Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises from the judgment in AS No. 65 of 1981 reversing the order of the learned Munsiff in EP No. 116 of 1978 in OS No. 773 of 1952. The appellants purchased the suit property (mentioned in item 1 of the plaint schedule and comprising 1 acre 90 cents) from the second plaintiff-decree-holder in OS No. 773 of 1952 under Ext. B1 deed of sale dated 13-12-1967. This property had been delivered to the second plaintiff, the legal representative of the first plaintiff who died during the pendency of the suit, as per Ext. B8 delivery list dated 23-2-1963, pursuant to the ex-parte decree passed against defendants 17 and 18 on 6-2-1961. 2. The property originally belonged to the first plaintiff. His power of attorney holder Ismail sold it to his mother Avva Ummal on 12-5-1941. She then sold it to the 1st and 2nd defendants on 4-5-1943. Under Ext. Al partition dated 24-6-1949 between defendants 1, 2,17,18 and others, the suit property was allotted to defendants 17 and 18. 3. The first plaintiff instituted the suit against these defendants to set aside the sale of the property by Ismail to his mother and the subsequent transactions and for other reliefs. Subsequent to the ex-parte decree passed against defendants 17 and 18, they filed applications under 0.9 R.13 of the CPC. to set aside the ex-parte decree passed against them IA No. 2083 of 1965 was the application filed by the 17th defendant on 20-10-1965. This application was pending when on 13-12-1967 the second plaintiff sold the suit property to the present appellants under Ext. B1. The 17th defendant's application to set aside the ex¬parte decree was dismissed by the trial court on 25-11-1970, but it was allowed on 22-3-1972 by the lower appellate court in CMA No. 6 of 1971. Subsequently on 12-9-1972. the 18th defendant's application was allowed by the trial court. Thereupon the suit was retried, and it was dismissed, in so far as the 17th and 18th defendants were concerned, by decree dated 10-11-1972. The decree was challenged by the second plaintiff in AS No. 24 of 1973 and in SA No. 913 of 1974, but without success. Thereupon EP No. 116 of 1978, from which the present appeal arises, was filed by the 17th and 18th defendants under S.144 of the CPC. for restitution. The decree was challenged by the second plaintiff in AS No. 24 of 1973 and in SA No. 913 of 1974, but without success. Thereupon EP No. 116 of 1978, from which the present appeal arises, was filed by the 17th and 18th defendants under S.144 of the CPC. for restitution. That petition was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the present appellants, who purchased the property from the second plaintiff, were bona fide purchasers for value without notice. That order was reversed by the lower appellate court by the judgment now under appeal. 4. Counsel for the appellants Shri. Viswanatha Iyer, referring to the decisions in Binayak Swain v. Ramesh Chandra, AIR 1966 SC 948, Zain-Ul-Abdin Khan v. Muhammed Asqhar Ali Khan, (1887) ILR 10 All. 166 (PC); Rewa Mahten v. Ram Kishen Singh. (1886) 14 Cal. 18 (PC); Abdul Ghani v. Mahendra Kumar, AIR. 1979 All. 106; Chota Nagpur Banking Assocn. v. Smith, AIR 1943 Patna 325; and 5. Chokalingam v. N. S. Krishna, AIR 1964 Mad. 404, contends that the appellants, being bona fide purchasers for value without notice, are protected from restitution under S.144 of the CPC Counsel for the respondents Shri. Ramesh Babu, on the other hand, points out that the property was purchased by the appellants when the 17th defendant's application under 0.9 R.13 of the CPC. was pending, and therefore, the sale was vitiated by reason of lis pendent in terms of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 5. Where property is sold by court-auction in execution of a decree, the sale is affected by the command of the court. There is in such cases a clear distinction between decree-holders, who purchased under their own decree, and bonafide purchasers who, bought in court-auction and who are not parties to the decree. While the former are affected by the reversal of the decree on appeal, the latter are not. Referring to this distinction in Zain-UlAbdin Khan v. Muhammad Asqhar Ali Khan, (1887) ILR 10 All. While the former are affected by the reversal of the decree on appeal, the latter are not. Referring to this distinction in Zain-UlAbdin Khan v. Muhammad Asqhar Ali Khan, (1887) ILR 10 All. 166,172 (PC), Sir B. Peacock observed: "It appears to their Lordships that there is a great distinction between the decree-holders who came in and purchased under their own decree, which was afterwards reversed on appeal, and the bonafide purchasers who came in and bought at the sale in execution of the decree to which they were no parties, and at a time when that decree was a valid decree, and when the order for the sale was a valid order. A great distinction has been made between the case of bona fide purchasers who are no parties to a decree at a sale under execution and the decree-holders themselves. In Bacon's Abridgment, Title 