K. K. VERMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a first appeal under Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 96 of the C. P. C. , 1908. It has been filed by a defendant from the judgement and decree dated 24th Nov. 1977 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sheopurkalan, in C. S. No. 9-A/1977 (filed on 25-7-1974) declaring respondents Babulal and Omprakash owners of the upper storey of a house (described in plaint para-1) situate at Sheopurkalan and ordering delivery of possession of the same to the respondents. ( 2 ) THE facts, no longer in dispute, are as follows : appellant Ramdas Gupta's paternal uncle Brindawan executed a registered sale deed dated 24-3-1960 (Ex. P. 3) in favour of the respondents for consideration in respect of the ground floor of the aforementioned house situate at the Main Road, Moti Katle Bazar Khaas, Sheopurkalan. On 12-7-1960 Brindawan executed a registered sale deed (Ex. P.-4) for consideration in favour of the respondents in respect of the remaining moiety of the aforementioned house i. e. its first and second floors. ( 3 ) BRINDAWAN died issueless in the year of 1962 survived by his widow Shrimati Kamlabai. ( 4 ) THE respondents filed an eviction suit (C. S. No. 21-A/1963) against Shrimati Kamlabai alleging that Brindawan had taken the suit premises (the first and second floor of the house) on lease from the respondents on 12-7-1960. Appellant Ramdas Gupta who used to reside in the suit premises was also impleaded as a co-defendant in the suit. ( 5 ) KAMLABAI and Ramdas Gupta contested the suit. Amongst other things, they had taken a plea in para 1 (1) in their written statement dated 5-12-1963 that the suit property (the first and second floors of the house) was their joint family property. ( 6 ) THE trial Court passed a decree for rent but disallowed the relief of eviction. Both sides appealed. The Additional District Judge, Morena affirmed the dismissal of the suit for eviction and further dismissed plaintiffs' claim for rent. ( 7 ) THE present respondents came up in second appeal, which was allowed and the suit for eviction and arrears of rent was decreed against Shrimati Kamlabai. Both sides appealed. The Additional District Judge, Morena affirmed the dismissal of the suit for eviction and further dismissed plaintiffs' claim for rent. ( 7 ) THE present respondents came up in second appeal, which was allowed and the suit for eviction and arrears of rent was decreed against Shrimati Kamlabai. ( 8 ) APROPOS, the defendants' plea and the liability of Ramdas Gupta (the present appellant) under the decree para 10 of the High Court's judgement said as follows :"the questions about the title of Bindraban and his capacity to dispose of the property are absolutely unnecessary to be gone into in these proceedings. As the relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and Bindraban having been established, the title of appellants is not at all necessary to be gone into. But it also cannot be doubted that respondent No. 2 widow of deceased Bindraban alone could be bound by the rent-note. Respondent No. 1, who is said to be a nephew of deceased Bindraban and was described as a person staying with Bindraban and treated like a son, in absence of any proof of his being the son of deceased Bindraban cannot be said to be bound by the rent-note executed by Bindraban deceased. " ( 9 ) WHEN a warrant of possession was issued in execution against Kamlabai, present appellant Ramdas Gupta filed a claim in the executing Court on 5-2-1974 asserting his title to the suit property and denying the decree holders title thereto. After giving notices dated 2-5-1974 and 7-5-1974 to the appellant, the respondents filed their suit for declaration of title and possession, based on the averment that they had become owners of the suit premises by virtue of a sale in their favour by the owner Brindawan. ( 10 ) THE present appellant contested the plaintiffs' title alleging that the suit property is the ancestral property of his joint family and, as such, Brindawan had no power of disposition over the said house in the first floor of which he (the defendant) and other family members had been living as co-owners right from the time of their anscestors. It was alleged that suit was barred by limitation. ( 11 ) THE parties adduced documentary and oral evidence. It was alleged that suit was barred by limitation. ( 11 ) THE parties adduced documentary and oral evidence. The learned trial Judge held that the house in question did not belong to the defendant's joint