JUDGMENT : T. Sathiadev, J.—Defendant in O.S. No. 2315 of 1981 on the file of First Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras is the Appellant. Legal representatives of the deceased, first Plaintiff and the second Plaintiff are the Respondents herein. First Plaintiff is the brother and second Plaintiff is the mother of late Captain G. Selvarajan, who was a Pilot in Indian Airlines Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'Corporation'), who has taken out a life insurance policy from the Defendant on 28.3.1973 for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- with accident benefit. The premium was payable annually and after paying the first annual premium of Rs. 4,684/- he had applied for conversion of the policy into one under Salary Saving Scheme whereby the premium is payable by the Corporation monthly and which will be deducted from his salary. This proposal was accepted by the Defendant by making an endorsement on the policy on 24.4.1974, and he had given necessary authorization for the premium amount to be deducted from his salary every month. He died on 2.6.1974, and therefore, first Plaintiff, as nominee and second Plaintiff as heir, made a demand for payment of the policy amount, but on Defendant unjustly rejecting, it had led to the filing of the suit. 2. Defendant admitted the existence of the policy and of the endorsement made on 24.4.1974 and of conversion of the same into Salary Saving Scheme. It is claimed that, when this conversion takes place, it could be effected only from May, 1974, and therefore, the life assured was asked to remit the premium amount of Rs. 390.40 per month of March and April, 1974 directly to Defendant, and as he had failed to pay the amount, the policy had lapsed, and therefore, the amount as claimed is not payable. 3. On trial court decreeing the suit as prayed for, in this appeal, it is contended that the following points arise for consideration: (1) Has not the policy holder by failing to pay the monthly premium for the months of March and April, 1974, allowed the policy to lapse? (2) Would the facts and circumstances of the case attract the accident clause in the policy? (3) Has the policy been converted into a policy under Salary Saving Scheme from March 1974 onwards? Point No. 1 4. There is no dispute that Exh. (2) Would the facts and circumstances of the case attract the accident clause in the policy? (3) Has the policy been converted into a policy under Salary Saving Scheme from March 1974 onwards? Point No. 1 4. There is no dispute that Exh. A-l policy dated 26.4.1973 was issued to late Selvarajan for Rs. 50,000/- , that the annual premium payable thereon was Rs. 4,684/- , that this policy was converted and brought under Salary Saving Scheme by an endorsement made on the policy on 24.4.1974, Exh. A-3, and that the monthly premium was fixed at Rs. 390.40 payable by the Airlines Corporation. It is a fact that the monthly premiums for March and April 1974 had not been paid either by the policy holder or by Corporation. Later on, no payment was made for the subsequent months, because Selvarajan died on 2.6.1974. 5. Mr. Ramamurthy, Learned Counsel for Appellant, strenuously pleads that, when the monthly premiums for two months had not been paid, and the policy holder having committed default relating to the insurance contract, and a breach of contract having occasioned thereby, the policy had lapsed and hence equities cannot be pleaded nor entertained, and that the terms and conditions of the policy alone should be looked into, and in this view, Plaintiffs are not entitled to claim the policy amount. The annual premium was due on 28.3.1974. Even before that date, on 16.3.1974, Selvarajan had asked for conversion of the policy, and this was accepted by Appellant by making an endorsement in the policy, Exh. A-3, on 24.4.1974, and in following the letter on the same date under Exh. A-2 it was intimated to him. Hence, Appellant having agreed to apply Salary Saving Scheme on and from March, 1974, it is bound by the said stipulation and cannot claim that the Scheme was made applicable only from May 1974 onwards, because it was only then it could send the first demand to Corporation for deducting the monthly premium from the salary of Selvarajan. He had sent his application before annual premium became payable. It is not in dispute that a grace period of one month is available even as per the policy issued in Exh. A-l. Having taken a decision to apply the Scheme from March, 1974, it is the Appellant who ought to have diligently and promptly intimated not only Selvarajan but the Corporation also. It is not in dispute that a grace period of one month is available even as per the policy issued in Exh. A-l. Having taken a decision to apply the Scheme from March, 1974, it is the Appellant who ought to have diligently and promptly intimated not only Selvarajan but the Corporation also. In Exh. A-2, it is stated that "the premium as from March 1974 will have to be paid by your employer by salary deductions at the rate of Rs. 390.40". Appellant takes its own time and signs Exh. A-2 only on 29.4.1974 which could not reach the Corporation well before it could disburse salary to Selvarajan in May 1974. Appellant is quite aware as to when deductions are made by companies, Corporation, etc., under the Scheme, and therefore, by signing a letter of this nature on the last but one day in the month, it had deprived itself from collecting the monthly premium from the Corporation when it disbursed the salary in May 1974. 