JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.:—These two writ petitions can be disposed of conveniently by this common judgment. Reference to the parties would be as in the Writ Petition No. 2404 of 1983. The petitioner claims that he was a tenant of the suit fields upon the relevant dates under sections 46 and 49-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (for short the "Tenancy Act"). 2. Briefly, the facts are that the field S. No. 47/3 admeasuring 3 acres 15 gs. and the field S. No. 57/1 admeasuring 6 acres 15 gs. both of village Chincholi were originally owned by one Bhujang of whom the respondents 2 to 6 are the legal representatives. During the years 1958-59 and 1959-60, it is not in dispute that the respondent No. 1 was a tenant of the suit fields. It is also not in dispute that in the year 1960-61, the said fields were cultivated by the original landlord Bhujang. However, he leased out the suit fields to the petitioner in 1961-62 to 1963-64. Thereafter, the said fields were cultivated personally by the original owner Bhujang. It thus appears that the petitioner was also dispossessed by the aforesaid original landlord Bhujang who was in possession of the suit fields on 31-7-1969. 3. Suo motu proceedings were initiated under section 46 of the Tenancy Act before the Additional Tahsildar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal (for short the A.L.T.) in the year 1965 as per Revenue Case No. 1040/59(13)/64-65 and Revenue Case No. 1045/39(13)/64-65 of village Chincholi in respect of the fields S. Nos. 47/3 and 57/1 admeasuring 3 acres 15 gunthas and 6 acres 15 gs. respectively. Originally by its orders dated 14-10-1969, the learned A.L.T. held in each of the above cases that the petitioner was the statutory owner of the suit fields. It, therefore, fixed the purchase price for the same. However, the respondent No. 1, i.e. the original tenant filed appeals before the learned Sub-Divisional Officer (for short the S.D.O.) against the aforesaid orders of the learned A.L.T. dated 14-10-1969. He also filed separate applications under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act for restoration of possession and for conferral of rights of ownership in regard to the aforesaid fields. The cases under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act are registered as Revenue Case No. 4/59(14)/74-75 and Revenue Case No. 1/59(13)/76-77 both of village Chincholi. He also filed separate applications under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act for restoration of possession and for conferral of rights of ownership in regard to the aforesaid fields. The cases under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act are registered as Revenue Case No. 4/59(14)/74-75 and Revenue Case No. 1/59(13)/76-77 both of village Chincholi. These applications under section 49-B were dismissed by the learned A.L.T. Hence, two appeals were preferred by the respondent No. 1 against the aforesaid orders also. In all these aforesaid appeals, the learned S.D.O. by his order dated 28-6-1978, set aside the aforesaid orders of the learned A.L.T. and remanding to it the said proceedings, directed that the applications filed by the respondent No. 1 under section 49-B should be first enquired into and decided according to law. 4. After the remand, the learned Additional Tahsildar held by his order dated 17-3-1981 that the respondent No. 1 had voluntary surrendered the suit fields to the landlord and, therefore, he was barred from claiming restoration of its possession under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act. He, therefore, dismissed the applications of the respondent No. 1 under section 49-B of the said Act. He further held by the said order that the petitioner was in possession of the suit fields on 1-4-1961 and 1-4-1963 and, therefore, was a statutory owner of the same. Since he was not in possession at the time of his impugned order, he directed that the possession of the said fields should be restored to him under section 36 read with section 100 of the Tenancy Act. 5. The respondent No. 1 challenged the aforesaid orders of the learned A.L.T. in appeals before the learned S.D.O. He, however, maintained the orders of the learned A.L.T. The respondent No. 1 then preferred revisions before the learned Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short the M.R.T.) which allowed the same on the ground that since the respondent No. 1 was a tenant in the year 1958-59, i.e. on the appointed day, which is 20-8-1958, his tenancy rights were prior to the tenancy rights of the petitioner who became the tenant of the suit fields subsequently and since according to it, the requirements of section 49-B were satisfied, he had a right of restoration of possession of the suit fields and of statutory ownership of the same under section 46 or section 49-A of the Tenancy Act. The learned M.R.T. therefore, set aside the orders of the courts below and remanded the proceedings to the Tahsildar for restoration of possession of the suit fields to the respondent No. 1 from the landlord and for taking action for fixation of the purchase price, in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Being aggrieved by the orders of the learned M.R.T. against him, the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petitions in this Court. 