LEGAN JUTE MACHINERY CO LTD v. EIGHTH INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL — 1987 DIGILAW 333 (CAL)

AJIT KUMAR SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THESE four matters are heard together as they raise common question of law for determination by the Special Bench. ( 2 ) AT the outset it is necessary to state briefly the circumstances under which the matters have come before the Special Bench. The General Electric Company of India Ltd. , the appellant in F. M. A. T No. 1876 of 1985 moved a Writ Application on 24th August, 1984 challenging, inter alia, the order dated 4th July, 1987 passed by the Fifth Industrial Tribunal. By the said order the Tribunal held that in the proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the earlier Tribunal did not decide finally the legality and propriety of the enquiry but came to a merely prima facie the finding in this regard. The said application was dismissed by U. C. Banerjee, J. by his Judgment and order, dated 22nd May, 1985. An appeal was preferred by the General Electric Company of India Ltd. against the said judgment and order. On 2nd September, 1985 the Division Bench presided over by Chittatosh Mookerjee, C. J. (as his Lordship then was) referred the said appeal to a larger Bench consisting of three learned Judges having regard to the fact that a similar reference had already been made by a Division Bench presided aver by Anil K. Sen, J. (as his Lordship then was) in F. M. A. T. No. 2087 of 1985 Machinery Manufacturers Corporation Ltd. v. Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and Ors. ( 3 ) IN the case of Machinery Manufacturers Corporation Ltd. similar question as regards the power and scope of the Tribunal under Section 33 (2) (b) of the said Act came up for consideration before U. C. Banerjee, J. who dismissed the Writ Application of the employer and the said appeal was allowed by The Division Bench and the Rule was restored to the file for hearing by a larger Bench consisting of three learned Judges. ( 4 ) ONE other appeal being the appeal of Lagan Jute Machinery Company Ltd. v. Eighth Industrial Tribunal arises out of the order of M. N. Roy, J. passed on 22nd August, 1980 in C. O. No. 8865 (W) of 1980 who rejected the Writ Application of the employer holding that there is no restriction on the power of the Tribunal dealing with the matter under Section 10 of the said Act although a determination was made under Section 33 (2) (b) of the said Act. The said appeal being F. M. A. H. No. 536 of 1981 is also heard by this Special Bench. ( 5 ) THE other matter arises out of the order, dated 4th March, 1985 passed in C. O. No. 8691 (W) of 1983 (Asbestos Cement Ltd. v. Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and Ors.) where S. C. Sen, J. held similar view. Asbestos Cement Ltd. preferred an appeal against the said order being F. M. A. T. No. 829 of 1985 which is also heard by this Bench. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH in the reference made by the Bench presided over by S. K. Sen, J. (as his Lordship then was) the Division Bench did not formulate any specific question but in fact the Division Bench referred the point of law in the following manner:"the point is as to whether the finding of a Tribunal adjudicating an application under Section 33 (2) (b) of the I. D. Act that the domestic enquiry had been fairly made for granting approval to an order of dismissal, would be conclusive between the parties for any subsequent adjudication on a reference of a dispute raised with regard to such dismissal or not. Though a Division Bench has held that such a finding is prima facie and not conclusive, we are satisfied that the point may require reconsideration in view of the authorities now cited". ( 7 ) THE question that calls for determination by this Bench is whether the finding in a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the effect that the domestic enquiry held by the employer was fair and proper, would operate as res judicata in a proceeding pursuant to a reference made under Section 10 of the said Act. ( 8 ) IT has been contended by Mr. R. C. Deb and Mr. ( 8 ) IT has been contended by Mr. R. C. Deb and Mr. P. P. Ginwala learned Counsels appearing for the appellants that whether the finding of the Tribunal in a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) would be res judicata or not in a subsequent proceeding under Section 10 of the Act would depend on the nature of the enquiry made by the Tribunal while exercising the power under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. It is the contention of the learned Counsel that according approval of the application of the employer for dismissal of a workman during the pendency of the proceeding before the Tribunal, the Tribunal firstly has to come to a finding whether the domestic enquiry held by the employer was fair and proper and secondly whether the workman was prima facie guilty of misconduct It is, therefore contended that unless the Tribunal comes to a finding that the domestic enquiry was held fairly and properly, it cannot accord any approval to the application for permission for dismissal of a workman. In other words, the contention is that there cannot be any prima facie ending as to the validity of the domestic enquiry. It must be conclusive finding, Otherwise the Tribunal cannot accord any approval to the application of the employer for dismissal of a workman. The finding as to the misconduct of the workman which is a prima facie finding of the Tribunal may be the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a