JUDGMENT 1. - This is criminal revision petition under section 397 and 401 Cr.P.C, against the judgment dated 13-12-1982 passed by Sessions Judge, Sikar in Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 1981 confirming the conviction and sentence against the petitioner under section 7/16 Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar vide his judgment dated 26-2-1981 in Criminal Case No. 47 of 1981 and reduced the sentence from one year R.I. and fine of Rs. 2,000/- to six months R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. 2. The facts so far as sale of common salt is concerned are not in dispute, Mr. Tibrewal learned counsel for the accused has concentrated on three fold submissions. Firstly, it was argued that the report of the Central Food Laboratory was received and the sample was sent and the proceedings in that respect were done with the abnormal delay and there has been violation of 13(2) (B) of the Food adulteration Act. It was then argued that in any case both in the charge as well as in examination this report of Director of Central Food Laboratory was never put to the accused and therefore the charge itself as have been found to be proved cannot be sustained Lastly it was argued that in any case the accused deserves to be dealt with seriously because he is not manufacturer of salt himself and the trial has taken too long a time and by this time more than a decade has passed in between and the accused also is old and infirm as he is suffering from hypertension and is more than 60 years of age. 3. All the three above contentions of Mr. Tibrewal were vehemently opposed by Mr. Kamal Nayan Shrimal, Public Prosecutor' According to him the provisions of 13(2) (B) are directory and not mandatory and there has been no non-compliance creating any prejudice to the accused. Mr. Shrimal then argued that the charge and the examination of the accused expressly mentions of adulteration of salt and type of adulteration is the same in the report of Public Analyst as well as Central Food Laboratory. According to him even if there is some omission or irregularity in the framing of the charge of the statement of the accused, section 465 Cr. P.C. cures it and no trial is vitiated unless prejudice is shown. Mr. According to him even if there is some omission or irregularity in the framing of the charge of the statement of the accused, section 465 Cr. P.C. cures it and no trial is vitiated unless prejudice is shown. Mr. Shrimal then argued that since it is a case of adulteration in salt which is of daily use for consumer and the adulteration of the food which is utilised by each and every house and human being in that are a every day it should not be lightly dealt with as these are cases crimes against the society and not individual. 4. I have given a very thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, and also perused the relevant record referred to me by the learned counsel for the parties and the decisions which were cited during the arguments which were quite elaborate and sustained in the present case. 5. Now so far adulteration of the salt purchased by the Food Inspector from the accused in the present case is concerned, the analysis by the Public Analyst dated 18-10-1978 as per the report and the certificate of the Public Health Laboratory Sikar dated 18-10-1978 mentions that the sodium chloride 19.2 per cent by weights, matter soluble in water other than sodium chloride 7.96 per cent. The report of Director Central Food Laboratory dated 8-9-1980 mentions that sodium chloride content is less than the minimum prescribed limit as it is 89.8 per cent and matter soluble in water other than sodium chloride above the maximum prescribed limit as it is 9.6 per cent. 6. It is common ground now that according to the standard prescribed in 8.15 clause of the P.F.A, Rules the result of both shows that the sample is not according to the prescribed limit and consequently it is adulterated. The edible common salt standard laid down in clause 8 15 of the P.F.A. Rules 1955 is not fulfilled in the present case according to reports of both Director Central Food Laboratory Gajiabad dated 8-9-1980 and the earlier report of the Public Analyst of Public Health Laboratory Sikar. It is common ground that there is no material difference so far this particular aspect of the case is concerned and therefore have to consider the case on that data. 7. Now coming to the question of non-compliance of section 13 (2) (B) Mr. It is common ground that there is no material difference so far this particular aspect of the case is concerned and therefore have to consider the case on that data. 7. Now coming to the question of non-compliance of section 13 (2) (B) Mr. Tibrewal has referred to the various decisions reported in 1984 (2) F. A. C. 261, 1984 (2) F. A. C. 206, 1982 (1) F A C 292, 1969 FAC 109. 8. Mr. Shrimal, learned Public Prosecutor has relied upon two judgments of the Apex court AIR 1983 SC. 303 AIR 1985 S.C. 29 in addition to the judgment of the Karala High Court 1986 Cr. L. J. page 1 and latest judgment of this court reported in 1987 Cr. L. R. (Raj.) 106. Lastly he pointed that this court itself in the last week has decided in the case of Gujarat v. State that the non-compliance of rule 9 (j) is not fatal as it is directory and not mandatory. While doing so this court has held that on account of the above two judgments of the Supreme Court the judgment of this court in 1980 Raj. Cr Cases 241 and 1982 Raj. Cr. Cases 268 cannot be said to hold that field and they will have to be treated as not having laid down good law. 9. The latest judgment of this court 1987 Cr. L R. (Raj.) 106 have been confirmed by this court in Sanwar Mais case also. 10. Now the question is that in the present case according to Mr. Tibrewal the sample was taken of common salt on 30th Sept. 1978, the complaint was filed on 21-8-1979, the notice under section 13 (2) was given on 24-10-1979 and the application for examination of the sample was moved by the accused on 25-10-1979. The sample was sent on 20th April, 1980 and it was examined on 8-9-1980. 