Judgment :- 1. Defendant seeks to revise an order allowing an application filed by the plaintiff under 0.9 R.9, Code of Civil Procedure. 2. There are two plaintiffs, wife and husband. The suit was posted for trial in the special list on 16-1-1985. As early as 5-1-1985 an application was filed for examination of the first plaintiff on commission alleging that she is laid up. A medical certificate was also produced. From 16-1-1985 the case was adjourned to 29-1-1985. On 25-1-1985 the application to examine the first plaintiff on commission was dismissed. On 29-1-1985 the suit was also dismissed for the reason that the plaintiffs did not appear. 3. The application to set aside the dismissal was filed within time. The ground alleged was illness of the first plaintiff and consequent inability to appear. The Doctor who treated the first plaintiff was examined as pw. 2 and the medical certificate was also produced and proved. Second plaintiff gave evidence as pw. 1 and another witness was examined as pw. 3. Defendant gave evidence as dw.1. Medical certificate is Ext. Al. 4. Trial court did not discuss the evidence to any extent except saying that the oral evidence of pws.1 and 2 is contradictory on many points and even assuming that first plaintiff was ill, second plaintiff could have come to court. Also for the further reason that first plaintiff was not examined, the court held that the reason cannot be accepted as true. However, "considering the ardent and acute nature of the claims and allegations" the court thought that it is only fair and proper that an opportunity to have the case decided on the merits should be allowed on terms. Whatever may be the words used and whatever may be its reactions on the evidence, the ultimate result is that the court considered this to be a fit case to set aside the dismissal on terms. The question is whether this Court will be justified in revision in interfering with that judicial discretion inspite of the unsatisfactory manner in which the order is reasoned and worded. 5. It is true that at the stage of considering applications like these under 0.9 R.9 or 0.9 R.13 or S.5 of the Limitation Act, merits of the claims and objections may not be very relevant materials that could influence the judicial mind. 5. It is true that at the stage of considering applications like these under 0.9 R.9 or 0.9 R.13 or S.5 of the Limitation Act, merits of the claims and objections may not be very relevant materials that could influence the judicial mind. But when the object and purpose of the existence of courts and those for which parties are approaching legal institutions are taken into account, such considerations cannot be said to be totally irrelevant in all cases. Sometimes such considerations also may have to weigh with the court in giving the judicial verdict whether there was 'sufficient cause' as envisaged in 0.9 R.9. That may sometimes help the court even in the absence of clinching evidence regarding 'sufficient cause' to come' to a practical conclusion which subserves the ends of justice better. Ordinarily a litigant who approaches the court with a genuine and substantial claim or contention and who knows that he is likely to suffer heavily by his absence, may not purposely evade court merely with a view to try his chance by a petition under 0.9 R.9 or R.13. There may be cases where though the absence was not wilful or due to reasons beyond control, the party may not be able to offer an explanation which is fully convincing to the court or prove the same satisfactorily. In such circumstances, there is a wide discretion with the court in deciding what 'sufficient cause' is for the purpose of allowing or rejecting the prayer. 'Sufficient cause' is an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guidelines could be given. The decision on the question must be the cumulative effect of various factors depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The nature of the claims or contentions and the effect which the decision of the case is having on the rights of parties cannot be ruled out as absolutely foreign to the area of consideration under any circumstances. In appropriate cases if such considerations also weighed with the court, it cannot be said to be a jurisdictional error. 6. The nature of the claims or contentions and the effect which the decision of the case is having on the rights of parties cannot be ruled out as absolutely foreign to the area of consideration under any circumstances. In appropriate cases if such considerations also weighed with the court, it cannot be said to be a jurisdictional error. 6. In this context the learned counsel for the revision petitioner drew my attention to the decision in Ramanatha Iyer v. Ibrahim Rowther (1961 KLT 18) wherein a Single Judge of this Court held that a decree passed in a suit cannot be lightly set aside especially without proper legal grounds therefor and it cannot be done as a matter of judicial generosity in any special case, reminding that decisions should always be governed by the head and not by the heart. As normal principles to be followed in ordinary circumstances, there cannot be any dispute with those propositions. But there may be instances where equitable considerations may have to come from the heart also without doing violence to what comes from the head. For example, in this particular case, though not on the basis of a nappy and proper discussion, the trial court came to the conclusion that the reason alleged cannot be accepted as true on the basis of the evidence. At the same time the following facts are also there. Claims and contentions were substantial and keen. The case was in the special list. 11 days before the posting of the case there was a commission application to examine