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1987 DIGILAW 326 (BOM)

Krishna Lulla v. Shyam Ajwani & others

1987-09-22

B.G.KOLSE PATIL, S.C.PRATAP

body1987
JUDGMENT - S.C. PRATAP, J.:---Hearing in extenso the petitioner in person who is also a practising advocate, we are unable to persuade ourselves to hold in his favour that a case has been made out for taking against the respondent action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 2. Embarrassing questions of a personal nature put in cross-examination to a witness in a judicial proceedings will not per se amount to contempt. The petitioner invited our attention to certain questions put in cross-examination of a witness in a proceeding under section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We cannot appreciate the tone and tenor of these questions or the relevance thereof to those proceedings. Courts must prevent vexatious cross-examination and overrule irrelevant questions. And if that is not so done, the aggrieved party is not without appropriate remedy. But action in contempt is not that remedy. We say no more. Indeed, we cannot, unless we travel beyond the parameters of these contempt proceedings. Threats of tax raids allegedly to deter a litigant from proceeding further with his legal/judicial proceedings would also not amount to contempt. Then again, annexing to a writ petition a copy of an order of discharge in criminal proceedings also cannot constitute contempt. The aforesaid were the acts cited and relied upon by the petitioner in support of his contention that the respondents were, because of these acts, guilty of contempt. However, none of these acts singularly or cumulatively justify action in contempt. The petitioner is, of course, at liberty to adopt appropriate remedy/remedies in that behalf. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to issue rule on this petition. 3. But from such limited facts and circumstances as have here come to our notice, we do feel inclined to observe albeit in passing, that this Courts's sympathy tilts, as at present, in favour of the petitioner. Be that as it may, the disputes and litigations such as reflected here are not an unknown feature of human life. Indeed, lawyers and judges in close nexus with courts and administration of justice will, cannot but help admit this. The petitioner and all others involved herein have thus to undergo the traumatic journey fighting their way to and for justice. Indeed, lawyers and judges in close nexus with courts and administration of justice will, cannot but help admit this. The petitioner and all others involved herein have thus to undergo the traumatic journey fighting their way to and for justice. However, in the context of the role of lawyers on whom the petitioner commented we can do no better than refer to the Supreme Court judgment in (E.S. Reddi v. The Chief Secretary, Government of A.P. and another)1, A.I.R. 1987 Supreme Court 1555 wherein quoting (Lord Raid in Rondel v. Worsley)2, (1967)3 All.E.R. 993, the following extracted observations therefrom are found in paragraph 11 of the Supreme Court judgment : "Every Counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every argument, and ask every question, however distasteful, which he thinks will help his client's case. As an officer of the Court concerned in the administration of justice, he has an overriding duty to the Court, to the standards of his profession, and to the public, which may and often does lead to a conflict with his client's wishes or with what the client thinks are his personal interests. Counsel must not mislead the Court, he must not lead himself to casting aspersions on the other party or witnesses for which there is no sufficient basis in the information in his possession, he must not withhold authorities or documents which may tell against his clients but which the law or the standards of his profession require him to produce. By so acting he may well incur the displeasure or worse of his client so that if the case is lost, his client would or might seek legal redress if that were open to him." And quoting the words of Lord Denning, M.R. in (Rondel v. Worsley)3, (1966)3 All.E.R. 657 :--- "He (the counsel) has time and again to choose between his duty to his client and his duty to the Court. This is a conflict often difficult to resolve; and he should not be under pressure to decide it wrongly. When a barrister or an Advocate puts his first duty to the Court, he has nothing to fear." ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "It is a mistake to suppose that he is the mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants : .......... This is a conflict often difficult to resolve; and he should not be under pressure to decide it wrongly. When a barrister or an Advocate puts his first duty to the Court, he has nothing to fear." ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "It is a mistake to suppose that he is the mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants : .......... He must disregard the most specific instructions of his client, if they conflict with his duty to the Court. The code which requires a barrister to do all this is not a code of law. It is a code of honour. If he breaks it, he is offending against the rules of the profession and is subject to its discipline." 4. We conclude then with the hope that Counsel appearing in the different proceedings reference whereto appears in the instant contempt proceedings, will act in the best traditions of the profession and in the true spirit of the observations supra. 5. Subject to the penultimate paragraph, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed. -----