6. It may be seen at this stage that in the Writ Petition No. 2404/1983, the subject-matter is the common order passed by the learned Tenancy authorities after remand in respect of the Revenue Case No. 1040/59(13)/64-65, i.e. the petitioner's case for transfer of ownership and fixation of purchase price about the field S. No. 47/3 of village Chincholi and the Revenue Case No. 4/59(14)/74-75 filed by the respondent No. 1 under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act for restoration of possession of the aforesaid fields to him and for conferral of the rights of ownership in regard to the same. In Writ Petition No. 2451/1963, the subject matter is similar common orders passed after remand by the learned Tenancy Authorities in respect of the other two cases filed by the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 respectively about the field S. No. 57/1 of village Chincholi. 7. Turning now to the contentions raised in this writ petition, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged before me that since the petitioner held suit lands as a tenant on 1-4-1963, he became their statutory owner by the operation of law as per the provisions of section 49-A of the Tenancy Act and, therefore, had a vested right of ownership in the same. His submission thus is that except by express statutory provisions, he could not be divested of the said right. It is his further contention that section 49-B of the Tenancy Act could not divest the petitioner of his right which was created in him by section 49-A of the Tenancy Act and which had thus accrued to him. In support of his submission that even a subsequent lessee who is in possession of the land on the relevant date i.e. 1-4-1963, is entitled to become its statutory owner, he has invited my attention to the provisions of section 49-A(2)(b) of the Tenancy Act. In support of his submission that even a subsequent lessee who is in possession of the land on the relevant date i.e. 1-4-1963, is entitled to become its statutory owner, he has invited my attention to the provisions of section 49-A(2)(b) of the Tenancy Act. Section 49-A(2)b), it may be seen, provides that a subsequent tenant, who is in possession of the land would become its statutory owner on the date of the expiry of the period of limitation under section 36(1) if no application thereunder is made by the previous tenant for possession of the land or on the date of final rejection of any such application if made by him under section 36(1) for possession. 8. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that since section 49-B of the Tenancy Act operates notwithstanding anything contained in section 36, the tenancy rights of respondent No. 1 created in the year 1958-59 would continue and not come to an end on expiry of the limitation prescribed for filing an application for possession under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act. His further submission is that since the respondent No. 1 satisfied the requirements of section 49-B of being in possession of the land as a tenant on the appointed day and since the landlord was in possession of the land on 31-7-1969 as contemplated by the said section 49-B, he was entitled to restoration of possession of the suit fields statutory owner by virtue of the provisions of section 49-B. It is also urged that since the dispossession of the respondent No. 1 was in May 1960, his tenancy rights did not come to an end on the relevant date under section 49-A of the Tenancy Act as the period of limitation of three years prescribed under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act for taking possession had yet to be expire on the said relevant date under section 49-A of the Tenancy Act. It is further urged that since the tenancy rights of the petitioner continued in respect of the suit fields, no tenancy rights could be created lawfully in favour of the petitioner and he could not, therefore, become the statutory owner of the suit fields under section 39-A of the Tenancy Act. 9. To appreciate the rival submissions it is first necessary to determine the scope and object of section 49-B of the Tenancy Act. 9. To appreciate the rival submissions it is first necessary to determine the scope and object of section 49-B of the Tenancy Act. Section 49-B of the Tenancy Act was inserted by the Maharashtra Act No. 49 of 1969. It is clear that the object of enacting section 49-B of the Tenancy Act was that although there were tenants upon the land on the date when the Tenancy Act came into force, i.e. 30-12-1958, they were illegally dispossessed or had surrendered their lands in ignorance of the rights created in their favour under the Tenancy Act and that they had not claimed restoration of the lands leased to them within three years after the date of their dispossession as provided under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act thus resulting in loss of their valuable rights of becoming the statutory owners of the lands leased to them either under section 46 or section 49-A of the Tenancy Act. It is thus for the benefit of such tenants that section 49-B is enacted. It is thus for the benefit of such tenants that section 49-B is enacted. 9-A. Section 49-B of the Tenancy Act is as follows : "49-B. Transfer of possession and ownership of lands to certain dispossessed tenants.