JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) APPELLANT State of M. P. has preferred this appeal under section 39 of the Arbitration Act aggrieved by the judgment and decree, passed by the district Judge, Balaghat, dated 6-4-1984. Claimant/respondent has also filed cross-objection. ( 2. ) THE Executive Engineer of Bagh Canal Division entered into a contract with respondent/contractor by contract No. 35/b-L year 1972-73, for earth and stone work, after accepting the tender of the respondent on current schedule rate at the rate of 33. 75 percent. This contract was executed on 22-12-1972 and the respondent/contractor was directed to start the work. There arose disputes with regard to this contract. Respondent/contractor, according to the Arbitration clause of the contract, claimed an amount of Rs. 2,77,488. 10 and also 18% interest as damages on the amount against the appellant before the Arbitrator Shri B. C. Subba Rao, the retired Chief Engineer (Irrigation), the Arbitrator appointed by the Government. On 27-9-1979, E. E. Bengaga division, on behalf of the appellant, filed his written statement. The Arbitrator after giving an opportunity to the parties for producing evidence, heard and delivered his award that appellant State shall pay an amount of Rs. 10,314. 65 with interest at the rate of 12% to respondent. The award was presented in the court of C. J. I, Balaghat, who by his order dated 15-7-1982 set aside the award and remitted it to the Arbitrator for passing an award according to the directions. According to the direction of the Court, the arbitrator after hearing the parties delivered the revised award on 29-1-1982. When this revised award was filed before the court, it again remitted the award to the Arbitrator with the direction to take on record 11 documents filed by the respondent. Thus the award was also set aside with the direction to give an award after considering the said documents of the respondent. The Arbitrator concluded that as his term has expired, he was not competent to act as an Arbitrator. The Addl. Distt. Judge Shri Kailash Chandra agrawal passed an order on 29-11-1982 by which he held that Arbitrator Shri Subba Rao is declared competent to act as an Arbitrator in view of the order dated 21-7-1982. The arbitrator was directed to deliver the revised award within a period of 3 months. The Addl. Distt. Judge Shri Kailash Chandra agrawal passed an order on 29-11-1982 by which he held that Arbitrator Shri Subba Rao is declared competent to act as an Arbitrator in view of the order dated 21-7-1982. The arbitrator was directed to deliver the revised award within a period of 3 months. The E. E. Bengaga was also directed to place entire record before the Arbitrator Shri Subba rao. The said Arbitrator at last passed the second revised award after hearing the parties and by his letter dated 24-1-1983 along with record sent the award to the District court. According to this award the appellant State was required to pay to the respondent Rs. 71,561. 40 as full and final settlement of dispute referred to the arbitrator. The appellant was also required to pay an interest at the rate of 12% from 2-2-1974, on the amount awarded. ( 3. ) THE Distt. Judge on receiving the revised award and record from the arbitrator issued notice to parties inviting objections. The appellant/state on 17-3-1983 filed objections :- (i) Addl. Distt. Judge Shri K. C. Agrawal when set aside the award dated 29-1-1982, the Arbitrator became functus officio and the revised award is illegal and without jurisdiction. (ii) The said Addl. Distt. Judge, as provided in Section 16 (2) of the arbitration Act, while remitting the award, has failed to fix the time within which the award should be made. (iii) New Arbitrator should have been appointed after Shri Rao became functus officio. (iv) The 11 documents produced by the respondent were not proved in accordance with law. The respondent also, by his application dated 23-2-1983 claimed more interest. On perusal of the objections of the parties and after hearing them, the Distt. Judge answered the issues thus, in the impugned judgment and decree :- (i) It was not necessary to appoint a new Arbitrator and the award made by shri Subba Rao was not contrary to law. (ii) The Arbitrator has not misconducted while passing the award after reconsideration. (iii) Addl. Distt. Judge Shri K. C. Agrawal had power to remit the award to shri Subba Rao under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act and hence the award was not void. (iv) The mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act have not been infringed and thus award was not void, etc. etc. (iii) Addl. Distt. Judge Shri K. C. Agrawal had power to remit the award to shri Subba Rao under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act and hence the award was not void. (iv) The mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act have not been infringed and thus award was not void, etc. etc. (v) Respondent is entitled to a decree according to the award dated 21-3-1983 and the parties shall bear their own costs. ( 4. ) SECTIONS 15, 16 and 17 of the Arbitration Act prescribe the acts that can be done by the court in which award has been filed under Section 14 (2) of the Act. These four sections of the Act are to be read as connected with one another. Where no action is taken by the party affected by the award for setting aside the same under Section 33 read with Section 34 or having it reconsidered by the Arbitrator under Section 16 of the act, the award though not made the rule of the Court by having it filed