JUDGMENT V. P. Gupta, J.— The learned Additional Sessions Judge (2) (Special Judge), Simla by his judgment, dated November 30, 1985 has convicted the appellant for offences under sections 409, 467, 468 and 471, I. P. C. and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 1,000 under section 409 and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs. 500 on each count for offences under sections 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The sentences for imprisonment are to run concurrently. 3. Feeling aggrieved from this judgment, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 4. Briefly the facts are that the appellant was working as an Agriculture Information Officer in the year 1976, when some quotations were invited for supply of maps relating to the agricultural activities in the State of Himachal Pradesh. One Badri Nath of Delhi submitted quotations with lowest rates. The quotations of Badri Nath were accepted and an order was placed with him for supply of maps, etc., which were to be supplied before the close of the financial year (i. e. March 31, 1977). 5. The Appellant was the Drawing and Disbursing Officer and he asked Badri Nath to send the bills before March 31, 1977 so that the payment could be made before the close of the financial year. Badri Nath despatched the bills from Delhi in the third week of March, 1977, but the goods had not been received. Nanak Chand was working as Clerk in the office of the appellant and the appellant asked Nanak Chand to make entries of these bills in the stock register although the goods had not been received. Nanak Chand was also asked by the appellant to prepare the bills on the basis of the three bills submitted by Badri Nath so that the money could be withdrawn from the treasury. The appellant signed the entries in the stock register made by Nanak Chand. Nanak Chand also prepared the bills and submitted these bills to the appellant, who signed the same. The payment of these bills was received from the State Bank of India by Jai Singh Cashier. 6. The appellant directed Jai Singh Cashier to pay the amount of bills to him so that he could give the amount to Badri Nath. Nanak Chand also prepared the bills and submitted these bills to the appellant, who signed the same. The payment of these bills was received from the State Bank of India by Jai Singh Cashier. 6. The appellant directed Jai Singh Cashier to pay the amount of bills to him so that he could give the amount to Badri Nath. For this purpose an interim receipt was issued by the appellant to Jai Singh Cashier and thereafter the appellant gave three receipts to Jai Singh Cashier which were stated to have been signed by Badri Nath. 7. A complaint was made that the payment of the three bills had not been received by Badri Nath and upon this a preliminary enquiry was conducted. In the enquiry it was found that neither the goods were received nor the payment of the bills had been made to Badri Nath. Jai Singh Cashier during the course of the enquiry obtained a writing from be appellant that the appellant had received the payment of the three bills. After this preliminary enquiry a case was registered against the appellant and during the investigation it was found that the three receipts purported to have been signed by Badri Nath were in the hand-writing of the appellant and the signatures of Badri Nath were forged. It was also found that the goods had not been received and that the appellant had received the payment of the bills. The goods were received by the appellant in October, 1979 and the payment was made simultaneously with the delivery of the goods. 8. After obtaining the sanction under section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act the appellant was challenged for having committed offences under sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 5 (1) (c) and 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 9. The appellant was charged and tried for these offences by Special Judge, Simla. 10. The learned Special Judge found that the amount of Rs. 13,827 was entrusted with the appellant in his capacity as a public servant and he dishonestly misappropriated the amount from March 30, 1977 to October 5, 1979. It was also found that the appellant had forged the three actual payees receipts for a sum of Rs. 10. The learned Special Judge found that the amount of Rs. 13,827 was entrusted with the appellant in his capacity as a public servant and he dishonestly misappropriated the amount from March 30, 1977 to October 5, 1979. It was also found that the appellant had forged the three actual payees receipts for a sum of Rs. 13,827 with an intention to cheat the government to and the receipts were used as genuine knowing or having reason to know that the same were forged. 11. The learned Special Judge, however, found that there was no valid and lawful sanction to prosecute the appellant and the appellant was not liable to be convicted under sections 5 (2) (c) and 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant was, therefore, convicted and sentenced for the offences under sections 409, 467, 468 and 471 of the Code of Indian Penal as stated above. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the conviction of the appellant under various sections of the Indian Penal Code is liable to be set aside. It is contended that the appellant was tried jointly for having committed offences under the Indian Penal Code along with the offences under sections 5 (1) (c) and 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in view of the provisions of section 7 (3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The learned Special Judge after finding that there was no valid and lawful sanction to prosecute the appellant under the Prevention of Corruption Act could not convict the appellant for any of the offences under the Indian Penal Code. He has relied on I.L.R. (Himachal Series (1984) page 312, Bihari Lal Gupta v. State of H. P., AIR 1961 Pat 203 ; Ramautar Mahton v. The State, and 1972 CLJ 802 ; Konsam Tharongou Singh v. The Union Territory of Manipur, in support of his contentions. 13. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent con tends that sanction is not required for the offences under the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the appellant has rightly been convicted. He could not site any judgment in support of his contentions. 14. 13. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent con tends that sanction is not required for the offences under the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the appellant has rightly been convicted. He could not site any judgment in support of his contentions. 14. In AIR 1961 Patna 203 (supra) it is held that if an accused is tried by a Special Judge for an offence under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the sanction is found to be invalid, then in that case no order of acquittal or conviction can be passed by the Special Judge and entire proceedings before him are null and void. It is further held that if the proceedings relating to offence under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not tried due to absence of a valid sanction, the Special Judge can have no jurisdiction under Sec. 7 (3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 to try the offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. In 1972 Criminal Law Journal 802 (supra) it is held that if the trial by the Special Judge for an offence mentioned in section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act lacks validity then the trial of an offence other than the one described in section 6 must stand invalidated because normally such a case is tried by the Sessions Judge only on commitment made to him by a competent Magistrate. Therefore, where the proceedings before the Special Judge in a case relating to an offence under section 5 (2; of the Prevention of Corruption Act is no trial at all because of lack of valid sanction under section 6 of that Act, the Special Judge has no jurisdiction under section 7 (3) of the Act of 1952 to try the offence under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code also. 15. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Bihari Lal Guptas case (supra), has also held that in the absence of a valid sanction within the contemplation of the section 6 of the Act the entire trial including the conviction and sentence as recorded against the appellant is void ab initio. 16. 15. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Bihari Lal Guptas case (supra), has also held that in the absence of a valid sanction within the contemplation of the section 6 of the Act the entire trial including the conviction and sentence as recorded against the appellant is void ab initio. 16. In the present case the learned Special Judge has already given a finding that there was no valid and lawful sanction for the prosecution of the appellant and for this reason he could not convict the appellant under section 5 (1) (o) and or 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 17. The learned Special Judge has, however, erred in holding that he could convict the appellant under sections 409, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. 18. After giving a finding that there was no valid sanction for prosecution the whole trial was null and void and the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to convict the appellant under any Sec. of the Indian Penal Code. He had no jurisdiction to try these offences in the manner in which the same have been tried by him. He could try these offences only by virtue of section 7 (3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, and he had tried these offences under the Indian Penal Code along with offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. the order of the learned Sessions Judge convicting the appellant is thus without jurisdiction and the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Special Judge are liable to be set aside, and are accordingly set aside. 19. The present appeal is accepted. This judgment will not debar the State from proceeding against the appellant in any manner which may be permissible under law. Appeal allowed.