JUDGMENT L. Yadav, J. - The present petit ion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 18-9-1972 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision filed under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short the Act). 2. The facts of the case in brief are, that the plots in dispute are contained in Khata Nos. 194 and 195. The petitioner was found in possession over the plots in dispute during the consolidation operations along with respondent Nos. 4 to 8. Whereas the respondent Nos. 4 to 8 were recorded in the basic years. 3. The petitioner filed an objection under Section 9A (2) of the Act claiming co-tenancy rights on the basis that the plots of both the khatas were ancestral acquisition and the petitioner being the descendant of Bhairon was entitled to half share, whereas the respondent Nos. 4 to 8 being descendants of Bhola were entitled to the remaining half share. 4. A third branch of Jagrup became extinct. Respondent Nos. 4 to 8, on the other hand, filed another objection alleging that the plots were acquired only by their ancestor Bhola and not by the petitioner's ancestor, hence they were the sole tenure-holders. 5. A pedigree of the parties to-appreciate the facts is given below : (see pedigree on next page) 6. The Consolidation Officer decided the case against the petitioner who preferred two appeals. The appeal in respect of Khata No. 194 was allowed and the appeal in respect of Khata No. 195 was dismissed. In Khata No. 194 the petitioner was given one half share and the remaining one half share was given to Respondents Nos. 4 to 8. The petitioner preferred a revision in respect of Khata No. 195 claiming the co-tenancy rights. Whereas respondents Nos. 4 to 8 preferred a revision in respect of Khata No. 194 claiming sole-tenancy rights. The Deputy Director of Consolidation by the impugned order allowed the revision of the contesting respondents in respect of Khata No. 194 and held them to be sole-tenure-holders. The petitioner's revision in respect of Khata No. 195 was dismissed. The result was that the contesting respondents were held to be the sole tenure-holders in respect of both the Khatas. Against these orders the petitioner filed the instant writ petition. 7. The petitioner's revision in respect of Khata No. 195 was dismissed. The result was that the contesting respondents were held to be the sole tenure-holders in respect of both the Khatas. Against these orders the petitioner filed the instant writ petition. 7. Sri A. N. Bhargava, the learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the extracts of Khataunis of 1357 to 1358 Fasli, other relevant extracts in question including the lease deed dated 5-11-1944, the oral and important documentary evidence, as well as the comparative table in respect of the plot in dispute and other evidence about the acquisition of land were not considered and even if it was considered material portion was ignored. He further urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was the last court of fact and his order is cryptic. He should have appreciated the evidence on record and the argument advanced on behalf of the parties after considering the whole matter he should have recorded his findings. It was further urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has misread the evidence in as much as Munda Pradhan stated that Bhola (the ancestor of contesting respondents Nos. 4 to 8) died after Bhairon (vide Annexure E to the petition) the ancestor of the petitioner. Bhola and Bhairon were real brothers whereas the Deputy Director of Consolidation has referred to these statements as if Bhairon died after Bhola which affects the sequence of the death. The statement of the petitioner's witness Smt. Dhanraji has not been considered or discussed. Similarly there is no discussion about the statement of Munda Pradhan except the portion which has been misread as indicated above. Copies of the statements of Smt. Dhanraji and Munda Pradhan have been filed. Certified copies of those statements were also furnished for perusal. It was also urged that if the case was to be governed under Oudh Rent Act, 1886, that would not make any difference as petitioner was a co-tenant along with Respts. 4 to 8, and on spot the petitioner continued to be co-tenure-holder in respect of both the Khatas but only the name of the petitioner could not be recorded. 8. Sri G. N. Verma, the learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that as the case arose from Pratapgarh District, Oudh Rent Act, 1886, would apply and the same was enforced on the relevant date. 8. Sri G. N. Verma, the learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that as the case arose from Pratapgarh District, Oudh Rent Act, 1886, would apply and the same was enforced on the relevant date. In Oudh the statutory tenancy was not heritable. Consequently, there was no question the petitioner getting any rights. He urged that the statements of the witnesses were duly considered and there was no misreading. Reliance was placed on Usman Ghani v. Taufiq Ali, 1983 All WC 531, Ram Jivan v. Smt. Phula, AIR 1976 SC 844 , Nankoo v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1973 Rev Dec 158 and Hakim Masi Huzzamam v. Rezwan, 1985 Rev Dec 479. 9. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the oral evidence has not been considered it has been consistently held by the court including in Ram Naresh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1978 Rev Dec 118, Paras Nath v. Majirul Hasan (1974 Unreported Revenue Cases 615, Ram Kishun v. Director of Consolidation 1974 Unreported Revenue Cases 655, and Radhey Shyam v. Deputy Director of Consolidation 1981 Rev Dec 21 :(1981 UP LT NOC 201) etc. that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was the last court of facts and he should consider the oral and documentary evidence afresh, his order should not be cryptic and there must be discussion of the oral evidence. In the, instant case although just a reference was made to the witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioner and in respect of Smt. Dhanaraji, the mother of the petitioner it was stated that she did not state anything as to when partition took place in the family. He did not discuss the other remaining portion of the statement made by her. As regards the statement of Munda Pradhan it has been stated that Bhairon died after Bhola. I have perused Annexure 'E' and certified copy of the statement of Munda Pradhan. It is just the contrary than what has been stated by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The statement of Munda was that Bhairon died after Bhola "Bhola Bhairo ke Bad Mare Hain". It was a clear misreading of the statement or the assumption of the statement which was actually not there. It is just the contrary than what has been stated by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The statement of Munda was that Bhairon died after Bhola "Bhola Bhairo ke Bad Mare Hain". It was a clear misreading of the statement or the assumption of the statement which was actually not there. Under the circumstances it could not be said that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has applied his mind to the oral evidence on record, while deciding