subsequent proceeding under Section 10 of the Act. ( 9 ) ON the other hand the contention of Mr. Sengupta, learned Counsel for the workman is that the finding of the Tribunal in a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) can never be conclusive as the Tribunal does not adjudicate on any issue at that stage. It is only a prima facie finding and therefore, when a reference is made under Section 10 challenging the legality end justification of, the order of dismissal, the Tribunal has to go into the question whether the domestic enquiry was fair and proper. It is only a prima facie finding and therefore, when a reference is made under Section 10 challenging the legality end justification of, the order of dismissal, the Tribunal has to go into the question whether the domestic enquiry was fair and proper. It is the contention of the learned Counsel that unless there is an adjudication on the issue, the finding cannot be res judicata and the very nature of the power conferred on the Tribunal under Section 33 (2) (b) of the said Act would show that there cannot be adjudication as to the validity of the domestic enquiry. Accordingly the ending of the Tribunal in such a proceeding can never be res judicata. ( 10 ) TO appreciate the respective contentions, it is necessary to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act while discharging the function in a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. It would be relevant at this stage to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court which according to the Division Bench presided over by Anil Kumar Sen, J. (as his lordship then was) required reconsideration by the larger Bench. The said decision. ii in the case of Graphite India Ltd v. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 1979 L. T. C. 1279. In Graphite India's case (Supra) the contention of the appellant company was that in the proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Tribunal having found that there had been no violation of the principles of natural justice, it was not open to the Tribunal to bold to the contrary in the proceeding under Section 10 of the Act. In other words, it was urged that the finding of the Tribunal in the proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act that a proper and legal enquiry was held against the workman as required under the law would operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding under Section 10 The Division Bench presided over by M. M. Dutta, J, (as his Lordship then was) observed as follows:"it is now a well established principle of law that the finding on an issue in order to be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding, the issue must have been heard and finally decided. In a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b), the Tribunal may approve of the action of the employer against his employee on a prima facie finding that the enquiry held against the employee was proper and legal and that all the principles of natural justice were complied with. The Tribunal is, therefore, not to decide finally as to the legality and propriety of the enquiry but comes to a prima facie finding in that regard. As the point cannot be said to have been finally decided by the Tribunal there is no question of the finding of the Tribunal operating as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding". "the principles of res judicata oust the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal to entertain any suit or proceeding. If an issue operates as res judicata it cannot be raised again in a subsequent suit or proceeding. It, therefore, follows that when the raising of a dispute is permitted and the Tribunal is entitled to entertain the same, there could be no question of res judicata preventing the Tribunal from determining that dispute". ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants urged that the Division Bench decision in the case of Graphite India Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (Supra) did not correctly lay down the law as it did not consider the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bengal Bhadee Coal v. Ram Probesh Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1964 S. C. 486. The contention is that the Division Bench fell into an error in holding that the finding that the domestic enquiry was fair in a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is a prima facie one and no finality could be attached to it. In other words, the correctness of the Bench decision calls for determination in this case. ( 12 ) THE principle of res judicata is that a final judgment rendered by a Court of Competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of parties. It constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same demand, claim or cause of action. It is a fundamental doctrine of all Courts that there must be end of litigation. It constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same demand, claim or cause of action. It is a fundamental doctrine of all Courts that there must be end of litigation. ( 13 ) ONE of the essential conditions of res judicata is that the matter directly and substantially in issue in a subsequent proceeding must have been heard and finally decided in a former proceeding. Although the rule of res judicata enacted in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in terms does not apply to the Industrial Tribunal but it is now well settled that the principle underlying it is applicable to their decision. It is, therefore, necessary that in