family and that it was Brindawan how was the exclusive owner of the said house. It was held that the plaintiffs have become the owners of the suit property under the registered sale deed dated 12-7-1960. A finding in negative was recorded against the defendant on his plea of limitation. The suit for possession of the suit property was decreed. ( 12 ) THE appellant's learned counsel has urged that the trial Court erred in giving the aforementioned findings and in non-recording of any finding about the month of the year of 1962 in which Brindawan had died. No other points were urged by the appellant's learned counsel. The other defences set up in the pleading or the memorandum of appeal are, therefore, not being mentioned. ( 13 ) THE first point for determination is whether the trial Court erred in holding that the house was the separate property of Brindawan and not the joint family property of Brindawan and appellant Ramdas Gupta. ( 14 ) THE respondents averred in plaint-paragraph 1 that the entire house was owned by Brindawan. ( 15 ) IT is worth underscoring that the appellant pleaded that at all material times the house comprising the suit property was a joint property belonging to an undivided Hindu family of which he and Brindawan, amongst others, were members. ( 16 ) NOW, the written statement does not say that the house was ancestral property of the said alleged joint family, or that the house was jointly acquired by Brindawan and the appellant or the appellant's father or paternal grandfather; or that Brindawan had blended the house with any ancestral or joint Hindu family property in which the appellant had any right, title or interest as a coparcener. ( 17 ) APPELLANT Ramdas Gupta has not filed any title deeds in support of his plea that the house in question was a joint Hindu family property. Admittedly, the plaintiffs have no title deed evidencing creation of title in favour of Brindawan in respect of the house in question. ( 17 ) APPELLANT Ramdas Gupta has not filed any title deeds in support of his plea that the house in question was a joint Hindu family property. Admittedly, the plaintiffs have no title deed evidencing creation of title in favour of Brindawan in respect of the house in question. ( 18 ) THE plaintiffs' father Badrilal (PW 3) who hailed from Sabai Madhopur deposed that he and Brindawan had been employed as munims in the shop of one Lekha Yamuna Das. Ramdas Gupta (DW 1) admits that Brindawan was an employee of his trading concern whose proprietors resided in Gwalior. He did not rebut Badrilal's aforementioned evidence and the version that he (Badrilal) had known Brindawan since Samvat 1992 that is, 1936 A. D. ( 19 ) SIMILARLY, Badrilai's (PW 3) statement that when he came to and settled down at Sheopurkalan in Samvat 1990 (1934 A. D.), the disputed house had only ground-floor and first -floor constructions and that the second-floor was being added to the house. ( 20 ) BAJRANGLAL (PW 4) had seen the house in 1935 A. D. at the time of his coming to and settling down at Sheopurkalan. ( 21 ) DEFENDANT Ramdas Gupta (DW 1), a legal practitioner at Sheopurkalan, is now aged 58 years, as reckoned from his apparent age as recorded by the trial Court on 20th September 1977. He recalled that at the time of coming of age of understanding at the age of 8 years (in or about year 1937), he was living in the disputed house with Brindawan. He conceded that he could not tell the year in which the house was first constructed. ( 22 ) HENCE, on the evidence all that can be said with certainty is that the house had come into existence before the year 1934 but not how much before. There is no evidence who had initially constructed the house. ( 23 ) IT is, therefore, evident that for the period before the year of 1934, there is no direct evidence. ( 24 ) THE evidence of Ramdas Gupta (DW 1) supported by the admission of Badrilal (PW 3) proves that Dhannulal the paternal grandfather of Ramdas Gupta belonged to Madhoganj (in the district of Jalon in U. P.) and that the old man and his sons had two ancestral houses there. ( 24 ) THE evidence of Ramdas Gupta (DW 1) supported by the admission of Badrilal (PW 3) proves that Dhannulal the paternal grandfather of Ramdas Gupta belonged to Madhoganj (in the district of Jalon in U. P.) and that the old man and his sons had two ancestral houses there. ( 25 ) RAMDAS Gupta (DW 1) deposed that Dhannulal had two sons, viz. , Brindawan and his (Ramdas Gupta's) father Phundilal. However, in his deposition dated 23-9-1965 in the previous suit (C. S. No. 21-A/1963) between