Judgment S. N. Jha, J. 1. The petitioner has filed this application for quashing an order dated 21-4-1986 whereby the trial court had fixed 12-5-1986 as the date for framing charge against the petitioner. 2. The relevant facts for the disposal of this application are that Opp. party no.1 filed a complaint petition on 2-2-1982 in the court of Chief Judicial magistrate, Patna stating, inter alia, that the complainant is associated with film industry and besides being the Director of Veena Theatre, Patna, he and his father are the financer and distributors of Bombay film producers for which he has also taken a flat at 45, Udathi Tarang, Juhu, Tara Road, Bombay. According to the case of the complainant, he came in contact with the husband of the petitioner and one Ravi Kalra (hereinafter, to be referred as the co-accused) in the year, 1980 at Bombay and at that time the co-accused was engaged in production of film known as Mangal Sutra under the banner of Gaurav Film International (hereinafter to be referred as the Firm) of which the co-accused was sole propriator and incharge of the said firm. The further case is that the financial transactions of the aforesaid firm was conducted by the husband of the petitioner who had been appointed as Attorney of the said firm by the sole proprietor, Ravi kalra with the powers of receipt of finances in connection with the production, distribution exhibition of the said film to the third parties. It is alleged that the husband oi the petitioner and the co-accused had visited Patna on 20-4-1980 and remained here lor two days in connection with business of the aforesaid firm and the complainant met them on the same day where the co-accused offered him for the distribution of his aforesaid film for Delhi and Uttar Pradesh circuit which he accepted and it was agreed upon for making initial payment of Rs.1,50,000/-out of the total price of Rs.6,00,000/. It was further agreed that rest of the amount would be paid within a period of three months from the date of delivery of the film for the above territory. It was further assured that when the film would be ready for release, the agreement in respect thereof would be executed by the said co-accused producer in favour of the distributors including the complainant also. 3. It was further assured that when the film would be ready for release, the agreement in respect thereof would be executed by the said co-accused producer in favour of the distributors including the complainant also. 3. Since the complainant was not in a position to make spot payment of Rs.1,50,000 at one lump-sum at Patna, the co-accused aud G. N. Shah (husband of the petitioner) agreed to receive part payment in respect of the total initial demand of Rs.1,50,000 in two instalments which the complainant was directed to make by December, 1980 and accordingly a sum of Rs.50,000 by way of first instalment was paid on the same day i. e.20-4-1980 at Patna to sri G. N. Shah (since dead) who accepted the same in the capacity of constituted attorney of the said firm vide a receipt granted by him which is annexure-3 appended to this application. It is further alleged thai again in the month of july, 1980, late G. N. Shah and co-accused had telephonic talks with the complainant who was at Patna making demand of Rs.1,00,000 by way of second instalment which they needed for the progress of the said film. Accordingly the complainant went to Bombay and made another payment of rs.1,00,000 to late G. N. Shah on 17-7-1980 at the residence of the complainant. A plain receipt was granted in respect thereof by Sri Shah which is annexure-3/1 appended to this application. 4. According to the complainant, he had grown much intimacy with late g. N. Shah and his wife, the petitioner, who according to the complainant was also associated with the film business since long and so far the film mangul sutra was concerned, she was one of the associate producers acting in complete collaboration with co-accused and late G. N. Shah. 5. The further case of the complainant is that on 28-11-1980 another demand of Rs.50,000 was made by late Shah and the petitioner for their personal needs, but the complainant was giving a clear cut assurance that this amount could be subsequently adjusted towards payment in respect of the said film at the time of execution of the agreement and the entire amount should be regularised in the account of mangnl Sutra. Accordingly, the complainant acting on their assurance made a payment for a sum of Rs.50,000/- to late g. N. Shah and the petitioner as members of the Hindu Undivided Family (in short the H. U. F. ). It is further said that the complainant used to meet the co-accused, late Shah and this petitiouer from time to time in order to ascertain the progress of the film and every time all of them used to inform the complainant that the film was still under production and the same is expected to be ready for release not earlier than June, 1981. 