, 1985, and the certificate issued in pursuance thereof dated 19th October, 1985, and also writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the functioning of the petitioner no. 1 as the Nazim. 4. 1 as the Nazim. 4. The contentions raised by Sri Sudhir Chandra, counsel for the petitioners, are : (i) The registration directed by the Assistant Registrar is ultra vires his powers keeping in view section 3-B of the Act ; (ii) the objects, and, in any case, one of the objects being religious, the society could not be registered, vide section 3 (2) (c) ; (iii) the provisions contained in the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960, are self-contained in regard to the superintendence, management and control of waqf property and there could not be imposition over the same of the Society. Sri S. P. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents, sought to defend the registration with the submissions : (i) the objects of the Soeiety even if religious are charitable none-the- less ; (ii) the management by the Society over the affairs of the Madarsa will not be in conflict with the control of the Sunni Board over the waqfs ; (iii) There is no bar arising under section 3-B in view of what is provided under section 3 (2) (c) of the Act. 5. A brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Act is apposite. The Act in its Preamble states its object as improving the condition of societies established for the promotion of literature, science, or the fine arts or for the diffusion of useful knowledge, the diffusion of political education, or for charitable purposes. Section 1 enacts that the Societies which may be registered are those which are formed for any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in section 20. In Section 20 we find these some purposes enumerated together with some other relevant among which is the foundation or maintenance of libraries or reading rooms for general use among the members or open to the public. 6. In recent years with a view that there may be more efficient and purposeful functioning of the Societies and the dissipation of public property is averted, the state legislature has made significant amendments into the Act, The Societies Registration (U. P. Amendment) Act, 1975 (U. P. Act 52 1975) which came into force on 10th October, 1975, introduced, among other provisions, the new Section 3. Sub-section (2) thereof lays down that the Registrar shall refuse to register a society if after giving it an opportunity of showing cause against such refusal he is satisfied inter alia, that :- (c) any one or more of the objects of the society sought to be registered is not an object mentioned in sections 1 and 20." The U. P. (Amendment) Act, 1979 (U. P. Act 26 of 1979) inserted section 3-B as follows :- "If any question arises whether any society is entitled to get itself registered in accordance with Section 3 or to get its certificate of registration renewed in accordance with Section 3-A, the matter shall be referred to the State Government, and the decision of the State Government thereon shall be final." 7. Upon the application for registration made by the respondents nos. 2 to 8 dated 29-3-85, the petitioner no. 1 (the Nazim) filed objections before the Assistant Registrar (vide Annexure-5); the petitioner no. 2 and others also filed objections (vide Annexures 6/7). These were on common grounds namely :- (1) the Institution is religious engaged in imparting teachings on the Islamic religion and hence not eligible to registration ; (2) the Institution is run by the Nazim who is also the Mutwalli of the various waqfs properties vesting in the Almighty and a different management may not be substituted. 8. Evidently, these objections gave rise to the question whether the Society in question (the Madarsa) could be registered under the Act. The Assistant Registrar chose to dispose of the objections himself with the observations that the Society teaches free of charge the Quran etc. and in the library there is a good collection of books on different religious and in various languages, and, therefore, the Society appears to fulfil the objects ordained under Secs. 1 and 20 of the Act. He further said that if the Mutwalli has control over the properties that will not pass over to the Committee of Management after registration. This approach to the issue attracts the attack on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which to our mind is possessed of merit. Under the scheme of the Act (as amended), the Registrar is not to act as an automaton. The satisfaction is objective on consideration of relevant material. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 begins with the non-obstante clause, that is, "notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1)". Under the scheme of the Act (as amended), the Registrar is not to act as an automaton. The satisfaction is objective on consideration of relevant material. