JUDGMENT Virendra Kumar, J. - This is a First Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 10.1.1977 passed by Sri S. N. Singh, Civil Judge, Lucknow, in suit No. 137 of 1971 of the court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow, decreeing the suit for Rs. 72,695.45 P excluding the amount of Rs. 243.30 P and Rs. 109.30 P. with proportionate costs and interest at 6% per annum. 2. The plaintiff respondent has filed the suit as a Private Limited Company on 15.7.1971 against the defendant which is a partnership firm. During the pendency of the First Appeal the word 'Private' was deleted on the application of the plaintiff respondent to this effect that it became a Public Company under the Companies Act. The defendant appellant has been carrying on business in the sale of Motor vehicle at Allahabad with a branch at Lucknow. 3. The plaintiff's case may be stated briefly : The defendant used to purchase automobiles from his Principals that is the manufacturers, for supplying them to his customers, and for that purpose used to borrow money from the plaintiff from time to time. The defendant got the money paid by the plaintiff either to its Principal or directly to the defendant. According to the terms of the agreement, an interest of Re. 1% per month was payable on the advance. The amount paid to the Bank in connection with the sending of Bank draft for the amount thus borrowed was also to be charged against the defendant. The plaintiff used to maintain due accounts in the ordinary course of business entering into all the credit and debit entries in the account books in connection with the said dealings. In connection with the advances made to the defendant the entire liability outstanding against him between 19.3.1963 to 13.11.1964 was paid off by the defendant through cheque issued on 13.11.1964. The dispute, in fact, arises in respect of the advances made from 25.11.1964, interest thereon as well as Bank commission charges. The plaintiff's accounts were maintained yearly with reference to each year commencing from first April and ending on 31st March following. Thus the accounts were running and the amount outstanding on 31st of March was carried forward on the 1st of April. The plaintiff has filed his accounts. At the close of year 196667 a sum of Rs. The plaintiff's accounts were maintained yearly with reference to each year commencing from first April and ending on 31st March following. Thus the accounts were running and the amount outstanding on 31st of March was carried forward on the 1st of April. The plaintiff has filed his accounts. At the close of year 196667 a sum of Rs. 48,087.48 P. was due to the plaintiff respondent from the defendant appellant on adding interest at the accrued rate at Re. 1% per month. The outstanding amount became Rs. 72,695.45 P. by the date of filing the suit. According to the plaintiff, the suit was within time on the date it was wfiled in view of various acknowledgements of liability as well as payments made by the defendant appellant from time to time on the demands made from the side of the plaintiff. 4. According to the defendant, loans from the plaintiff were taken under negotiable instruments and used to be paid up on sale of vehicles purchased by the appellant. Payments made by the plaintiff were in respect of specific loans taken. There was no arrangement for keeping running and current accounts alleged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff deliberately withheld all the original documents and pronotes executed by the defendant appellant in original. As to the rate of interest, the instruments contained the specific instructions in respect of interest for slab periods. Thus the interest was payable for broken periods of a month. There was no liability for payment of Bank commission charges on the advances. The accounts furnished by the plaintiffrespondent have not been admitted except a few entries. It is denied that the letters or correspondence on the basis of which extension of period of limitation for filing the suit has been claimed are acknowledgements of liability on the part of the defendant. Consequently the suit is barred by time and is also not maintainable. 5. The trial court accepted the case of the respondent and repelled the contrary pleadings of the appellant except that the claim of the plaintiffrespondent in respect of the two amounts (detailed in the opening para) was not upheld. 6. From the side of the appellant it is contended that he was not afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to place its evidence before the trial court and this has resulted in failure of justice. 6. From the side of the appellant it is contended that he was not afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to place its evidence before the trial court and this has resulted in failure of justice. