BOPANNA, J. ( 1 ) THESE Writ Petitions are filed by the tenants of certain premises situate in Arcot srinivasachar Street challenging the validity of the preliminary and final notifications issued by the State Government under the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the 'act' ). As many as 85 persons appear to be aggrieved by the impugned notifications and the subsequent actions taken by the authorities under the Act pursuant to the said notifications. ( 2 ) A few facts which are not in serious controversy may be noted before we go into the disputed questions which arise for consideration in these petitions. Ordinarily the challenge to the validity of the acts of the authorities under the Act does not take much time of this Court since all points touching the actions of the authorities are well-settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court. But, these cases appear to rest on a different matrix in view of the long delay on the part of the authorities in completing the acquisition proceedings and also in view of the long delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court. ( 3 ) TWO principal contentions on these undisputed facts which require consideration are: (I) Whether the impugned proceedings could be attacked on the ground that the authorities did not complete the same within a reasonable time; (ii) Alternatively, whether the petitioners should be granted the reliefs sought for under Article 226 of the constitution in view of the long delay and laches on their part in approaching this Court for the necessary reliefs. ( 4 ) THE scheme in question is for widening the road known as Arcot Srinivasachar Street which was conceived nearly 3 1/2 decades ago, i. e. , in the year 1950. Perhaps, at that time itself the authorities might have felt that this road was too narrow to contain the volume of vehicular traffic and that is the reason the Corporation authorities planned the widening of the road way back in 1950. But, however, the necessary action was initiated as also the sanction for widening the road was obtained some time in 1974. ( 5 ) THE preliminary Notifications No. RD 282, 283, 281, 284, 287, 280, 272 and 286 aqb 74 dated 24. 9. 1974 and the notification no. But, however, the necessary action was initiated as also the sanction for widening the road was obtained some time in 1974. ( 5 ) THE preliminary Notifications No. RD 282, 283, 281, 284, 287, 280, 272 and 286 aqb 74 dated 24. 9. 1974 and the notification no. RD 285 AQB 74 dated 29. 4. 1974 were published in the Gazette on 3. 10. 1974 and the final notifications No. RD 294, 288, 293, 290, 289 and 296 AQB dated 14-8-1975, 13. 8. 1973, 18. 8. 1975 except those relating to the preliminary notifications No. RD 272, 286 and 287 AQB 74 dated 24. 9. 1974 were published under Section 6 of the Act on 21. 8. 1975. So the time lag between the preliminary notifications and the final notifications does not appear to be unreasonably long. But, the grievance of the petitioners is that pursuant to the final notifications in the year 1975 no action was taken by the authorities to acquire the lands and even the awards had not been completed in most of the cases and, thereby, the petitioners who are all tenants and were eking out their livelihood by carrying on business in metalware, cycle spare parts, drugs and pharmaceauticals, etc. , are seriously affected by the impugned action of the authorities after a lapse of nearly 20 years, and the impugned acquisition proceedings are seriously flawed by various irregularities - statutory and otherwise and, therefore, they have approached this Court for the necessary reliefs. , are seriously affected by the impugned action of the authorities after a lapse of nearly 20 years, and the impugned acquisition proceedings are seriously flawed by various irregularities - statutory and otherwise and, therefore, they have approached this Court for the necessary reliefs. ( 6 ) THEY have contended that the proceedings are bad in law since no individual notice was served on them excepting 3 of them; that there was no public notice of the substance of the preliminary notification which is mandatory under the provisions of Section 4 (1) of the Act; that no notice of hearing was served on any of them; that their objections were not heard by the authorities under Section 5-A of the Act; that no intimation of the report of the Land acquisition Officer ('lao') was given to them; that no award notices were served on them either under Sections 9, 10 or 12 of the act; that there was neither the sanction of the Corporation nor of the Government for widening the street in question; that though, they being tenants are persons interested in the premises in question and are also entitled to compensation in terms of the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 ('kmc. Act') no provision was made for payment of compensation to them; that the proceedings were initiated on account of collusion between the Corporation authorities and the owners of the premises since the owners had been trying to evict them from the premises in question because of the unremunerative rents they were paying and, therefore, they took the opportunity of getting the petitioners evict ed by resorting to the provisions of the Act with the help of and in collusion with the Corporation authorities. They have also attacked the validity of the 'public purpose' for which the premises are sought to be acquired on the ground that, though ostensibly the premises are required for widening the Arcot Srinivasachar Street, there is neither an existing need nor a future need for widening the street; that there is only 'one-way' traffic in that road after the issue of the impugned notifications, that no parking is allowed in that street and that the streets which are adjacent to Arcot Srinivasachar Street are not sought to be widened by the Corporation but only the Arcot srinivasachar Street and thus it is singled out with a view to evict the petitioners/tenants from the premises which they have been, occupying over 2 to 3 decades. They have also relied on the assurance given by the then chief Minister some time in the year 1978 that they would not be evicted or displaced before the authorities concerned without making adequate arrangements or provisions for their resettlement by arranging suitable accommodation to accommodate their business or trade as the case may be. Additionally, they have relied on the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution and certain decisions of the Supreme Court rendered recently on the scope and applicability of Article 21 to cases of this nature. ( 7 ) THE delay in approaching this Court is explained by the petitioners in para-18 of the petition thus:"since most of the petitioners have not been issued with statutory notice under the Land Acquisition Act they were under the impression that the acquisition proceedings were abandoned or dropped by the authorities and they became aware of the continuation of the acquisition proceedings only recently when actually their possession is threatened by the officials of the Corporation and hence there is nd deliberate delay or laches on the part of the petitioners. " ( 8 ) BOTH the Corporation and the State government have entered appearance through their learned Counsel and have filed their objections. The Corporation has contested these petitions on various ground. According to the learned Counsel for the corporation these petitions should be dismissed in limine since the petitioners have not properly explained the delay in approaching this Court. " ( 8 ) BOTH the Corporation and the State government have entered appearance through their learned Counsel and have filed their objections. The Corporation has contested these petitions on various ground. According to the learned Counsel for the corporation these petitions should be dismissed in limine since the petitioners have not properly explained the delay in approaching this Court. On the question whether the premises in question are required for a public purpose, i. e. , for widening the Arcot Srinivasachar Street, it is contended that the declaration made by the government under Section 6 of the Act is conclusive of the fact that it is for a public purpose and this Court cannot investigate into the facts alleged by the petitioners as to the existing and the future needs of the corporation to widen the street. Regarding the other contention relating to discrimination, it is said that this road is the road connecting a few very important places in Bangalore City, namely, K. R. Market, victoria Hospital, Kempegowda Road and other places of importance and without widening this road, flow of traffic to other important points will be greately affected and hampered and it would also result in traffic hazards. He has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in GURUDIAL singh v STATE OF PUNJAB ( AIR 1980 s. C. 319) to meet the case of collusion, colourable exercise of power and malafides alleged by the petitioners. ( 9 ) THE learned Government Advocate appearing for the State has taken similar contentions on behalf of the State government. ( 10 ) BEFORE I go into disputed questions it would be necessary to" cull out a few facts from the records of the impugned proceedings. Learned Counsel for the Corporation sri G. P. Shivaprakash has produced 3 files of the Corporation relating to the impugned acquisition proceedings. No. doubt, these files were produced for the first time before this Court when the arguments of the petitioners were half way through. But, learned Counsel for the petitioners were permitted to inspect these records before they concluded their arguments and this court can proceed on the basis that all the disputants have inspected the records and they are also aware of the contents of the records. But, learned Counsel for the petitioners were permitted to inspect these records before they concluded their arguments and this court can proceed on the basis that all the disputants have inspected the records and they are also aware of the contents of the records. ( 11 ) THE first file deals with the notifications made by the State Government under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, the representations made by the petitioners after the issue of the preliminary notifications, the award notices issued by the LAO under the relevant provisions of the Act and the inspection notes pertaining to the impugned acquisition proceedings. The first document which should be noticed is the order of the state Government dated 25. 