Judgment 1. Defendant is the petitioner. Opposite party 1 filed a suit against the petitioner and opposite party 2 for declaration that she was the absolute owner of Truck No. B.R.Y. 263 and for other reliefs. 2. On 16-1-1981 the suit was fixed for hearing and opposite party 1 applied for time. The Court below granted it by awarding cost against her and in favour of the petitioner. On 6-1-1982 when the suit was fixed for hearing, opposite party 1 again prayed for time and it was adjourned on payment of cost of Rs. 25/-. Opposite party 1 did not pay the cost so awarded and an application was filed for dismissal of the suit in terms of S.35-B of the Civil P.C. The Court below after hearing the parties, rejected the prayer of the petitioner by order dt. 12-2-1982. This order has been challenged in this revision application. 3. In this civil revision application, we are to see the scope of S.35-B of the Civil P.C. Can it be held that by not paying the cost, opposite party No. 1 has forfeited her right to prosecute the suit? Sec.35-B was inserted in the Code by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. The heading is "Cost for causing delay" and S.35-B reads as follows : "35-B.(1) If, on any date fixed for the hearing of a suit or for taking any step therein, a party to the suit - (a) fails to take the step which he was required by or under this Code to take on that date, or (b) obtains an adjournment for taking such step or for producing evidence or on any other ground, the Court may, for reasons to be recorded, make an order requiring such party to pay to the other party such costs as would, in the opinion of the Court, be reasonably sufficient to reimburse the other party in respect of the expenses incurred by him in attending the Court on that date, and payment of such costs, on the date next following the date of such order, shall be a condition precedent to the further prosecution of - (a) the suit by the plaintiff, where the plaintiff was ordered to pay such costs, (b) the defence by the defendant, where the defendant was ordered to pay such costs. Explanation. Explanation. - Where separate defences have been raised by the defendants or groups of defendants, payment of such costs shall be a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the defence by such defendants or groups of defendants as have been ordered by the Court to pay such costs. (2) The costs, ordered to be paid under sub-s.(1) shall not, if paid, be included in the costs awarded in the decree passed in the suit; but, if such costs are not paid, a separate order shall be drawn up indicating the amount of such costs and the names and addresses of the persons by whom such costs are payable and the order so drawn up shall be executable against such persons." 4. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the language of the section makes the payment of cost a condition precedent to enable the defaulting party to further prosecute the suit or defend it as the case may be. In this case as opposite party 1 did not pay the cost as ordered by the Court below, the Court below had no option but to hold that she was not entitled to prosecute the suit and it was liable to be dismissed. Reliance was placed by him in Anand Parkash V/s. Bharat Bhusan Rai, AIR 1981 Punj and Har 269 (FB). On behalf of opposite party 1, it was submitted that against the petitioner also cost had been awarded on earlier occasion by the Court below and it was not paid within the time; but the Court below had extended the time for payment of cost. It was urged that notwithstanding the language used in that section, in an appropriate case, the Court has jurisdiction to extend that time under Sec.148 of the C.P.C. According to opposite party 1 S.35-B has not been correctly interpreted in Anand Parkashs case (supra). 5. Whether the use of the word shall necessarily renders statutory provision mandatory has been repeatedly considered by the Supreme Court and 1 May notice only two cases, State of Uttar Pradesh V/s. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 and State of Mysore V/s. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190 . The law so laid down by the Supreme Court is of general application. In this case we are concerned with the procedural law. The law so laid down by the Supreme Court is of general application. In this case we are concerned with the procedural law. In Sangram Singh V/s. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 with regard to the Code the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties: not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it." "Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle." The rule for interpreting procedural law, therefore, is that ordinarily a party must be allowed to prosecute his suit and the defendant must be allowed to contest the same. 6 Order 11. Rule 21 of the Civil P.C. also provides for dismissal of a suit if there be failure on the part of the plaintiff and striking out the defence if the defendant was defaulter. Yet in M/s. Babbar Sewing Machine Co. V/s. Trilok Nath Mahajan, AIR 1978 SC 1436 , it was held that unless there has been obstinacy or contumacy on the part of the defaulting party, the plaintiff should not be non-suited and the defendants. defence should not be struck off. 7. Reference may also be made to the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to S.11A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. defence should not be struck off. 7. Reference may also be made to the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to S.11A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. There also it was provided that on the failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent, within fifteen days from the date of the order or the subsequent rent by the 15th day of the next following month, the Court shall order the defence against the ejectment be struck out and the tenant be placed in the same position as if it did not defend the claim of ejectment. The Supreme Court in Ganesh Prasad V/s. Laxmi Narayan, AIR 1985 SC 964 , held that notwithstanding the language used in the section, the wordshall used in the section is directory and not mandatory. Further, to fortify this conclusion, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that when the Court fixes a time to do a thing, it always retains the power to extend the time for doing so under S.148 of the Civil P.C. and the principle of this section must govern in not whittling down the discretion conferred on the Court. It was held that Court may in appropriate case enlarge the period. 8. Sec.148 is part of the Code and it reserves right with the Court to enlarge the period fixed or granted by it for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The power to impose cost under S.35-B is discretionary and if cost is imposed the period for this payment is fixed. If it is held that the Court has absolutely no discretion to enlarge the period originally fixed, then it will amount to "whittling down the discretion conferred on the Court" under S.148. 9. It will be noticed that in S.35-B there are two parts, one provided for dismissing the suit or striking out the defence, as the case may be and the other for realisation of the cost by execution. If the first part of the section is mandatory then not only the suit is dismissed when the defaulter is the plaintiff or the defence is struck off if the defaulter is the defendant, but also he cannot escape in paying the cost. The party, therefore, suffers twice. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature. 10. If the first part of the section is mandatory then not only the suit is dismissed when the defaulter is the plaintiff or the defence is struck off if the defaulter is the defendant, but also he cannot escape in paying the cost. The party, therefore, suffers twice. This could not have been the intention of the Legislature. 10. For the reasons, aforesaid, it must be held that the power of Court given in S.35-B with regard to dismissing suit or striking out defence is directory and the Court has power to extend the period for payment of cost, if sufficient cause is shown. The majority view in Anand Parkashs case, (AIR 1981 Punj and Har 269) (FB) (supra), if I may say so with respect, does not lay down the correct law. 11. The Court below in the order impugned has exercised the power under S.148 of the Civil P.C. and has given reasons for not allowing the prayer of the petitioner. In civil revision, there is no scope to interfere with that order. 12. In the result, I find no merit in this application and the same is dismissed. But in the circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. Let the lower Court records of the case be sent down to the trial Court forthwith.