the parties he had stated that Brindawan and Phundi Lal had two more brothers named Ramnath and Shriram. Similarly, in the present suit Ramdas Gupta (PW 1) deposed that his elder brother Ramswaroop and younger brother Ramdas lived with him in the suit house. Incidentally, in the previous suit he had deposed that he had two more brothers named Sitaram and Om Prakash. In the present suit Ramdas Gupta has not even mentioned Sitaram and Om Prakash. ( 26 ) RAMDAS Gupta (DW 1) deposed that his paternal grandfather Dhannulal and father Phundilal died at Madhogarh in 1949 and 1951 respectively. ( 27 ) THE appellant did not dispute in his pleading or in his evidence that Brindawan had been in possession of the house comprising the suit property till 12-7-1960. So far the appellant himself is concerned all that he has stated that he spent his childhood in the house and was married from that house and continued to live in the house with Brindawan. ( 28 ) A certified true copy of the Valuation Register of the Nagarpalika Parishad, Sheopurkalan for samvat 2015 (Ex. P. 2) records the name of Brindawan S/o Damru Lal Vaish (and of no others) as the owner of the house. The document is a certified true copy of a public document belonging to the category mentioned in S. 74 (i) and (iii) of the Evidence Act 1872. Under the illustration in (a) of S. 114 of the Evidence Act, it may be presumed that the aforementioned record was correctly prepared by the Nagarpalika officials. ( 29 ) RAMDAS Gupta (DW 1) kept mum over this entry in his examination-in-chief. Under the illustration in (a) of S. 114 of the Evidence Act, it may be presumed that the aforementioned record was correctly prepared by the Nagarpalika officials. ( 29 ) RAMDAS Gupta (DW 1) kept mum over this entry in his examination-in-chief. About the aforementioned entry in cross-examination, he has given an explanation that only Brindawan's name to be recorded because the latter's father Dhannulal was illiterate and also because Brindawan was the elder brother of Phundilal, the appellant's father. This explanation is entirely unsatisfactory and is, therefore, rejected. ( 30 ) HENCE, the said record (Ex. P. 2) is one of the evidentiary links on the factum of the exclusive title and possession of Brindawan over the house in question just before the execution of the registered sale deed dated 24-3-1960 (Ex. P. 3 ). ( 31 ) THE registered sale deed dated 24-3-1960 (Ex. P. 3) executed by Brindawan recites that he was the sole owner and in exclusive possession of the entire house in question, and that the vendor had delivered possession of the ground-floor of the house to the vendees that very day. The annexed sketch-map, drawn to a scale shows a flight of steps with a note : "zeena Upar Ko Brindawanji Ka. " ( 32 ) THE statement of Om Prakash (PW 1) and of his father Badrilal (PW3) that after the purchase of the ground floor of the house they started to run a shop in the aforementioned accommodation were not even touched upon in cross-examination. In fact, Ramdas Gupta (DW 1) admitted that the plaintiffs were running their shop in the ground floor of the house. He stated that he did not know the capacity in which the plaintiffs had been running their shop in the said accommodation. He has expressed want of knowledge about the factum of the aforementioned sale, evidenced by the sale deed dated 24-3-1960 (Ex. P. 3 ). It is difficult to conceive that the appellant, a legal practitioner of some standing, was not aware of the sale or did not make any inquiry as to the capacity in which the plaintiffs had started their shop in the ground-floor. It is evident that he was very well aware of the sale and the capacity in which the plaintiffs had started their shop viz. , as owners of the accommodation. It is evident that he was very well aware of the sale and the capacity in which the plaintiffs had started their shop viz. , as owners of the accommodation. All this conduct on the part of the appellant is totally inconsistent with his case that he was a joint-holder of the house in question. It is clear that it was Brindawan who had acted as the sole-owner of the accommodation in executing the sale deed dated 24-3-1960 (Ex. P. 3) and delivered possess on of the ground-floor of the house to the vendees. ( 33 ) THEN, with the sale of the suit property viz. , remaining portion of the house the upper two storeys of the house, there is overwhelming evidence in the form of the testimonies of Om Prakash (PW1) and Badri Lal (PW3) and the rent-note dated 7-12-1960 (Ex. P. 5) written and