---Where a tenant referred to in section 46 or section 49-A was in possession on the appointed day but is not in possession of the land held by him on the relevant date on account of his being dispossessed before that date, otherwise than in the manner and by an order of the Tahsildar as provided in section 36, and the land is in the possession of the landlord or his successor in interest on the 31st day of July, 1969 and is not put to a non agricultural use on or before the last mentioned date, then the Tahsildar shall, notwithstanding anything contained in section 36, either suo motu or on the application of the tenant, hold an inquiry, and direct that such land shall be taken from the possession of the landlord, or as the case may be, his successor in interest, and shall be restored to the tenant, and the provisions of sections 46 to 49-A shall, in so far as they may be applicable apply thereto, as if the tenant had held the land on the relevant date, subject to the modification that the ownership of the land shall stand transferred to, and vest in, the tenant, and such tenant shall be deemed to be the full owner of the land, on the date on which the land is restored to him : Provided that, the tenant shall be entitled to restoration of the land under this section only if he undertakes to cultivate the land personally and of so much thereof as together with the other land held by him as owner or tenant shall not exceed three family holdings. Explanation 1.—In this section, the expression "relevant date" means in relation to a tenant referred to in section 46, the first day of April 1961, and in relation to a tenant referred to in section 49-A, the 1st day of April, 1963. Explanation 2.—In this section, "successor in interest" means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition on devolution on death." 10. Explanation 2.—In this section, "successor in interest" means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition on devolution on death." 10. It may be seen that, there are certain conditions and/or restrictions placed under section 49-B while conferring the right upon the tenant of restoration of possession of his tenanted land to him and making him its statutory owner upon the relevant dates under section 46 or 49-A of the Tenancy Act. Such a right is conferred only upon the tenant who held the land as a tenant on the appointed day i.e. 20-8-1958. The first condition for the entitlement of such a right is that the landlord or his successor-in-title should be in possession of the land on 31-7-1969 which is incidentally the date on which the Amending Act No. 49 of 1969 came into force. The expression "successor-in-title" is defined in the Explanation 2 of section 49-B to mean a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death. The second condition imposed is that the lands should not have been put to non agricultural use on or before 31-7-1969. 10-A. If these two conditions are satisfied, then only such a tenant is entitled under section 49-B to claim restoration of possession of his tenanted land and also a right of ownership under section 46 or section 49-A notwithstanding the fact that he did not actually hold the land on the relevant dates mentioned therein. The other conditions for restoration of possession are mentioned in the proviso to section 49-B with these petitions are not concerned. It is, however, clear that there is no express provision in section 49-B or anywhere else in the Tenancy Act by which a subsequent tenant, i.e. a person inducted as a tenant after the dispossession of the original tenant, who held the land on the appointed day, can be divested of his right of ownership conferred upon him under section 49-A(2)(b) of the Tenancy Act. 11. It may be seen that since the definition of the expression "successor- in-title" does not include "transferee" of the landlord, the provisions of section 49-B would not divest the purchaser of his title and possession of the tenanted land if the land is sold to him by the landlord on or before 31-7-1969, so that the landlord does not own the tenanted land and is not in its possession on that date. It is clear that under section 49-B, it is only the landlord or his successor in interest i.e. a person acquiring the interest by testamentary disposition or on devolution on death, he can be divested of his right of ownership and possession. The above intrinsic evidence under section 49-B would thus militate against the construction that by operation of section 49-B a subsequent tenant who becomes statutory owner under section 49-A(2)(b) can automatically be divested of his right of ownership. I am, therefore, unable to accept the above construction sought to be placed upon section 49-B of the Tenancy Act on behalf of the respondent No. 1. 12. Turning now to the question whether the subsequent tenant who holds the land on 1-4-1963 can become its statutory owner, the first question which needs to be considered is whether the tenancy of the petitioner, i.e. the subsequent tenant, is illegal or invalid as contended on behalf of the respondent No. 1. The submission on his behalf is that the tenancy rights of the respondent No. 1, who was dispossessed after the year 1959-60 do not come to an end on the relevant date, i.e. 1-4-1963 and, therefore, the tenancy of the petitioner created in the year 1961-62 is illegal and invalid. It is, however, submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the tenancy of the petitioner cannot ipso facto become invalid or illegal unless and until by recourse to a competent Court of law or Tribunal the respondent No. 1 obtains possession of the tenanted land. It is, however, submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the tenancy of the petitioner cannot ipso facto become invalid or illegal unless and until by recourse to a competent Court of law or Tribunal the respondent No. 1 obtains possession of the tenanted land. In support of his submission that the tenancy of the petitioner is not illegal or invalid, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn assistance from the provisions of sub-section (2)(b) of section 49-A of the Tenancy Act itself, according to which, if the previous tenant has not made any application within the period of limitation prescribed under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act, or having made an application, such an application is finally rejected, any other person who held the land as a tenant on the expiry day of the said period of limitation or on the date of final rejection of the application of the previous tenant under section 36(1) becomes the full owner of the land on the date of expiry of the date of limitation or as the case may be on the date of final rejection of the application under section 36(1). In support of his above submission, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of (Pandharinath v. Bhagwan)1, 1979 Mh.L.J. 337. 