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the defendantappellant's application for adjournment of the case on the ground of illness of his counsel, Sri J. J. Malviya was wrongly rejected and in the absence of Sri J. J. Malviya the statements of the witnesses of the plaintiff respondent were recorded; and further the application of the defendant appellant for adjournment on the ground that witnessess of the defendant had not come to court on 8.1.1977 was wrongly rejected with the result that appellant could not produce oral evidence. According to the appellant, rejection of adjournment application was unjustified and unwarranted. The suit for recovery of money against the defendantappellant was filed on 15.7.1971. Issues were framed on 5.7.1975. On 11.11.1976 and 25.11.1976, which were the dates fixed for final hearing, the defendantappellant sought adjournment seeking time for settlement of the dispute outside the court. On both the dates the defendant was allowed time. While granting time upto 8.12.1976 to file compromise it was ordered by the court that no further time would be extended. On 8.12.1976 the plaintiff respondent moved an application for six days' more time which was put up for orders on 9.12.1976, but on that date the plaintiffrespondent did not press the application for the reason that the defendant's partner had not turned up for initiating the talk of compromise on the dates agreed. The next date fixed for final /tearing was 5.1.1977. The defendantappellant applied for adjournment on that date on the ground of illness of his counsel, Sri J. J. Malviya, an advocate of Allahabad. For reasons this application was rejected by the court. The defendantappellant has filed Vakalatnama in the case on 5.12.1972 engaging Sri J. J. Malviya and four other counsel. It is quite evident on the record that apart from Sri J. J. Malviya other counsel were also looking after the case from the side of the defendant appellant. It is apart from the fact that it has not been pointed out nor shown that Sri J. J. Malviya was the seniormost counsel amongst all the counsel engaged by the defendant appellant. It is apart from the fact that it has not been pointed out nor shown that Sri J. J. Malviya was the seniormost counsel amongst all the counsel engaged by the defendant appellant. The trial court has mentioned that the counsel of Lucknow engaged by the defendant there were fairly senior ones. It is also a fact that the witnesses of the plaintiff's side examined on January 5 and 7 were crossexamined by the defendant's counsel other than Sri J. J. Malviya. Again on 6.1.1977 after close of the plaintiff's evidence an application was moved from the defendant's side for adjournment on the ground that the defendant's partner could not come to Lucknow. The adjournment was allowed at the suggestion of the defendant. The case was adjourned to 8.1.1977. Obviously it was to enable the defendant to produce its witnesses on that date. The defendant's application of 6.1.1977 for adjournment of the case was allowed with stop order but on 8.1.1977 despite the fact that the case was called out repeatedly, none seemed to appear from the defendant's side nor any witnesses were produced on its behalf. The court, however, ordered to wait for the defendant upto 1.15P.M. Subsequent to this order (dated 8.1.1977) the defendant appellant moved an application on 8.L1977 for adjournment on the ground of illness of his counsel Sri J. J. Malviya. From the side of the plaintiff it was asserted and an affidavit was also filed subsequently to this effect that Sri M. L. Agarwal, one of the partners of the defendant, was seen in the precinct of the court. No counter affidavit was filed from the side of the defendant and further, the trial court extended an opportunity to the defendant to crossexamine the deponent who filed the said affidavit from the side of the plaintiff. But the opportunity of examination was not availed of by the defendant. In view of the facts and circumstances the trial court rejected the application dated 8.1.1977 of the defendant appellant for adjournment. Arguments in the case were heard on that date i. e. 8.1.1977 and the judgment was delivered on 10.1.1977. Thus it is a clear case of lapses and laches and delaying tactics on the part of the defendantappellant. In view of the facts and circumstances the trial court rejected the application dated 8.1.1977 of the defendant appellant for adjournment. Arguments in the case were heard on that date i. e. 8.1.1977 and the judgment was delivered on 10.1.1977. Thus it is a clear case of lapses and laches and delaying tactics on the part of the defendantappellant. The trial court was quite justified in rejecting the defendant's application for seeking the adjournment of the case on 5.1.1977 and again on 8.1.1977, The appellant's contention that he was denied fair and reasonable opportunity to place its evidence or of hearing before the trial court is without force and substance. 