6. 1975 sanctioning the action proposed by the Corporation to acquire the lands for widening the Arcot srinivasachar Street. The order of the government is found in letter dated 24. 4. 1979 by Order No. RD 187 AQB. 74. This sanction was issued pursuant to the letter No. 71/72 dated 28-9-1984 from the deputy Commissioner (Development) Corporation requesting sanction for the alignment of B. V. K. lyengar Road upto sultanpet. Since the acquisition proceedings relate to two different proposals in regard to sy. Nos. 196 to 202 and Survey Nos. 119 to 126, the record discloses two different proceedings of the Government and two separate sanctions issued on the same date but bearing different Government Orders. By these two sanctions, the Government directed the Corporation to take further action under Section 4 (1) of the Act and also directed that the preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act should be published in the Mysore Gazette on 3. 10. 1974 positively. Accordingly, the preliminary notifications were published on the various dates before 3. 10. 1974. The record further discloses that on 20. 1. 1975 hearing of the objectioins as required under section 5-A of the Act was fixed on 5. 2. 1975 at 3. 00 P. M. in the chambers of the Deputy commissioner (Development) and a number of persons were asked to appear in person or through their advocates at the time of hearing. The names of 63 persons are found in the endorsement dated 28. 1. 1975. 2. 1975 at 3. 00 P. M. in the chambers of the Deputy commissioner (Development) and a number of persons were asked to appear in person or through their advocates at the time of hearing. The names of 63 persons are found in the endorsement dated 28. 1. 1975. That means to say as many as 63 persons who were aggrieved by the preliminary notification were aware of the same and had filed their objections against the said notification and they were also called upon to appear before the Land Acquisition Officer for enquiry as required under Section 5-A of the Act. The fact that the petitioners preferred their objections against the proposed acquisition could not be disputed in the light of a number of cyclostyled statements of objections filed by them individually or by subscribing their signatures to the joint representation filed by the association constituted by themselves as Arcot Srinivasachar Street Tenants' Association. This association was formed by the petitioners calling themselves as residents/businessmen/tenants of the premises in Arcot Srinivasachar Street with a view to safeguard and protect their interest in regard to the impugned acquisition proceedings. The representation discloses that they had elected a Managing Committee and on their behalf the said Managing committee had submitted the representation which is in the nature of objections to the preliminary notifications. The objection statement dated 3. 2. 1975 requires a special mention since as many as 83 persons who claim to be the members of the Tenants' association have signed this statement. A copy of this statement was sent to the commissioner (Development), City corporation, Bangalore, and it bears the signature of 139 tenants. The original of this representation bearing the same date was sent to the Commissioner of Corporation and this was also likewise signed by the very same number of tenants. Additionally, the record discloses that 20 other tenants had sent their objections separately making use of the cyclostyled form of objections prepared by the Association. There is also a representation by Bangalore Textile workers' Union who have their registered office in one of the premises in the street in question. Record further discloses that locality mahazar was drawn on 6. 8. 1975 before the Revenue Inspector. There are mahazars of this type for Division No. 18 and the market value of the land is fixed at rs. 200/- per sq. yard. Record further discloses that locality mahazar was drawn on 6. 8. 1975 before the Revenue Inspector. There are mahazars of this type for Division No. 18 and the market value of the land is fixed at rs. 200/- per sq. yard. A memo has been issued from the office of the Commissioner of Corporation directing the Revenue officer/corporation Engineer to publish the gazette notification at the locality and also to affix it on the land on 25. 10. 1974. The memo further states that the locality mahazar 'having been published may be drawn'and sent to 'this office as early as possible for taking further action. ' The number and the date of the notification to be published in the locality and affixure in the notice board are mentioned in the said memo. This memo was sent to the Corporation Engineer with the following note:"forwarded to the Deputy Engineer (S and c) for information and to take necessary action and report as desired by the commissioner overleaf. The copies of gazette notification are here-with enclosed for reference. "the memo had finally reached the corporation Engineer for implementation and he has endorsed as follows:"the Report of the Deputy Engineer along with locality mahazar in original is herewith sent to take further action. "the mahazar is also found in the record. The mahazar states that on 2. 11. 1974 in division No. 18, Arcot Srinivasachar Street a mahazar has been executed in relation to the notification mentioned in the memo to which i have referred to earlier. 30 witnesses have signed this mahazar and they are all either the residents or the occupants of the premises in Arcot Srinivasachar Street. It will not be wrong to assume that those persons who have signed this memo are some of the petitioners since their names also figure in the Writ Petition. Likewise there is another mahazar drawn on 2. 11. 1974 and that had been witnessed by as many as 17 witnesses. These witnesses are either the residents or occupants of the premises in arcot Srinivasachar Street. ( 12 ) FROM these facts, this Court can safely proceed on the basis that the petitioner- tenants were aware of the preliminary notification made in September, 1974 and other relevant dates; that there was also substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 4 (1) of the Act, viz. ( 12 ) FROM these facts, this Court can safely proceed on the basis that the petitioner- tenants were aware of the preliminary notification made in September, 1974 and other relevant dates; that there was also substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 4 (1) of the Act, viz. , that substance of the notification was also published by the execution of necessary mahazars in the presence of witnesses who were available at that time in the locality in question. That is also proved by the formation of the association of the petitioners known as arcot Srinivasachar Street Tenants' association and from the nature of objections filed by them. The records also disclose that Section 5-A report was sent to the Government on 24/27-3-1975 and intimation of the submission of the report was also given to the petitioners. At this stage it would be necessary to note the objections filed by the petitioners against the preliminary notification. They have stated inter-alia:"it is seen from the several notifications published in the Karnataka Gazette from time to time that the Corporation has started acquisition proceedings of land and portions of building abutting Arcot sreenivasachar Street obstensibly with a view to widening the road. In this connection, at the out-set, it is not very clear as to why Arcot Sreenivasachar street has been singled out for the special treatment as there are narrower roads in the same area with the same if not greater density of traffic. For instance, the width of the Avenue Road which is a busier thoroughfare with a higher density of traffic so also the roads like Chickpet, balepet and Cottonpet is less than that of arcot Sreenivasachar Street. Yet curiously no steps have been taken for widening those roads but fresh building licences continue to be issued in those roads on the basis of the existing alignment. There are also quite a number of other roads in the vicinity which are at times choked with traffic but apparently no scheme is on the anvil for widening them. "in paragraph-3 of the representation they have stated:"the acquisition proceedings, in our view, have to be justified from the following aspects: a) Traffic. b)Cost. c) Injury likely to be caused to the residents. d) Human. These aspects are highlighted in paragraphs-4, 5, 6, and 7 of the objections. "in paragraph-3 of the