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1987 DIGILAW 329 (KER)

SREENIVASAN v. SUBBARAMA SASTRIKAL

1987-07-21

PADMANABHAN

body1987
Relied on: 1955 TC.1; 1975 Gauhati 14; 1966. (1.)MLI 406 Judgment :- 1. The short question for consideration is whether the subject-matter of the suit is a promissory note payable on demand or otherwise than on demand. If it is payable on demand the stamp affixed is sufficient, otherwise it is insufficiently stamped. The Subordinate Judge found that it is payable otherwise than on demand and hence insufficiently stamped and therefore inadmissible in evidence. Plaintiff seeks to revise that order. 2. There is no dispute that taken alone by itself the promissory note is one payable on demand and hence sufficiently stamped. S.2(22) of the Indian Stamp Act accepts the definition of promissory note in the Negotiable Instruments Act. S.4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act defines promissory note as an instrument in writing (not being a bank note or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument. A promissory note or bill of exchange, in which no time for payment is specified, and a cheque, are payable on demand according to S.19 of the said Act. The subject-matter of the suit contains an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker to pay rupees fifty thousand with 12 percent interest to the plaintiff or his order on demand without fixing any time for payment. 3. But the whole difficulty arose because after execution of the promissory note, on the reverse side of it, on the same day it was recorded under the signatures of both the parties that if the amount is paid within one month it was decided that interest need not be paid. It was for this reason alone that the trial court held the promissory note to be one payable otherwise than on demand. The learned Advocate for the respondent/ defendant would put this as a contemporaneous agreement postponing the time for payment by one month and as such an alteration of the terms of the instrument as held in Joharmal Behartlal v. Chettyar Firm (AIR 1936 Rangoon 136). I do not think that the argument is acceptable or the decision is applicable to the facts of the present case. The endorsement is independent of the promissory note and it was executed after execution of the pronote. I do not think that the argument is acceptable or the decision is applicable to the facts of the present case. The endorsement is independent of the promissory note and it was executed after execution of the pronote. Even if that was included and executed as part of the promissory note itself, it would not have in any way changed the nature of the pronote as one payable on demand. What is given by the endorsement is only a concession that if the defendant chooses to make the payment within a month he need not pay the interest. That does not in any way affect the right of the plaintiff to make a demand for payment even before the expiry of the concessional period of one month or the liability to pay immediately without demand. One month is not an extended period but only a concessional period within which at any time (immediately or forthwith) the amount is payable without interest. That concession does not affect any other agreement in the pronote. On the other hand it only reiterates and affirms liability for immediate payment with an added inducement for the same. In order to constitute an instrument a pronote payable on demand or otherwise than on demand, liability of the maker to pay interest is not an integral part. Time for payment is not in any way postponed for a period of one month by the endorsement. That concession was not availed of and the agreement has already run out its period and it does not survive for any purpose. That agreement does not in any way affect the terms of the pronote as matters now stand. Further it is an independent transaction signed by the maker and payee whereas the pronote is signed only by the maker. 4. If the promissory note is payable on demand stamp duty payable is under Art.49(a) of Schedule I to the Indian Stamp Act and if it is payable otherwise than on demand, duty under Art.49(b) is the same as a Bill of Exchange (No. 13). In order to make a promissory note 'on demand', it must be payable 'at once', 'forthwith' or 'immediately'. The expression'on demand', unlike in ordinary parlance, has, a technical connotation in the law of negotiable instruments. In order to make a promissory note 'on demand', it must be payable 'at once', 'forthwith' or 'immediately'. The expression'on demand', unlike in ordinary parlance, has, a technical connotation in the law of negotiable instruments. If any time is fixed for payment then payment could be demanded and the amount becomes payable only after that period and in such a case the instrument is only one payable otherwise than on demand even though the words 'on demand' are there. That is because payment need be made only on or after that period. Aiyappankutty v. Mathai (1954 KLT 785), Thenappa v. Andiyappa (AIR 1971 Madras 290), Devassya v. Shamsuddin (1976 KLT 24) and other decisions relied on were concerning instruments where periods were fixed for payment. When time for payment is fixed a promissory note cannot be payable 'on demand' whatever be the wording. In the case in hand the pronote taken by itself or read along with the endorsement, is payable on demand because it was payable immediately without any time limit at all. A promissory payable 'on demand' is one payable without any demand and time limit. The true import of the words 'on demand' is that the debt is due and payable immediately. The instrument involved in this case satisfied this test even read along with the endorsement. The endorsement does not mean that it is not payable immediately or without any demand. Even the words 'on demand' are not necessary to make it on demand because under S.19 of the Negotiable Instruments Act a pronote in which no time for payment is specified is one payable on demand. 5. In Subramania Iyer v. Muthuperumal Pillai (AIR 1955 TC 141) dealt with a pronote in which there was a clause that if the promisee fails to pay he and his properties shall be liable for the principal, interest and all damages consequent on such default. It was held that the clause does not amount to an agreement making the liability of the promisor conditional and it merely shows what the consequences of non-payment 00 demand would be and does not qualify the operation of the note. In Surjit Singh and others v. Ram Ratan Sharma (AIR 1975 Gauhati High Court 14) below the acknowledgment of the receipt of the amount by the debtor, the promissory note contained an endorsement by another person guaranteeing repayment of the amount. In Surjit Singh and others v. Ram Ratan Sharma (AIR 1975 Gauhati High Court 14) below the acknowledgment of the receipt of the amount by the debtor, the promissory note contained an endorsement by another person guaranteeing repayment of the amount. It was held that the endorsement is entirely a different agreement and the promise to pay on demand is independent and unaffected by the guarantee and the document still is a promissory note. In 1966 (1) MLJ 406 it was held that the default clause in a document did not have the effect of altering the nature of the document as a promissory note because the parties intended primarily that the document should be treated as promissory note and the default clause might or might not operate and did not qualify the nature of the promissory note. In this case the endorsement on the reverse is at the best only a collateral agreement which does not and cannot control the character of the note and has no impact on it. 6. The Subordinate Judge was clearly wrong when he found that the plaintiff was barred from claiming principal and interest for a period of one month and hence the note is one payable otherwise than on demand. It is only a promissory note payable on demand is sufficiently stamped and admissible in evidence. Civil revision petition is allowed and the order is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.