7. According to the appellant's contention, Section 18 of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Money Lending Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Money Lending Act) prohibits continuance of this suit filed (in 1971) on the basis of loan in the absence of a certificate of registration issued to the plaintiff respondent for tarrying on the business of money lending under Section 7 of the Money Lending Act. In this connection the appellant referred to proviso to Section 18 of the Money Lending Act. The respondent challenges the contention. Admittedly the plaintiff respondent has obtained no certificate of registration for carrying on money lending business. 8. Section 18 of the Money Lending Act of 1976 is reproduced here : Section 18. Bar of certain suits by moneyleaders No suit on the basis of any loan, agreement or security referred to in SubSection (1) Section 15 shall be instituted by a moneylender, unless he at the time of any such loan or agreement made or security taken after the commencement of the Act, holds a valid certificate of registration; Provided that a suit for enforcement of any loan, agreement or security made or taken before such commencement may be instituted or continued if the money lender applied for registration under Section 7 within a period of three months from the date of such commencement, and a certificate of registration is issued to him. 9. The Uttar Pradesh Money Lending (Amendment) Act, 1978 which was published in U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 6.1.1979, substituted the above reproduced Section 18 (old) by the new Section 18. 9. The Uttar Pradesh Money Lending (Amendment) Act, 1978 which was published in U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 6.1.1979, substituted the above reproduced Section 18 (old) by the new Section 18. The substituted Section 18 runs as follows : Substitution of Section 18 For Section 18 of the Principal Act, the following Section shall be substituted and be deemed always to have been substituted, namely : 18. Bar on certain suits by moneylenders (i) No suit on the basis of any loan, agreement or security referred to in sub section (1) of Section 15 shall be instituted by a moneylender, unless at the time of advancing such loan or making such agreement or taking such security (a) such moneylender held a valid certificate of registration; or (b) such moneylender had applied for such certificate and the same had not been refused; or (c) the period specified in the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 7 had not expired. I0. It is thus obvious that in view of the substituted Section 18 the proviso to the earlier Section 18 is deemed to be nonexistent since the time of commencement of the Money Lending Act, 1976. Therefore the appellant's contention that the aforesaid proviso bars the continuance of the suit is untenable, In the cases of Babban Mani Tiwari Vs. Ram Bar an (1979 Allahabad Law Journal N.O.C. 75) decided by a single Judge of this Court on 18.4.1979, and Har Nath Vs. Satya Guru (1985 All LJ 1202) decided by a single Judge in 1985, the attention of the court does not appear to have been drawn to the substituted Section 18, with the result that both the cases were decided as though the proviso to Section 18 continued in existence which was not a fact in view of the substituted Section 18. 11. The plaintiff respondent at the time of the institution of the suit in 1971 was a Private Ltd. concern. Subsequently the word 'Private' was deleted at the instance of the plaintiffrespondent on the ground that it has become a public company under the Companies Act, 1956. Section 21 of the Companies Act permits the change by deleting the word 'Private' on conversion of a private company into public company. Section 23 of the Companies Act lays down that change of name shall be completed and effective on issue of certificate of incorporation as public company by the Registrar. Section 21 of the Companies Act permits the change by deleting the word 'Private' on conversion of a private company into public company. Section 23 of the Companies Act lays down that change of name shall be completed and effective on issue of certificate of incorporation as public company by the Registrar. Section 43A lays down that a private Company shall become a public company on the basis of percentage of paid up share capital of a private company. The plaintiff applied for deletion of word 'Private' from its name on the ground that it had been issued the necessary certificate and became a Public Company on satisfying the requisite conditions. As against the affirmations of the plaintiff respondent in this connection contained in the affidavit filed from its side, no counter affidavit or any other evidence has been filed to rebut them. Section 23 (3) of the Companies Act provides that the assets and liabilities of the old Company shall be inherited by the new company. Therefore, the plaintiff on ceasing to be Private Ltd. concern and becoming a public company remained entitled to Continue the suit to enforce the right to recover the money from the defendant. Section 2 (1) (b) of the Money Lending Act, provides that nothing in the said Act shall apply to or in respect of any loan or advance to or by a Public Company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956. 