representation they have stated:"the acquisition proceedings, in our view, have to be justified from the following aspects: a) Traffic. b)Cost. c) Injury likely to be caused to the residents. d) Human. These aspects are highlighted in paragraphs-4, 5, 6, and 7 of the objections. Finally, in paragraph-8 they have stated as follows:"in conclusion, we have to stress once again that as brought out in the preceding paragraphs, the proposed acquisition proceedings are from the point of view of traffic unjustifiable, financially unsound, ethically indefensible and would virtually amount to a callous betrayal of the interests of a large section of loyal tax-payers of the Corporation as it is bound to cause incalculable damage and injury to them. We pray that you will give due consideration to the various aspects highlighted above and in the true tradition of the City Corporation which "has built up for itself name for efficient administration, issue orders to the appropriate authorities to desist from proceeding with such a retrogressive measure in the interest of equity and natural justice. "in the light of these objections, the two serious contentions raised by the petitioners in these proceedings could be disposed of at this stage. Firstly, the contention of the petitioners that these acquisition proceedings were initiated as a result of collusion between the landlords who were unable to obtain orders of eviction against them by virtue of the protection conferred on them under the Karnataka Rent and accommodation Control Act and these landlords were in league with the corporation officials to acquire the premises under the Act for the purpose of evicting the petitioners from the various tenements in their occupation. This plea could have been taken by the petitioners, if at all there was collusion and malafides in their statement of objections and therefore, the plea of collusion and malafides which I thought at one stage of the arguments was well-founded is an after thought and cannot be entertained. This plea could have been taken by the petitioners, if at all there was collusion and malafides in their statement of objections and therefore, the plea of collusion and malafides which I thought at one stage of the arguments was well-founded is an after thought and cannot be entertained. It is also clear from the records of the corporation at page-73 of the file relating to the acquisition proceedings that an endorsement was made by the Assistant engineer to the effect that he tried to get the consent of the owners of the buildings for the acquisition of the premises but the owners were not available since all the buildings were in the occupation of the tenants and the tenants were not willing or were not forthcoming to furnish the addresses of the owners. Therefore, it could be seen from the records that even in the year 1974 the petitioners were opposing the acquisition proceedings tooth and nail knowing fully well the consequences of such proceedings. Though one of the contentions of Mr. Ron appears to be that some of the landlords are present in the Court and are instructing the learned Counsel for the Corporation, I do not think that their participation in the proceedings in the Court would lend any colour of malafides to their action or collusion to establish a diabolical nexus between the Corporation officials and the landlords. ( 13 ) THE second contention which could be disposed of at this stage is the authority of the Government to initiate proceedings under the Act in the light of certain provisions of the Bangalore City Municipal corporation Act, 1949 which was in force at the relevant time and the provisions of the karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 which repealed the Bangalore Municipal corporation Act in the year 1976. Mr. Ron was at pains to bring out the relevant provisions of these two Acts for the purpose of establishing that the impugned acquisition proceedings are vitiated by non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of some of the provisions of the earlier Act. I would have seriously taken note of these objections but it should be noticed that the petitioners were all assisted by their Advocates in preparing the objections against the preliminary notification but they did not take up any such contention in their statement of objections. I would have seriously taken note of these objections but it should be noticed that the petitioners were all assisted by their Advocates in preparing the objections against the preliminary notification but they did not take up any such contention in their statement of objections. Records disclose that a number of Advocates had filed vakalaths for the petitioners and they were also notified about the hearing before the Land Acquisition officer. So, it cannot be said the petitioners who are Laymen did not know the legal implications of the validity of the acquisition proceedings. They had. the assistance of counsel and as could be seen from the tenor of their objection, the statements of objection were also prepared with the assistance of their counsel. Under the scheme of the Act the report under Section 5-A assumes finality when the final notification under Section 6 is published. Therefore, at this distance of time, it is not proper for this Court to entertain the objections based on the provisions of the two corporation Acts. In this connection, the grievance of the learned counsel for the corporation requires to be noticed. Mr. Shiva Prakash contended that these acquisition proceedings are challenged after a lapse of nearly 13 years and as a result the corporation is greatly prejudiced by not having the relevant records in support of the impugned acquisition proceedings. Because, the objections taken by the petitioners placing reliance on certain provisions of the two Corporation Acts will have to be tested by the records maintained by the corporation in respect of these proceedings. The second hurdle for the petitioners in regard to these contentions taken by their learned counsel is that all those provisions relate to the property that had vested in the corporation. But here we are dealing with the case of the tenements which did not vest in the Corporation but vested in the owners of the premises. So these tenements which did not vest in the Corporation would not be covered by the relevant provisions of the two corporation Acts. Therefore, in my view, the elaborate arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners for challenging the acquisition proceedings on the ground that they did not comply with the mandatory requirement of the respective corporation Acts do not require any consideration. Therefore, in my view, the elaborate arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners for challenging the acquisition proceedings on the ground that they did not comply with the mandatory requirement of the respective corporation Acts do not require any consideration. But one provision, however, will have to be noticed while considering the relief that the petitioners would be entitled to in these petitions and that will be done at the appropriate place. In the light of these facts, the first contention raised by the petitioners will be considered now. ( 14 ) MR. Ron, learned counsel for the petitioners, strongly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in THE COLLECTOR (DIST. MAGISTRATE), ALLAHABAD AND another v RAJA RAM JAISWAL (A. I. R. 1985 S. C. 1622) and contended that the notices under Section 4 of the Act were not served on the petitioners except the three petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 9189, 9218 and 9219 of 1987 and, therefore, the impugned notifications are liable to be quashed. The Supreme Court has observed in that case that"in order to comply with the mandatory requirements therein set out, a notification stating therein the land which is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose had to be published in the official gazette. The second part of the sub-section provides that the Collector has to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Both the conditions are mandatory. As a notification under section 4 (1) initiates the proceedings for acquisition of land and uses the expression 'shall' the mandate of the legislature becomes clear and therefore, the infirmities therein cannot be wholly overlooked on the specious plea that the Courts do not interdict at the stage of a mere proposal. " ( 15 ) THE Supreme Court further observed that"it could not be urged that since the underlying purpose behind publication of a notice in the locality is to give an opportunity to the person interested in the land to object to the acquisition, where in a case, the purpose is achieved as in the instant case the petitioner having filed his objections, the failure to publish the substance of the notification in the locality need not be treated fatal and cannot invalidate the proceedings. The submission as presented is very persuasive and but for binding precedents, the Supreme Court would have accorded considerable attention to it. But the Supreme Court would not whittle down a mandate of legislation recognised by a long line of decisions solely depending upon the facts of a given case. Further the on the facts of a given case. Further the submission is predicated upon an assumption that the sole purpose behind publication of substance of notification in locality is to make requirements of Section 5-A functionally effective. The assumption is not well founded. " ( 16 ) IN the cases on