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 begins with the non-obstante clause, that is, "notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1)". Sub-section (1) provides that upon memorandum of association and copy of rules and regulations being filed, the Registrar shall certify that the society is registered. Even if this could be classed as a ministerial act, it has definitely assumed a different character with the introduction of sub-section (2) which places the Registrar under mandate ;to refuse registration upon his satisfaction as to the existence of any one or more of the grounds specified. The satisfaction is not subjective. This presupposes application of mind despite there being no formal opposition as such to the application for registration. But if there be opposition such as may admit of debate and not prima facie frivolous or vexatious the only course permissible to the Registrar is to refer the matter to the State Government. The decision in that event is to be of Government and not the Registrar. The jurisdiction cannot be usurped by the latter. 9. Sri Gupta urged that the words "entitled to get itself registered" appearing in Section 3-B should be confined in their application to a case where the objection raised is as to the competence of certain individuals to seek the registration of a society. There is, in our opinion, no warrant to narrow down in this manner the language of Section 3-B which is plain and unambiguous. The apprehension that the provision contained in Section 3 (2) (c) might be rendered redundent otherwise seems unfounded. As we explained above, the Registrar is under duty no doubt to consider the implications in the light of the criteria laid down in section 3 (2) before acceding to registration, but if there is specific objection raised including by someone not mere strangers and the objection is not such as might be discarded prima facie as meaningless or untenable, the Registrar must follow the directive laid in Section 3-B. The argument of the learned counsel then that this interpretation of ours may not hold good in the case of application for renewal of registration is also unappealing. The U. P. (Amendment) Act, 1975 (U. P. Act 52 of 1975) also introduced Section 3-A in this Act which deals with Renewal of Certificate of registration. This was amended further by the U. P. (Amendment) Act, 1984 (U. P. Act 11 of 1984). Sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 3-A (as amended) read as follows :- (1) subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), a certificate of registration issued under section 3 shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of Provided that a certificate issued before the commencement of the Societies Registration (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1974 (hereinafter in this section referred to as 'the said Act') shall remain in force for a period of five years from the date of such commencement. (2) A society registered under section 3, whether before or after the commencement of the said Act, shall, on application made to the Registrar within one month of the expiration of the period referred to in sub-section (1) and on payment of the fee specified in sub-section (3), be entitled to have its certificate of registration renewed for two years at a time : Provided that, in the case of a society registered before the commencement of the said Act, the Registrar shall refuse to renew the certificate of registration if, after giving it an opportunity of showing cause against such refusal, he is satisfied that any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of the section 3 exist in respect thereof. 10. In view of the proviso to section 3-A (2), therefore, in case of renewal too the application shall have to satisfy the rigors of Section 3 (2). Where the certificate is applied for on or after 10th October, 1975, for the first time, the Registrar shall not grant it except upon satisfaction in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 3; if the certificate was issued prior to this date, it shall not be renewed thereafter unless it falls within the purview of Section 3 (2). It is well settled that the legislature must be supposed not to have intended to contradict itself. The Act must be construed as a whole. If two sections of the same statute are repugnant, the known rule is that the last must prevail. It is well settled that the legislature must be supposed not to have intended to contradict itself. The Act must be construed as a whole. If two sections of the same statute are repugnant, the known rule is that the last must prevail. But this is very much a last resort and there are various techniques of construction which may be employed in order to avoid a repugnancy. One of these is the technique of holding that one section apparently in conflict with another merely provides for an exception to the general rule contained in that other (Cross : Statutory Interpretation, page 101; Maxwell : On the Interpretation of Statutes 12th edition page 187). If there be a proviso in an Act which is repugnant to the purview of the Act, the proviso stands and be a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers (Gaies : Statute law P. 220). But, citing the Kent's Commentaries, the learned author observes : "The true principle undoubtedly is that the sound interpretation and meaning of the statute on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause, and proviso taken and construed together, are to prevail." The interpretation should be such that, if possible, effect is given to both, where there is in a statute a provision seemingly in conflict with another. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction. (Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255 ; Raj Krishna v. Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 . It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head on clash "between two sections of the same Act and wherever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise". In the words of B. K. Mukherjia, J.: "It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose of the Act itself" Popoatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274 . In Administrator General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick, (1895) ILR 22 Cal. In Administrator General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick, (1895) ILR 22 Cal. 788 (PC) it was held : "It is conceivable that the legislature while enacting one clause in plain terms might introduce into the same statute other enactment which to some extent clarify or neutralise its effect." In Canada Sugar Refining Company v. R, 1898 AC 735 it was observed by Lord Davey :- "Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the Act, so as, as far as possible to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject matter." 11. Considered in the light of these principles, section 3-B of the Act is in substance a proviso to what is enacted in section 3 and 3-A preceding. The application for registration or its renewal is to be disposed of ordinarily by the registrar at his level but where this is raised in issue on ground for instance that the proposal travels outside the purview of sections 1 and 20 of the Act, the decision would be of the State Government. The Court cannot pre-empt the State Government by adjudicating in the light of its own opinion even before the latter has had opportunity to express its views. 12. Upon the merits, therefore, we refrain from expressing opinion, except taking note out of deference to learned counsel of the submissions made in this behalf. In White v. White, (1891-4) All E. R. (Reprint) P. 242 relied by Sri S. P. Gupta, in the context of interpreting a Will Lindley L J. observed that the authorities show that a bequest to a religious institution, or for a religious purpose is prima facie a bequest for a "charitable" purpose and the law applicable to "charitable" bequests, as distinguished from the law applicable to ordinary bequests, ought to be applied to a bequest to a religious institutions, or for a religious purpose. Learned counsel referred also to the classic list of charitable purposes formulated by Lord Machaughten in Special Commissioner v. Penisel, (1891-94) All. E. R. (Reprint) P. 28. A reference to the legislative history of the definition of "charitable purpose" in the income tax law appears in CIT (Addl.) v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, Baraut, (1980) 2 SCC 31 . E. R. (Reprint) P. 28. A reference to the legislative history of the definition of "charitable purpose" in the income tax law appears in CIT (Addl.) v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, Baraut, (1980) 2 SCC 31 . It was observed that in English law it is not enough that a purpose falls within one of the four divisions of charity set out in Lord Machaughten's classification. It must also be within the sprit and intendment of the Preamble to the statutes of Elizabeth if it is to be regarded as charitable. There is no such limitation so far as Indian law is concerned; under the Indian Income Tax law, every object of general public utility would be charitable subject only to the condition imposed by the restrictive words "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit." On account of this basic difference between the Indian and English law of charity, Lord Wright in All India Sinners' Association case, AIR 1944 PC 88 cautioned against blind adherence to English decisions on the subject. Bhagwati, J observed in Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers' Association (supra) that the definition of "charitable purpose" in the Indian Statute must be construed according to the language used there and against the background of Indian life. From the decision in that case and Bar Council of Maharashtra case, 1981 (3) SCC 308 the test culled out in this sphere is: "what is the predominant object of the activity whether it is to carry out a charitable purpose or to earn profit ? If the predominant object is to carry out a charitable purpose and not to earn profit, the purpose would not lose its charitable character merely because some profit arises from the activity" (See also CIT v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, (1986) 2 SCC 391 ). This may be of academic interest only so far as instant case is concerned because the interpretation made therein is of definition appearing in the Income Tax Act. In S. Mohan Lal v. R. Kondiah, AIR 1979 SC 1132 the guiding principle enunciated is : "It is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act; more so if the two Acts in which the same word is used are not cognate Acts. In S. Mohan Lal v. R. Kondiah, AIR 1979 SC 1132 the guiding principle enunciated is : "It is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act; more so if the two Acts in which the same word is used are not cognate Acts. Neither the meaning, nor the definition of the term in one statute affords a guide to the construction of the same term in another statute and the sense in which the term has been understood in the several statutes does not necessarily throw any light or the manner in which the term should be understood generally." 