12. The respondent's case that there was running and current account of the advances made by the respondent to the appellant from time to time, gets support from the testimony of P. W. 1 Sadha Shanker, the Accountant of the Company and P. W. 2 H. C. Gupta, Managing Director of the respondent's company, as well as the copies of the accounts filed from their side. The oral evidence coupled with the entries in the account books of the respondent (filed in the case) further shows that the financial year of the Company starts from 1st of April and closes on 31st of the following March. P. W. 1 Sadha Shanker, Accountant, has affirmed that account books of the respondent were maintained in the ordinary course of business, and all money transactions relating to the suit were maintained in the account books. P. W. 1 Sadha Shanker, Accountant, has affirmed that account books of the respondent were maintained in the ordinary course of business, and all money transactions relating to the suit were maintained in the account books. He has also sworn that account books were maintained under the supervision of the Managing Director (Sri H. C. Gupta). Prior to the maintenance of the accounts by P. W. 1 Sadha Shanker, accounts were maintained by one Sri D. D. Bhargavas Accountant. P. W. 2 H. C. Gupta, the Managing Director, has identified the writing of the Accountant, D.D. Bhargava. On the other hand, according to the appellant's case each advance made by the respondent and repayment made by the appellant to the respondent was a distinct and separate transaction and there was no running and current account between the parties nor payments were made by him towards running account. Apart from the fact that there is satisfactory evidence (discussed above) from the side of the respondent in this connection which goes contrary to the case of the appellant, it is important to note that the appellant has not filed his own accounts or their copies to support his case. It cannot be believed that the appellant who used to enter into repeated money transactions to the tune of thousands of rupees in the nature of taking loans or making repayments by way of discharge would not be maintaining his own accounts in the same connection. No satisfactory explanation for nonproduction of accounts by the appellant is coming forward. This is also a strong circumstance which goes against the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant has laid stress on the point that P. W. 2 H. C. Gupta, his admitted the execution of pronote for advances of loan, but pronotes have not been filed by the respondent. In this behalf it is important to note that consistent case of the respondent is that collateral securities, were obtained for the loans advanced by the respondent. The responded, in this situation, is not barred from filing his claim on the basis of entries of the transactions maintained in the account books. The appellant his admitted a few entries of the account books of the respondent (filed with the plaint) for advances to and repayments by the appellant towards their discharge and satisfaction. The responded, in this situation, is not barred from filing his claim on the basis of entries of the transactions maintained in the account books. The appellant his admitted a few entries of the account books of the respondent (filed with the plaint) for advances to and repayments by the appellant towards their discharge and satisfaction. According to the respondent, the agreed rate of interest between the partes was 1% per month and the same used to be debited to the account of the appellant. The appellant has not totally denied the liability of payment of interest but has pleaded that the negotiable instruments relating to the advances taken from the respondent contained specific instructions that the interest was payable for slab periods. The respondent's case in this behalf gets support from the entries of their account books filed in this case. It may be mentioned that account books of the respondent having been maintained in a regular way and in ordinary course of business, inspire confidence. The respondent's entry of debiting Rs. 1745.75 P. as interest on the outstanding dues against the appellant on 5.2.1965 has been admitted by the appellant. It is urged that the rate of interest charged was the flat rate of 1% per month. It is also urged that the appellant has failed to show that the payments were made within one month so as to entitle the firm to claim payment of interest for broken periods of a month and not for full month. The evidence from the respondent's side is to the effect that the interest was debited correctly as it was due. It may also be mentioned that interest at the rate of 12% per annum can hardly be said to be unreasonable keeping in view the custom and rate prevailing in the market. 