11. Obviously technically the time lag is more than that has been prescribed under the provisions of section 13 (2) (B) and the question is whether on account of this the accused deserves acquittal. 12. The sample was sent on 20th April, 1980 and it was examined on 8-9-1980. 11. Obviously technically the time lag is more than that has been prescribed under the provisions of section 13 (2) (B) and the question is whether on account of this the accused deserves acquittal. 12. It may he noticed that though the provisions of Rule 9 (j) and s. 13 (2) (B) are meant for different situations, but primarily the question regarding the time prescribed either under the Rules or the Act, for various purposes in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is imperative, mandatory or directory has been considered by Hon'ble O. Chinnappa Reddy in 1983 S.C. 303 and the test to hold a particular provision directory or mandatory in such situation has been laid down, (in Head note 'A') which reads as under : "There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether a particular provision in a statute is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the statute is important. The object of the particular provision must be considered. The link between the two is most important. The weighting of the consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory or directory is vital and more of them than not, determinative of the very question whether the provision is mandatory or directory. Where the design of the statute is the avoidance or prevention of public mischief, but the enforcement of a particular provision literally to its letter will tend to defeat that design, the provision must be held to be directory, so that proof of prejudice in addition to non-compliance of the provision is necessary to invalidate the act complained of." Thereafter the court has held that the rule that the copy of the reports should be given within ten days of the receipt of the report was directory and not mandatory and the Andhra Pradesh Judgment to the contrary was overruled and held to be bad law. 13. The principle which has been laid down in this judgment is that : "Every prescription of a period within which the act must be done is not prescription of a period of limitation with painful consequences if the act is not done within that period. 13. The principle which has been laid down in this judgment is that : "Every prescription of a period within which the act must be done is not prescription of a period of limitation with painful consequences if the act is not done within that period. Rule 9 (j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, as it stood prior to 4-1-1977 merely instructed the Food Inspector to send by Registered post copy of the Public Analyst's Report to the person from whom the sample was taken, within 10 days of the receipt of the report. Quite obviously the period of 10 days was not a period of limitation within which an action was to be initiated or on the expiry of which a vested right accrued. The period of 10 days was prescribed with a view to expedition and with the object of giving sufficient time to the person from whom the sample was taken to make such arrangements as he might like to challenge the report of the public Analyst. Where the effect of non-compliance with the rule was such as to wholly deprive the right of the person to challenge the public Analyst's report by obtaining the report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, there might be just cause for complaint, as prejudice was caused there could be no cause for complaint." The above view has again been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulsi Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh where rule 9 A has been interpreted ( AIR 1985 SC 299 ) . It was a case where the sending of public Analyst report to vendor according to rule 9 A of the prevention of food Adulteration rule, 1955 was to be done immediately. The Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreted it and held that the idea is to avoid dilatoriness on the part of the official demand prevention of unnecessary harassment to the accused. But the idea is not to penalise the prosecution and to provide a technical defence. First to construe immediately as "forthwith" or "at once" and next to treat delay as fatal would make rule 9 A ultravirus of section 13 (2). 14. But the idea is not to penalise the prosecution and to provide a technical defence. First to construe immediately as "forthwith" or "at once" and next to treat delay as fatal would make rule 9 A ultravirus of section 13 (2). 14. Now coming to section 13 (2) (B) all that is essential is that the sample should be examined by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory and the certificate to the court in the proper from is to be sent specifying the result of the analysis. 15. The period for one month certainly has been prescribed in this but as held in the above judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court it is not the period of limitation so as to deprive the prosecution of getting the legal machinery moved for conviction of the accused, inspite of adulteration nor it is a sort of defence readily available to the accused on the technicality of the time have been run out. 16. The two above judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have emphasised though while dealing with rule 9 (j) and the other one regarding the phrase immediately in 9A that these provisions would not be utilised for technical defence to the accused unless prejudice has been shown. 