executed by Brindawan and the entries on the back of the receipts of payments of rent made by Brindawan from 1-1-1961 to 1-5-1962. All this clearly proves that Brindawan had taken the suit property on rent from the plaintiffs. ( 34 ) IT is evident that the defendant must have been aware all of these transactions and of leasing of the suit accommodation by the plaintiffs to Brindawan. However, there is nothing to show that he had taken any legal steps to vindicate his rights in the house in question to establish his own interest or title therein. Thus, the plaintiffs have introduced adequate and reliable evidence in support of their claim that they owned the suit accommodation by virtue of the sale deed dated 12-7-1960 (Ex. P. 4 ). ( 35 ) NOW, we turn to the point whether the defendant has rebutted the aforementioned case successfully. ( 36 ) THERE is no documentary evidence whatsoever to show in whose name (s) the houses at Madhogarh had stood at the time of the Dhannulal's death in 1949. According to Ramdas Gupta (DW 1) one of the houses at Madhogarh was a residential house of the family while the other house was being rented out to tenants. There is no evidence how much rent the other house fetched. ( 37 ) RAMDAS Gupta (DW1) deposed that his grandfather Damru Lal (Dhannulal ?) had a grocery shop. According to Ramdas Gupta (DW 1) one of the houses at Madhogarh was a residential house of the family while the other house was being rented out to tenants. There is no evidence how much rent the other house fetched. ( 37 ) RAMDAS Gupta (DW1) deposed that his grandfather Damru Lal (Dhannulal ?) had a grocery shop. He does not tell where it was situated and what profits the business yielded and whether the profits were sufficient to form nucleus for the acquisition of the house in question at Sheopurkalan. ( 38 ) APART from the omission of any pleading in the written statement as to the origin of the acquisition of the house comprising the suit property at Sheopurkalan, vide para 16 (supra), that there is an iota of evidence to show who else of the family had jointly acquired the house in question along with Brindawan or that Brindawan had blended the house with any ancestral or joint Hindu family property. In which the appellant had arty right, title or interest. ( 39 ) AT this stage, I refer to the following statement of law in Mudigowda v. Ramchandra, AIR 1969 SC 1076 :" The case of the appellants was that these lands were self acquisition of Goudappa, but the respondents contended that they were joint family properties. The law on this aspect of the case is well settled. Of course there is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because it is joint, possesses any joint property. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property is, therefore, in the first instance upon the person who claims it as coparcenery property. But if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any aquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. This is however subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the family estate. " ( 40 ) IT is, therefore, clear that the appellant has totally failed to rebut the plaintiffs' case that Brindawan was the sole exclusive owner of the suit property. ( 41 ) IT is proved that Brindawan was the sole owner of the house sold to the respondents on 24-3-1960 and 12-7-1960 (Exs. P-3 and P-4 ). ( 42 ) THE next point for determination is whether the suit, based on title, is time-barred. Art. 65 of the Limitation Act governs such suits. Time begins to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiffs. ( 43 ) THE averments in paragraph of the written statement dated 5-12-1963 in the previous suit (No. 21-A/1962) was in the light of the proved facts of this case the first occasion of the appellant's declaration that he was in occupation of the suit property adversely to the present respondents. Thus, time begins to run for the subsequent suit on 5-12-1963. The subsequent suit was filed on that is, within 12 years from 5-12-1963, and was within the period of limitation prescribed by Art. 65. ( 44 ) THE admitted and proved facts render the month of death of Brindawan in the year of 1962 irrelevant to the main controversy. ( 45 ) THE trial Court's judgement and decree are, therefore, affirmed. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellant shall vacate the suit house within two months' time from today. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-, if certified. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Appeal dismissed. .