6. It is contended that Selvarajan ought to have paid the annual premium by 28.4.1974, but this contention is baseless because even by 24.4.1974, Appellant had taken the decision to implement the Scheme from March 1974 onwards. The terms of the policy having stood altered from March 1974 onwards by the said decision taken by the Appellant, the original terms of the policy cannot be relied upon and put against Selvarajan. When so much stress is put by Appellant on the life insurance contract, as to what are the binding terms between the parties on the relevant date could be only with reference to what decision Appellant had taken in converting the policy into Salary Saving Scheme, on and from March 1974 onwards. It ought to have along with Exh. A-2 asked the Corporation to deduct premiums for two months from the salary of Selvarajan when the next salary disbursement takes place. It sent the demand list only in the month of May, 1974. It had not even taken care to include in the said list, premiums for the months of March and April 1974, which could not be recovered because it had taken longer time to take the decision in favour of Selvarajan. Lack of diligence on its part had been responsible for failure to collect premium on time. It had not even taken care to include in the said list, premiums for the months of March and April 1974, which could not be recovered because it had taken longer time to take the decision in favour of Selvarajan. Lack of diligence on its part had been responsible for failure to collect premium on time. On 24.4.1974, while effecting endorsement on the policy, knowing quite well that it had already allowed two months to lapse, it could have implemented the Salary Saving Scheme from June onwards if permissible under the Rules, and should have informed Selvarajan that he could avail of the Scheme only from a future date, which, if permissible under the Rules and Regulations of Appellant Corporation. Having chosen to take the decision that the Scheme would be retrospectively applicable, it is only the Appellant Corporation which will have to take the consequence of its belated performance. Once as in Exh. A-2, the Scheme was made effective from March 1974 onwards and Appellant having agreed to recover the amounts only from the Corporation, the employer of late Selvarajan, it should have addressed the employer to pay for March and April 1974 as well since it is permissible under para 15 of Scheme as per the terms and conditions of the insurance contract read with Scheme Appellant cannot therefore look to Selvarajan to pay the premium amounts for March and April. Even in Exh. A-2, in the last paragraph, there is no indication of the time granted to him within which he should remit the premium for the two months. It is contended that as per the terms of the policy, the grace period is 15 days. The said period would have no application to the instant case because the premiums are recoverable from the employer, and contrary to it, the demand was made on the policy holder. He should have been informed about the period within which the demand is to be complied with. Para 15 of Scheme allows six defaults to employer before recon-version. For two months, Appellant ought to have addressed employer for recovery. Belatedly this was attempted after Selvarajan's death. Nonpayment for the said two months has not resulted in contravention of Scheme condition, nor breach of terms of policy. B-11 dated 16. Para 15 of Scheme allows six defaults to employer before recon-version. For two months, Appellant ought to have addressed employer for recovery. Belatedly this was attempted after Selvarajan's death. Nonpayment for the said two months has not resulted in contravention of Scheme condition, nor breach of terms of policy. B-11 dated 16. 7.1974 is the letter from Corporation, which refers to memo issued by Appellant on 3.7.1974 making a demand for the recovery of the premium amount with effect from March 1974 relating to Selvarajan. Therefore, it is crystal clear that Appellant had made the demand as per the terms of the revised policy on the employer for the months of March and April, 1974. This demand made by it is in accord with the conditions stipulated in Exh. A-2 to the effect that "the premium as from March 1974 will have to be paid by your employer by salary deductions at the rate of Rs. 390.40." Hence, the concluding part of Exh. A-2 cannot override the agreed terms between the parties. Because of the lethargic manner in respect of a Scheme which had been ushered in March 1974 relating to Selvarajan, Appellant took a decision only on 29.4.1974 and hence the premiums for the two months could not be recovered. 