a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) Tribunal must have finally decided the issue as to whether the domestic enquiry held was fair and proper. Even if res judicata does not apply, the party may be precluded from contending the contrary of any precise point, which was distinctly put in issue and was found against him. The conclusiveness of the determination is the essential condition of res judicata. ( 14 ) IN this context we may proceed to consider the scope and ambit of Section 33 (2) (b ). Section 33 (2) (b) provides that during the pendency of the Conciliation proceeding before the Conciliation Officer, or Board or any proceeding before any arbitrator or Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, for any misconduct not connected with industrial dispute, discharge or punish a workman whether by dismissal or otherwise, provided that the workman has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before whom such proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. ( 15 ) IT is, therefore, necessary to consider what are the limits if any, to the discretionary power of the Tribunal when entertaining a petition under Section 33 (2) (b ). There are certain pre-requisites to be satisfied before permission or approval is accorded to the employer for discharge or dismissal of any workman during the pendency of the proceeding before the concerned authority. There are certain pre-requisites to be satisfied before permission or approval is accorded to the employer for discharge or dismissal of any workman during the pendency of the proceeding before the concerned authority. In according or withholding approval to the dismissal or discharge of a workman on the application of the employer, the Tribunal has to consider firstly, whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules/standing orders and the principles of natural justice has been held; secondly, whether there is legal evidence to sustain the misconduct warranting the dismissal of the workman and thirdly whether the dismissal of the workman amounts to unfair labour practice and is intended to victimise the workman. Upon such consideration the Tribunal either accords or withholds the approval to the dismissal or discharge of the workman concerned. ( 16 ) THE ambit of the Tribunal's jurisdiction under Section 33 of the Act was considered for the first time by the Supreme Court m the case of Atherton West and Company Limited v. The Suti Mill Mazdoor Union and Ors. reported in (1953) II LLJ 321 In that case a theft in the canteen of the company has led to the dismissal of the Canteen Manager, which became a subject of industrial dispute referred for adjudication under the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Three other workmen were implicated and permission to dismiss them was accorded by the Additional Conciliation Officer under Clause 23 of the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act 1947. It may be mentioned that Clause 23 is a part of the Government Notification, dated 10th March, 1948 issued by the U. P. Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Sections 3 and 8 of the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Subsequently, the dispute regarding the dismissal of those workmen was referred to a Labour Court for adjudication which resulted in an award of reinstalment. On appeal the award of the Labour Court was sustained by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Subsequently, the dispute regarding the dismissal of those workmen was referred to a Labour Court for adjudication which resulted in an award of reinstalment. On appeal the award of the Labour Court was sustained by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Against the order of the Appellate Tribunal, the employer filed an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution in which it was contended that the order made by the Assistant Regional Conciliation Officer giving the company a written permission to dismiss the three workmen was final and conclusive and their dismissal could not be the foundation of any industrial dispute which could be referred to the Regional Conciliation Board at the instance of the Union. This contention was negative by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed thus:"it is clear that Cl. 23 imposed a ban on the discharge or dismissal of any workman pending the enquiry of an industrial dispute before the board or an appeal before the industrial court and the employer, his agent or manager could only discharge or dismiss the workman with the written permission of the regional conciliation officer or the assistant regional conciliation officer concerned. Even if such written permission was forthcoming the employer, his agent or manager might or might not discharge or dismiss the workman and the only effect of such written permission would be to remove the ban against the discharge or dismissal of the workman during the pendency of those proceedings. The regional conciliation officer concerned would institute an enquiry and come to the conclusion whether there was a prima facie case made out for the discharge or dismissal of the workman and the employer, his agent or manager was not actuated by any improper motives or did not resort to any unfair practice or victimisation in the manner of the proposed discharge or dismissal of the workman. But he was not entrusted, as the board or the industrial court would be, with the duty of coming to conclusion whether the discharge or dismissal of the workman during the pendency of the proceedings was within the