hand, it should be noticed that the issuance of the preliminary notifications under Section 4 cannot be disputed and they were also served on all petitioners. Otherwise, it would not have been possible for the petitioners to form an association for the protection of their interests and put forth their objections in identical terms. The second part of Section 4 (1) was also complied with as noticed earlier by the mahazars prepared and published at the appropriate places. Therefore, the challenge to the preliminary notification on the ground that the notice were not served on the petitioners and there was no compliance with the mandatory requirement of the second part of Section 4 fails. It should also be noticed that here we are dealing with the case of a large number of premises sought to be acquired under the act and a large number of persons are obviously affected by the impugned notifications. So, even assuming that some persons had not been notified either sight or because of the fact that their names are not found in the assessment list or in the corporation Revenue Records, that by itself would not invalidate the proceedings. ( 17 ) A Division Bench of this Court has held in STATE OF KARNATAKA, bangalore AND ANOTHER v kempaiah AND ANOTHER (A. I. R. 1984 karnataka 208):"when there is acquisition or taking for a larger public purpose, the person from whom property is taken is paid 'just compensation' and in such a case it would be somewhat odd to hold that there is expropriation in a mere theoretical sense. We cannot approach the matter on dogmatic or doctrinaire principles and make the working of the Act almost impossible. We cannot approach the matter on dogmatic or doctrinaire principles and make the working of the Act almost impossible. When large areas of lands for huge irrigation project or a modern steel plant have to be acquired, can the court insist that there should be service of the preliminary notification on every person recognised in the RTC or the municipal assessment register or person who claims to be the owner of such property. Any such insistence will make the acquisition for a public purpose almost impossible to achieve. The preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act is a proposal to which it is open to the owners, occupiers and all persons interested in the land and other as to object and the requirement of that section should be published in the official gazette and notice thereof should be given in the locality where the land is "situated or the land owners are residing, are mandatory is concluded by the several rulings of the Supreme Court (Vide State of Mysore v Abdul Razak Sahib AIR 1973 sc 2361 ). But, that is not the position on the other requirement of Section 4 (1) of the Act and the same, therefore, calls for a closer examination. "a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in state OF GUJARAT v PANCH OF NANI haman's POLE AND OTHERS (A. I. R. 1986 SC 803) has observed:"by reading Section 4 (1) which Rule 1 of gujarat Rules framed under Section 55 it could not be interpreted to mean that a personal notice to each and every interested person is the requirement of section 4 and in absence of such a notice the proceedings of acquisition will be invalidated. The manner in which the notice is to be given is provided in Section 4 (1) itself by publication of the substance of the notification at a convenient place in the locality. " ( 18 ) FROM the facts on record, it is established that there was service of individual notices on the petitioners/tenants of Arcot Sreenivasachar Street and there was also public notice of the substance of the preliminary notifications. The notices of hearing were also served on all the petitioners and they had been heard. The notice of the report submitted to the government was also given to the petitioners. The notices of hearing were also served on all the petitioners and they had been heard. The notice of the report submitted to the government was also given to the petitioners. So, the essential mandatory requirements of completing the acquisition proceedings were complied with by the authorities before the final notifications under Section 6 (1) were made. So, the appropriate stage for challenging the report made by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 5-A of the Act was in the year 1974 or in the earlier part of 1975. There is no good reason why the petitioners did not approach this court to challenge the acquisition proceedings at that time. Therefore, this Court must necessarily take the view that the petitioners were guilty of laches in approaching this Court and it is not the authorities who are said to have been guilty of not completing the acquisition proceedings in time. ( 19 ) THE grievance of the petitioners that no award notices were served on them as required under Section 9, 10 or 12 of the Act would be considered at this stage. The records in this respect do not show there had been service of the notice on all the petitioners. A few petitioners appear to have been served with the award notices. But mere failure to serve the award notices under section 9 or 12 would not invalidate the acquisition proceedings. But perhaps it may provide a right for the petitioners to put forth the claim before the appropriate authority for enhancing the compensation. It is well settled that the L. A. O's award is not binding on the aggrieved parties. The award is a mere proposal of the Land Acquisition officer and that award is always subject to review by the authorities under the Act, viz. , the Civil Judge specially empowered to determine the compensation due to the parties aggrieved. So if at all the petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of the authorities to serve award notices on them, it is open to this Court to protect their rights by making a suitable direction to the Land Acquisition officer to refer the claims of the petitioners in this regard to the appropriate authority for adjudication in accordance with law. So if at all the petitioners are aggrieved by the failure of the authorities to serve award notices on them, it is open to this Court to protect their rights by making a suitable direction to the Land Acquisition officer to refer the claims of the petitioners in this regard to the appropriate authority for adjudication in accordance with law. ( 20 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no sanction of the Government or the Corporation for widening the road was taken is also liable to be rejected since I have noticed in the earlier part of this order that the Government had sanctioned the proposal of the Corporation. ( 21 ) THE next point for consideration is whether in the light of subsequent developments, there is any existing or future need for the acquisition of the premises in question. The petitioners have relied on various facts which are not in serious controversy. They have stated that consequent of the shifting of certain markets in the adjacent area and consequent of the regulation of traffic in Arcot Sreenivasachar street by making it lone way traffic' and consequent on certain other developments that had taken place, this road could be kept as it is and thereby the petitioners' tenements could be saved from the acquisition proceedings. They have also stated that the corporation have not taken any action since 1974 and hence the actions of the authorities are vitiated by delay and laches and therefore, this Court should interfere under article 226. According to them, though the scheme was conceived in the year 1950 it came into existence in 1975; that the corporation has thought it fit to widen this road by evicting the tenants though other streets are also as congested as this street; that the Corporation has singled out this road only for the purpose of widening and thereby the petitioners are signed out for discrimination. They have also relied on the assurance given by the then Chief Minister in 1979 as contained in the press note issued by the Tenants' Association published in the 'deccan Herald'. ( 22 ) THE legal position is clear in this regard. They have also relied on the assurance given by the then Chief Minister in 1979 as contained in the press note issued by the Tenants' Association published in the 'deccan Herald'. ( 22 ) THE legal position is clear in this regard. Once a declaration is made under section 6 (2) of the Act and is published in the official Gazette, under Section 6 (3) that would be conclusive evidence that the premises were acquired for a public purpose in the manner hereinafter provided under the Act. So, the effect of Section 6 (3) of the act is that the declaration published in the official Gazette is conclusive evidence of the fact that the land was needed for a public purpose. Therefore, a heavy burden is cast on the petitioners to displace the conclusive nature of evidence in terms of the declaration made under Section 6 (1 ). In this regard a reference to the nature of the traffic in the streets of Bangalore and the survey made by the authorities to reduce the volume of traffic in these roads requires to be noticed. In the report of the Comprehensive development Plan prepared by the bangalore Development Authority dated 22-5-1972 it is found that the following are the centres of intensive activity in the City:1. City Railway Station 2. City Market 3. Kempe Gowda Road 4. Russel Market 5. Vidhana Soudha area 6. Approaches to the city on eight traffic routes. At page 46 of the report, the Committee studied the nature of accidents within the limits