13. There is a great force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner. Perusal of section 49-A(2)(b) of the Tenancy Act would show that any other person holding the land as tenant during the period after the previous tenant is dispossessed can get the right of ownership as provided therein if the previous tenant does not make an application for restoration of possession within the time prescribed under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act. The right of the subsequent tenant to become the statutory owner of the land held by him as a tenant is thus recognised by the aforesaid provisions of section 49-A(2) of the Tenancy Act. 14. The right of the subsequent tenant to become the statutory owner of the land held by him as a tenant is thus recognised by the aforesaid provisions of section 49-A(2) of the Tenancy Act. 14. It may be seen that either under the equitable consideration that the transferor cannot prejudice the rights of the transferee by any subsequent dealing with the property as expressed in the equitable maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure, or under the statutory provision of section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, a mere right is created in a prior transferee which is also not absolute and may be forfeited in certain cases such as fraud, misrepresentation or gross negligence, or where the subsequent transferee has no notice of the prior transfer. It is, therefore, clear that many defences may be available to the subsequent transferee when a right is claimed by a prior transferee on the basis of his prior transfer. The subsequent transfer is thus not per se illegal or void but is only voidable at the instance of the prior transferee. 14-A. It has therefore, to be held that the tenancy of the petitioner, cannot be said to be illegal and invalid ipso facto unless and until so adjudicated by a competent Court of law or by Tribunal and in particular in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1) or section 100(2) or other relevant provisions of the Tenancy Act. Since the respondent No. 1 has failed to get such an adjudication, the petitioner would be entitled to become the statutory owner of the suit fields after the expiry of the period prescribed for making an application under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act for restoration of possession of the suit fields to the respondent No. 1. I may make it clear that if a period of three years of limitation prescribed under section 36(1) expires before 1-4-1963, then the subsequent tenant would become a statutory owner on 1-4-1963 in accordance with section 49-A(1) of the Tenancy Act itself. 15. I may make it clear that if a period of three years of limitation prescribed under section 36(1) expires before 1-4-1963, then the subsequent tenant would become a statutory owner on 1-4-1963 in accordance with section 49-A(1) of the Tenancy Act itself. 15. In my view, the principle underlying section 49-A(2)(b) or for that matter underlying section 46(1)A(b) is that after the period of limitation prescribed for recovery of possession has expired the previous tenant would lose his tenancy right with the result that there would be no cloud upon the tenancy right of the subsequent tenant whose said right would then get perfect and as such on the date of the expiry of the said period of limitation, the right of statutory ownership can be and is conferred upon him under the aforesaid provisions. In this regard it may be seen that it is well settled that the principle underlying section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (analogous to section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908) is of general application and is not confined to suits and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act. See (Dindayal v. Rajaram)2, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1019 para 10. The said principle is that if the remedy to recover possession of any property is lost because of the expiry of limitation prescribed therefore, the right to such property stands extinguished. The said principle would be applicable to the tenancies under the Tenancy Act also. A similar view is taken by this Court in the case of (Bhagwant v. Ganpat)3, 1975 Mh.L.J. 9 and in the case of (Shivgonda v. Chandrakant)4, 1978 Mh.L.J. 169. If the remedy of a tenant for recovery of possession of his tenated field is lost because of the expiry of the period of limitation of three years prescribed therefore under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act, his tenancy rights in his tenated field would also stand extinguished. 16. If the remedy of a tenant for recovery of possession of his tenated field is lost because of the expiry of the period of limitation of three years prescribed therefore under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act, his tenancy rights in his tenated field would also stand extinguished. 