revisions under S. 48 of the Act. 10. As regards the documentary evidence from the discussions of the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) it appears that he has 'applied his mind to the documentary and oral evidence on the record of the case. He has compared the numbers of plots in the Third and the Second Settlements on the basis of the comparative table and the relevant documents available on the record of the case, but the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not consider the same. Similarly the 12 years extracts of khatauni since 1357 Fasli to 1368 Fasli have been considered by the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation). There were other, documentary evidence which had been referred to and considered by the Assistant' Settlement Officer (Consolidation). There was a lease dated 5-11-1964 attested by the Supervisor Kanungo but this has not been considered by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. It can, accordingly, be said that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has not applied his mind to a number of important documentary evidence on record. 11. From the perusal of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation it appears that the order passed by him is also cryptic as he has not applied his mind to the arguments of the parties, nor he has formulated the points to be decided, nor he referred to the relevant documents on record of the case. As the Deputy Director of Consolidation is the last court of facts he should have passed a detailed order particularly when his order was that of reversal. 12. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that under the Oudh Rent Act 1886 which was applicable in District Pratapgarh, the tenancy was not heritable. Hence the petitioner cannot claim that he or his predecesor-in-interest has inherited any interest as co-tenant. 12. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that under the Oudh Rent Act 1886 which was applicable in District Pratapgarh, the tenancy was not heritable. Hence the petitioner cannot claim that he or his predecesor-in-interest has inherited any interest as co-tenant. But the point that has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents was not taken before the consolidation authorities. A perusal of the judgments of the consolidation authorities would indicate that this point was never taken. Further tenancy was created after repealed of Oudh Rent Act, 1886. 13. As regards however the case law relied upon by the respondents reported in Usman Ghani v. Taufiq Ali (1983 All WC 531) (supra) it was held that the statutory tenancy under the Oudh Rent Act was not' heritable. The heirs of the substituted tenant were entitled to remain in occupation for a period of five years after the date of death and after the rent became payable but they were not entitled to the renewal of the tenancy. After the expiry of the statutory period it was for the landlord to settle the land in question with the heirs or with one of them after payment of rent and settlement afresh with some other person. But in case the heirs in occupation were not ejected within a period of three years after the expiry of the statutory period of five years they became statutory tenants in view of Section 3(18) of the Oudh Rent Act. In Ram Jiwan v. Smt. Phula (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that where a tenant died in 1916 leaving his widow, who occupied the said land as tenant, would herself become statutory tenant under the Oudh Rent Act, 1886 as amended by U. P. Act No. 4 of 1921 and she would become hereditary tenant under the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939 and later on she had become bhumidhar. In Hakim Masi Huzzamam v. Mohd. Rezwan (1985 Rev Dec 479) (supra) it was held by Hon'ble K. N. Misra, J, that co-option was not permissible for creating tenancy in view of the provisions of Section 48(3) and Section 3(18) of the Oudh Rent Act, 1886. 14. There is no quarrel with the propositions of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions. But the difficulty is that they are based on different facts. 14. There is no quarrel with the propositions of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions. But the difficulty is that they are based on different facts. In the instant case it appears, as is clear from the judgment of the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in appeal that there was a lease created on 5-11-1944 which was attested by the Supervisor Kanungo. There was an extract of Khatauni of 1357 Fasli to 1368 Fasli for about twelve years in which Govind, son of Bhola was recorded and after discussion it was held that over plots Nos. 105, 708 etc. Bhairon, the ancestor of the petitioner was entered. 15. It appears that the tenancy in the present case was created sometime in 1949. Oudh Rent Act, 1886 was repealed under Section 2 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which came into force on 1-1-1940. It therefore, appears that if the transaction between the parties commenced after 1940, as is clear from the discussions of the entries, the principles of the Oudh Rent Act, 1886 were not applicable. Otherwise also, I am of the view that a statutory tenancy may not be heritable but there is another aspect of the matter. If Sections 48 and 3(18) of the Oudh Rent Act are read together the only possible inescapable corollary was that if the heirs of the statutory tenants were entitled to remain in occupation for a period of five years to be counted from the date of death of the original tenant, they would pay the rent payable by their predecesor-in-interest, those heirs could not as a matter of right claim renewal of the tenancy under the law. But in case they continued to remain in possession it was open to the landlord to settle the tenancy with them or with somebody else. In case they continued in possession within a period of three years after the expiry of the aforesaid period of five years, they would become themselves statutory tenants in view of Section 3 (18) of the Oudh Rent Act. In the instant case there was no evidence that the heirs of the statutory tenant either left possession or that the landlord settled the land held by the.statutory tenants, with the contesting respondents or with somebody else. In the instant case there was no evidence that the heirs of the statutory tenant either left possession or that the landlord settled the land held by the.statutory tenants, with the contesting respondents or with somebody else. It cannot, therefore, be said with certainty that the petitioner would lose their rights simply on the ground of analogy of Sections 48 and 3(18) of the Oudh Rent Act. 16. In view of the facts discussed above, the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained in law and deserves to be quashed. 17. In the result, the petition succeeds, and is accordingly allowed and the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is herby quashed and the case is remanded back to him to be decided afresh in accordance with law after affording due opportunity to the parties for being heard and in the light of the observations made above. Under the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.