rights o: the employer, his agent or manager. But he was not entrusted, as the board or the industrial court would be, with the duty of coming to conclusion whether the discharge or dismissal of the workman during the pendency of the proceedings was within the rights o: the employer, his agent or manager. The enquiry to be conducted by the regional conciliation officer concerned was not an enquiry into an industrial dispute as to the non-employment of the workman who was sought to be discharged or dismissed, which industrial dispute would only arise after an employer, his agent or manager discharged or dismissed the workman in accordance with the written permission obtained from the officer concerned. This was the only scope of the enquiry before the regional conciliation officer or the assistant regional conciliation older concerned and the effect of the written permission was not to validate the discharge or the dismissal but merely to remove the ban on the powers of the employer, his agent or manager to discharge or dismiss the workman during the pendency of the proceedings. Once such written permission was granted by him, that order made or direction issued by him was to be final and conclusive and was not to be questioned by any party thereto in any proceedings. The only effect of Cl. 24 (1) was to prevent any party to the pending proceeding, from challenging the written permission thus granted by the officer concerned. Such written permission could not be made the subject matter of any appeal at the instance of either party and both the parties would be bound by the order made or direction issued by the officer concerned so far as it gave or refused the permission to the employer, his agent or manager in the matter of the proposed discharge or dismissal of the workman. ""this was the only scope of the provisions of Cls. 23 and 24 (1) above mentioned. ""this was the only scope of the provisions of Cls. 23 and 24 (1) above mentioned. Once the written permission was granted by the officer concerned, the ban against the discharge or dismissal of the workman would be removed and the employer, his agent or manager could in the exercise of his discretion, discharge or dismiss the workman but in that event an industrial dispute within the meaning of its definition contained in Sec. 2 (k), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would arise and the workman who had been discharged or dismissed would be entitled to have that industrial dispute referred to the regional conciliation board for enquiry into the same. That right of the workman to raise an industrial dispute could not be taken away in the manner suggested by Sri C. K. Daphtary by having resort to the provisions of Cls. 23 and 24 (1) aforesaid. That right was given to the workman by the terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and would remain unaffected by any of the provisions herein before referred to". (Emphasis supplied ). ( 17 ) THE Supreme Court in that case laid down a two-fold test in dealing with the application for approval of the action taken by the employer for discharge or dismissal of the workman. Firstly, the employer must have made out a case for the proposed action and secondly, was acting bona fide. ( 18 ) AT this stage it may be mentioned that the Supreme Court in the case of Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala, reported in 1955 (1) LLJ 346 observed that the Cl. 23 of the notification under the U. P. Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, which fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Atherton West (Supra) is in pari materia with Sec. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There the Supreme Court held as follows:"it has been held by this Court m Atherton West and Company Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union, (1953-II L. L. J 321) which was case under Cl. 23 of the Uttar Pradesh Government notification quoted. Section 22 of the 1950 Act is in pari materia with S. 33 of the 1947 Act and the above Cl. 23 of the Uttar Pradesh Government notification quoted. Section 22 of the 1950 Act is in pari materia with S. 33 of the 1947 Act and the above Cl. 23 of the Uttar Pradesh Government notification and most of the considerations noted above in connection with these provisions apply mutatis mutandis to S. 22 of the 1950 Act". ( 19 ) IN Section 33 of the Act there are two types of authorities - conciliatory authority that is to say, conciliation officer or the board and the adjudicating authority, that is to say, arbitrator, labour court, industrial tribunal or national tribunal. All these authorities have the same power in considering, whether the ban imposed by Section 33 (2) (b) would be lifted or not. The Labour Court Industrial Tribunal or. National Tribunal are empowered to decide or adjudicate upon industrial disputes, but the conciliation officer or the Board has no jurisdiction or power to adjudicate. They are normally charged with the duty of bringing about the settlement of disputes. But the Act has given similar discretionary power to all these authorities whether conciliatory or adjudicating either to withhold or accord permission for the dismissal of workman during the pendency of the proceeding before such authorities. The content of the power and extent of jurisdiction of these authorities under Section 33 (2) (b) are same. It cannot, therefore, be contended that the finding of a conciliation officer in lifting the ban will not be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding under Section 10, whereas the decision of Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal in a similar case giving approval to the discharge or dismissal of a workman would be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. ( 20 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala and Ors. reported in 1955 (1) LLJ 346 considered the scope of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1950. The Supreme Court held:"the object of S. 22 of the 1950 Act like that of S. 33 of the 1949 Act as amended is to protect the workman concerned in disputes which form the subject matter of pending proceeding against victimization by the employer on account, of their having raised industrial disputes of their continuing the pending proceedings. The Supreme Court held:"the object of S. 22 of the 1950 Act like that of S. 33 of the 1949 Act as amended is to protect the workman concerned in disputes which form the subject matter of pending proceeding against victimization by the employer on account, of their having raised industrial disputes of their continuing the pending proceedings. It is further the object of the two Sections is to ensure that proceedings in connection with industrial disputes already pending should be brought to a termination in a peaceful atmosphere and that no employer should, during the pendency of those proceedings, take any action of the kind mentioned in the Sections which may give rise to fresh disputes likely to further exacerbate the already strained relations between the employer and the workmen. To achieve this object a ban has been imposed upon the ordinary right which the employer has under the ordinary law governing a contract of employment. Section 22 of the 1950 Act and S. 33 of the 1947 Act which impose the ban also provide for the removal of that ban by the granting of express permission in writing in appropriate cases by the authority mentioned therein. The purpose of these two Sections being to determine whether the ban should be removed or not, all that is required of the authority exercising jurisdiction under these Sections is to accord or withhold permission. And so it has been held - we think rightly - by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Carlsbad Mineral Works Company Ltd. v. Their workmen, (1953-I LLJ 85) which was a ease under S. 33 of the 1947 Act. Even a cursory perusal of S. 33 of the 1947 Act will make it clear that the purpose of that Section was not to confer any genera! power of adjudication of disputes. It will be noticed that under S. 33 of the 1947 Act the authority invested with the power of granting or withholding permission is the conciliation officer, board or tribunal The conciliation officer or the board normally has no power, under the 1947 Act, to decide any industrial dispute but is only charged with the duty of bringing about a settlement of dispute. It is only the tribunal which can by its award decide a dispute referred to it. Section 33 by the same language confers jurisdiction and power on all the three authorities. It is only the tribunal which can by its award decide a dispute referred to it. Section 33 by the same language confers jurisdiction and power on all the three authorities. Power being thus conferred by one and the same section, it cannot mean one thing in relation to the conciliation officer or the board and a different and larger thing in relation to the tribunal. There is no reason to think that the legislature, by a side wind as it were, vested in the conciliation officer and the board the jurisdiction and power of adjudicating upon disputes which they normally do not possess and which they may not be competent or qualified to exercise. Further, if the purpose of the section was to invest all the authorities named therein with power to decide industrial disputes one would have expected some provision enabling them to make and submit an award to which the provisions of the Act would apply such as is provided in S. 33a of the 1947 Act or S. 23 of the 1950 Act. There is no machinery provided in S. 33 of the 1947 or S. 23 of the 1950 Act for enforcing the decision of the authority named in those sections. This also indicates that those sections only impose a ban on the right of the employer and the only throng that the authority is called upon to do is to grant or withhold the permission, i. e. , to lift or maintain the ban And so it has been held by this Court in Atherton West and Company Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union (1953-II, LLJ 321)". (Emphasis supplied) ( 21 ) REFERENCE may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mill Ltd. v. Ram Sarup and Ors. reported in 1957 (1) LLJ 17 . It has been held by the Supreme Court that the Tribunal before whom an application is made under Section 33 has not to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute arising between the employer and the workmen, but has only got to consider whether the ban which is imposed on the employer during the pendency of the proceedings therein referred to should be lifted. The Supreme Court held thus:"a prima facie case has to be made out by the employer for the lifting such ban and the only jurisdiction which the tribunal has is either to give such permission or to refuse it, provided the employer is not acting mala fide or is not resorting to any unfair practice or victimisation. . . . . . If the permission is granted, the ban would be lifted and the employer would be at liberty if he so chooses thereafter to deal out the punishment to the workmen. On such action being taken by the employer the workman would be entitled to