under Section 14 (2) or having it filed under Section 17, to get a decree thereon, it stands a valid award as between the parties in respect of subject matter entrusted to the Arbitrator. Further, more, Section 16 should be construed independently and the remission of the award or any matter contemplated by this section is not intended to include within if fold setting aside of the award or part of it as contemplated by Section 30 which is apparently an exhaustive provision specifically dealing with setting aside of award. Section 16 empowers the court to remit the award to the Arbitrator himself for reconsideration where there are omissions or defects therein which are such as cannot be modified or corrected by the court itself under Section 15 of the Act. The power to remit the award is distinct from the power to remit any matter referred to Arbitration. If the whole award is remitted, the effective award is the second award. When the court decides to remit the award under this section, it is not final and so long as it is not final and is in the hands of the Arbitrator, it can be altered by him. If the whole award is remitted, the effective award is the second award. When the court decides to remit the award under this section, it is not final and so long as it is not final and is in the hands of the Arbitrator, it can be altered by him. It would be relevant to refer the provisions of section 16 of the Act: "section 16 (1) (2): (1) The Court may from time to time remit the award or any matter referred to Arbitration to the Arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration upon such terms as it thinks fit - (a) where the award has left undetermined any of the matters referred to Arbitration, or where it determines any matter not referred to arbitration and such matter cannot be separated without affecting the determination of the matters referred; or (b) where the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution; or (c) where an objection to the legality of the award is apparent upon the face of it. (2) Where an award is remitted under sub-section (1) the Court shall fix the time within which the Arbitrator or umpire shall submit his decision to the court: provided that any time so fixed may be extended by subsequent order of the Court. " Thus, under the proviso to Section 16 (2) of the Act the Court may extend the time fixed by the order of remission by a subsequent order. The proviso does not require that the subsequent order must be made before the expiry of the time so fixed. The discretion of the Court is unfettered and may be exercised both before and after the expiry of the time. ( 5. ) THUS, while remitting the award to the Arbitrator, if the court does not fix the time for passing the award but does so later on, as has been done in this case, there is no illegality committed by the court and the award thus passed is not void. There is no doubt that ordinarily the Arbitrator becomes functus officio after passing the award but exception is also provided in the Act enumerated in Section 16. There is no doubt that ordinarily the Arbitrator becomes functus officio after passing the award but exception is also provided in the Act enumerated in Section 16. The Supreme Court in the case of Jaggilal vs. General Fibre Dealers, AIR 1962 SC 1123 , has observed :- "it is true that generally speaking, an Arbitrator is functus officio after he has made the award; but this only means that no power is left in the Arbitrator to make any change of substance in the award that he had made (except in certain circumstances which have been provided in the law ). Section 13 (d), arbitration Act for example, gives power to the Arbitrator to correct in an award any clerical mistake or error arising from any accidental slip or omission-Further, Section 16 gives power to the court to remit the award to the Arbitrator for re cpnsideration. Section 19 gives power to the court not to supersede the reference and so leave the Arbitration agreement effective even when it sets aside the award and thereupon it will depend upon the terms of the Arbitration agreement whether Arbitration proceedings can go on with respect to the same dispute or with respect to some other dispute arising under the Arbitration agreement. " Thus, the contention of the appellant, therefore, that once the award is set aside, the arbitrator becomes functus officio and consequently there can be no further reference with respect to the dispute decided by the award which is set aside, must fail in view of the specific provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act. ( 6. ) WE are constrained to observe that the appellant at no stage raised any objection before the court with regard to the remitting of the award to the Arbitrator, though the court chose to remit the award twice and at one stage the Arbitrator contended that he has become functus officio. Appellants made no endeavour to have the orders of the court vacated by filing a review application. Not even a single voice of protest was raised by the/appellant before the court. On the other hand we find that the appellant participated in the proceedings before the court and also before the arbitrator without any demur to their jurisdiction. Appellants made no endeavour to have the orders of the court vacated by filing a review application. Not even a single voice of protest was raised by the/appellant before the court. On the other hand we find that the appellant participated in the proceedings before the court and also before the arbitrator without any demur to their jurisdiction. The