of the Bangalore Municipal corporation and observed as follows:"with the detailed information on hand a further work of Traffic Regulation Study was made. The increased vehicular traffic in the city has posed many problems so far as regulation of traffic is concerned. It is absolutely necessary to widen many of the main roads to the widths sufficient to carry the increasing traffic. The traffic is bound to grow more in the future in the central areas. But it is impossible to widen the roads in the heavily built-up areas like City Market, Russel Market, old City and Cantonment areas. Traffic engineering measures have limited scope in improving these roads, as it would involve a heavy expenditure and also these measures are time consuming. The only answer for this problem would be to accept traffic regulations which ensure safe and efficient traffic flow. Traffic engineering measures have limited scope in improving these roads, as it would involve a heavy expenditure and also these measures are time consuming. The only answer for this problem would be to accept traffic regulations which ensure safe and efficient traffic flow. The traffic regulation recommended speed limits, parking restrictions, one- way streets, prohibition of certain turning movements, marking of silent zones, school zone etc. . . . "though the committee at that time was in favour of the introduction of traffic regulation for the safe and efficient flow of traffic, the committee had also recommended the widening of many of the roads. But its only objection was that it Was not possible to widen the roads in the heavily built-up areas like City Market, Russel market, Old City and Cantonment areas. But this does not mean that the Government has no power to acquire the premises for widening the streets if a proper proposal is put up by the Corporation to acquire the same for the purpose of widening the streets. This decision to widen the streets primarily rests on the Corporation and from the statistics given by the learned Counsel for the corporation for the relevant years in regard to the increase in the number of vehicles, it cannot be said that the proposal to acquire these lands is not a public purpose. In page 17. of the Comprehensive Development Plan of Bangalore City Planning Area prepared by the Bangalore Development Authority the statistics of the number of vehicles for the years 1970-71 to 1981-82 are given. Whereas in the year 1970-71 the total number of vehicles inclusive of two wheelers and three wheelers was 51,987, in the year 1981-82 the number rose upto 1,96,969. The increase is nearly 4 times the traffic in the year 1971. By the same reckoning the increase in the number of vehicles in the year 1986-87 would be atleast 6 tunes the number of vehicles that plied the streets of this city in the year 1970-71. The present number of vehicles plying on the city roads would be not less than 3 lakhs. By the same reckoning the increase in the number of vehicles in the year 1986-87 would be atleast 6 tunes the number of vehicles that plied the streets of this city in the year 1970-71. The present number of vehicles plying on the city roads would be not less than 3 lakhs. This figure would be sufficient indication of the problem faced by the authorities in regulating the flow of traffic in the city roads and therefore the authorities were of the view that Arcot Sreenivasachar street had to be widened with a view to ease the flow of traffic and also to relieve the congestion on the other roads leading to City market, K. R. Hospital and other places of intense activity. It cannot be therefore said that the purpose of acquisition is something extraneous to the requirement of widening the road. No doubt, the petitioners being occupants of the premises in question for a period of 30-40 years would be seriously affected by the impugned acquisition proceedings; but that by itself would not affect the power of the authorities to acquire the same. It is well settled that the interest of private parties/owners must yield to the interest of the general public and viewed from that angle the State Government's declaration under Section 6 of the Act is conclusive evidence of the fact that the land was acquired for a public purpose The petitioners cannot rely on the human aspect of their problem to impeach the acquisition proceedings. In the view I have taken, it is unnecessary to consider the various other contentions taken by the petitioners regarding the existence or otherwise of the public purpose. Even though I have held that the acquisition proceedings are valid in law, certain other points require consideration in view of certain special features in this case regard being had to the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal corporation Act and the decision of the supreme Court in Olga Tellis. Even though I have held that the acquisition proceedings are valid in law, certain other points require consideration in view of certain special features in this case regard being had to the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal corporation Act and the decision of the supreme Court in Olga Tellis. Learned counsel for the petitioners have relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in OLGA tellis and OTHERS v BOMBAY municipal CORPORATION AND others (A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 180) and on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in bamandas MUKHERJEE v STATE OF west BENGAL AND OTHERS (A. I. R. 1985 Calcutta, 159) to drive home the point that the eviction of the petitioners from their tenement should be preceded by suitable measures for accommodating their business/trades. ( 23 ) I will first take up the assurance given by the Chief Minister which is produced at annexure-S in the writ petitions. To quote the relevant portion of the press report:"the Chief Minister is reported to have assured the members that sufficient space on either side of the street would be acquired for not only widening the street but to construct buildings for shops. These, on completion would be allotted to the present tenants. Corporation Administrator N. Lakshman Rao was also present at the meeting, according to a press note issued by the association. "relying on this assurance given by the Chief minister, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the authorities are bound by the principle of promissory estoppel and therefore the petitioners cannot be dislodged from the premises in question unless the authorities give them alternative accommodation for housing their business. Mr. Ron and Mr. Vedantha lyengar have invited my attention to the possible eviction of a number of petitioners who are carrying on business for a period of 40-50 years and submitted their cases cannot be treated on a par with the cases of agriculturists if their lands are sought to be acquired for the construction of dams or other projects. According to them, the petitioners are business people and they have acquired certain amount of goodwill along with their business. Therefore, even assuming they have to go elsewhere to set up their business, it will not be possible for them to develop their business in other localities. According to them, the petitioners are business people and they have acquired certain amount of goodwill along with their business. Therefore, even assuming they have to go elsewhere to set up their business, it will not be possible for them to develop their business in other localities. Therefore, their right to livelihood which is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution would be taken away by the impugned acquisition proceedings. ( 24 ) NOW what is the validity of annexure-S, even assuming that the statement of the then Chief Minister is the statement of the Government? Annexure-S is not a statement made by the Government. It is only a press note and that too a press note issued by the interested parties namely the association of the petitioners. They have not asked the Government to produce the records in regard to the alleged assurance given by the then Chief Minister. They have not filed the affidavit of the Corporation administrator who was allegedly present at the meeting when the Chief Minister gave that assurance. In the circumstances, it would be highly unsafe for this Court to bind the Government and the Corporation to the principles of promissory estoppel based on the interested version given by the petitioners in the press note. The Supreme court in Olga Tellis case has added a new dimension to the content and interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The supreme Court in that case was concerned with the plight of slum-dwellers in Bombay city who had challenged the notices of eviction served on them by the Bombay municipal Corporation (AIR 1986 SC, 180 ). The plight of the slum-dwellers who belong to the lowest strata of the Society in I country is well known and the Supreme court in para 32 of its judgment had observed as follows:"as we have stated while summing up the petitioners' case, the main plank pf their argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by Art. 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by art. 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, "except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. and yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to liveli- hood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the "villages. The motive force which propels their desertion of their hearths and homes in the village is the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas J. in Baksey, (1954) 347 M. D. 442 that the right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. 