one of the plaintiffs on commission on the ground of illness supported by a medical certificate. The case was adjourned from 16-1-1985 to 29-1-1985 and the commission application was dismissed only on 25-1-1985. The petition under 0.9 R.9 was filed shortly after the dismissal of the suit. Three witnesses including one of the plaintiffs and the Doctor were examined. Ail these aspects might have weighed with the court in restoring the suit on terms in spite of the finding that on the evidence the reason cannot be accepted as true. The petition under 0.9 R.9 was filed shortly after the dismissal of the suit. Three witnesses including one of the plaintiffs and the Doctor were examined. Ail these aspects might have weighed with the court in restoring the suit on terms in spite of the finding that on the evidence the reason cannot be accepted as true. While allowing the application on terms the court might have thought that in the circumstances, though the reason cannot be accepted as true, the absence cannot be wilful and in the nature of the claims and contentions involved and taking the conduct of the plaintiffs into consideration an opportunity for a decision on the merits will be conducive to justice. 7. All these provisions are introduced to enable the courts to do substantial justice as between parties and avoid law's delays. Interpretations must always be in consonance with that purpose. That does not mean that whatever may be the negligence each and every application under 0.9 R.9 or R.13 will have to be allowed in cases where refusal will amount to negation of a substantial claim or rejection of a substantial contention. That is a matter for the judicial mind to decide influenced by various considerations which cannot be put in a straightjacket. Law should be applied with facts in a meaningful and practical manner which subserves the ends of justice. Courts will have to bear in mind that ordinarily a litigant approaching a court with a bona tide claim does not stand to benefit by purposely absenting himself and courting a dismissal for default. In a case where there are more plaintiffs or more defendants, any one may be in complete charge of the case and others may be only silent spectators unable to do anything substantial for the conduct of the case due to various reasons. To insist that sufficient cause for absence in the case of each and every one among them will have to be proved may not sometimes be a practical approach. But there may be cases in which temples of justice are being misused with vexatious suits or contentions with ulterior motives. Such persons may be misusing the provisions of 0.9 R.9 or 13 or S.5 of the Limitation Act or other provisions. Judicial wisdom and experience must enable the courts to distinguish the chaff from the corn. But there may be cases in which temples of justice are being misused with vexatious suits or contentions with ulterior motives. Such persons may be misusing the provisions of 0.9 R.9 or 13 or S.5 of the Limitation Act or other provisions. Judicial wisdom and experience must enable the courts to distinguish the chaff from the corn. When once that is done substantial justice must be preferred to technical considerations in deserving cases. There is no presumption that non-appearance is deliberate or on account of culpable negligence or malafides. That is what the Supreme Court said in a recent decision reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag, v. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353. Though that decision was concerning S.5 of the Limitation Act the principles evolved are equally applicable in matters coming under 0.9 R.9 or 13 also. 8. Normally an opinion formed by the trial court on the evidence in matters like this will not be interfered with by this court in revision even if it is felt that it could have been otherwise also. A person may be disabled from appearing before court due to various reasons without being wilful. When sufficient cause is shown the approach should not be negative because presumption is not in favour of negligence or malafides. Even in cases where the court is not fully satisfied of the 'sufficient cause' an order allowing the application on terms, if the court feels that such a course is necessary for meeting the situation more suitably for doing justice to the parties, is well within the competence of the court. The section itself authorises the court to allow applications on terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit. Exercise of such a judicial discretion also will not ordinarily be interfered in revision unless it is found to be perverse or illegal. At the same time courts must also be cautious to make all attempts to curb law's delays by discouraging malafide attempts to protract litigations under the guise of sufficient cause. The judicial verdict must be a compromising position as between various interests involved. 9. Viewed in the light of the above principles I do not find any reason to interfere in revision. The judicial verdict must be a compromising position as between various interests involved. 9. Viewed in the light of the above principles I do not find any reason to interfere in revision. In effect what the trial court intended and found was that even though reasonably sufficient grounds are not there this is not a case of wilful absence and the laches could be compensated by costs in doing justice to both sides. Since 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic, the approach of the trial court must be held to be meaningful. As the Supreme Court said the approach most be liberal and not pedantic. The doctrine must be approached in a rational common sense pragmatic manner and not pedantic. The revision petition is dismissed without costs.