only inference from this conduct of the appellants we can safely draw is that it had no objection to the orders remitting the award. Thus by acquiescence the appellants permitted the proceedings without faintest protest and hence the appellants are now precluded from challenging (he jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and also of the Court. (See N. Chellappan vs. Kerala s. E. Board, AIR 1975 SC 230 ). ( 7. ) THE contention of the appellant that the award is bad because no reasons were given for passing such an award, must be rejected outright. Absence of reasons for award is no error of law on the face of the award. This court in State of M. P. vs. M/s M. B. Gharpuray, 1986 MPLJ 591 , (the judgment was handed by one of us in this Bench sic. Varma, J.), has held as below : - "the Court before which an award by the arbitrator is filed does not deal with that award as a court of appeal. It has to act within the frame-work of the arbitration Act. The award can be set aside only in terms of Section 30 of the arbitration Act. The Arbitrator is not bound to record his reasons or state the principles of law on which he proceeds. Absence of reasons is no error of law apparent on the face of the award. It is only when the Arbitrator proceeds to give his reasons or to lay down the principles on which he has arrived at his decision, that the Court is competent to examine whether he has proceeded contrary to law and is entitled to interfere if such error in law is apparent on the face of the award. " Earlier to this in Umraosingh vs. State of M. P. , 1976 MPLJ 91 , this court expressed the view that an award made by an Arbitrator cannot be set aside on the ground that he has committed mistakes in law and facts. " Earlier to this in Umraosingh vs. State of M. P. , 1976 MPLJ 91 , this court expressed the view that an award made by an Arbitrator cannot be set aside on the ground that he has committed mistakes in law and facts. It can only be set aside if the error in law appears on the face of the record. ( 8. ) THE Arbitrator Shri Subba Rao and also the court in the impugned judgment have awarded the respondent interest at the rate of 12% from 2-2-1974 to 24-1-1983, the date of the award. The appellants, also challenge in this appeal and contend that the rate of interest awarded is high and the Arbitrator was not competent to award the interest. Respondent has also filed cross objection and prays therein that costs of the proceeding and the interest till the date of the satisfaction of decree be awarded. In the impugned judgment the learned Distt. Judge while answering issue No. 8 has ordered that the respondent shall receive interest on the amount of award at the rate of 12% and the parties shall bear their own costs. We have therefore, to examine whether the rate of interest at 12% per annum is ex facie bad and to that extent there is an error apparent on the face of record. Contention of the respondent that he is entided to receive the interest even after the date of award i. e. till the decree is satisfied, can be rejected in view of Thawardas vs. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 468 , wherein it has been held that interest after the date of award could not be allowed. Furthermore, Arbitrator is not a court within the meaning of Section 34 Civil Procedure Code nor the provisions of the Code apply to Arbitrators. In Firm Madanlal Roshanlal vs. Hukumchand Milk, AIR 1967 SC 1030 , this subject was elaborated and it was pointed out that where a dispute as to interest is referred to arbitration, it is an implied term of reference that the Arbitrator will decide the dispute according to existing law and give such relief with regard to interest as a court would give if it decided the dispute. Thus the principles of Section 34 of Civil Procedure Code were held applicable in such cases and Arbitrator was held to have jurisdiction to allow interest subsequent to the passing of the award. In this judgment Thawardas (supra) was distinguished. (See also State of M. P. vs. M/s Saith and Skelton (P.) Ltd. , AIR 1972 SC 1507 ). It thus becomes clear that Arbitrator is permitted to award interest after the making of award if the question relating to interest has been referred to it for decision, only on the analogy of Section 34 Civil Procedure code. The analogy necessarily, therefore, must extend in its application to the rate of interest as well and the arbitrator cannot be left at liberty to award interest at rate beyond that which is permissible under Section 34 Civil Procedure Code. This section permits award of interest at the maximum rate of 6% per annum after the date of suit. This is the maximum rate of interest except for commercial transactions, State of M. P. vs. M/s M. B. Gharpuray (supra ). Obviously, therefore, the transaction in question cannot be said to be commercial within the meaning of that section. Interest, therefore, could be awarded only at the rate of 6% per annum and to that extent the award made by the Arbitrators has to be modified. In this view of the matter the cross objection filed by the respondent has to be rejected. ( 9. ) THIS appeal, therefore, partly succeeds and hence partly allowed to the extent indicated. The part of the decree awarding interest at 127o per annum is set aside, instead the respondent is held entitled to interest at 6% per annum from 2-2-1974 to 24-1-1983 and onwards from this date until realisation. The award made by Arbitrator shall also stand modified to that extent. However, there shall be no order as to costs of this appeal. Order accordingly.