17. In the present case as have discussed above the result of the analysis both of the Public Analyst sikar as well as the Director of Central Food laboratory at Gajiabad so far as the two particular ingredients on the basis of which adulteration has been held to be proved are concerned, they are same identical though there is minor difference but substantially they are same and there is no real, difference. In such circumstances the mere fact that there has been delay would not cause any prejudice to the accused. The various judgements referred to by Mr. Tibrewal in this respect need not be discussed because after the judgement of the Apex court the other discussion of various racets by the various High Courts cannot have any better authoritative value. I am therefore not discussing them. Moreso because in the earlier judgement only given in the last week have discussed similar judgements in connection with the interpretation of 9 (j) in the case of Gajraj v. State (S.B. Cr. Revision petition No. 304 of 1983, decided on 20th March, 1987) and in Sanwar Mal's case (reported in 1987 Cr. I am therefore not discussing them. Moreso because in the earlier judgement only given in the last week have discussed similar judgements in connection with the interpretation of 9 (j) in the case of Gajraj v. State (S.B. Cr. Revision petition No. 304 of 1983, decided on 20th March, 1987) and in Sanwar Mal's case (reported in 1987 Cr. L.R. (Raj.) 107 this court has already discussed above various judgements even of this court which are based on Andhra pradesh view which can no longer be sustained as good law. 18. Consequently, I am of the opinion that like rule 9 (j) section 13 (2) (B) is also directory and the one month period mentioned therein is not the period of limitation but it is period to appreciate the legislative anxiety for urgency in the matter. Once the report has come and from the subject matter of the record thereafter, unless something very specific has been caused, it will be deemed that no prejudice has been caused. 19. The order sheet of the case shows that the report was taken in the record be a mention in the order itself, therefore it will be deemed that the accused is aware of it. 20. Now the second question which has emerged for consideration during this legal debate is whether on account of non-mention of the report of the Director of Central laboratory at Gajiabad in the charge as well as in the examination of the accused the accused is entitled to acquittal. Here again it must be mentioned that the charge make a mention of standard and adulteration in the salt on account of report of the Public Analyst and as have mentioned the report of the Central laboratory on these two points on account of which adulteration was found by the Central laboratory is not different but they are identical more or less. 21. It also appears from the record that the report of the Central laboratory was taken on record by mentioning in the order sheet itself and therefore the accused would be deemed to be aware of it. It is true that normally this report should be made subject matter of charge and so also it must be put to the accused but at the same time cannot undermine the submission of Mr. It is true that normally this report should be made subject matter of charge and so also it must be put to the accused but at the same time cannot undermine the submission of Mr. Shrimal that the report was received at the instance of the accused on his application and at his request and therefore he cannot plead ignorance when it was taken on record by expression in the order sheet. 22. Consequently, it is not possible to say that any prejudice has been caused. In this connection Mr. Tibrewal referred to various decision where in such circumstances the trial has been vitiated and the accused have been acquitted. In particular he referred to 1975 (2) FAC 242, 1985 (1) FAC 179, 1983 (1) FAC 36, 1982, FAJ 636, 1983 (2) FAC 312. Here again I may mention that the most important judgment which requires due consideration and which is to be given full weight, is Bhim singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1975 (2) FAC 242 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court acquitted the accused because the sample of the aerated water was found containing less than the prescribed minimum 5 per cent of the sucrose. However, when the charge was framed the charge mentioned that it contained less than sucrose then the minium requirement of 5 percent was put according to the earlier public analysis report. The Director Central Food laboratory it appears did not corroborate that but it came out with a different case that it contained unpermitted coal tar dye. The Directors report superseded the report of public analysis and therefore now the case should have been that the Director Central food Laboratory has reported that it contained unpermitted coal tar dye. This was made neither subject matter of charge nor put to the accused and on that premise the Supreme Court said that the accused is deemed to have been prejudiced and the acquittal was ordered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 23. This was made neither subject matter of charge nor put to the accused and on that premise the Supreme Court said that the accused is deemed to have been prejudiced and the acquittal was ordered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 23. When an argument was made before the Supreme Court that the report of the Director Central Food Laboratory superseded the report of public Analyst was there on the record and therefore even though accused could not be convicted for the earlier charge of less than five percent sucrose but could have been convicted for the aerated water having been found having contents of non permitted coal tar dye, Hon'ble Supreme Court repelled this argument on the ground that this is desparate attempt to sustain the conviction because neither the conviction is based on it nor it was subject matter of charge nor it was put to the accused in his examination. 