6. It is stated in the complaint petition that the complainant was shocked to find that the film mangal Sutra was already released for exhibition through different distributors concerned and lor Delhi and Uttar Pradesh circuit the aforesaid film was already released in April, 1981 through a third party without any knowledge and notice of the complainant which was against the promise and representations made by the co-accused. The complainant after knowing that the film had already been released, at once rushed to Bombay where he met the co-accused ana late Shah and expressed his surprise and sorrow for the act of betrayal for not giving the distribution of the said film to the complainant as promised earlier. Again assurance was given to the complainant by the co-accused and late Shah that in case the complainant would not agree to accept the next film, they would return the amount along with interest. This time also the complainant believed the statement of the co-accused and kept waiting for any future adjustment as promised by them. 7. According to the complainant, he remained busy in May and June, 1981 at Patna in connection with his business and other family affairs and in july 1981, he again visited Bombay where he learnt that Sri Shah expired suddenly on 20-7-1981 due to heart failure. 8. 7. According to the complainant, he remained busy in May and June, 1981 at Patna in connection with his business and other family affairs and in july 1981, he again visited Bombay where he learnt that Sri Shah expired suddenly on 20-7-1981 due to heart failure. 8. According to the complainant, one month after the sad demise of Sri shah the complainant met the co-accused and the petitioner on 29-8-1981 at the residence of the petitioner who had by then taken over the whole affairs and business of her late husband and he was assured by the petitioner and the co-accused that he would be offered the distribution of another film, namely dil diwane for the eastern circuit which was on the verge of release through them. On getting this offer, the complainant accepted the same and made an immediate demand for the execution of the agreement for which they showed their willingness to execute the same after a fort-night. But on 30-8-1981 the co-accused pretended to have an urgent work at Madras and therefore the complainant left for Patna with hope to reach Bombay again for finalisation of the contract. It is alleged that on 5-9-1981 throught a Magzine, namely,film Information the complainant found to his utter dismay and surprise that the film do Dil Diwane has also been distributed and sold for all circuits to different parties and it was announced in the name of different firm but the office address was the same. On getting this information, the complainant reached Bombay in September, 1981 and was surprised of the situation and the successive acts of deceipt and deceptions played with him. Therefore, in that situation, he wanted his money back from the co-accused, the proprietor of the said firm on whose behalf late Sri shah had accepted the entire amount. According to his case, on such demands the co-accused made a very sensational and startling disclosure that he was, in fact, not the real owner of the firm but was set up by late Shah and this petitioner to act and also profess as producer of film mangal Sutra and proprietor of the firm before the public at large. He further disclosed that he did not owe any property and assets to pay back the dues and financial obligations. He further disclosed that he did not owe any property and assets to pay back the dues and financial obligations. He was a monthly paid employee of late Sri Shah and the petitioner who were the real owners of both mangal Sutra and gaurav Film International. 9. From the statements made in the petition, it appears that the co-accused showed two photo copies of agreement one dated 1-4-1980 and another undated August, 1980 out of which the first agreement related to the "world right control" granted by the co-accused in the capacity of proprietor of the firm to the husband of the petitioner as world right controller in respect of the film mangal Sutra. The other deed of agreement of August, 1980 was in respect of granting power of attorney to the petitioners husband conferring all the power of controlling and management. The complainant has asserted that he being a new enterpreneur in this trade was utterly baffled and deceived by the fraudulent acts done and false promises given by the co-accused, late Sri Shah and the petitioner. On 21-10-1981. , the complainant also sent a personal letter to the petitioner in which also he made a request to repay the money but the petitioner gave reply through. her lawyer taking stand that she, being a house wife, was quite ignorant of the fact and not connected with any business and transactions of her late husband. According to the complainant, it clearly shows petitioners dishonest conduct and inasmuch as the petitioner was connected with film business from very beginning as an active participants being an associate producer of the film mangal Sutra along with the co-accused even after the death of her husband and continued to conduct the business in independent capacity. The complainant again requested to pay back the money vide letter dated 5-1-1982 but instead of repaying the money, the petitioner sent a telegram asking him to withdraw the aforesaid letter otherwise the petitioner would file a criminal case against the complainant and in this way the complainant has been cheated for a sum of Rs.2.00,00,) and being compelled he filed the complaint petition for redressal of his grievance, 10. Before framing of the charge, the complainant was examined as p. W.1 and his cashier as P. W.2 for substantiating the case against the petitioner. Before framing of the charge, the complainant was examined as p. W.1 and his cashier as P. W.2 for