13. The respondent has debited the bank commission paid by the company on account of the advances made to the appellant or to their principals or manufacturers at the latter's instance. The appellant denied the liability to pay Bank commission. 13. The respondent has debited the bank commission paid by the company on account of the advances made to the appellant or to their principals or manufacturers at the latter's instance. The appellant denied the liability to pay Bank commission. The respondent has nowhere specified in his pleading as to who was to bear the Bank commission charges for the aforesaid advances made at the instance of the appellant whether they were to borne by the respondent or by the appellant's principals or manufacturers in those cases where advances were made to them at the instructions of the appellant? It is quite understandable and also seems reasonable that for the advances paid to the appellant or to the principals or manufacturers of the appellant the commission paid to the Bank will be borne by the appellant and not by the creditor. The account books of the respondent which were maintained in regular course of business show that the bank commission was being debited against the appellant. There is material on the record to indicate that the appellant had given instructions to the respondent for sending drafts to the principals. The trial court has, further, specifically found on discussion that for the item of Rs. 18/ dated 2.12.1964, the appellant was liable to pay the bank commission. 14. The trial court has, rightly, not accepted, and on the other hand repelled the claim of two items, namely, Rs. 243.30 P and Rs. 101.39 P, for the reason that they were not duly proved by the respondent. From the side of the respondent these two claims were, in fact, not pressed in the Course of arguments in appeal. The findings of the trial court in this regard are sound and justified, 15. The appellant has taken up the plea that the claim of the respondent is barred by time. According to the respondent, amounts of the repayments made and liability acknowledged in writing from the side of the appellant from time to time extended the period of limitation and in this way the suit filed was within time. Both the parties have referred to Sections 18 and 20 of the Limitation Act. The same are reproduced below ; 18. According to the respondent, amounts of the repayments made and liability acknowledged in writing from the side of the appellant from time to time extended the period of limitation and in this way the suit filed was within time. Both the parties have referred to Sections 18 and 20 of the Limitation Act. The same are reproduced below ; 18. Effect of acknowledgment in writing : (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed, (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation : For the purposes of this section (a) an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right, (b) the word signed means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf, and (c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right. . 20. Effect of acknowledgment or payment by another person (1) The expression agent duly authorised in this behalf in Sections 18 and 19 shall, in the case of a person under disability, include his lawful guardian, committee or manager or an agent duly authorised by such guardian, committee or manager to sign the acknowledgement or make the payment. . 20. Effect of acknowledgment or payment by another person (1) The expression agent duly authorised in this behalf in Sections 18 and 19 shall, in the case of a person under disability, include his lawful guardian, committee or manager or an agent duly authorised by such guardian, committee or manager to sign the acknowledgement or make the payment. (2) Nothing in the said sections renders one of several joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees chargeable by reason only of a written acknowledgment signed by or of a payment made by, or by the agent of, any other or others of them. (3) For the purposes of the said sections (a) an acknowledgment signed or a payment made in respect of any liability by, or by the duly authorised agent of, any limited owner of property who is governed by Hindu law, shall be a valid acknowledgment, or payment, as the case may be, against a reversioner suceeding to such liability; and (b) where a liability has been incurred by, or on behalf of a Hindu undivided family as such, an acknowledgment or payment made by, or by the duly authorised agent of, the manager of the family for the time being shall be deemed to have been made on behalf of the whole family. 