'life' as observed by Field, J. in Munn v Illinois, (1887) 94 US 113, means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. "having held so, the Supreme Court, in para 57 of its judgment gave the following directions:"we have referred to the assurances given by the State Government in its pleadings here which, we repeat, must be made good. Stated briefly, pavement "dwellers who were censused or who happened to be censused in 1976 should be given, though not as a condition precedent to their removal, alternate pitches at malavani or, at such other convenient place as the Government considers reasonable but not farther away in terms of distance; slum dwellers who were given identity cards and whose dwellings were numbered in the 1976 census must be given alternate sites for their resettlement; slums which have been in existence for a long tune, say for twenty years or more, and which have been improved and developed will not be removed unless the land on which they stand or the appurtenant land, is required for a public purpose, in which case, alternate sites or accommodation will be provided to them; the 'low Income Scheme Shelter programme' which is proposed to be undertaken with the aid of the World bank will be pursued earnestly; and, the 'slum Upgradation programme (SUP)' under which basic amenities are to be given to slum dwellers will be implemented without delay. "so from the directions given by the Supreme court, it is clear that the Maharashtra government, in its pleadings had given certain assurances for the rehabilitation of these slum dwellers. In this case, the State government or the Corporation had not given any such assurance. "so from the directions given by the Supreme court, it is clear that the Maharashtra government, in its pleadings had given certain assurances for the rehabilitation of these slum dwellers. In this case, the State government or the Corporation had not given any such assurance. The State government has generally adopted the contentions put forward by the Corporation and that apart, the position of petitioners tenants who do not belong to the lowest strata of the Society and who are carrying on fairly lucrative business in their respective premises cannot be equated with that of the slum dwellers. Therefore, it is not open to them to contend that their fundamental right under Article 21 would be violated by the impugned acquisition proceedings. Their constitutional right to carry on business is always subject to reasonable restrictions and to public interest, if the petitioners are properly compensated for the loss of their tenancy rights, justice would be done to them in these cases. ( 25 ) THE next question that was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners touches upon the constitutional guarantee conferred on them by Article 14 of the constitution. Though this question was not raised before the authorities in the enquiry held under Section 5-A, since this question relates to the fundamental right of the petitioners, I have permitted them to argue this point and accordingly, this contention raised in I. A. II was allowed by me and I have heard all the parties on this question. The question arises in this way. It is not in dispute that in respect of two preliminary notifications out of 9 preliminary notifications issued by the State Government, final notifications were not published obviously because the State Government as also the corporation had dropped the idea of not acquiring the premises covered by those two preliminary notifications. On this undisputed fact, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that there had been a hostile discrimination which would attract the provisions of Article 14 of the constitution and that there was also an element of arbitrariness in not acquiring the lands under the said two preliminary notifications. Therefore the final notifications pursuant to other 7 preliminary notifications are liable to be quashed. Therefore the final notifications pursuant to other 7 preliminary notifications are liable to be quashed. The answer to this challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution is met by the Corporation in the additional statement of objections filed by it which reads as:"it is submitted that the final notifications in respect of the aforesaid two preliminary notifications viz, RD 272 and RD 286 could not be issued and the same was delayed in the course of proceeding in the subordinate offices and therefore the final notifications could not be issued with the "prescribed time. Action has already been initiated to acquire the other properties covered by the aforesaid preliminary notifications RD 272 AND RD 286. "it is alleged by the petitioners that the State government in its statement of objections has taken a contrary stand. I have no reason to disbelieve the stand of the Corporation in this regard. The Corporation had requested the State Government to initiate proceedings to acquire the premises for the purpose of widening the street. The Corporation which is the civic authority constituted to look after the civic amenities of the citizens of bangalore should be more conversant and concerned with the needs of the citizens of bangalore and therefore when they have made a submission that the lands under the two preliminary notifications would be acquired in due course, this Court should accept the same. It would not be proper for this Court not to give credence to the statement of the Corporation because the state Government has not supported it. Assuming for the sake of argument that there is a contradictory stand in this regard by the state Government, I am inclined to believe the statement of the Corporation in the additional statement of objections. The legal position is also well settled by the three decisions reported in H J. SIDDAPPA v THE state OF MYSORE AND ANOTHER (A. I. R. 1967 Mysore 67), in AMBALAL purshottam ETC. v AHMEDABAD municipal CORPORATION OF THE city OF AHMEDABAD AND OTHERS (A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1223) and in NARAIN dass AND OTHERS v THE improvement TRUST, AMRITSAR and ANOTHER (A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 865 ). In siddappa's case (AIR 67 Mys. v AHMEDABAD municipal CORPORATION OF THE city OF AHMEDABAD AND OTHERS (A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 1223) and in NARAIN dass AND OTHERS v THE improvement TRUST, AMRITSAR and ANOTHER (A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 865 ). In siddappa's case (AIR 67 Mys. 67), a Division bench of this Court dealing with the case of hostile discrimination under Article 14 of the constitution observed that every wrong interpretation of a rule or law does not amount to hostile discrimination. But, what is important is an intentional unequal treatment of persons similarly placed. Applying the ratio of that decision to the facts of the case, I am of the view that the failure to make a final notification in respect of the two preliminary notifications was not with the deliberate intent to treat the petitioners differently. Perhaps, there might have been some confusion or oversight in the corporation Office since this is a case where the Corporation was not dealing with one notification but with a large number of notifications bearing different dates. From the statement of objections it could be seen that a large number of persons were involved in the preliminary notifications and therefore, there was every possibility that the land Acquisition Officer did not request the government suitably for issuing the final notifications in respect of these preliminary notifications. I will go to the extent of saying that the Land Acquisition Officer was not diligent in advising the Government suitably in respect of these two preliminary notifications. But that does not attract the constitutional guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution, since there was no intentional unequal treatment of persons similarly placed. In Narain Dass case (AIR 72 SC 865), the supreme Court was dealing with a case under Section 56 of the Punjab Town improvement Act (Act No. 4 of 1922 ). In that case, the exemption from the Act was granted to one Bikram Das. But, the appellant therein, Narain Dass, was not given such exemption. The Supreme Court dealing with plea of discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution observed as follows:"article 14 guarantees to all persons in our country equality before the law and equal protection of the laws which only* means that all persons are equally subject to the law and have a right to equal protection in similar circumstances both as regards privileges conferred and liabilities imposed by the laws. In other words, equal laws have to be applied to all persons in the same situation and there "must be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same. Section 56 does not suffer from any vice offending art. 14 and indeed it was not so contended by Shri Gupte. what was contended by him was that while administering Section 56 there has been hostile discrimination against the appellants because lands under orchards belonging to persons similarly placed have been exempted whereas the appellants have been refused exemption. No doubt, equal protection can be denied as much by the administration of a law as by legislation. But in the present case it is not possible to hold on the