substantiating the case against the petitioner. From the petition, it appears that during the course of enquiry, p. W.1 proved all the money receipts. The complainant also proved his own letter dated 21-10-1981. In the court below, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that she was not at all concerned in any manner with this case. Hence, no charge be framed against her. It was also pointed out that from the receipts which were exhibited before the trial court, it was clear that the complainant had made payments of money to the husband of the petitioner and another co-accused whose trial has been separated from the present case, therefore, no case has been made out against her and she should be discharged from the case. This argument was not accepted by the trial court and the trial court gave a finding that this petitioner also along with her husband and the co-accused had been taking part in the business, as such she might have been connected with the case. 11. Accordingly the trial court directed the petitioner to be present in the court to hear the charge and fixed 12-5-1986 for framing of the charge against the petitioner. Hence, this application. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that no case has been made out against the petitioner either on the basis of the complaint or on the basis of the receipts and letter annexed with this application. The learned counsel pointed out that the receipts which are annexure-3 series even do not contain full description and the same do not show how the petitioner is at all connected with the payment of money. According to the learned counsel, as the complainants case stands, three instalments were paid by him ; one instalment of Rs.50,000 at Patna to late G. N. Shah, who accepted the same for distribution of the film mangal Sutra, the second instalment of Rs.1,00,000 in July, 1980 for progress of the film at Bombay and the third instalment of Rs.50,000 was paid to late Sri Shah for the benefit of H. U. F. but in all these transactions the petitioner does not come in picture at all. Therefore, no criminality can be fastened to her. Therefore, no criminality can be fastened to her. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has drawn my attention to a letter by the complainant to the petitioner before filing of the complaint which is annexure-4 to this application, mentioned earlier also. In that letter, it is mentioned that late Sri Shah received Rs.1,50,000 from him as constituted attorney of the firm in July and October, 1980; one at Patna and the other at Bombay against plain receipts granted by him. It was further written that late Sri Shah also demanded a sum of Rs.50,000 in his personal capacity for the benefit and necessity of the H. U. F. while he was at Patna with an assurance that he would return the same with interest at the rate as prevalent in Bomaby market in his next visit to Patna. But unfortunately he died on 20-7-1981. Therefore the complainant requested the petitioner to return the amount as assured by her husband as a pious successor so that his soul may rest in peace. 13. It was vehemently argued on behalf of the petitioner that nowhere there was any whisper in the said letter that this petitioner had any connection either with business of the said firm of which her husband was attorney or with the execution of any receipt executed by her husband in the capacity of attorney of the said firm. Therefore, the roping of the petitioner in the present case is an after-thought of the complainant and she has been falsely implicated just to harass her. According to the learned counsel, from the letter it is manifestly clear that no criminal liability has been fastened against the petitioner; if at all it will be a case it will be a case of civil liability. It was submitted that under the terms of agreement the moneys were advanced; Rs.1,50,000 towards the film mangal Sutra which was being produced under the banner of the firm of which co-accused was the sole proprietor and Rs.50,000 for the benefit of the h. U. F. 14. The moot question for consideration is as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is at all liable for the offences levelled against her. The moot question for consideration is as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the petitioner is at all liable for the offences levelled against her. In a criminal case unless the statute either clearly or by necessary implications rules out mens rea as a constituent part of the crime, an accused cannot be found guilty of an offence unless he has a guilty mind. There is presumption that guilty intent is an essential element of an offence. It is well established rule that none is guilty under the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind. In such situation, I have to examine as to whether the petitioner had any guilty mind or she was at all connected with any of the transactions between the complainant and her late husband and another co-accused so that she may be put on trial for criminal offence, if any. 15. It was contended that admittedly letter dated 21-10-1981 (annexure-4)which was the earliest statement and admission by the complainant himself in which there is a categorical statement that the husband of the petitioner had visited Patna in July, 1980 but in the petition and the complaint and the evidences available on the record, the date of visit has been changed from July, 1980 to 20-4-1980. Therefore, a false and concocted case has been made out against the petitioner just to entangle her for causing harassment, undue influence and pressure with a mala fide motive for extorting money. It was further contended that no case of cheating or conspiracy or breach of trust has been made out against the petitioner. 