17. This applies equally to the definitions given to the expressions "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose" in section 3 (3)/(23) of the UP ZA and LR Act, 1950, which Sri Sudhir Chandra cited on the petitioner's behalf. Section 3 (2) (c) of the Act (as amended in its application to U. P. with effect from October 10, 1975, by the U. P. Act 52 of 1975) moreover, contemplate refusal to register if any one or more of the objects of the society is not an object mentioned in sections 1 and 20. The appropriate authority shall have therefore, also to consider whether in this context the test of predominance of one of the two objects may exclude clause (c) of Section 3 (2) (c) from the application, assuming, of course, that the other objects are not merely incidental or ancillary. In 28 All. 384 Anjuman Islamia of Muttra v. Nasir Uddin, etc. relied by Sri Gupta there is a general observation following White v. White (supra) that a religious purpose may be a charitable purpose and that a society for religious purposes would ordinarily be a society for charitable purpose. In Haji Mohammad Hussain Sahil v. Majiday Mahmood J. Managing Committee, AIR 1940 Madras 167 concurred with the opinion that where a society is formed for certain purposes whose paramount object is charitable, the fact that some of the purpose may not be strictly charitable but religious would not render the society any less a charitable society, if the purpose was one intended to benefit the public or a considerable portion of the public. A Division Bench of this Court endorsed this view in reference to Radha Swami Satsang Sabha in AIR 1969 SC 248 Shanti Swarup v. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha. To serve a charitable purpose it is not necessary that the object should be to benefit the whole of mankind or all persons in a particular country or State. It is sufficient if the intention is to benefit a section of the public as distinguished from a specified individual is present. (1971) 82 ITR 704 (Ahmada- bad Rana Caste Association v. C. I. T. Gujrat (SC). 13. A different view is taken in Mohammad Yunus v. Inspector General of Registration, AIR 1980 Patna 138 (Division Bench) relied upon by Sri Sudhir Chandra, the principal objects of the society in that case were the supervision and control of Mosque and Idgah ; the second was supervision and control of existing Madarsa situated within premises of the said Mosque, and the third was supervision and control of assets and properties relating to the Mosque, the Idgah and the Madarsa. The view expressed was that 'charitable purpose' must be a purpose which has some element of general public benefit and not a religious purpose and further that : ".........the expression charitable purpose as used in the Societies Registration Act does not embrace purposes which are religious or predominantly religious." 14. The Bench also took into aid the observations appearing in Fazlul Rabbi Pradhan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 SC 1722 which the Supreme Court made in the context of the W. B. Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 pointing out that in the context thereof charitable and religious purposes are two distinct concepts and are not overlapping. In exercise of powers under section 3-B of the Act, the State Government shall have to express its opinon in the context of Section 3 (2) (c). 15. Sri Sudbir Chandra took us through the salient provisions of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 and argued that these are self contained and confer adequate powers of superintendence, management and control upon the Board of Waqf. To constitute the Society, it was added, would intermeddle with this statutory scheme. 15. Sri Sudbir Chandra took us through the salient provisions of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 and argued that these are self contained and confer adequate powers of superintendence, management and control upon the Board of Waqf. To constitute the Society, it was added, would intermeddle with this statutory scheme. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the properties concerned under the waqfs may continue to be looked after as at present while the society would manage the affairs of the Madarsa without evoking a conflict of interest. We would leave it at this stage this being interlinked to the question arising under section 3-C of the Act. 16. Having regard to the discussion made hereinbefore the order made by the Assistant Registrar, Firms Societies and Chits U. P. dated 18th October, 1985, for registering the Madrasa-Mazahir Uloom, Saharanpur and the certificate dated 19th October, 1985 issued in pursuance thereof (vide annexures 8/9 to the writ petition) are quashed. The respondent no. 1 is directed to refer forthwith under section 3-B of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (as amended) to the State Government the question of registration of this society. The State Government shall upon receipt of the reference, as far as possible within three months, after hearing the parties record its decision on the subject. The respondent no. 1 is directed not to interfere with the functioning of the Nazim the petitioner no. 1, pending decision of the State Government. The petition is allowed accordingly with no order, however, as to the costs. Petition allowed.