7. It is then contended by relying on Exh. B-8 dated 16.3.1974, a letter by Selvarajan addressed to Corporation stating that he would be responsible for any consequence of non-payment of premium under the policy for reasons beyond the control of the Corporation, such as himself proceeding on leave without pay or on himself drawing advance salary without deduction of premium, etc. This is not a case wherein he has drawn his salary in advance. He drew the salary for the months of March and April, 1974 because the Appellant had not intimated the Corporation on time about deduction of the premium from his salary. Having never been intimated as to what would be the amount recoverable from his salary, he cannot abstain from getting the salary without deduction. He cannot live without salary till Appellant takes a decision, therefore, in the absence of a timely demand made by Appellant, there was no breach of contract committed by him in drawing the salary for the said two months in full. He cannot live without salary till Appellant takes a decision, therefore, in the absence of a timely demand made by Appellant, there was no breach of contract committed by him in drawing the salary for the said two months in full. Therefore, non-payment of premium for the said two months having resulted because of the delayed communication sent by the Appellant, it cannot any longer claim that it was either Selvarajan or the employer-Corporation which was responsible for non-realisation of the amount on time, and hence, this point is held as against the Appellant. Point No. 2 8. Selvarajan had gone to Kodaikkanal accompanied by his elder brother, first Plaintiff, to settle a bride for him, and during his stay therein, he used to go for walk in the mornings. The family was staying in a hotel from 28th May, 1974 onwards, and even though he left the hotel in the morning at 7 a.m. on 2.6.1974, as he had not turned up, first Plaintiff in the afternoon of the next day (3.6.1974) made a complaint to the police and late in the night on that day, they brought the dead body of Selvarajan claiming that he had fallen down near the suicide point. Exh. B-3, Certificate of Registrar of Deaths, shows that the cause of death was "accidental fall". The relevant clause in the policy, Exh. A-l, states "if any bodily injury is suffered solely or directly from accident caused by outward violent and visible means then it would enable policy holder to claim the accident benefit." Mr. Ramamurthy relies upon the proviso which deals with intentional injury, suicide or attempted suicide, insanity or immorality, etc., which would exclude the liability of the Appellant Corporation from its liability, but there is no evidence let in to show that it was a case of suicide. Selvarajan had gone to Kodaikkanal with the entire family to find out a bride for him. On the event of his marriage, nothing is disclosed as to why he should commit suicide. His service records had not been summoned to show that there are circumstances warranting him to commit suicide. Appellant had not produced any medical evidence to show that he was suffering from insanity or mental disability or prone to commit suicide. Having relied upon the proviso, the burden is on the Appellant to establish those claims. His service records had not been summoned to show that there are circumstances warranting him to commit suicide. Appellant had not produced any medical evidence to show that he was suffering from insanity or mental disability or prone to commit suicide. Having relied upon the proviso, the burden is on the Appellant to establish those claims. Appellant relies upon the following passage at para 2094 of page 822 of MacGilHvray & Partington on Insurance Law (Sixth Edition): ...Crossing or walking along railway track without looking to see if trains are coming, going too near the edge of a cliff in search of wild flowers, traveling in an unlighted vehicle at dusk or in the dark, boarding a moving train, climbing a fence with a loaded gun have all been held to be unnecessary exposure to danger within the meaning of the exception. He submits that this sort of instances would come under the definition of "unnecessary exposure to danger" and in turn they would amount to gross or wanton negligence with regard to the personal security of the insured, and hence, the policy amount cannot be claimed when an insured exposes himself to anyone of such acts. The late Selvarajan having gone near the edge of the cliff and that too called as a "Suicide point", he had brought about the accident by his wanton negligence, and hence, the Plaintiffs claim has to fail. 9. As to what is an 'accident', in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition, Volume 25) in paragraph 594, it is stated as follows: ...The idea of something haphazard is not necessarily inherent in the word; it covers any unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed, or any