24. Naturally the case discussed above by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was far different from the facts of the present case, where not only the two reports are identical for the two points of adulteration mentioned above more or less, but further the conviction have been made on that basis and it is not sought to be rectified here only as was the case in Supreme Court. 25. In this connection Mr. Shrimal contention that section 465 Cr. P.C. also comes to his rescue has got great relevance. Although that in itself may not save the situation if the reports would have been different as the Directors report superseded the report of public analyst. 26. In this view of the matter I am of opinion that no-mentioning of the report of the Director of Central Food Laboratory in the charge sheet when the identical report of the Public Analyst has been mentioned and not putting a question on this very point regarding Director of Central Food laboratory report is not fatal though it is always desired that the accused should be put straight aware the relevant material directly and nothing should be kept concealed from him. 27. The question before this court is not that what should be done but the question is that whether it becomes fatal warranting acquittal for setting aside of convicting or quashing the trial as a whole at this stage of revision. 28. 27. The question before this court is not that what should be done but the question is that whether it becomes fatal warranting acquittal for setting aside of convicting or quashing the trial as a whole at this stage of revision. 28. Now the third question which requires consideration is whether in a case of this nature I should take a liberal and lenient view in the matter of sentence and reduce it any further then what has been done by the lower court. The accused has been convicted under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for adulteration of selling salt which was adulterated. He was convicted by the Magistrate and the sentence imposed was one year with fine of Rs. 2,000/-. In appeal that has been reduced to six months and fine has been reduced to Rs. 1,000/-. 29. The accused at the time of examination was of sixty years in the year 1981. The adulteration is of salt which is of common use in every house every day and is required in preparation of the food both in vegetable as well as the bread. The recent legislative tendency is of increasing the sentence in such matters as per the recent amendment which have been made. In the present case section 16(1) (A) mandates that if the adulteration is found in any article of food which is for sale or stores or distributes then the sentence should be imprisonment for a term which should not be less than one year but which may extend to six years and with a fine which shall not be less than Rs. 2,000/-. 30. The above applies to the manufacturer. So far as the present case is concerned it is common ground he is covered by section 16(1) and sub-section (a) where the penalty prescribed is a term of imprisonment which should not be less than six months but it may extend to three years and with fine, which shall not be less than 1,000/-. Rupees. So far as the present case is concerned it is common ground he is covered by section 16(1) and sub-section (a) where the penalty prescribed is a term of imprisonment which should not be less than six months but it may extend to three years and with fine, which shall not be less than 1,000/-. Rupees. The last proviso in this sub-clause (1) provided that in cases of offence sub-clause (2) of (a) and it is with respect to contravention of any rule made under clause (a) or clause (b) of section (1) (a) of section 23 or clause (b) the court may for any adequate special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and with fine to the extend of Rs. 500/-. 31. It would thus be seen that the minimum sentence prescribed is six months and can extend to three years, and fine of Rs. 1,000/-not less than Rs. 1,000/- but for special reasons the court may in a given case reduce the sentence or impose the sentence of three months and fine Rs. 5,00/-. So far as the present case is concerned, the fact that the accused was sixty years of age when he was examined, he may now be above sixty years or little less than 80 cannot be said to be a special or adequate reason. The accused has not brought any extra gavating circumstances so far as the stocking and selling of the common salt is concerned and the sentence which was imposed by the Magistrate was one year and which has been reduced by the appellate court as six months. Mr. Tibrewal pointed out that in the trial court he was granted exemption and he was a patient of hypertension and he purchased the salt from some other person in the market. 32. He further submitted that he is a small shop keeper in a small town of Reengus. Mr. Shrimal on the contrary has referred to the Judgment of Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court 1927 Cr.L.J. 79 wherein the court has said that in a case of section 16 of the Act the sentence cannot be awarded below the minimum provided in that sub-section. Mr. Shrimal on the contrary has referred to the Judgment of Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court 1927 Cr.L.J. 79 wherein the court has said that in a case of section 16 of the Act the sentence cannot be awarded below the minimum provided in that sub-section. The court observed that when the Statute has fixed the minimum sentence no court can for adequate and special reasons further reduce than the one given in the Act itself. If such a thing is permitted it was observed that the policy of the strict punishment for the consent of minimum sentence to check the growth of criminal activities under the Act is likely to be defeated. 