16. In order to appreciate the points raised by the learned counsel, it is essential to examine Sec.420 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the Code)-Section 420 of the Code says that whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces a person deceived, to deliver any property to any person shall be published. From a perusal of section 420 of the Code, it appears that there must be a cheating. From a perusal of section 420 of the Code, it appears that there must be a cheating. For cheating, in my opinion, three ingredients must be present, namely, practice of deception by the offender on account of deception there must be fraudulent or dishonest inducement so as to make the person deceived or to do something and by reason of doing of such thing, there must be causing or likelihood of causing of damage or harm to the person so deceived. In other words, the essential ingredients for an offence of cheating is that on the basis of a fraud the complainant is induced to part with any valuable right. In the instant case, I find that the petitioner never induced the complainant to part with any money which is manifestly clear from the letter written by the complainant himself to the petitioner after the death of her husband before filing of the complaint petition nor do I find any fraud or dishonest inducement on the part of the petitioner to compel the complainant to part with the money in question. 17. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party has contended that inherent power of this Court under Sec.482 of the Code of criminal Procedure (in short the Cr. P. C. ) cannot be exercised in regard to matters which are specially governed by the other provisions of the Cr. P. C. According to him, the inherent! jurisdiction of this Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against the accused persons must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceeding at the trial stage. It was further conteded that the complaint petition was filed as far back as 2-2-1982 and the cognizance in the case was taken in the year, 1982 under Sections 420, 120-B and 406 of the Code and the petitioner did not move this Court for quashing. Therefore, at this stage when the trial has commenced, she cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court and in such circumstances this Court should not interfere with the proceedings. 18. Therefore, at this stage when the trial has commenced, she cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court and in such circumstances this Court should not interfere with the proceedings. 18. It is, no doubt, true that cognizance was taken in the year, 1982 but the moot question for consideration is whether the High Court will shut its eyes and not interfere with the said proceeding in a case where the allegations in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirity. do not constitute any offence in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice before framing of charge. In this connection, I may point out to the provision of Sec.245 of the Cr. P. C. Sec.245 of the Cr. P. C. has laid down that, if upon talcing all the evidence referred to in Sec.244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which unrebutted would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. In the instant case an argument was made before the trial court that no case has been made out against the petitioner. Therefore, she should be discharged under Sec.245 of the Cr. P. C. which was rejected by the order as indicated above and being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed this applcation for quashing the same. 19. Therefore, she should be discharged under Sec.245 of the Cr. P. C. which was rejected by the order as indicated above and being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed this applcation for quashing the same. 19. In the case of R. P. Kapur V/s. State of Punjab, AIR.1960 SC 866, the supreme Court has laid down some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised by this Court; namely; (i) where it is manifestly clear that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of offences alleged, this Court can quash such case; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value or accepted in their entirity, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iii) where the allegations made against the accused persons do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge, this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdication can quash the proceedings in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice. 20. 20. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Nagawas V/s. Veeranna Shivalingappa Kanjalgi and others, AIR 1976 SC 1947 and four classes of following cases have been laid down where an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: " (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelvant or inadmissible ; and (4) where the complaint suiters from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. " 21. I must, therefore, now proceed to consider the petitioners case in the light of the aforesaid cases of the Supreme Court as to whether the evidence and material available on record makes out any case against the petitioner on the allegations of the complainant that he was induced by the petitioner to part with the amounts in question. The main argument of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant is that in any event this Court could not take upon itself task of assessing or appreciating the weight of matetial on the record in order to find whether any charge could be legitimately framed against the petitioner. So long there is some material on the record to connect the petitioner with the crime, the learned counsel argued that the case must go on and the High Court has no jurisdiction to put an end to the proceeding on the belief that the prosecution is not likely to succeed. This in my opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept in view of the provisions as laid down in Section 245 of the Cr. P. C. I have already indicated above that Sec.245 of the cr. This in my opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept in view of the provisions as laid down in Section 245 of the Cr. P. C. I have already indicated above that Sec.245 of the cr. P. C. has laid down that if upon consideration of the records of the case and the documents submitted therewith, the Magistrate considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused after recording his reasons for so doing. It is clear from Sec.245 of the cr. P. C. that the Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the record and hearing the parties he comes to the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The main object of the provision is to find out as to whether any prima facie case has been made out or not before framing a charge and if the Magistrate finds that no prima facie case has been made out against the accused, proceeding may be quashed to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to secure ends of justice, but if the facts are otherwise, the matter may be different. Proceedings against an accused can be quashed at the initial stage if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence at all is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaints as they are, without adding or substracting therein, if no offence is made out then, in my view, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding in exercise of its powers under Sec.482 of the Cr. P. C. this Court is entitled to quash the proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The saving of the High courts inherent power is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.1 (complainant ). 22. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.1 (complainant ). 22. In the instant case, I also do not find any ingredient of Sec.406 of the Code. The offence of criminal breach of trust is committed when a person who is entrusted in any manner with property or with dominion over it, dishonestly misappropriates it or converts it to his own use or dishonestly uses is or disposes it of in violation of any direction. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, it is very difficult to hold that from the very beginning the petitioner adopted any fraudulent practice acting in active conspiracy with her husband and the co-accused, deceived the complainant without complying the promises. It is also relevant to mention here again that in the letter written by the complainant there is no whisper of the fact that the petitioner was anyhow connected with the business of the said firm alongwith her late husband. In that view of the matter, I am inclined to hold that no prima facie case has been made out against the petitioner for any criminal offence. 23. Even assuming that the third instalment of Rs.50,000 was paid to late G. N. Shah and Sri Shah accepted the money as Karta of H. U. F. for the benefit and legal necessity for the business of the said H. U. F. on the agreement that the said amount would be adjusted towards the distribution of the said film mangal Sutra or in case that would not be done, the said amount would be returned to him with interest at the rate as prevalent in Bombay market on his next visit to Patna for which the petitioner cannot he held to be criminally liable. If at all there is any liability, that may be a civil liability against the members of the H. U. F. 24. Having given my most anxious considerations to the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner and having heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, I am of the view that it is not a fit case where the petitioner should be dragged in the criminal court because no prima facie case has been made out against her. Therefore, in such circumstances, I think that the continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioner shall be an abuse of the process of the Court and it must be quashed. 25. Before parting with this judgment, I would, however, like to observe that any observation on finding in this judgment should not be taken into consideration in trial of the co-ascused whose case has been separated from the trial of this petitioner. The case against the co-accused must take its due and lawful course. 26. For the reasons stated above, this application is allowed and the impugned order dated 21-4-1986 passed in Complaint Case No.40 (c) 82 is hereby quashed. Application allowed.