ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This is a defendants' writ petition arising out of a suit under S. 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The plaintiff opposite party had claimed hereditary tenancy in the disputed land on the ground that the Zamindar Sher Singh Mian had let out the land to the plaintiff through a registered patta dated 11-11-1963 and the defendants occupied the disputed land in 1375F, hence the suit. 2. The defendants had contested the suit with the allegations that the plaintiff was not hereditary tenant and that the defendant' have been in possession for more than statutory period and that the defendants had become Adhivasis of the disputed land and various other pleas were taken to negative the plaintiffs suit. 3. The trial court through its judgment dated 12-2-1971 dismissed the plaintiffs suit as is evident from Annexure attached with the writ petition. In appeal, the first appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiffs suit as is evident from Annexure 11 attached with the writ petition. Thereafter the second appeal filed by the defendants has failed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate courts the defendants have , approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the defendants has contended before me that the suit should have been abated under Rules 4 and 5 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Rules. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the judgment of the second appellate Court is not a judgment in the eye of law and it has not decided the various points raised on behalf of the defendants-petitioners. Third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the defendants have become Adhivasis of the disputed land and are immune from ejectment yet a decree for ejectment has been passed in favour of the plaintiff opposite party. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party, i.e. the plaintiff has tried to refute the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. According to him the impugned judgment need not be interfered with in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. He has also emphasised that the petitioners have failed to point out which Notification made U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act applicable to the disputed land. According to him the impugned judgment need not be interfered with in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. He has also emphasised that the petitioners have failed to point out which Notification made U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act applicable to the disputed land. Therefore, the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners based upon the provisions of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and its Rules should be ignored. It has also been emphasised that the entries in favour of the petitioners were held as fictitious entries, therefore, those entries would confer no right upon the petitioners. In short, the claim of the petitioners has been rightly negatived by the appellate Courts and the impugned judgments should not be interfered with. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties find that the impugned judgment of the second appellate Court is really no judgment in the eye of Law. It has failed to consider the points involved in the case and it has confirmed the judgment of the first appellate Court without dealing with the points involved in the case and without examining the relevant provisions of law. 7. During the course of argument the learned Counsel for the opposite party has indicated that the Notification mentioned at page 234 of 1969 Lucknow Law Times Part V is inapplicable to the disputed land. According to him the aforesaid Notification was applicable to estates or parts thereof owned by the State Government. He has emphasised that the disputed land was let out to the opposite party by the Zamindar, therefore, the aforesaid Notification would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. He has submitted that the provisions of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act were applicable to the area in question by some other Notification which he has failed to point out. The only emphasis was that in the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court S. 20(B) has been mentioned, therefore, the Notification relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners mentioned at item No. 104 at page 234 of 1969 Luck Part V is inapplicable to the present case. 8. I find that the plaintiffs suit was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that it was barred by time and that the defendants-petitioners had become Adhivasis of the disputed land. 8. I find that the plaintiffs suit was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that it was barred by time and that the defendants-petitioners had become Adhivasis of the disputed land. On the facts emerging in the present case it is evident according to the allegations of the plaintiff that the defendants had occupied the land in the year 1375F. The entries in favour of the petitioners in 1374F and 1375F, had been discarded on the ground that the relevant provisions of the Land Records Manual were not followed by the Lekhpal in making entries in favour of the defendants-petitioners. The paragraph mentioned in the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court also indicates that they were applicable to the area which could be governed by the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Therefore, I think that the appellate courts have not approached the problem from correct angle nor they have examined the claim of the defendants-petitioners in view of the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act applicable to the area in question. The second appellate Court and the first appellate Court both have considered the entries of 1374F and 1375F and they appear to think that the relevant year for the application of the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act to the land in dispute is 1373F The notification relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners indicates that the appointed date would be 1-7-1969 which would correspond to 1377F. Since it has been admitted to both the parties that the disputed land would be governed by the provisions of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act on the date of decision by the trial court, I think that the appellate courts have not examined the relevant law while determining the claim of the defendants-petitioners, therefore, their judgments cannot be sustained. 9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party, has emphasised that the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act would not be applicable to the facts of the present case because the suit was filed much before the enforcement of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act to the area in question. It is well established by now that if on the date of decision due to change in law a party acquires any right in the subject matter of the litigation, it is. the , duty of the courts to determine their right. It is well established by now that if on the date of decision due to change in law a party acquires any right in the subject matter of the litigation, it is. the , duty of the courts to determine their right. Moreover, conferment of Adhivasi right upon the persons who were recorded prior to the year in which the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act was made applicable would indicate that the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act in this behalf would be retrospective. I have a feeling that the claim of the petitioners has not been examined by the appellate Courts in the light of the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. It is admitted to both the parties that the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act are applicable to the disputed land, therefore, in my opinion the judgments of the appellate Courts deserve to be quashed. 10. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgments of the appellate Courts are hereby quashed and the case is sent back to the first appellate Court for examining the claim of the defendants-petitioners under the provisions of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.