16. The respondent's case is that all the advances etc. debited to the account of the appellant between 9.3.1963 and 13.11.1964 were paid up in full by the appellant last payment having been made by cheque on 13.11.1964. The appellant has not denied it and expressed want of knowledge in this regard on his part. No claim is made in respect of the period prior to 13.11.1964. Thus the transactions which are relevent in the suit are of the period from 25.11.1964 onwards. The trial court, while discussing issue no. 3 in its judgment, has given a list of advances by the respondent to the appellant and the repayments by the latter to the former from 25.11.1964 onwards. The last repayment made by the appellant was on 24.8.1966 for Rs. 5,000/. This repayment of Rs. 5,000/ is not denied by the appellant. It was undoubtedly towards running account of the money dealings entered into between the parties. This repayment of Rs. 5,000/ was towards outstanding balance against the appellant on that date. The last repayment made by the appellant was on 24.8.1966 for Rs. 5,000/. This repayment of Rs. 5,000/ is not denied by the appellant. It was undoubtedly towards running account of the money dealings entered into between the parties. This repayment of Rs. 5,000/ was towards outstanding balance against the appellant on that date. That outstanding balance was several times more than Rs.5,000/ which was paid by the appellant to the respondent on 24.8.1966. Thus reckoning from 24.8.1966, the period of limitation of three years for respondent's outstanding claim was to expire on 23.8.1969. In the letter dated 23.8.1966 (Paper No. 23 Ga), duly proved, an outstanding claim of Rs. 49,843.73 P. was made by the appellant against the respondent. The appellant through letter dated 29.10.1966 (paper No. 25 Kha), admitted that he was finding ways to clear this amount . The appellant further assured the respondent through the same letter that every pie would be paid (by the appellant). It is borne out from the material available on the record that L. N. Agarwal and M. L. Agarwal were partners of the appellant's firm. There have been brought on the record letters signed by M. L. Agarwal also. Through letter dated 25.6.1966 (paper No. 26 Kha) signed by L. N. Agarwal on behalf of appellant's firm and suit to the respondent the former again acknowledged that financial arrangement to pay up outstandings against the appellant was being made. It is urged that on the close of the year 196667 the outstanding balance had been shown as Rs. 48,087.48 P. against the appellant. Again through letter dated 7.8.1967 (paper No. 34 Kha) signed by L. N. Agarwal of the appellant's firm he assured the respondent that full payment would be made in a short time. It is thus evident that through these letters the appellant had been acknowledging the liability and making promises to clear up the outstandings against him. In fact, he was pointing out his difficulty and pressing for more and more time through these letters. Through letter dated 19.4.1968 (paper No. 27 Kha) L. N. Agarwal, the partner of the appellant's firm, has informed the Managing Director that he would be remitting a sum of Rs. 6/7 thousand every month to liquidate the outstanding dues. In fact, he was pointing out his difficulty and pressing for more and more time through these letters. Through letter dated 19.4.1968 (paper No. 27 Kha) L. N. Agarwal, the partner of the appellant's firm, has informed the Managing Director that he would be remitting a sum of Rs. 6/7 thousand every month to liquidate the outstanding dues. After it another letter dated 15.7.1968 (paper No. 28 Kha) was written by L. N. Agarwal to another partner of the firm, M. L. Agarwal, for whom the abbreviations used in the letter are 'M. L'. This letter was written by L. N. Agarwal under his signature on the pad of the appellant's firm. In this letter M. L. Agarwal was asked to make payment of Rupees six to seven thousand to Sri H. C. Gupta (Managing Director of respondent's Co.) from the proceeds expected out of the sale of both the Layland chassis at Lucknow. The respondent contended that a period of limitation was extended for three years from the date of this letter (dated 15.7.1968) as it was an acknowledgement of liability within the meaning of Sections 18 and 20 of the Limitation Act keeping in view the letter dated dated 19.4.1968 which has been admitted by the appellant. On the other hand the contention of the appellant is that these two letters dated 19.4.1968 and 15.7.1968 were in the first place not written by L. N. Agarwal in the capacity of partner of the appellant's firm nor the letter dated 15.7.1968 was addressed to M. L. Agarwal in the capacity of partner