16. It is true that section 49-B of the Tenancy Act seeks to restore the tenancy rights of a tenant whose tenancy was created on the appointed day but who had lost possession of his tenanted land thereafter and was not in its possession on the relevant date under section 46 or 49-A of the Tenancy Act notwithstanding the fact that he had not initiated any proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted land within the period of limitation prescribed under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act. The effect of section 49-B of the Tenancy Act clearly is to restore tenancy rights of such a tenant by restoring him possession of his tenanted land and thereafter conferring upon him a statutory right of ownership of the said land from the date the land is so restored to him. This is the view taken by this Court in the case of Pandharinath v. Bhagwan 1979 Mh.L.J. 337. 17. The above decision of this Court would not apparently support the contention raised by the petitioner in this writ petition and it is, therefore, surprising how he has relied upon it. Nonetheless it should be seen that the question which was raised in the said case was whether the heirs of the tenant could claim restoration of possession and consequently the rights of ownership under section 32(1-B) of the Bombay Tenancy Act and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for short "the Bombay Act"), which is analogous to section 49-B of the Tenancy Act. It is clear from the facts in the said case that the rights of the third person had not come into being during the period of loss of possession of the tenant after the appointed day, with the result that the possession of the tenanted land could be restored to him or his legal heirs without any difficulty and the right of statutory ownership could thus consequently be conferred upon him or his legal heirs as the case may be. 18. The question in the instant writ petition is, however, different. As already pointed out, the right of the subsequent tenant, viz. 18. The question in the instant writ petition is, however, different. As already pointed out, the right of the subsequent tenant, viz. the petitioner, who was inducted as a tenant after the respondent No. 1 had lost possession of the suit land, had come into existence much prior to enactment of section 49-B of the Tenancy Act since he had become the statutory owner of the suit lands on 1-4-1963 or in May, 1963 either under section 49-A(1) or under section 49-A(2)(b) of the Tenancy Act. Since the statutory ownership had vested in the petitioner, a clear and express provision of law would be necessary to divest him of such a right of ownership. As already pointed out there is no such specific provision either under section 49-B of anywhere in the Tenancy Act. 19. On the other hand, it is clear from the scheme of section 49-B of the Tenancy Act that it is not intended to affect the rights of the third person because it contemplates that a landlord, or his successor-in-interest is in possession or has a right to claim possession so that the tenanted lands can be restored to the tenant who was in possession on the appointed day. The definition of the expression "successor in interest" in the Explanation 2 of section 49-B of the Tenancy Act shows that it includes only such person who acquire the interest by testamentary disposition or on devolution on death and does not include persons to whom the land is transferred in any other mode. There is thus intrinsic evidence in section 49-B itself to show that the rights of the third persons are not intended to be affected by it. 20. In my view, according to well-settled canons of construction, section 49-B has to be construed by reading it in the context of or in the light of the scheme of the whole act and particularly the scheme of sections 46 and 49-A of the Tenancy Act as per it intends to confer the right of statutory ownership upon the tenants to whom the land is restored thereunder. If so read, the conclusion is irresistible that section 49-B of the Tenancy Act would not affect the right of the tenants who have already become statutory owners in accordance with the provisions of section 46 or section 49-A of the Tenancy Act much prior to enactment of section 49-B of the said Act. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner had already become the statutory owner of the suit lands and that he cannot be divested of his rights of statutory ownership by the initiation of proceedings by the respondent No. 1 under section 49-B of the Tenancy Act is well founded and has to be accepted. 21. As also held by this Court in Pandharinath's case cited supra upon the analogous provision of the Bombay Act a legal fiction is created in section 49-B of the Tenancy Act of continued subsistence of tenancy because of the non obstante clause therein dispensing with section 36 and thus with the period of limitation prescribed in section 36(1) for restoration of possession of the land to the tenant who was in possession on the appointed day. In interpreting the provision creating a legal fiction, it is well settled that the Court has to ascertain for what purpose the legal fiction is created and then to give full effect to it but not beyond the purpose for which it is created. In (In re Coal Economising Gas Co.'s)5, case, 1875(1) Ch.D. 182 at pp. 188-189, it is observed that where the legislature provides that something is to deemed other than it is, we must be careful to see within what bounds and for what purpose it is to be so deemed. In his leading judgment, in the case of (Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar)6, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 661 at page 680, S.R. Das, J., (then Acting Chief Justice) held that the legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose and added that "a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it was created and should not be extended beyond its legitimate field". 