material on the record to which our attention was drawn that the case of Mahant Bikram Das was so similar in all essential particulars to that of the appellants that the act of granting exemption to his land has resulted in hostile discrimination against the appellants. In any event if the appellants have failed to bring their case within section 56 of the Act then merely because some other party has erroneously succeeded in getting his lands exempted ostensibly under that section that by itself would not clothe the present appellants with a right to secure exemption for their lands. The rule of equality "before the law or of the equal protection of the laws under Art. 14 cannot be invoked in such a case. "the principle that could be deduced from this case is that an erroneous decision taken by the authorities or an act which suffers from negligence or oversight by itself could not confer a right on the parties aggrieved to invoke Article 14 of the Constitution. This point does not require any further elaboration since I am inclined to accept the statement made by the Corporation in the additional statement of objections that they are going to acquire the lands covered under the two preliminary notifications in due course. Therefore, the argument based on discrimination under Article 14 must fail. ( 26 ) I have already dealt with the plea of malafidcs and also the plea raised under the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal corporations Act and the City of Bangalore municipal Corporation Act. ( 27 ) LEARNED counsel Mr. Therefore, the argument based on discrimination under Article 14 must fail. ( 26 ) I have already dealt with the plea of malafidcs and also the plea raised under the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal corporations Act and the City of Bangalore municipal Corporation Act. ( 27 ) LEARNED counsel Mr. Ron has relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in BAMANDAS MUKHERJEE v state OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS (A. I. R. 1985 Cal. 159 ). The Calcutta High court made a direction following the interim order made by the Supreme Court in Olga tellis and taking judicial notice of the acute shortage of alternative accommodation that the State Government should not acquire the dwelling house of the tenants in question without providing alternative accommodation to the tenants. That was a case of acquisition of residential house for the expansion of an existing college. The dwelling house was in a congested area of calcutta City and in disregard of the interest of the tenants of that house, the State government initiated proceedings for acquiring that house for the purpose of expansion of a girls' college. The Calcutta high Court on the facts of that case observed:"the interest of the individual can no doubt be sacrificed and ignored for the betterment of the society but this cannot be an absolute doctrine. In the context of acute housing problem in this metropolitan City and the exorbitant rent, a tenant who has been occupying a house at a very nominal rent if asked to leave his hearth and home for the alleged purpose of expansion of a college without providing him any alternative accommodation will be either homeless or a slum dweller. This can never be the object of a democratic or socialistic state. "these observations in my view must be confined to the fa. cts of that case. The calcutta High Court doubted the validity of the acquisition proceedings and held that the expansion of a girls' college was not a public purpose. It also took into consideration the interim order made by the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis case but as noticed the earlier interim order of the supreme Court now merges with its final order. I have already excerpted the directions made by the Supreme Court to maharashtra Government in Olga Tellis. It also took into consideration the interim order made by the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis case but as noticed the earlier interim order of the supreme Court now merges with its final order. I have already excerpted the directions made by the Supreme Court to maharashtra Government in Olga Tellis. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the calcutta High Court rests on the facts and circumstances of that case and that cannot be an authority for the proposition that before acquiring the premises in Arcot sreenivasachar Street, the petitioners should be accommodated elsewhere. But, even then, the petitioners would be entitled to some relief in these proceedings in view of the fact that the state Government and the Corporation authorities have taken their own time to finalise the proceedings. However, it is contended by the learned counsel for the corporation that the acquisition proceedings had taken their own time because of the lobbying done by a powerful section of the tenants who had been from time to time making representations to the Government and to the authorities to stall the process of acquisition. There is some force in this contention of the Corporation. As could be seen from Annexure-C, though the final notification was made in the year 1975, the Corporation could not complete the acquisition proceedings in view of the various representations made by the petitioners to the authorities concerned. These representations are found in the annexures dated 25-11-1985, 30-5-1986, 9-5-1986, 3-2-1984, 22-6-1984, 11-4-1985, 25-11-1985, 21-5-1985, 21-8-1986, 26-9- 1986, etc. These representations were made after 16th November 1978, that is, after the meeting with the then Chief minister who had, according to the petitioners, had promised not to acquire the premises in question without providing them with alternative accommodation. Even then, if the petitioners were to be evicted from the premises forthwith consequent on the dismissal of these writ petitions, they would suffer irreparable loss and injury. Even then, if the petitioners were to be evicted from the premises forthwith consequent on the dismissal of these writ petitions, they would suffer irreparable loss and injury. ( 28 ) FURTHER, under Section 270 (2) of the karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, any land or building acquired under clause (b) of sub-section (1) may be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of, after public advertisement, and any conveyance made for that purpose may comprise such conditions as the standing committee thinks fit as to the removal of the existing building, if any, the description of the new building (if any) to be erected, the period within which the new building (if any) shall be completed and any other similar matters. The Standing committee, as per sub-section (3) of Section 270, may require any person to whom any land or building is transferred under sub-section (2) to comply with any conditions comprised in the said conveyance before it places him in possession of the land or building. While enacting this section the legislature has obviously taken note of the problems that would be created for the residents of the Corporation when their lands or buildings are acquired for widening the road. Such a provision is not found in any of the other Acts like the Karnataka acquisition of Land for grant of House Sites act or the Bangalore Development authority Act or the Land Acquisition Act and therefore any injury that may be caused to the petitioners by their eviction from the premises in question should be properly made good by the Corporation by complying with the provisions of section 270 of the karnataka Municipal Corporations Act if the circumstances so warrant. In what manner the said compliance should be made by the corporation cannot be decided in these petitions since it depends upon the steps that the Corporation is going to take for the purpose of widening the street in question. The Corporation may demolish all the buildings or it may acquire all the buildings, or may leave in tact a few buildings which may not be strictly necessary for widening the street. The Corporation may demolish all the buildings or it may acquire all the buildings, or may leave in tact a few buildings which may not be strictly necessary for widening the street. Therefore, it is open to the petitioners after the State Government completes the acquisition proceedings to make a suitable representation in the light of provisions of Section 270 of the Municipal corporations Act and it is for the corporation to consider the case of the petitioners due regard being had to the provisions of that Section. ( 29 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of the Supreme court in SHRI CHAND ETC. v government OF U. P. , LUCKNOW AND others (A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 246) to sustain the plea that the delay in the acquisition proceedings is fatal to the validity of the impugned notifications. There a scheme framed under Section 68 (1) of the Motor vehicles Act was quashed by the Supreme court on the ground that if there is unanswerable delay by the State in passing the orders under Section 67-D of the Motor vehicles Act, the State Government could be directed not to proceed with the consideration of the Scheme itself under section 68-C of that Act because Section 68 does not confer unfettered power under the motor Vehicles Act and that power should be exercised having due regard to public interest. This decision was rendered on a consideration of the scheme under Section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. The supreme Court found on the