unexpected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence.... When Appellant is unable to show that any of the factors in the proviso to the accident benefit clause could be applicable, the entry in Exh. B-13 that the cause of death of Selvarajan was "due to accidental fall", will have to be accepted and acted upon. When Appellant is unable to show that any of the factors in the proviso to the accident benefit clause could be applicable, the entry in Exh. B-13 that the cause of death of Selvarajan was "due to accidental fall", will have to be accepted and acted upon. It is claimed that he could not have fallen if he had not walked very near to the edge of the rock, and therefore, by taking the said risk, he had brought about the accident in a notorious place called "Suicide point" and hence proper inference to be drawn is that he had committed suicide. Even at a place named thoughtlessly as a "Suicide point" and publicized in that manner, and to which general public are invited to go and have a close look at it, an accidental fall could occasion. Going very near to the edge of the rock in a hilly terrain and which interestingly turns out to be a tourist spot, could not be a ground to disentitle the heirs of a policy holder from claiming compensation in the event of death due to accidental fall of the policy holder at such a place. Unless an intention to commit suicide is made out, even for an accidental fall, suicide cannot be imputed. Therefore, when the Appellant had failed to discharge the burden that anyone of the factors in the proviso to the accident benefit clause is applicable, it has to be held that Selvarajan died only due to an accidental fall at a tourist spot. Point No. 3 10. Already, while dealing with point No. 1, the documents, the endorsement made in Exh. A-l policy, the letters exchanged between the Appellant, the Corporation and the late Selvarajan had been referred to and they all go to show that the policy taken under Exh. A-l with a liability to pay premium annually stood altered as one which could come under the Salary Saving Scheme on and from March 1974 onwards. Both in Exhs. A-l and A-3, Appellant had clearly stated that the premiums will have to be paid from March 1974 onwards by the employer of Selvarajan at the reduced rate of Rs. 390.40. A-l with a liability to pay premium annually stood altered as one which could come under the Salary Saving Scheme on and from March 1974 onwards. Both in Exhs. A-l and A-3, Appellant had clearly stated that the premiums will have to be paid from March 1974 onwards by the employer of Selvarajan at the reduced rate of Rs. 390.40. Once an endorsement is made in the policy to that effect, forwarding a demand list in May 1974 to Corporation which is a follow-up action to the conversion Scheme, would not make it as having come into existence only from May 1974 onwards. Based on the Scheme coming into force only with effect from March, 1974, on 3.6.1974, Appellant had addressed the Corporation in Memo No. Dept/SSS/PA/187/CSM dated 3.6.1974 demanding premium amount of Rs. 390.40 per month with effect from March, 1974. It is claimed by Appellant that a copy of this memo had been destroyed in the fire in L.I.C. Building at Madras. When the particulars of the letter have been disclosed in Exh. B-ll, and when Exh. A-l policy had been affixed an endorsement, Exh. A-3, that the Scheme had come into effect from March 1974 onwards, it is strange that the Appellant should raise an issue regarding the month in which the Scheme had come into force in so far as Selvarajan is concerned. It has taken an unreasonable stand in spite of its delayed manner of taking decision and which has been already referred to. For holding the amount unjustly, an interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum could have been awarded, but no cross-objections have been filed, it only results in awarding of costs. 11. First Plaintiff is admittedly a nominee and was not entitled to a share in the policy amount. It is only the mother, who is entitled to the entire amount, and in granting the decree, this aspect had not been spelt out clearly in the decree; decree was passed as if both the Plaintiffs are entitled to that amount It is stated that first Plaintiff is since dead and his legal representatives have come on record. It is only the mother, who is entitled to the entire amount, and in granting the decree, this aspect had not been spelt out clearly in the decree; decree was passed as if both the Plaintiffs are entitled to that amount It is stated that first Plaintiff is since dead and his legal representatives have come on record. Under Hindu Law, Selvarajan having died as a bachelor, it is only his mother, who is entitled to the entire compensation amount First Plaintiff had to join the suit because he was the nominee, which means that he had a right to collect the amount, but hand over the same to the lawful heir in full. Hence, the decree passed enables only the second Plaintiff to claim the entire amount. 12. Hence, this appeal is dismissed with costs.