raise an industrial dispute which would have to be referred to the appropriate tribunal for adjudication by the Government on proper steps being taken in that behalf. When such industrial dispute comes to be adjudicated upon by the appropriate tribunal, the workmen would be entitled to have all the circumstances of the case scrutinized by the tribunal and would be entitled to get the appropriate relief at the hands of the tribunal. . . . . The Tribunal before whom such an application for permission is made under Section 22 of the Act would not be entitled to sit in judgment on the action of the employer if once it came to the conclusion that a prima facie case had been made out for dealing out the punishment to the workmen. It would not be concerned with the measure of the punishment nor with the harshness or otherwise of the action proposed to be taken by the employer except perhaps to the extent, that it might bear on the question whether the action, of. the management was bona fide or was actuated by the motive of victimization. If on the materials before it the tribunal came to the conclusion that a fair enquiry was held by the management in the circumstances of the case and it had bona fide come to the conclusion that the workman was guilty of misconduct with which he had been charged, a prima facie case would be made out by the employer and the tribunal would under these circumstances be bound to give the requisite permission to the employer to deal out the punishment to the workmen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the only function of the tribunal under Section 22 of the Act would be to either grant the permission or to refuse". The Supreme Court further held:"in the circumstances of the present case the appellant succeeded in establishing that the workmen had resorted to an illegal strike frown 7 A. M. on 27th May, 1952, that a fair enquiry into the alleged misconduct and insubordination of the workmen had been held by the management without violating any principles of natural justice, that the management had as a result of such enquiry found that workmen had been guilty of misconduct and insubordination with which they had been charged and that the management had come to the bona fide conclusion, that continuing the workmen in its employ was detrimental to discipline and dangerous in the interest of the appellant, the Labour Appellant Tribunal ought to have held that a prima facie case for dismissal of the workmen had been made out by the appellant and ought to have been granted the applicant the permission to dismiss the workmen" (Emphasis supplied ). ( 22 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its workmen reported in 1961 AIR S. C. 860, held:"in view of the limited nature and extent of the enquiry per-missible under Section 33 (2) (b) all that the authority can do in dealing with an employer's application is to consider whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out by him or not. If before dismissing an employee the employee has held a proper domestic enquiry and has proceeded to pass the impugned order as a result of the said enquiry, all that the authority can do is to enquire whether the conditions prescribed S. 33 (2) (b) and the proviso are satisfied or not" (Emphasis supplied ). ( 23 ) IT, therefore, appears that Section 33 of the Act imposes ban on the discharge or dismissal of any workman during the pendency of a proceeding before the concerned authority and the employer would be at liberty to discharge or dismiss only after obtaining written permission of the Conciliation officer or the Board or the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or the National Tribunal as the case may be. The only power or jurisdiction of these authorities is to remove the ban against the discharge or dismissal of the workmen during the pendency of the proceedings before permission of any such authorities. It would be amply clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above that the authority in giving permission or refusing permission for discharge or dismissal of the workmen comes to a conclusion whether a prima facie case has been made out by the employer for the discharge or dismissal of the workman and whether the employer was actuated by any improper motive, In other words the concerned authority has to come to a prima facie conclusion as to whether in dismissing or discharging of the workman the employer adopted any unfair practice or victimization. Once a written permission is granted by the concerned authority, the ban against the discharge or dismissal of the workman would be removed and the employer in their discretion may dismiss or discharge the workman. Thus the enquiry made by the authority in exercising the power and jurisdiction under Section 33 (2) (b) is only a prima facie enquiry. It does not decide or adjudicate any dispute or any issue finally or conclusively. ( 24 ) THE expression, 'prima facie' means at the first sight or on the first appearance or on the face of it, or so far as it can be judged from the first disclosure. Prima facie case means that the evidence brought on record would reasonably allow the conclusion that the Plaintiff seeks. The prima facie case would mean that a case which has proceeded upon sufficient proof to that stage where it would support finding if evidence to contrary is disregarded. See Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. ( 25 ) THE decisions of the Supreme Court emphasized a prima facie case in contradistinction to adjudication. The Supreme Court in Martin Burn Limited v. R. N.