facts of that case that the State Government should be prohibited from implementing the Scheme due regard being had to the public interest. The anology of a scheme prepared under section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act will not hold good for the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act for a public purpose when that purpose has to be achieved to relieve the traffic congestion in the street in question. Further in my view as the petitioners are guilty of laches having approached this Court after 13 years after the issue of the final notification, it is not open to them to contend that the delay in acquiring the lands have given them a right under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, that decision of the Supreme court is of no avail to the petitioners. Therefore, that decision of the Supreme court is of no avail to the petitioners. In my view the only way the petitioners could have succeeded in challenging the impugned notifications is that the notifications are vitiated by legal malafides, in that, the purpose for which the premises were sought to be acquired was not a public purpose but the premises were sought to be acquired on certain extraneous considerations as stated by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in GURDIAL SINGH v STATE OF punjab AND OTHERS (A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 319 ). But, that is not the case here. No legal malafides can be established on the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the petitioners have not established any valid grounds to challenge the impugned notifications and accordingly the petitions must fail. However, in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in Olga tellis the petitioners are entitled to some consideration in the hands of the authorities, since their eviction would result in the loss of their livelihood. Therefore, I direct the authorities to grant them six months' time from the date of this order to vacate the premises in question, failing which, it is open to the authorities to seek eviction of the petitioners in accordance with law. But, the corporation must also keep in view the provisions of Section 270 of the Karnataka municipal Corporations Act while proceeding further with the acquisition proceedings. ( 30 ) AS noticed earlier, the records do not disclose service of Award notices on the petitioners who are indisputably the tenants of the premises in question. It is not disputed that the petitioners are also interested persons in the premises in question being the tenants and therefore, they are also entitled to compensation that would be awarded by the authorities under the Act. In M/s. HUNUIKERI BROS, v assistant COMMISSIONER, DHAR- war DIVISION, AND ANOTHER (A. I. R. 1962 Mysore 169) a Division Bench of this court dealing with the provisions of Section 9 of the Act observed:"the object in enacting sub-section (3) of section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act is to afford to persons occupying the land or interested in it to make a claim for compensation, so that the Collector might decide the compensation payable to them, and order its payment. If, in the making of that claim or in its establishment the omission to serve a notice under Section 9 (3) has brought about a hindrance, the person who was so prevented from making a claim or from establishing it, has a right to challenge the award, by the adoption of suitable steps for that purpose. But there is no inflexible rule that an omission to serve a notice under section 9 (3), always and in all circumstances, vitiates an award. "in that case, dealing with the case of persons who had not been served with the Award notices, though they were persons interested, this Court observed:"but, in the case of the remaining six petitioners, it is impossible for us to hold that the award itself had no existence in the eye of law or was void. Their own conduct in intervening in the acquisition proceedings in which they presented claims for the payment of compensation to them clearly precludes them from urging any such contention. At the highest, what may be said is that by reason of the omission to issue a notice to them, they have been prejudiced to the extent that they were prevented from asking for a reference under Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act, to the Court, for the award of enhanced compensation. The only order that we should therefore make would be to direct the Collector, if an application is presented to him for that purpose under Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act by any of these six petitioners, to make a reference under the provisions of that section to the competent court, so that that court might dispose of that reference on merits. That Court to which such reference is made shall dispose of the reference only on merits, although such reference might have been made beyond the time prescribed by section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Mr. Government "pleader undertakes that on behalf of the Collector, no argument will be advanced before the court that the references were made beyond the period of limitation. The only other direction that we need give in this regard is that the Collector should make the references as directed only if the petitioners or any of them present applications for references under Section 18, within a period of six weeks from this date. The only other direction that we need give in this regard is that the Collector should make the references as directed only if the petitioners or any of them present applications for references under Section 18, within a period of six weeks from this date. "learned counsel for the Corporation fairly adopted the same stand in this case and he submitted that in all fairness to the petitioners he has no objection if the petitioners were to make representations before the Land Acquisition Officer under section 18 of the Act within a period to be specified by this Court. The right of the petitioners to claim compensation cannot be questioned in the light of the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act as also the Act and, therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners have failed in their challenge to the acquisition proceedings, being persons interested in the premises in question, they should be permitted, if they have not been served with the notices of the Award, to seek enhancement and also for apportionment of the compensation due to them by making suitable representations to the Land acquisition Officer within six weeks from the date of receipt of this order and on such representation being made, the Land acquisition Officer shall make a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The undertaking of the learned counsel for the corporation and also the State Government that they would not take the plea of limitation against the petitioners is recorded. If any awards have been made awarding compensation to the owners of the premises ignoring the interest of the petitioners who are interested in those premises it is open to the petitioners in such cases to make an application before the Land Acquisition officer to re-open such cases and request time to make a suitable reference under section 18 of the Act within 6 weeks from the date of receipt of this order. ( 31 ) IN Writ Petitions Nos. 9915 to 9977 of 1985 disposed of on 16-12-1985 some of the bunkshop owners who had put up bunk shops on the Corporation land near the City market area had sought for a writ in the nature of mandamus restraining the corporation authorities from demolishing the bunk-shops and from evicting them from those shops till alternative accommodation was provided to them in the new City market. Challenge was made under Article 21 and 300-A of the Constitution. Swami, J. , dismissed those petitions; but however made certain observations in paragraph 18 of his order for mitigating the hardship of the petitioners therein if they were directed to be evicted from the bunk-shops forthwith. It was observed in paragraph 18 of the order thus:"it is also further submitted by Sri. Veerabhadrappa, learned counsel for the petitioners, that as the petitioners have been conducting business in the bunk shops from the year 1982 pursuant to annexure-A, the Corporation may be directed to provide alternative accommodation. Learned counsel for the corporation submits that there are no shops available; therefore, it is not possible to accommodate the petitioners. However, learned counsel for the corporation submits that the petitioners may make necessary applications for allotment of shops anywhere in the corporation area; and the Corporation will consider the same in accordance with law and subject to shops being available. The aforesaid submission made on behalf of the Corporation is placed on record. "this observation was affirmed in the connected writ appeals filed by the aggrieved persons. Learned counsel for the corporation made a similar submission in this Court to the effect that, if the petitioners were to make any applications for allotment of shop premises which have been constructed by the Corporation within the corporation limits, the Corporation will consider their applications favourably if the rules permit allotment of such shops to the petitioners. This submission is also taken on record. ( 32 ) WITH these observations and directions made above these writ petitions are dismissed. But, the parties to bear their own costs. Writ Petition dismissed --- *** --- .