33. The recent trend in criminal law in favour of harsh deterent as well as for prescription of minimum sentence for some offences which are hazardous to the society. The Full Bench observed that the recent trend is to be noticed by the courts because when such offences are committed which are against society and which are hazardous to the society then they are offences affecting the health of the society and sentence in such cases should be harsh so that it pinches offenders and acts as deterent. The Full Bench observed that any legislative measures for harsh and severe punishment has to be strictly enforced. The Hon'ble Judge constituting the Full Bench said that when such enforcement of mandate of a statute is not to be done leniency the basis of ideas of officer presiding a court before which a criminal is tried should have any weight. 34. The Full Bench also noticed the history of the amendments in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and observed that the history shows that every time amendment has been made the legislative has made it more harsh and strict for punishment because in these days of inflation everyone including the person dealing in good article is motivated by the profit incentive to indulge in various nefarious activities and social acts. Every day according to the Full Bench invents new technique of money spinning by questionable means and for marketing and selling the consumer adulteration misbranded spurious food articles. Every day according to the Full Bench invents new technique of money spinning by questionable means and for marketing and selling the consumer adulteration misbranded spurious food articles. It was therefore, emphasised that crime detractors are making efforts to detect the adulteration in food increasing alarming and by experience offence is injurious to the public health are being identified and stricter and harsher punishments are provided in accordance with the gravity of the situation. 35. Then the Full Bench also discussed that what can be the adequate and special reasons for lenient view and observed that it was the first offence or that he has a large family to support or that he has abandoned the business of it, could not be treated as adequate and special reasons for awarding lesser punishment. 36. The Full Bench therefore confirmed the sentence of six months and fine of one thousand rupees and refused to reduce to it to one given in the proviso for adequate reasons of three months and rupees five hundred. 37. Para 18 of the judgement of the Full Bench reads as under:- "Now coming to the case in hand whether the reasons put forward by Yad Ram for asking the sentence lesser than the minimum under section 16 of the Act are adequate and special, we find that these do not satisfy the criteria first offence does not mitigate the offence. We do not know how many times before the detection of the case Yad Ram had been selling adulterated milk though he says that he indulged in this business only for a few days. It is hardly an adequate ground to invoke the proviso to section 16. Similarly, it is no ground for leniency if the accused has a large family to support or has abandoned the business of selling milk. Economic stringency of a person does not entitle him to pay with health of other people. At the cost of the health of other people. At the cost of the health of the general public adulterators cannot be encouraged to rear their own families or provide them with comfortable living, Giving up of the business of selling milk does not condone the offence committee under the Act by an accused. These are not adequate grounds nor is anything special in these. At the cost of the health of the general public adulterators cannot be encouraged to rear their own families or provide them with comfortable living, Giving up of the business of selling milk does not condone the offence committee under the Act by an accused. These are not adequate grounds nor is anything special in these. The learned Additional Session Judge erred in law to let Yad Ram off with too lenient a sentence towards which law looks with contempt. He had no power under the law to award any punishment lesser than the minimum provided under Section 16 of the Act, Even if the proviso has applied, though we have held that it does had applied though we have held that it does not because, the lack of the adequate and special reasons, the sentence of less than three months and Rs. 500/- as fine could not be awarded." 38. In my opinion the cases of adulteration in Food articles salt which is of daily consumption and for a number of times in each house are certainly of a specie or a variety where this court should not have any misplaced leniency in the matter of sentence specially which it has been reduced by the Session Court from one year to six months. The reasons given by Tibrewal in his submission may have some bearing in some other cases but so far as the cases of Food Adulteration are concerned and that too of articles like salt or such other species which are of daily use for human consumption because even the poorest of the poor who would take even meals once a day as he cannot afford two square meals a day. would also required salt and it is really pity that even in salt there is adulteration. Probably it is not worth the salt of any citizen of this country, who has taken itself the Constitution and directive principles, to in any manner involve in the adulteration of salt. 39. That being so I have got no other option but to confirm the judgment of the lower court and dismiss the revision petition.Revision dismissed. *******