'Error', it is laid down, citing old authorities, that if a man recovers damages, and hath execution by fieri facias, and upon the fieri facias the sheriff sells to a stranger a term for years, and after the judgment is reversed, the party shall be restored only to the money for which the term was sold, and not to the term itself, because the sheriff had sold it by the command of the writ of fieri facias'. There are decisions to similar effect in the High Court at Calcutta. They are collected in a note in Broughton, in his book on the Code of Civil Procedure, fourth edition, note to S.246, Act 8 of 1859. So in this case, those bonafide purchasers, who were no parties to the decree which was then valid and in force had nothing to do further than to look to the decree and to the order of sale." 6. S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which embodies the rule of lis pendens in relation to a suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is in question, specifically provides that the vice of that rule is not attracted where property is transferred or otherwise dealt with under authority of the competent court. The rationale of this exemption is that a purchaser in court-sale has a right to presume that the court has properly investigated the rights of the parties before ordering the sale. The rationale of this exemption is that a purchaser in court-sale has a right to presume that the court has properly investigated the rights of the parties before ordering the sale. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that sales made under the authority of the court are not lightly set aside. This exception to the rule in S.52 has no application in respect of private alienations where parties deal with each other at arms length. Significantly the rule in S.52 has application only incases where right to immovable property is in question. It has no application to a suit for money. A sale in execution of a money decree, subject to the rule of restitution contained in S.144 of the CPC., is not affected by the subsequent reversal of the decree: Shill Bhavan v. Shambbuprasad, (1905) ILR. 29 Bom. 435, 446 (FC.). No statutory bar is attracted to such a sale. The decisions cited on behalf of the appellants concerned court-sales in execution of money decrees. The subsequent reversal of the decree in such a case did not affect the bona fide transferee without notice who is entitled to claim relaxation of the rule of restitution contained in S.144 of the CPC. see Chota Nagpur Banking Assocn. v. Smith, AIR. 1943 Patna, 325. That principle has no application, whatever, to a case such as this which squarely falls within the mischief of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The rule of lis pendens "affects not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending litigation, rights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party." Per Lor Gransworth in Bellamy v. Sabine, (1857) 1 De G & J. 566, 578.584 (quoted by Mulla, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, 7th edn. 231). 7. The present suit related to a right to immovable property. The appellants purchased the property, not in a court-auction, but from the decree-bolder in a private sale. Such sale during the pendency of the application under Order IX R.13 of the CPC was a transaction during the pendency of the "suit or proceeding" within the meaning of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The prohibition contained in that Section provides for no exemption in favour of a bona fide purchaser without notice. Such sale during the pendency of the application under Order IX R.13 of the CPC was a transaction during the pendency of the "suit or proceeding" within the meaning of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The prohibition contained in that Section provides for no exemption in favour of a bona fide purchaser without notice. Whether or not the appellants are of such a category, they purchased the suit property by a private sale, and not by an involuntary sale ordered by the court, and the statutory prohibition, therefore, invalidated the sale. 8. A prudent investigation of the title would have disclosed to a vigilent buyer that the property bad been delivered to the vender consequent upon an ex-parte decree in a suit relating to a right to immovable property, and that an application was pending to set aside that decree. The lower appellate court was, therefore, perfectly justified in attributing constructive knowledge to the appellants. The appellants having had constructive notice of toe cloud on the vender's title, and being therefore disqualified in law to be treated as bona fide purchasers without notice, as against them, defendants 17 and 18 are entitled to restitution, and their application in that behalf has been rightly allowed by the lower appellate court (see Chota Nagpur Banking Assocn v. Smith, AIR 1943 Patna 325). The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs. Issue carbon/ photo copies of this judgment to the parties on the usual terms.