of the appellant's firm. The contentions of the appellant in this regard do not seem to be correct. It is important to note that the letter dated 19.4.1968 has been admitted by the appellant and the letter dated 15.7.1963 has also been admitted but it is subject to the pleas taken up in the written statement. The letter dated 15.7.1968 was written by L. N. Agarwal on the pad of appellant's firm besides the fact that it was written to M. L. Agarwal, another partner of the firm. Further, the appellant wants the court to believe that letters dated 19.4.1968 and 19.7.1968 were written in personal capacity by L. N. Agarwal and had nothing to do with the dues outstanding against the appellant's firm. Further, the appellant wants the court to believe that letters dated 19.4.1968 and 19.7.1968 were written in personal capacity by L. N. Agarwal and had nothing to do with the dues outstanding against the appellant's firm. But no such case that the acknowledgement towards payment of Rupees six to seven thousand made in these letters was for some personal debts against the writer, has been taken up in the pleadings of the appellant. 17. The appellant has taken up the case that the letter dated 15.7.1968 related to purchase of a secondhand car from H. C. Gupta (P. W. 2) in which connection the letter was obtained by Kali Charan, a man of H. C. Gupta, but despite the fact that the transaction of the purchase of car from H. C. Gupta did not materialise, the letter was passed on to H.C. Gupta and retained by him for the ulterior motive of using it for the purpose of this case. The appellant's case in this regard is denied by the respondent. No satisfactory evidence in support of the appellant's case has been brought on the record. The letter dated 15.7.1968 (keeping in view the earlier letter dated 19.4.1968) fulfills the ingredients of Sections 18 and 20 of the Limitation Act and is thus an acknowledgement of liability on the part of the appellant's firm within the meaning of law. Therefore, the trial court has rightly held that the period of limitation for filing the suit was to be reckoned from the date of letter dated 15.7.1968 (paper No. 28 kha) and the suit which was filed on 15.7.1971 was within time. In this connection the case of M/s. Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills, Co. Ltd. Vs. The Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd. ( AIR 1971 SC 1482 ) has been relied in which it was held : The statement on which the plea of acknowledgement is founded need not amount to promise and need not indicate the exact nature or the specific character of the liability. It must, however, relate to a present subsisting liability and indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as, for instance, that of a debtor and a creditor and the intention to admit such jural relationship. Such an intention need not be in express terms and can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and the surrounding circumstances. Such an intention need not be in express terms and can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and the surrounding circumstances. Generally speaking a liberal construction of the statement in question should be given. That of course does not mean that where a statement is made without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such intention should be fastened on the person making the statement by an involved and farfetched reasoning. AIR 1961 SC 1236 and AIR 1967 SC 935 and 188426 Ch D 474. 18. In an earlier case of Shapoor Fredoom Mazda Versus Durga Pro sad Chamaria and others ( AIR 1961 SC 1236 ), it was observed that the words used in the acknowledgment should indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor but such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and surrounding circumstances and need not be expressed in words. The facts and circumstances of the instant case, as discussed above, clearly make out that letters dated 19.4.1968 and 15.7.1968 were written by the partner of the appellant's firm as such and the letter of the subsequent date is 15.7.1968 was sent to another partner of the firm. Consequently the cases of Gadu Bibi and others Vs. Parsotam (ILR Allahabad Volume 10,1888 page 418) and M/s Mama Ram & Sons Vs. M/s. Janki Das Om Prakash (AIR 1984 Allahabad 267) relied upon by the appellant, are quite distinguishable on facts and hence are of little avail to the appellant. Unlike the instant case, in those cases the endorsement of acknowledgment was not found to have been made by a partner of the concerned firm so as to bind the other partner or the firm. Thus this suit was filed within time. 19. The respondent having fully established their claim except for the two amounts, namely, of Rs. 243.30 P. and Rs. 101.39 P., the suit was rightly decreed by the trial Court. 20. The appeal has no merits and is dismissed with costs. (Appeal dismissed)