21-A. It would be useful to refer to the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of (Arthus Hill v. The East-D West India Deck Co.)7, 1884(9) A.C. 448 in which although in the words creating the legal fiction viz. 21-A. It would be useful to refer to the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of (Arthus Hill v. The East-D West India Deck Co.)7, 1884(9) A.C. 448 in which although in the words creating the legal fiction viz. "shall be deemed to have been surrendered" there was no limitation still it was held by Lord Plankhura, J., in his judgment (see p. 456 of the judgment) that the said expression means as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act and no further. He observed that to give the said expression the means as canvassed on behalf of the appellant in that case would work a cruel hardship upon person in the position of the lessors viz. the respondent in that case and all other persons who had interest in the lease in consequence of there having been an assignment of the lease. As already pointed out in the instant case, the clear purpose of section 49-B is not to affect the rights of the third persons in the land sought to be restored to the tenant who was in its possession on the appointed day but had lost the same thereafter, because if it was so done, it would work crucial hardship to such persons who would be divested of their vested right in the land which if at all, intended would have been done by clear express provision in that regard. I, therefore, cannot persuade myself to accept the construction sought to be placed upon section 49-B of the Tenancy Act on behalf of the respondent No. 1. 22. As regards the date of vesting of ownership of the petitioner in the suit fields which is the only question which now remains to be considered, it may be seen that there would be a slight difference regarding the date of vesting of ownership in view of the submission made on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that his dispossession was in May, 1950. It is, however, submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the dispossession of the respondent No. 1 was in fact in March, 1960. The petitioner has, in this regard, brought to my notice the application in the case relating to the suit field S. No. 47/3 which is the subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 2404/1983, in which the respondent No. 1 has stated that his dispossession was in March, 1960. The petitioner has, in this regard, brought to my notice the application in the case relating to the suit field S. No. 47/3 which is the subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 2404/1983, in which the respondent No. 1 has stated that his dispossession was in March, 1960. But in the case relating of Field S. No. 57/1 which is the subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 2451/83, even in the application itself, the respondent No. 1 has stated that his dispossession was in summer of 1960. However, in both the cases the evidence led on behalf of the respondent No. 1 is that his dispossession was in May, 1960. 23. In Writ Petition No. 2404/1983, relating to the field S. No. 47/3, since the application of the respondent No. 1 under section 49-B as well as his memo of appeal mentions March, 1960 so the month in which he was dispossessed, the said date has to be adopted and his evidence in that regard that the dispossession was in May, 1960 cannot be accepted. However, with regard to field S. No. 57/1 which is the subject-matter of Writ Petition No. 2451/1983, the application as well as the evidence show that the dispossession was in May, 1960. The fact that in the memo of appeal the dispossession is shown as in March, 1960 would not, therefore, be material in the instant writ petition. In both these cases, there is no evidence led on behalf of the petitioner to show when the dispossession of the respondent No. 1 had taken place. In the absence of any contrary evidence, it will have to be accepted in regard to field S. No. 57/1 that the dispossession of the respondent No. 1 was in May, 1960. 24. As already pointed out, the date of dispossession is material because it will change the date of vesting so far as those fields are concerned. As regards field S. No. 47/3, since the dispossession of the respondent No. 1 was in March, 1960, the period of limitation of three years would expire in March, 1963 and the respondent No. 1 would have no tenancy rights in the said field thereafter and therefore, he cannot be said to have held the land as a tenant on 1-4-1963. On the contrary, since the petitioner held the said field as a tenant on 1-4-1963, he would become its owner by virtue of section 49-A(1) of the Tenancy Act at which time section 49-B had not even come into force. However, in regard to field S. No. 57/1, since the dispossession of the respondent No. 1 was in May, 1960, the period of limitation of three years prescribed for taking possession under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act would expire in May, 1963 and, therefore, in May 1963, the petitioner would become the statutory owner of field S. No. 57/1 in accordance with the provisions of section 49-A(2)(b) of the Tenancy Act, since he held the said field as a tenant on that day. 25. In the result, with the slight modification about the date of vesting in regard to the field S. No. 57/1 in the order of the learned A.L.T. as shown in the above para, both the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in these writ petitions are set aside. There would, however, be no order as to costs in these petitions. Rule made absolute in the above terms. Petitions allowed. -----